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ABSTRACT
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ABSTRACT OF GRADUATE STUDENT RESEARCH
Dissertation
Andrews University
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Title: A CRITICAL STUDY OF CARL F. H. HENRY’S PORTRAYAL OF THE
HUMAN ROLE IN REVELATION AND INSPIRATION
Name of researcher: Boxter Kharbteng
Name and degree of faculty adviser: Miroslav M. Kis, Ph.D.
Date completed: January 1997
This dissertation investigated Carl F. H. Henry’s portrayal of the human role in his
doctrines of revelation and inspiration. The study queried whether his depiction of that role
in revelation is harmonious or consistent with the one given in inspiration. This question
arises from a consideration of Henry’s own formulation of his doctrines of revelation,
inspiration, and man. The thesis of this dissertation is that inasmuch as man has the innate
ability to receive, understand, and impart revelation without divine help, he should likewise
be expected to exercise that ability at the level of inspiration without detailed or
comprehensive superintendence of the Holy Spirit.
In the course of the investigation it was observed that man, during revelation,
actively and independently uses his will, conscience, linguistic capacity, reasoning powers,
memory, and verbal skills to receive, elucidate, or articulate revelation. Its nature is so
adjusted to man that he does not need supernatural help to understand and communicate it.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

In fact his reasoning faculties can even discriminate between revelation and pseudo
revelation.
When it comes to inspiration, however, man is portrayed as one lacking the natural
capacity to carry out the task, namely that of inscripturating revelation. This incompetency
is brought about by his inherent sinfulness. To solve the predicament, God had to subject
man to a long period of comprehensive training. That preparation, however, does not
qualify him to execute independently his role in inspiration. Thus, the man that is depicted
as active, independent, and naturally competent and ready for revelation is now portrayed at
the level of inspiration as one who is naturally incompetent, unready, passive, and totally
dependent upon supernatural help. This is despite the fact that man inerrantly receives,
understands, remembers, and has the linguistic capacity to articulate revelation. In fact, he
had to be given the mind of the Holy Spirit, and even guided in the choice of words. That
is, Henry does not allow the competent operation of the writer’s natural faculties in
inspiration as he does in revelation. And neither does he admit the weaknesses and
limitations of man as depicted in inspiration to have a bearing upon his reception and
conveyance of revelation. In view of his insistence upon revelation’s lucidity, its
propositional form, man’s linguistic capacity, the content identity between revelation and
inspiration, as well as the identicalness of the human agent in the two events, Henry’s
divergent portrayal of human role within these phenomena betrays inconsistency.
The study concluded by first pointing to Scripture’s depiction of the human role in
revelation and inspiration as being broader than that given by Henry. From that
perspective, some suggestions were then recommended which hope to supply a degree of
consistency in his portrayal of the human role in revelation and inspiration.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Revelation and inspiration as methods of divine communication of God and his will
for humanity are basic presuppositions of Christianity.1 Several theories have been
advanced attempting to define these two presuppositions and to clarify their relationship to
one another. Since this dissertation critically assesses the human role in Carl F. H.
Henry's doctrines of revelation and inspiration, it is necessary that we place Henry's
exposition of these doctrines in the light of others's formulations or theories of the
doctrines. In fact, Henry's treatment of these two theological concepts has often been
carried out with an explicit recognition of and a reaction to some other competing or
alternative approach. Our acquaintance with the theories also helps us in enhancing our
appreciation and understanding of these doctrines in Henry's own thought.
The number of theories chosen is limited and the focus is only on those that have
been most influential in terms of articulation of Christian theology. The presentation is
descriptive, brief, and limited to the modem period,2 and broadly follows a historical
lSee Raoul Dederen, "The Revelation-Inspiration Phenomenon According to the
Bible Writers,'' in Issues in Revelation and Inspiration, ed. Frank Holbrook and Leo Van
Dolson (Berrien Springs, MI: Adventist Theological Society Publications, 1992), 12.
2The demarcation of the history of Western civilization into premodem, modem,
and postmodern is seen in several authors. See, for instance, Ted Peters, God—The
World's Future: Systematic Theology fo r a Postmodern Era (Minneapolis: Fortress Press,
1
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sequence. The classification as well as naming of the theories may differ from one author
to another. However, the nomenclatures attached to them are those that seem to be more
commonly used.1 Since the focus of this dissertation is on the human role the survey of the
theories is pursued with an interest on how they portray that role along with its counterpart:
the divine role.2 I approach the examination of the theories by combining them on the basis
of the degree of correspondence and similarity in their portrayal of the human as well as
divine roles. The approach, however, is aimed at sharpening the focus on the human role
in the revelation-inspiration phenomena.
1992), 18-30; Richard Tamas, The Passion of the Western Mind: Understanding the Ideas
That Have Shaped Our World View (New York: Ballantine Books, 1991), 281-297; 395410; and Huston Smith, Essays on World Religions, ed. M. Darrol Bryant (New York:
Paragon House, 1992), 262-274. The above authors have also provided a character sketch
for each of these periods. In this connection, however, Smith (p. 262) made this pertinent
observation: "Postmodernism has not displaced modernism; the two outlooks jostle one
another as they compete for the current western mind."
With respect to the last two outlooks, others do not make such a strict distinction.
Both are summarily considered as one, called the modem period, which for some began
after the end of the Middle Ages (15th century), or from the 17th century to the present.
See Collins Dictionary o f the English Language, ed. Patrick Hanks (1984), s.v. "Modern",
"Middle Ages"; hereafter cited as CDEL; and Jeffery Hopper, Understanding Modem
Theology I: Cultural Revolutions and New Worlds (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 2,
5; hereafter cited as "Hopper I." For my purpose, however, the term "modem period”
broadly refers to that phase of Western history from the 16th century to the present.
'This difference in the giving of names to the theories is especially seen in the case
of the theories of inspiration. See Millard J. Erickson, Christian Doctrine (Grand Rapids:
Baker, 1993), 206-207; Charles C. Ryrie, Basic Theology (Wheaton, IL: Victor Books,
1986), 73-76; Robert Gnuse, The Authority of the Bible: Theories o f Inspiration, Revelation
and the Canon o f Scripture (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 20-21; and Robert K.
Johnston, Evangelicals at an Impasse: Biblical Authority in Practice (Atlanta: John Knox
Press, 1979), 18-34.
2Since it is beyond the scope of this dissertation to directly address the divine role, I
nevertheless want to acknowledge its importance in the doctrines of revelation and
inspiration. Moreover, one's understanding of the human dimension can be enhanced by
viewing it from the perspective of the divine dimension.
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This chapter also provides a brief sketch of Henry’s own formulation of the
doctrines of revelation and inspiration with the purpose of facilitating his portrayal of the
human role in them. In addition, the sketch indicates the significance of my dealing with
the human role and the appropriateness of choosing Henry for the dissertation. Finally, the
chapter concludes by furnishing both statement and justification of the problem, the purpose
and scope of the research, the methodology adopted, as well as the chapters that constitute
this dissertation.

Theories of Revelation
Reason as Revelation
Proponents of reason as revelation1 hold that reason is capable of deducing God's
lThe emphasis on the primacy of reason over revelation and/or experience is also
seen in Descartes, Kant, and Hegel. Descartes, for example, felt that questions pertaining
to God and the soul should be "demonstrated by philosophy rather than theology." His
method of systematic doubt—or the mental destruction—of all "former opinions "/beliefs that
are not "entirely certain and indubitable," is seen not only as the sure avenue to true
knowledge, but also an indication of the priority of reason for all epistemic inquiries. See
Rene Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, The Library of Liberal Arts, no. 29,
trans. Laurence J. Cafleur (New York: Bobbs Merrill Co., 1960), 3, 17, 43-44. See also
Helmut Thielicke, Modem Faith and Thought, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 52, where he observes that Descartes' "Cogito, ergo sum" (I
think, therefore I am) placed emphasis on the priority of the noetic over the ontic.
Kant likewise made reason tire basis of religion so that what is "contrary to [it] is to
be rejected” (Bernard M. G. Reardon, Kant as Philosophical Theologian [Totowa, NJ:
Barnes and Noble, 1988], 90). And since reason cannot "penetrate beyond the limits of
experience," it is therefore impossible to know "the existence of a God or a future life; for,
if he knows this, he is just a man whom I have long wished to find" (Immanuel Kant,
Critique o f Pure Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn, intro. A. D. Lindsay (London: J. M.
Dent, and New York: E. P. Dutton, 1959), 469, 25. God for Kant is therefore" not a
being outside, but merely a thought within" (Willibald Klinke, Kant fo r Everyman [London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1951], 89; italics original), "a logical possibility and a moral
necessity" (Hans Schwarz, Responsible Faith: Christian Theology in the Light of Twentieth
Century Questions [Minneapolis: Ausburg Publishing House, 1986], 104). See also Kant,
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existence, nature, and will, and of determining the foundations of religion and ethics.1
Therefore what is called revelation can be none other than "the pure religion of reason.1,2
Critique o f Pure Reason, 469-70 and 342-361, where Kant rejects all proofs for the
existence of God, hence of revelation, and does not even feel the need for a being superior
to himself to tell him what is right and wrong because his own reason can find it out. See
also Immanuel Kant, "Preface to the First Edition," in Religion within the Limits o f Reason
Alone, trans. with intro. Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper
and Row, 1960), 3.
Hegel had similar views. In fact, he carried "Kant's vision of the active role of the
mind to its final consequences," so that for him the essence of reality itself is rational in
nature, and is summed up in the Spirit, whose preoccupation is its own "unfolding" or
"completing" by means of a dialectical progress (Justo L. Gonzalez, A History o f Christian
Thought: From the Protestant Reformation to the Twentieth Century, vol. 3 [Nashville:
Abingdon Press, 1975], 316-317; Tamas, 379; Georg Wilhelm F. Hegel, The Christian
Religion: Lectures on the Philosophy o f Religion: The Revelatory, Consummate, Absolute
Religion, ed. and trans. Peter C. Hodgson, based on the edition by Georg Lasson
[Missoula, MT: Scholars Press, 1979], 3, 13).
lS. N. Williams, "Deism," N D T (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1988),
190. "For most of the deist writers revelation served no other purpose than to reinforce the
truths of natural reason" (Reardon, 190). John Hales, a deist thinker of the 17th century,
believed that "the seat of authority in religion [should be] found ultimately in reason and
conscience, [and] revelation must be interpreted by the enlightened mind of man." Hales's
contemporaries, John Bidle and John Fry, went as far as claiming that beliefs either
"contrary to or above rational understanding could not be part of true Christian religion."
See Stephen H. Daniel, John Toland, His Methods, Manners, and Mind (Montreal: McGillQueen's Univer-sity Press, 1984), 37-38, italics original. Toland himself said, "There is
no doctrine of the Gospel contrary to reason: . . . neither is there any of them above
reason; and by consequence, . . . none is a Mystery." See John Toland, Christianity Not
Mysterious (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag [Gunther Holzboog],
1964), 7, 174.
H. D. McDonald considered deists as classic representatives of equating revelation
with reason. See H. D. McDonald, Theories of Revelation: An Historical Study, 1860-1960
(London: George Allen and Unwin, 1963), 8. For an exhaustive exposition of deism, see
Henning Graf Reventlow, The Authority of the Bible and the Rise o f the Modem World
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 289-334.
2Kant, Religion Within the Limits, 144, 146. Note: Kant (ibid., 144-155) attempted
to show Christianity as a product of pure reason. In his own words, "Christianity [is] a
natural religion [as well as] a learned religion" (ibid., 145), and "through reason, it was
able to spread [itself] at all times and among all peoples" (ibid., 155).
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Reason alone is the seat for "all moral concepts," and "the supreme exegete of Scripture.
Because what is called revelation is actually a discovery of reason, the word "revelation"
should then be used mythically as a "way of describing sudden and transforming insights
that arise from the exercise of the latent powers of the human mind. "2
This theory assumes that man has the mental capacity to discover for himself truths
that otherwise would have been considered revelatory by others. Divine role is not
anticipated by this theory because man is assumed to possess the requisite capability to find
out for himself the very truths God would want man to know.

The Bible as Revelation
Philip Hughes observed that for centuries and until modern times, revelation was
essentially understood as the divinely revealed will and plan for sinful man? that was made
‘Immanuel Kant, Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals and What Is
Enlightenment? trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Educational Pub.,
1959), 28; Kant in Reardon, 107.
2Avery Dulles, Models o f Revelation (Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1983),
8. Karl Jaspers supports the symbolical or mythical use of the word 'revelation' when he
suggested translating revelation as a cipher for transcendence. See Karl Jaspers,
Philosophical Faith and Revelation, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Harper & Row,
1967), 340.
3Philip Hughes, "The Knowledge of God: The Inspiration of the Bible," in Basic
Christian Doctrines, Contemporary Evangelical Thought Series, ed. Carl F. H. Henry
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1962), 17. With the onset of modernity, scholars
began to study the Bible through the lenses of the critical-historical method, which treated
the Bible like any other ancient document, and credited its production to "forces" other than
God, such as "history, sociology, anthropology, psychology, [and] politics."
Consequently, the Bible, for many, ceases to be the Word of God or revelation, and no
longer is allowed to be its own interpreter. See E. Edward Zinke, "Postreformation
Critical Biblical Studies," in A Symposium on Biblical Hermeneutics, ed. Gordon M. Hyde
(Washington, DC: General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 1974), 71, 75, 84;
Hendrikus Boers, "Historical Criticism Versus Prophetic Proclamation," Harvard
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available in written Scripture, later called the Bible, to be used as a normative guide in his
relationship with God and his fellowmen.1 God has revealed himself directly through
timeless truths that are universally valid,2 and these are to be found in the Bible. This
revelation was mediated through specially chosen prophets and apostles who, with the help
of the Holy Spirit, put it in scriptural form.3 The Bible therefore is God's revelation. It is
his "Word in written form,"4 "the written body of revelation,"5 and "the pure Word of
Theological Review 65 (1972): 393-95; see also Eta Linnemann, Historical Criticism of the
Bible: Methodology or Ideology? trans. Robert W. Yarbrough (Grand Rapids: Baker,
1990), 121, 148.
According to Millard J. Erickson, acceptance of the Bible as the Word of God is on
the decline. Referring to the Gallup poll in 1963, 63% agreed with the statement that "the
Bible is the actual Word of God" verbatim. By 1976, the figure had dropped to 35%, and
by 1988, it had dropped further to 31 %. The survey also noted that those with a
conservative view of Scripture are predominantly Blacks and Hispanics—not Whites. The
Whites, however, are more educated than the other two. Erickson concluded that there is a
close correlation between higher education and a liberal view of Scripture. This means that
the higher the blacks and Hispanics rise in their educational standards, the less likely they
will hold to a conservative view of Scripture. See Millard J. Erickson, Where Is Theology
Going? Issues and Perspectives on the Future o f Theology (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1994),
89-90. See also Cornelius van Til, The Defense o f the Faith, 3d rev. ed. (Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian Reformed Pub. Co., 1967), 107-109.
‘Geoffrey W. Bromiley, "Reveal, Revelation," The International Standard Bible
Encyclopedia (1991), 4:169; hereafter cited as "Bromiley, ISBE 4." See also Leon Morris,
I Believe in Revelation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), 68-71.
2Richard J. Coleman, Issues o f Theological Warfare: Evangelicals and Liberals
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972), 75.
3Benjamin B. Warfield, Revelation and Inspiration (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1927), 48.
4Wayne A. Grudem, Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrines
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan and Leicester; London: Inter-Varsity Press, 1994), 50, 73.
sBenjamin B. Warfield, Biblical Foundations, Selected Theological Studies (Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1958), 40. See also Robert Shaw, An Exposition of the Confession of
Faith o f the Westminster Assembly o f Divines (Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of
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God."1 It originated in his mind.2 So whenever a person reads or hears the Bible, he is
actually reading or hearing God's word.
Compared to the preceding theory, this one swings to the opposite direction by
shifting the responsibility of revelation to God. This theory presents him as the primary
author of Scripture. Although the Bible was written by men in human words, language,
and literary style, yet these are only vehicles of revelation. Man's role in revelation is
secondary.

Revelation as Experience
Revelation is a "consciousness" of God,3 a "sense and taste for the Infinite.” It is
Publications, 1846), 14, where the Bible is regarded as the "revelation [that] has been
committed to writing."
1The Augsburg Confession. Confession o f Faith Presented in Augsburg by Certain
Princes and Cities to His Imperial Majesty, Charles V in the year 1530, trans. from the
German Text (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), 24, 57.
2Harold Lindsell and Charles J. Woodbridge, A Handbook of Christian Truth
(Westwood, NJ: Fleming H. Revell, 1953), 20.
Precursors of this view included the Schwenkfeldians (16th century) with their
mystical reflections and the Quakers (17th century) by their emphasis of the Inner Light
that "either supplemented or superseded Scripture" (Bromiley, ISBE 4, 170), or "seemed to
set aside [its] authority. . . and [that of] the historic Christ." See The Oxford Dictionary of
the Christian Church (1990), s.v. "Friends, Religious Society of." According to Jack B.
Rogers and Donald K. McKim, the idea of revelation as experience seems to evolve out of
the stress on the continuity between God and man. See Jack B. Rogers and Donald K.
McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach (San
Francisco: Harper and Row, 1979), 407, 442. For other representatives of this school see
McDonald, 32-33, note 6. See also Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, trans.
H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1968), 52; idem, On
Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman (New York: Harper
Torchbooks, 1958), 39; hereafter cited as "Schleiermacher, Speeches."
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an "original feeling," an intuition, or a "new communication” generated within the soul.1
Revelation is an "insight, a penetration . . . which gives to . . . our very being that point of
contact it needs for its vital power for salvation, and for the realization of our true
dignity."2 Revelation stands for the self-communication of God to man,3 a "consciousness
o f infinity within.'4 Revelation is an experience of "commerce" with God by generations of
‘Schleiermacher, Speeches, 89; idem, The Christian Faith, 51. Schleiermacher
attempted to address those cultural despisers who had exhibited carelessness and
indifference to the religion of the church because they thought it was a superstitious relic of
the past and hence, unbefitting for a "man-come-of-age" (Rudolf Otto, "Introduction," in
Schleiermacher, Speeches, vii-ix). In fact, the despisers went beyond by showing
sympathy with the views of Spinoza (pantheism) and atheism (Hendrikus Berkhof, Two
Hundred Years o f Theology: Report o f a Personal Journey, trans. John Vriend [Grand
Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989], 33, 37-40). In his Speeches (pp. 36, 39, 45-101)
Schleiermacher argued for the universality of religion by pointing to the feeling of absolute
dependence upon God that all men experience. Religion is "God-consciousness," and not
one based on reason or morality that gives only an indirect knowledge of God. A religion
based on feeling yields a direct experience of God as it is divinely caused. This redefinition
of religion led Schleiermacher to the emphasis on God's immanence rather than his
transcendence. Christian revelation is described by him as "a knowledge of God mediated
through the corporate experience of redemption rather than of a body of doctrine
propositionally revealed." See Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 47, 50; see also W. A.
Hoffecker, "Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst," ED T(Baker, 1984), 982; J. B.
Webster, "Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst," ND T(1988), 619.
2Nathan Soderblom, The Nature o f Revelation, trans. Frederic E. Pamp, ed. with
intro. Edgar M. Carlson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1966), 98.
3Ibid. See also John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966), 94.
4Soderblom, 107; italics original. For similar ideas, see also H. Wheeler Robinson,
Inspiration and Revelation in the Old Testament (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946), 160164, 278-279; Macquarrie, Principles, 83-86; idem, "Inspiration and Revelation," DBR
(1986): 491-492; David Elton Trueblood, The Trustworthiness o f Religious Experience
(Richmond, VA: Friends United Press, 1939), 15-17.
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religious persons, a communion with him by each individual soul.1 Revelation therefore
stands for that profound insight of men gifted with the scent for truth. It is an intuition of a
religious genius, an inner consciousness of God. This has been perfectly achieved by
prophets and apostles who were religious geniuses, and most of all, by Jesus Christ.2
This theory points to man as the primary source of revelation, brought about by his
own willingness to be open towards God, and conditioned by the latter's own spirituality
and religious sensitivity, which characteristics he shares with God himself.3 The theory
emphasizes the broadening and heightening of man's psychological, psychical, and emotive
faculties so that he is able to give expression to sublime experiential truths. Christian
doctrines are therefore none other than accounts of the Christian religious affections set
forth in speech or writing.4
‘David Elton Trueblood, The Essence o f Spiritual Religion (New York: Harper &
Row, 1975), 98; idem, Philosophy o f Religion (London: Harper & Row, 1951), 29. See
also Ninan Smart, The Religious Experience o f Mankind (New York: Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1969), 13-14; Wilhelm Herrmann, The Communion of the Christian with God:
Described on the Basis o f Luther's Statements, trans. J. Sandys Stanyon, rev. R. W.
Stewart (London: Williams and Norgate, 1913), 199.
2Soderblom, 115. Supporters of revelation as experience reject the dichotomy
between natural and revealed religion, and between general and special revelation. Further,
since revelation is an experience, any suggestion for a propositional form of revelation is
also set aside. Schleiermacher, for example, rejected the historical fall, the originally
righteous Adam, the Virgin Birth, the Trinity, and the second coming of Christ (see
Hoffecker, 982-983); see also Auguste Sabatier, Religions of Authority and the Religion o f
the Spirit, trans. Louise Seymour Houghton (New York: Hodder and Stoughton, 1904),
xxx, 266, 268-69, 276-278.
3Trueblood, The Essence, 98.
“Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 76-78; 112-118.
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Revelation as Encounter1
Revelation as encounter is generally espoused by neoorthodoxy and stresses the
personal nature of revelation. Karl Barth, for instance, held that revelation is the revelation
of God himself2 as the eternal Word in Jesus Christ,3 who is the Word made flesh. Jesus
‘The neoorthodox view of revelation is also classified as revelation through history
(Erickson), because it holds that an event itself should not be identified with revelation, but
as one through which revelation can and does occur to a believing Christian. The event,
however, is personal and subjective, which only the person of faith, through the action of
the Holy Spirit, can experience or know. Similarly, although the Bible is not to be equated
with revelation, yet it too, in spite of its many errors and contradictions, can be the means
through which revelation can and does occur. See Millard J. Erickson, Christian Theology,
l-vol. ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1985), 183.
2Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, vol. I, part 1, The Doctrine o f the Word o f God
trans. G. T. Thompson (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1949), 340; hereafter cited as "CD
1/1," followed by page number/s. A similar entry is also made for any of the volumes of
this work. This page (CD 1/1, 340) alone has the phrase, "God reveals Himself,” four
times. This view had already been introduced by Temple. See William Temple, Nature,
Man and God, The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Glasgow, 1932-34
(London: Macmillan, 1953), 312-317; A. E. Baker, ed., William Temple's Teaching
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1951), 36-42. According to John Baillie, the so-called
neoorthodox concept of revelation actually originated with William Temple (John Baillie,
The Idea o f Revelation in Recent Thought [New York: Columbia University Press, 1956],
31-32).
3CD 1/1, 129-131; see also Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith, trans. Schubert
M. Ogden (New York: Living Age Books/Meridian Books, 1960), 74. For Bultmann,
revelation is a divinely caused occurrence from without that breaks in upon a person's
heart. It is an occurrence resulting in the opening of "man’s eyes" so that he sees "his own
existence and is once again able to understand himself ” Therefore revelation is selfunderstanding or self-knowledge. It is understanding of his being limited by death. As
such, revelation gives life. In fact, it can be equated with salvation or life. But since Jesus
Christ is really the one who gives life, revelation then "consists in nothing other than the
fact of Jesus Christ. Revelation has occurred in the sending of Jesus in his incarnation,
death, and resurrection." Based on this understanding of revelation, the NT can be spoken
of as revelation to the extent that it is kerygmatic, or is "the proclaimed Word of Christ"
only insofar as it "preaches Christ" (ibid., 62, 71-72, 75, 78, 80, 85, 88, 90; italics
original; idem, Theology o f the New Testament, vol. 2, trans. Kendrick Grobel [New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955], 127-128; see also Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology
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Christ is therefore "the essence of revelation."1 Moreover, when God reveals himself as
Word, he does so through either of the threefold forms: direct revelation in Jesus Christ,
Scripture, and proclamation, which he also terms as the Word revealed, the Word written,
and the Word preached.2
In a similar vein, Brunner holds that "the real content of revelation . . . is not
'som ething', but God himself. Revelation is the self-manifestation of God. The revelation
with which the whole Bible is concerned is God’s self-manifestation." This manifestation
of God is concretely realized in Jesus Christ who is the Word of God, and the Bible is
of Karl Barth, trans. John Drury [New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971], 61-62;
see Barth, CD 1/1, 295; 117-119; 137; 157; idem, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. G. T.
Thompson (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1959), 17; Rogers and McKim, 442; and
John M. Lewis, Revelation, Inspiration, Scripture [Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1985],
20-22). CD 1/1, 164-165. See also Karl Barth and others, Revelation, ed. John Baillie and
Hugh Martin (London: Faber and Faber, 1975), 49, 51, 56.
‘Barth and others, 44-45, 49; CD 1/1, 134.
2"The revealed Word of God we know only from the Scripture adopted by Church
proclamation, or from Church proclamation based on Scripture.
The Written Word of God we know only through the revelation which makes
proclamation possible, or through the proclamation made possible by revelation.
The proclaimed Word of God we know only by knowing the revelation attested
through scripture, or by knowing the Scripture which attests revelation" (CD 1/1, 136).
For an exposition of each of these forms of the Word of God, see ibid., 98-135.
With respect to the Bible as the Word of God, Barth said that although the Bible is not to be
equated with revelation itself, yet "it is the revelation, if and in so far as Jesus Christ
speaks to us through the witness of his prophets and apostles" (Barth and others, 67; italics
original). It is God's Word "so far as” in the event of its reading and/or proclaiming it
"attests revelation" (CD 1/1, 136). Therefore, the Bible should be read or heard as the
Word of God (ibid., 299). Otherwise, and properly speaking, Scripture is "the witness to
revelation" (ibid., 331, 339, 359). For a further exposition of this concept, see CD 1/2,
457-538.
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witness1 to that Word—though not every part of it bears witness equally. In fact, some
parts of Scripture do not at all witness to or reveal the Word of God, and others only
"stammer" his name.2 A similar view also seems to be shared by Bernard Ramm and
Donald G. Bloesch, who hold that the Bible is a witness to Jesus Christ who is the content
of revelation. Accordingly, Ramm and Bloesch regard the Bible as having a
functional/instrumental authority rather than a normative one.3
The neoorthodox concept of revelation not only points to God as one exclusively
lA similar view has also been espoused by Baillie, 50; and Austin Marsden Farrer,
The Glass o f Vision (London: Dacre Press, 1948), 36-38.
2See Emil Brunner, Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine o f Faith and
Knowledge, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1946), 25 , 27, 48, 95118, 118, 129-130. Elsewhere, Jesus Christ is regarded as the self-communication of God;
idem, The Divine-Human Encounter, trans. Amandus W. Loos (Philadelphia: Westminster
Press, 1943), 109-110; 172-177. For Brunner's exposition of Jesus Christ as the Word of
God, see his work, The Mediator, trans. Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1947), 201-230, 400-401. See also Paul King Jewett, "Emil Brunner’s Doctrine of
Scripture," in Inspiration and Interpretation, An Evangelical Theological Society
Publication, ed. John F. Walvoord (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), 220-223, 227-228.
Reinhold Niebuhr also held a neoorthodox view of revelation. For him revelation is
relational because it is an "encounter between two subjects," or selves, namely, man and
God. Revelation is an "invasion of the historical by an absolute world of God." It is a
consciousness of the "sense of being confronted with the 'wholly other.'" It is this
disclosure of God as a "Thou"—and is discerned by faith—that brings meaning to man's
life. See Miroslav M. Kis, "Revelation and Ethics: Dependence, Interdependence,
Independence? A Comparative Study of Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl F. H. Henry" (Ph.D.
diss., McGill University, 1983), 69, 71, 75-76, 90, 98. For a further exposition of the
neoorthodox view of revelation as given by those who espouse it, see Baillie, 25, 27-28,
31-33, 49, 60, 64, 106, 110; Gordon Kaufmann, Systematic Theology (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1968), 69; and Lewis, 20-22.
3See Bernard Ramm, The Witness o f the Spirit: An Essay on the Contemporary
Relevance o f the Internal Witness o f the Holy Spirit (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959), 124125; idem, The Pattern of Religious Authority (Grand Rapids, Eerdmans, 1957), 30-33, 37;
and Donald G. Bloesch, "The Sword of the Spirit: The Meaning of Inspiration," Reformed
Review 33, no. 2 (Winter 1980): 65 , 66-68; idem, Holy Scripture: Revelation, Inspiration
and Interpretation (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1994), 48-50, 56-57, 113-114.
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responsible for revelation, but also makes him its content. While revelation implies an
ongoing process, yet it always is and ever will be the Person of God himself who is the
locus of revelation. Man’s role is reduced only to an object of this encounter who can
authentically and authoritatively witness to the experience of revelation, but whose
articulation of it cannot be identified with revelation itself.1 Moreover, whatever man has
to say about revelation is incomplete and fallible because it is beyond his nature to be
infallible.

Revelation as Event
This theory has been taken to mean two things: (1) Revelation in history, and (2)
Revelation as history. Revelation in history refers to God's redemptive actions through
certain biblical events wrought in order to fulfill his purpose for his people. Both the events
and their meaning are revelatory because they are not obvious to a secular historian, except
those to whom God chooses to disclose.2 This school of thought, also called Salvation
‘Scripture is man’s word about revelation; it becomes revelation (God's Word) to us
only through faith (CD 1/1, 121, 124, 127, 131).
2Oscar Cullmann said, "Apart from revelation [or the divinely given interpretation
of the event] and faith in this revelation, the event may signify nothing. Since, however,
the revelation and faith in this revelation are related to the event, it is of central importance
that the bearer of revelation be himself an eyewitness to the event." See Oscar Cullmann,
Salvation in History, trans. Sidney G. Sowers and editorial staff of the SCM Press
(London: S.C.M. Press, 1967), 90, 92, 97-98. G. E. Wright and Reginald Fuller,
however, seem to differ from Cullmann with respect to the interpretation of the events.
According to them, although the acts/events were wrought by God, yet their meaning and
significance are derived through or "inferred from" the "historical experience ” of his own
people, made possible by the "eye of faith” of the "covenant community," and not by an
individual in isolation. See G. Ernest Wright and Reginald H. Fuller, The Book o f the Acts
of God (New York: Doubleday, 1957), 27-28, 32; see also G. E. Wright, God Who Acts:
Biblical Theology as Recital (London: SCM Press, 1952), 107. David Kelsey dismissed
Wright's equation of inference with revelation as being an "odd use." As Kelsey sees it, it
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History or Heilsgeschichte,l holds that the Bible should be regarded as a witness to God's
revelatory acts, or as a record of the acts of God.2 In this sense, revelation is subordinated
to one section of history, namely, salvation history, instead of to history in general.3
Revelation as history, on the other hand, views history as the content and not
context of revelation. That is, revelation is identified with the whole of history,4 and brands
"revelation in history" as a "ghetto" type of history, because God is revealed only at
history's end event, and not in one or a few of such historical events. And when viewed
from the end-point perspective, one can say that all of history is the medium through which
God makes himself known. Moreover, revelation does not require any special prophetic
would have been less confusing had Wright used the word "discovered” or "found out"
instead of "revealed" because what is found out is not the same as what is revealed (see
David H. Kelsey, The Uses o f Scripture in Recent Theology [Philadelphia: Fortress Press,
1975], 38).
‘Kelsey, 50.
2C. H. Dodd, The Bible To-day (Cambridge: University Press, 1952), 8, 15, 27.
3CuIlmann, Salvation in History, 57, 89. Cullmann also pointed out that of all the
events, the Christ-event is central because its significance stretches from creation to the end
of time, and epitomizes all other special acts of God in history. Therefore all the events in
the past (OT) are interpreted in the light of the Christ-event, and all future events are
likewise consequential of that event. This is another way of saying that these events are to
be understood in a context of promise-and-fulfillment. We now stand "in the midst of a
stream of salvation history," which will be consummated only at the end of history (ibid.,
99-100, 293).
For an espousal of the Heilsgeschichte, see also Wright, God Who Acts, 23, 57-58,
61-65, 82. J. C. K. von Hoffmann (d. 1877) and Adolf Schlatter (d. 1938) were also
known for advocating this view (Gerhard F. Hasel, New Testament Theology: Basic Issues
in the Current Debate [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978], 36, 39). For a treatment of
Heilsgeschichte from an evangelical perspective, see George Eldon Ladd, A Theology of the
New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974).
“Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed., Revelation as History (New York: MacMillan, 1968),
16, 18-25; 131, 133, 135-140.
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interpretation because history is self-interpreting.1
In the theory of revelation as event, we observe one common emphasis: the
limitation of revelation to certain events or to universal history per se which is a clear
departure from the personal nature of revelation as espoused by the preceding theory.
However, the two ideas of revelation as event differ in their emphasis on the human role.
The first minimizes it because both event and interpretation of the event originated with
God. The second maximizes the human role because it assigns to man—to his intellectual
powers—the gigantic responsibility of showing that history and its events are indeed a
revelation of God.2

Theories of Inspiration3
In the preceding pages, we saw how differently revelation has been understood by
various authors, and how they allow less or more room for man's role in revelation. Those
different ways of understanding revelation are similarly reflected in the understanding of
1Ibid., 131, 133, 135-140. See also Avery Dulles, "Pannenberg on Revelation and
Faith," in The Theology of Wolfhart Pannenberg, ed. Carl E. Braaten and Philip Clayton
(Minneapolis: Augsburg Pub. House, 1988), 172-173, 177, 179, 185. Jurgen Moltmann
and R. Rendtorff likewise take a similar position. See Cullmann, Salvation in History, 57;
Rolf Rendtorff, God's History: A Way Through the Old Testament, trans. Gordon C.
Winsor (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), 65-66, 76-77.
2When interpretation is left to man, reason is the tool to be employed. Because of
this, Platcher considers Pannenberg a theologian of reason. See William C. Platcher,
"Revealed to Reason: Theology as 'Normal Science,'" The Christian Century, 19
February, 1992, 192.
3Dale Moody observed that the doctrine of inspiration was not fully formulated until
the Protestant Reformation when biblical authority became the supreme appeal over
ecclesiastical tradition. But "a doctrine of biblical authority also [produces] theories of
inspiration." See Dale Moody, The Word of Truth: A Summary o f Christian Doctrines
Based on Biblical Revelation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1981), 45.
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inspiration. The human role likewise varies in degree from one theory to another. We
shall consider the following six theories.

Dictation Inspiration
The dictation theory holds that God gave us the Bible by means of a supernatural
dictation by the Holy Spirit to the sacred writers of Scriptures.1 In this dictation, nothing is
left to man's own judgment. "All the words, without exception, contained [in Scripture]
lThe Jews, who were the precursors of the dictation theory, believe that "the whole
Pentateuch [was] dictated by God." Moses's Torah was but "a copy of the heavenly
original" (Daniel Shurer, The History o f the Jewish People in the Times of Jesus Christ
[175 B. C.—A. D. 135], trans. Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar, and Matthew Black, vol. 2
[Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1973], 316, 315). The Jewish belief in the heavenly origin of
the Torah was so deep that whoever does not believe in that "has no share in the world to
come" (ibid., 315). The Torah is eternal. It existed in heaven before creation; and the
world was created for the Torah. See Alfred Edersheim, A History of the Jewish Nation:
After the Destruction o f Jerusalem Under Titus, rev. Henry A. Dwight (Grand Rapids:
Baker, 1954), 313-314. The notion of dictation inspiration was also an early teaching of
the Roman Catholic Church. This was supported by the Council of Trent (1545-1563).
See Canons and Decrees o f the Council o f Trent, Original Text with English Translation,
trans. H. J. Schroeder (St. Louis, MO: B. Herder Books, 1941), 17. This position was
also reaffirmed verbatim by Vatican I (1869-70). See Dogmatic Canons and Decrees:
Authorized Translations o f the Dogmatic Decrees of the Council o f Trent, the Decree o f the
Immaculate Conception, the Syllabus of Pope Pius IX, and the Decrees of Vatican Council
(New York: Devin-Adair Co., 1912), 8. Vatican II (1962-65; "Dei Verbum"), however,
while still affirming the inspiration of the Bible, yet dropped out the phrase "dictation of the
Holy Ghost" in favor of "at the prompting of the Holy Spirit." An added emphasis of
Vatican II is the need for the recognition of literary forms in order to arrive at a correct
understanding of the text. Moreover, while the word "inerrant" is retained to describe the
effect of inspiration, it seems that it is limited only to the writer's intention and the overall
purpose of Scripture, namely, salvation. See Vatican Council II: The Conci-liar and PostConciliar Documents, gen. ed., Austin Flannery, pref. John Cardinal Wright (Collegeville,
MN: Liturgical Press, 1957), 753, 756-58. Furthermore, and in the manner of a reminder,
the council states that all interpretation of Scripture must be finally ratified by or "subject to
the judgment of the church which exercises the divinely conferred commission and ministry
of watching over and interpreting the Word of God" (ibid., 753, 756).
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were dictated by the Holy Spirit to the pen of prophets and apostles.1,1 The Bible writers
"neither spoke nor wrote any word of their own, but uttered syllable by syllable as the
Spirit put it into their mouths."2 The Scripture was "entirely dictated by the Holy Ghost; it
gives us the very words of God; it is entirely . . . given by the breath of God."3 "The very
phrases of which [Scripture] is composed have been given by him. "4 The necessity of
God’s choosing "his own words" in writing Scripture resides in the fact that the matter that
he wanted to share with man is so "important and delicate" that only dictation can ensure a
lDavid Hollaz/or Hollazius (d. 1713) in Christian Dogmatics, ed. Carl E. Braaten
and Robert W. Jenson, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 66. The inspiration of
the words "was necessary to the proper expression of the mind of the Holy Spirit. For the
prophets and apostles were not at liberty to clothe the divine meaning in those words which
they might of their own accord select; but it was their duty to adhere to, and depend upon,
the oral dictation of the Holy Spirit, so that they might commit the sacred Scriptures to
writing in the order and connection so graciously and excellently given, and in which they
would appear in perfect accordance with the mind of the Holy Spirit" (Hollaz quoted in
Heinrich Schmid, The Doctrine of Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, trans.
Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobson, 5th ed. (Philadelphia: Lutheran Publication
Society, 1876), 65. According to Berkhof, "the climax of [the dictation idea of inspiration
was brought about by] the Swiss Formula Consensus (1675) which declared the Masoretic
Text fully inspired, including its consonants and vowel points. For if anything remains
doubtful on this point, in principle the authority of all Scripture collapses." See Hendrickus
Berkhof, The Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Study o f the Faith, trans. Sierd
Woudstra, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 95; see also Moody, 46.
2Richard Hooker (d. 1600), in Augustus Hopkins Strong, Systematic Theology: A
Compendium and Commonplace Book, Designed fo r the Use o f Theological Students, 3
vols. in one (Philadelphia: Judson Press, 1944), 208.
3L. Gaussen, Theopneustia. The Bible: Its Divine Origin and Inspiration Deduced
from Internal Evidence, and the Testimonies of Nature, History and Science (Cincinnati:
Cranston and Stowe; New York: Hunt and Eaton, 1867), 66.
4Ibid., 67.
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"correct" expression of how he wanted it said.1
This theory exclusively limits inspiration to God's action, with the result that man,
in the event of inspiration, is completely passive, reduced to a mere hand, or stenographer,2
and hence, psychologically and intellectually detached from the content of inspiration. The
genuine and active involvement of his various faculties is therefore virtually suspended
from the writing.
‘Loraine Boettner, The Inspiration o f Scriptures (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1937),
13-14. John R. Rice, while vigorously denying mechanical dictation, yet describes
inspiration in line with the dictation theory, when he conceives it as "a word-for-word
inspiration of Scriptures. ” "God gave the very words" of the autographs. See John R.
Rice, Our God-Breathed Book—The Bible (Mulfreesboro, TN: Sword of the Lord
Publishers, 1969), 265-267, 241-258, 261.
Berkhof (The Christian Faith, 95) observed that the dictation theory of inspiration
as expounded by Protestant scholasticism left "no room for the individual authors of the
Bible other than that of being stenographers of the dictation of the Spirit; an inspiration
which also pertains to chronological, geographical, and physical data and which left no
room for deviation and contradiction among the writers." With respect to the diversity of
styles observed in the Bible, this was attributed to the accommodation of the Holy Spirit.
His versatility is such that he has no difficulty in accommodating it with perfection
(Schmid, 65).
2Athenagoras, the 2nd-century apologist, said that during inspiration the prophets
and apostles were "lifted in ecstasy above the natural operations of their minds by the
impulses of the Divine Spirit, uttered the things with which they were inspired, the Spirit
making use of them as a flute-player breathes into a flute." See The Writings o f Justin
Martyr and Athenagoras, Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vol. 2, trans. Marcus Dods,
George Reith, and B. P. Pratten (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1868), 384. In Bromiley's
observation, the acceptance of Scripture as a divine product produced through passive
human agents was a common view from the early church to the medieval period. See
Geoffrey W. Bromiley, "Inspiration, the History of," ISBE (June 1990), 2:849-851;
hereafter cited as "Bromiley, ISBE 2." Bruce Vawter observed that the concept of God as
author of Scripture, and the prophets and apostles as his writing instruments, was of
patristic origin. See Bruce Vawter, Biblical Inspiration (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1972), 31, 34-35. Similarly, James D. G. Dunn noted that the 17th century scholastic
Protestantism espoused the dictation theory of inspiration and conceived the Bible writers as
"living and writing pens." See James D. G. Dunn, The Living Word (Philadelphia:
Fortress Press, 1987), 90-91.
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Verbal-Plenary Inspiration
According to advocates of this theory,1 inspiration is an "absolutely unique and
specifically different. . . divine influence"2 "exerted on the sacred writers by the Spirit of
‘James Oliver Buswell observed that "verbal" and "plenary" inspiration are used
interchangeably. However, quite "frequently, the two words are coupled together to avoid
any ambiguity." See James Oliver Buswell, A Systematic Theology o f the Christian
Religion, vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1962), 186.
Exponents of this theory include Francis Turretin, Alexander A. Hodge and B. B.
Warfield (whose theological basis later became known as the Old Princetonian theology),
William Lee, John Urquhart, promoters of The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth, 4
vols. (Chicago: Testimony Publishing Co., n.d.), hereafter cited as "The Fundamentals-,"
evangelical members of the International Council on Biblical Inerrancy, and members of the
Evangelical Theological Society (ETS). See Francis Turretin, The Doctrine o f Scriptures:
Locus 2 oflnstitutio Theologiae Ellenchticae, ed. and trans. John W. Beardslee III (Grand
Rapids: Baker Books, 1981), 53-54,59-60; Archibald A. Hodge and B. B. Warfield,
Inspiration, intro. Roger R. Nicole (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), hereafter cited as "Hodge
and Warfield"; William Lee, The Inspiration of Holy Scriptures: Its Nature and Proof (New
York: Robert Carter and Bros., 1858), 227, 236-238, 244; John Urquhart, The Inspiration
and Accuracy o f the Holy Scriptures (London: Marshall Bros., c. 1895), 12-15, 19; The
Fundamentals. Decades later, they were revised and republished as The Fundamentals fo r
Today, 2 vols., ed. Charles L. Feinberg (Grand Rapids: Kregel Publications, 1958),
"Foreword"; "The Chicago Statement" (Article X), in Norman L. Geisler and William E.
Nix, A General Introduction to the Bible, rev. and expan. (Chicago: Moody Press, 1986),
183; and Roger R. Nicole, "The Old Testament Quotations in the New Testament with
Reference to the Doctrine of Plenary Inspiration," in Evangelicals and Inerrancy:
Selections from the Journal o f the Evangelical Theological Society, ed. Ronald Youngblood
(Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1984), xi. Subscribing to the verbal-plenary theory is standard
practice for the orthodox or traditional position (see Bromiley, ISBE 2, 853-854).
For members (persons and institutions) of the International Council on Biblical
Inerrancy see Geisler and Nix, 181, 184; Johnston, 18. For an additional list, see also
Harold Lindsell, The Bible in the Balance (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979), 10; and Carl
F. H. Henry, "Conflict Over Biblical Inerrancy," Part 5, Christianity Today, 1 May 1976,
24. According to Kelsey (p. 17), Warfield is by far the best known exponent of plenary
inspiration. See also James Barr, Fundamentalism (London: SCM Press, 1977), 262.
2Lee, 242; italics original.
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God"1 so that what they wrote was without error2 because the Holy Spirit "commanded
their gifts and abilities. "3 The inerrant nature of the writings is due to their having been
"breathed out" (theopneustos) by God, which some see as a metaphor for his speaking.4
So, when Paul says "all Scripture is God-breathed” (2 Tim 3:16), he is in effect saying that
"every word [hence, plenary] written was exactly the word God wanted written, so that
Scripture is not only the words of men but also the words of God. "s
lBenjamin B. Warfield, The Inspiration and Authority o f the Bible (Phillipsburg, NJ:
Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1948), 131.
^Turretin (pp. 54, 237-238) said that while under inspiration, the prophets and
apostles "made no mistakes . . . not even in matters of little significance, because if they
did, faith in the whole of Scripture would be turned into doubt." Outside of inspiration,
however, they were men like us, subject to errors and moral lapses. Since all of Scripture
has been written under inspiration, "whatever contradictions seem to be in Scripture are
apparent but not real. [They appear] only with respect to the understanding of us who are
not able to perceive and grasp everywhere their harmony. They are not in the material
itself" (ibid., 61).
Lindsell (The Bible in the Balance, 14-15) too holds a similar view regarding the
inerrancy of Scripture—not only that this quality of Scripture was brought about by the
action of the Holy Spirit upon the Bible writers, but that the Bible itself plainly teaches this
doctrine. Moreover, "once inerrancy is abandoned, it inevitably results in further
concessions and points in the direction of apostasy." And those who believe in the teaching
of an apostate church cannot be saved. The inerrancy of Scripture is pervasive; it includes
"values, the meaning system and religious things, . . . [and also] when it speaks of history
and the cosmos." See Francis A. Schaeffer, The Complete Works o f Francis A. Schaeffer:
A Christian World View, vol. 2, A Christian View o f the Bible as Truth, 2d ed.
(Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1985), 120, 146.
3Lindsell, The Bible in the Balance, 12.
4Wayne A Grudem, "Scripture's Self-Attestation and the Problem of Formulating a
Doctrine of Scripture," in Scripture and Truth, ed. D. A. Carson and John D. Woodbridge
(Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1983), 39.
sFor those who identify this theory of inspiration with dictation, James 1. Packer
says that such an identification is "a man of straw,” for none of the Christian theologians
from the Reformation till now has ever held it. "And certainly" none of the modem
evangelicals. Although the word dictation sometimes is still used by some evangelical
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[The Holy spirit exercised] in, through, and by means of the writers' own activity, in
writers, yet it is often used figuratively to show the identicalness of the writer's thought
with that of God and not with "psychological overtones." James I. Packer,
' Fundamentalism' and the Word o f God: Some Evangelical Principles (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1959), 79. See also Arthur Gabriel Herbert, Fundamentalism and the Church
o f God (London: SCM Press, 1957), 56; Lee, xxxi.
The correlation between inerrant manuscripts (autographs) and sinful human writers
is also made possible by the supernatural intensive and comprehensive preparation of the
writers so that they were able to write exactly "what [God] intended" (Packer,
Fundamentalism, 80; see also idem, God Has Spoken [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity
Press, 1979], 100; Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 155-156. Moreover, the emphasis
on inerrancy points to the text as the focal point of inspiration. "The object o f inspiration is
not the inspiration of the men but the books—not the writers but the writings." See James
M. Grey, "Doctrine of the Bible—Definition, Extent and Proof," in The Fundamentals fo r
Today, ed. Charles L. Feinberg, Jubilee Year ed., vol. 1 (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 1958),
126; italics original.
The production of Scripture through the breath of God is likened to the creation of
the hosts of heaven by means of the same breath (Ps 33:6) (Packer, God Has Spoken, 98).
Warfield explains this phenomenon by pointing to the Greek term theopneustos as meaning
"breathed out" ("spiring" or "spiration") and not "breathed into" ("inspiring" or
"inspiration") because Scripture is not the product of divine in-breathing into its human
authors but that it is breathed out by God. It is the "product of the creative breath of God."
This means that Scriptures are a divine product. The Holy Spirit does not breathe into the
writers so that it becomes a human product. "Men were moved by the divine initiative and
borne by the irresistible power of the Spirit of God along ways of his choosing to ends of
his appointment" (Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 133, 153); Grudem, "Scripture’s
Self-attestation," 57-58; see also Lindsell, The Bible in the Balance, 12. One of the favorite
analogies for illustrating the divine-human nature of Scripture has been that of the divinehuman nature of Jesus Christ. See Lee, ix, xi, xiii; Gerhard Hasel, Biblical Interpretation
Today (Washington, DC: Biblical Research Institute, 1985), 101, 113.
Those who espouse the inspiration of the reader instead of the text (as is stressed by
the dictation and verbal-plenary theories of inspiration) said that this is indicated by the
unevenness of authority of Scripture where some texts are found to be readily significant
and thereby are formative and normative, while others remain only nominally normative.
Inspiration is therefore identified with the apprehension of the Bible as God's message of
salvation. This means that inspiration is instrumental ("inspiring") rather than normative
("inspired") (See Kern Robert Trembath, "Evangelical Theories of Biblical Inspiration: A
Review and Proposal" [Ph.D. diss., Notre Dame University, 1984], 215, 168). For an
elaboration of this attempt at locating inspiration in the readers/community—i.e., the social
theory of inspiration—in the form of enrichment and transformation, see William J.
Abraham, The Divine Inspiration o f Holy Scripture (Oxford: Oxford University, 1981), 6365, 71-72; and Trembath, 131, 133-134, 141, 145, 193-195, 230-233.
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such a way that their thinking and writing was both free and spontaneous on their part
and divinely elicited and controlled, and what they wrote was not only their own work
but also God's work.1
According to Warfield, "revelation is but half revelation unless it be infallibly
communicated, it is but half communicated unless it be infallibly recorded. "2
This theory claims inspiration is a cooperative effort involving both the divine and
the human. The divinity of the writings is indicated by their inerrancy,3 and their humanity
is evidenced by their distinct human traits and character such as style and language. The
inspiration that allows for God to express his thoughts (revelations) perfectly through
imperfect human writers, without mechanically controlling them, is often admitted by
supporters of this theory as an "inscrutable mystery."4 With respect to the human role, this
theory clearly attempts to portray it as being genuinely present—one in which man's
faculties were equally involved. But despite its attempts to acknowledge the genuine human
role in inspiration, the verbal-plenary theory still subordinates man to the direction and
detailed superintendence of the Holy Spirit. This subordination is necessary in order to
guarantee the inerrancy of what they wrote.
Packer, Fundamentalism, 80; italics original. The emphasis on divine control of
the writers in order to render their product inerrant is also indicated by Packer in God Has
Spoken, 97-98.
2Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 442.
3Since inerrancy is limited only to the autographs, "inspiration [therefore] belongs
only to the autographs." See Hodge and Warfield, 42.
4Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 420-21; Geisler and Nix, 45-46; GRA 4:213,
277.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

23

Limited Verbal Inspiration
Clark H. Pinnock defines inspiration as a "divine activity accompanying the
preparation and production of the Scriptures."1 Inspiration, however, does not extend to
every word nor is it to be equated with "perfect errorlessness" of the Warfieldian type.2
That is, inspiration is not to be equated with inerrancy as fundamentalists and their
followers understand it.3 The Bible is inspired in its broad and practical sense. Inspiration
refers "to the sufficiency of Scripture through the Spirit of God to nourish and instruct the
church for its faith and life, and not to an abstract perfection." Inspiration refers to
Scripture's ability "to bring us to know and to love God in Jesus Christ and to nurture us in
that saving relationship. "4 Inspiration is to be correlated with the purpose of the Bible,
which is "to witness to the salvation of God and to faith" and not to provide us with "a
scientific gnosis in order to convey and increase human knowledge and wisdom. "s The
‘Clark H. Pinnock, The Scripture Principle (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1984),
63.
2Clark H. Pinnock, "Three Views of the Bible in Contemporary Theology," in
Biblical Authority, ed. Jack Rogers (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1977), 71.
3Ibid., 66.
4CIark H. Pinnock, "Theological Table Talk. Evangelicals and Inerrancy: The
Current Debate," Theology Today 35 (April 1978): 67. The "focussed purpose of the Bible
. . . [is to] lead us to know God and love God in Christ and to grow to maturity in him, not
to be a textbook giving scientific particulars that can be found by empirical research. It is a
religious classic, operating in a specialized area, and not running a competition to the
sciences" (idem, The Scripture Principle, 69, 127).
5G. C. Berkouwer, Holy Scripture, Studies in Dogmatics, trans. Jack B. Rogers
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975), 178, 180. Stephen T. Davis, who identifies himself with
this view and who suggests that it be called "limited inerrancy," holds that inspiration refers
to the Bible’s trustworthiness on matters of faith and practice but not on science and
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Bible is therefore inspired and/or inerrant only insofar as it deals with "revelational truths"
and not with "non-revelational matters."1
This theory, like the preceding one, accepts the Bible as both divine and human.
history, on which it can err. See Stephen T. Davis, The Debate About the Bible: Inerrancy
Versus Infallibility (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1977), 34, 38-40, 114.
‘Daniel P. Fuller, "Benjamin B. Warfield's View of Faith and History: A Critique in
the Light of the New Testament," Bulletin of the Evangelical Theological Society 2 (Spring
1968): 81, hereafter cited as "Fuller, 'Warfield’s View'." For Fuller, inerrancy should be
limited to the writer’s or writing's ability to fulfill his/its intended purpose, namely, "to
give the correct meaning of God's redemptive acts in history." Nonrevelational matters, on
the other hand, may be errantly understood, but they can nevertheless be effectively used
for the service of revealed truths. See Daniel P. Fuller, "The Nature of Biblical
Inerrancy," Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 24 (June 1972): 47, 49-50.
According to Paul D. Feinberg, Warfield himself belongs to the limited verbal theory of
inspiration, because he limited the Bible's inerrancy to matters of faith and practice,
particularly, the soteriological goal of Scripture. See P. D. Feinberg, "Inerrancy and
Infallibility of the Bible," E D T (1984): 142. van Bemmelen's intensive study of Warfield
shows that in his later years Warfield preferred the term "trustworthy" over "inerrant" (see
Peter M. van Bemmelen, Issues in Biblical Inspiration: Sanday and Warfield, Andrews
Seminary Doctoral Dissertation Series, vol. 13 [Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Press, 1987], 308-309, 361).
Berkouwer distinguishes between time-bound and timeless elements. The latter
belongs "to the depth of the Gospel." The time-bound elements are essential "in order to
hear the Word of God," and should therefore be taken seriously because "God's words
themselves cannot be understood in their content and meaning without this timerelatedness.” The time-related material, however, must be reckoned "in the context of the
goal of Scripture" (Berkouwer, 186-190; italics original). For God to communicate with
man, he has to do so in the language and thought categories that man uses and understands.
But since man's language is culturally and historically conditioned, God had to
accommodate himself to this finite and fallible human language. For instance, Christ
pointed to the mustard seed as being the smallest of seeds which, in actuality, is not the
case. But he accommodated himself to the common thinking of that time "in order not to
divert their attention from the knowledge of the salvation he was about to bring to their
souls" (Fuller, "Warfield’s View," 81-82). For an articulate defense of the theory of
accommodation, Rogers and McKim, xvii, 53-55, 126-127. Rogers and McKim are
particularly strong in their assertion that salvation is the Bible's true and central function.
"The purpose of the Bible is to warn against human sin and offer us God's salvation in
Christ. Scripture infallibly achieves that purpose" (ibid., 391, 45). See also Vawter, 162,
169-170.
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However, it is clear that proponents of this theory see the human side of the Bible
differently from those holding to the plenary-verbal theory. They see it as including errors,
inconsistencies, and similar human lapses. As far as they are concerned, there is no such
simple equation of the words of men being simultaneously the words of God. Inspiration as
a divine method for communication of revelation should therefore be limited only to areas
of knowledge that man on his own cannot discover for himself. Man's role in this theory is
accordingly one that is less restrained by supernatural power and more free to express
himself in matters that are not directly connected with salvation; that is, on those that he
himself can know or has already known.

Dynamical Inspiration
In the dynamical theory,1 inspiration is the work of God within man's soul, rather
Charles F. Baker observes that the dynamical theory is commonly held by liberal
Protestant theologians. See Charles F. Baker, A Dispensational Theology, 2d ed. (Grand
Rapids: Grace Bible College Publications, 1972), 41. In essence, this theory and the one
preceding it primarily stress the spiritual-moral function as the main purpose of inspiration.
Accordingly, both can be classified as dynamical. How-ever, I choose to place them as two
separate heads because some advocates of the limited verbal theory, such as Davis, object
to the limiting of the infallibility of the Bible only to the salvific as being too restrictive, for
it amounts to providing "insufficient cloth to cover the entire range of Scripture" (Davis,
47). Moreover, in the case of those holding to the limited verbal theory, there is still an
emphasis on the importance of paying attention to the words of Scripture as being also the
words of God—e.g., Berkouwer (pp. 139, 143, 145).
Representatives of the dynamical theory include William Sanday, Augustus H.
Strong, E. Y. Mullins, and Dewey M. Beegle. For a fuller discussion of this theory, see
Charles F. Baker, 39-40, and Morris Ashcraft, Christian Faith and Beliefs (Nashville, TN:
Broadman Press, 1984), 83. For earlier representatives of this view, see also
William Robertson Smith, The Old Testament in the Jewish Church: Twelve Lectures on
Biblical Criticism (New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1882), 4-5, 15; and L. Harold
DeWolf, A Theology o f the Living Church (New York: Harper & Bros., 1953), 76, 68-77.
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than a communication of knowledge and information from without.1 It is a "supernatural
influence upon [the] minds"2 of the sacred writers so that they were enabled to have an
insight "into truths . . . far beyond" their natural abilities. The truths enunciated by them,
however, are religious and moral in nature.3 William Sanday, for instance, held that since
biblical criticism has shown the Bible to be incorrect in historical, geographical,
archaeological, and scientific matters, inspiration should accordingly be limited to the
religious or spiritual areas of human knowledge. Based on this limitation, some portions of
Scripture are seen to be fully inspired while others are hardly inspired.4 Moreover, since
only religious and ethical truths are infallible, the Bible then no longer is but contains the
Word of God.5
This theory takes for granted the humanness of the Bible and explicitly correlates it
with errors in the historical, geographical, and other human sciences. Unlike the previous
theory that recognizes direct divine inspiration, this one prefers to speak of it in terms of a
supernatural suggestion. While the limited verbal theory attributes to God as the originator
of religious matters of the Bible, including even their verbal formulation, this one gives
more credit to man even for origination of the religioethical truths enshrined in Scripture.
lStrong, 211.
2Trembath observed that Strong was the first among the evangelicals to locate
inspiration in contemporary readers instead of in the Bible (Trembath, 97).
3Ibid., 215.
4See William Sanday, Inspiration: Eight Lectures on the Early History and Origin o f
the Doctrine of Biblical Inspiration (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1896), 398-399,
409; cf. van Bemmelen, 188-189; 348, 157.
sGeisler and Nix, 158.
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Illumination Inspiration
According to C. H. Dodd, inspiration is a Spirit-induced "intense feeling," or an
"arousal within," or an "elevation" of the mind to the extent that the writer is able to give
expression to a highly creative and ingenious message.1 Inspiration and illumination are
"the same in kind, though the former is greater in degree," because the Holy Spirit is the
one who inspired and illumined.2 In inspiration, there is no communication of truth but
only a heightening of the prophet's natural powers and ability.3 In other words, the prophet
"does not communicate objective truth beyond his ability to discover or understand. "4 G.
W. H. Lampe, an advocate o f the illumination theory of inspiration, says that it is a mental
capacity elevated by the Holy Spirit, centered upon the believer's testimony to Jesus Christ,
and seen in its most sublime form in the testimony of a martyr.5 This means that
inspiration continues to the present, and for Dewey M. Beegle, it is even found in the
lC. H. Dodd, The Authority o f the Bible (New York: Harper Torch Books, 1960),
72, 87. Coleridge too seemed to be sharing the illumination theory of inspiration when he
identified it with the reader and not the writer. Inspiration happens when, in the act of
reading the Scripture, its message finds the reader in his inner being. The experience of
being found points not only to inspiration, but also to "an irresistible evidence of its [the
Bible's] having proceeded from the Holy Spirit." See Samuel Taylor Coleridge,
Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit: Letter II, Fortress Texts in Modem Theology, intro.
David Jasper (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 27; italics supplied. See also Anthony
John Harding, Coleridge and the Inspired Word (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University
Press, 1985), 8.
2Strong, 204.
3Erickson, Christian Doctrine, 206-207.
4Strong, 204.
5G. W. H. Lampe, "Inspiration and Revelation," IDB (1962), 2:714, 716.
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writings of the Fathers, the Apocrypha, and the great inspiring Christian hymns.1
Similar to the preceding theory, this one too is practically oblivious the transmission
of revelational truths from without. Instead, it makes man the basis and source, and
attributes to him intellectual and spiritual precocity which, when under divine stirrings of
his latent creative powers, is capable of articulating truths and teachings that otherwise
would not be possible under normal conditions.

Social or Ecclesial Inspiration
Inspiration is not a one-time event of the prophet writing down Scripture; rather, it
is a process continuing over a considerable period of time that culminated in the final text.2
Moreover, inspiration does not belong only to a small number of exceptional persons like
St. Matthew or St. Paul, but extends over a large number of anonymous persons so that it
is proper to consider inspiration as belonging to the community as a whole rather than to a
group of quite exceptional individuals who through unique inspiration "gave" the scriptures
to the community.3
Inspiration occurs within the community—the custodian and generator of oral
traditions out of which evolved the written texts of Scripture. In a way, inspiration is a
•Dewey M. Beegle, The Inspiration o f Scripture (Philadelphia: Westminster Press,
1963), 139-141; 174, 192, 233. Note: Beegle's book was later revised and expanded, with
a new title, Scripture, Tradition, and Infallibility (1973). However, his basic arguments
remain unchanged. Beegle's position seems to imply that inspiration is a continuing
experience of God's people throughout the ages. This view is also supported by Abraham;
see Abraham, 71-73, 75.
2James Barr, Holy Scripture: Canon, Authority, Criticism (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1983), 27.
3Ibid.
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"process of reinterpretation" of the traditions by the community of faith, in the face of a
new situation.1 Inspiration and community cannot be separated; neither should Scripture
and community be separated. They "develop together, and cannot be understood apart
from each other. "2 Robert Gnuse sees the process of inspiration as follows:
God- Community- T radition- Scripture.3
This theory, like the one that precedes, shifts the locus of inspiration from God to
man and, in this case, to the entire community of faith. This shift creates a distance
between God and inspiration and correlates the latter with the community's faith, response,
and reformulation of the traditions, pointing to the community (or the church) not only as
lGnuse, 111; Paul J. Achtemeier, The Inspiration o f Scripture: Problems and Propo
sals, Biblical Perspectives on Current Issues (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), 116.
2Achtemeier, 115; Barr, Holy Scripture, 26.
3Gnuse, 111. Similar views have also been expressed by Dodd, Authority o f the
Bible, 17-20, 22, 24-25, 29; and DeWolfe, 76. According to Gnuse (p. 51), Roman
Catholics are the primary exponents of the social theory of inspiration. Vawter (pp. 106,
158-59), a Catholic scholar, understands inspiration as a response of the community to the
utterance/s of the primary author. Those involved in the creation of the biblical
texts—writers, copyists, editors, redactors, and responders and interpreters such as the
church Fathers, the doctors and theologians as well as the deliberation of the councils and
the dogmatic decisions of the Magisterium—are all "agents of the inspired community."
Inspiration should also be attached to the Spirit's continuing direction of the church "in the
way of truth." Inspiration is therefore a "collective" phenomenon. See Pierre Benoit,
Aspects o f Biblical Inspiration, trans. J. Murphy-0'Connor and S. K. Ashe (Chicago:
Priory Press, 1965), 31-35, 25-26. John L. McKenzie, a vigorous Roman Catholic
exponent of social inspiration, looks at "the community of the people of God, Israel and the
Church" as "the vehicle of inspiration.” See John L. McKenzie, Myths and Realities:
Studies in Biblical Theology (Milwaukee: Bruce Pub. Co., 1963), 68; 59-69; John L.
Mckenzie, "Inspiration," DB, 1965, 392. See also James Tunstead Burtchaell,
"Inspiration," NDCT (1989): 303; idem, Catholic Theories o f Inspiration Since 1810: A
Review and Critique (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 295, 302, where he
also projects a similar social view of inspiration by viewing the Bible as a product of
believers of the past era.
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the one responsible for the production of Scriptures, but also indirectly pointing to the
community as a basis of interpretation and authorization of Scripture.

The Divine Role in Revelation-Inspiration: A Synthesis
The preceding pages have briefly described the various theories of revelation and
inspiration and have also shown how each has shifted its focus either to God or man, or, in
some cases, to both. In this section and in the one that follows, a synthesis is attempted of
the theories of revelation and inspiration based on their portrayal of the divine and human
roles. The synthesis in this section combines one or two theories of revelation with one or
two theories of inspiration that seem to share an equal degree of interest or disinterest in the
divine role. The procedure of beginning with revelation and of tagging to it inspiration is
also in line with the traditional understanding that revelation logically and noetically
precedes inspiration, and the two are integral to each other.1 I begin with those theories
that maximize the divine role and end with those that minimize that role.
The theory of the Bible as revelation speaks of an initiating, active God who takes
the entire responsibility in transmitting revelation to mankind. Not only is he the author of
Scripture, but it is also he who determines when, how, and through whom revelation should
Revelation is conceived as the "acquirement" of truth and inspiration as the
"communication" of that truth. See Warfield, Inspiration and Authority, 421. Geisler and
Nix (p. 41) describe the relationship between revelation and inspiration as follows:
"Revelation is the fact of divine communication; inspiration is the means of divine
communication; and interpretation is the process of understanding the divine
communication" (italics supplied). Seen from this perspective, revelation refers to that
which God discloses to the prophets and apostles, and inspiration, to the method by which
God enables the prophets and apostles to articulate and/or record that which has been
revealed, so that the rest of mankind can get access to it.
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be made available. God determines the content of revelation, chooses the quality as well as
quantity of persons through whom revelation is to be relayed, and decides the form in
which it is to be made available to mankind. This theory of revelation places a primary
emphasis on the transcendence and sovereignty of God. It shows him to be from beyond
and above man, who enters the latter's world on his own terms, authority, and choice, and
who delivers his will on his own choosing, and holds mankind responsible for the reception
or rejection of revelation.
This notion of revelation seems to find a natural/logical correspondence with the
dictation theory of inspiration, where we again observe God playing a dominant and active
role. In this theory, we see God playing the primary role in writing. He chooses,
conditions, and prepares the men so that they do what he bids them do. He converts them
into skillful stenographers, dictates the messages, and enables them to take down the
dictation with skill and accuracy. He even chooses the literary style in which the message
is to be conveyed. A similar depiction of the overwhelming divine role is also presented by
the verbal-plenary theory of inspiration. There, too, we see God through his Spirit,
actively influencing, elevating the writer's psychical and emotive faculties, and
superintending his chosen writers so that they are prevented from any human error in
thought or meaning or even the choice of words.
This emphasis on the transcendence and sovereignty of God is also seen in the
theory of revelation as encounter. In this view God, by virtue of his own sovereignty,
chooses those whom he will encounter, when, and how. In the theory of the Bible as
revelation however, revelation exists in propositional truths. But in revelation as encounter

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32
one waits or depends upon God for revelation. It is God who decides when that encounter
should take place and through what medium.1 And when that takes place, it is God’s
person and not propositional truths that is the essence of revelation.
The other theories, however, seem to limit the emphasis on the divine role. This
deemphasis is seen in revelation as event (revelation in history), where God's revealing
activity is curtailed only to certain events in history characterized as redemptive. There,
God is still portrayed as being wholly active and responsible in setting the stage for the
lA renewed emphasis on the divine role in revelation was also brought about by the
collapse of liberalism’s optimism on account of the two world wars. See John Dillenberger
and Claude Welch, Protestant Christianity Interpreted Through Its Development, 2d ed.
(New York: Macmillan Pub. Co., and London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1988), 19192. Liberalism died in Europe during the First World War, and died elsewhere by the
onset of the Second World War, together with the murder of six million Jews, the atomic
bomb, the cold war, the Korean war, and the ever-present threat of the Third World War.
All these raised a serious question concerning the goodness of man, which liberalism had
uncritically accepted. See William E. Hordern, A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology,
rev. ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1968), 95-97, 244; Robert P. Lightner, Evangelical
Theology: A Survey and Review (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1986), 7-8; see also Carl F. H.
Henry, "Honoring the Bible as the Word of God," The Gideon 56 (August 1954): 14,
hereafter cited as "Henry, The Gideon.”
One of those who reacted to the excesses of liberalism—especially to its
unquestioned faith in the goodness of man and his progress and consequent betterment of
this world—was Karl Barth. His reaction became public in 1918, through his publication of
Der Romerbrief (E.T.: The Epistle to the Romans). The commentary not only marked the
end o f liberal theology but the ascendancy of neoorthodoxy. In fact, according to Hordern
(p. 93) neoorthodoxy arose out of the breakdown of liberalism. It rejected the latter's
emphasis on the immanence of God, the goodness of man, the authority of religious
experience, and the gradual coming of the kingdom of God on earth. Over and against
these Barth emphasized the transcendence and holiness of God, the sinfulness of man, the
saving revelation of the righteousness of God in Jesus Christ, and justification by faith in
Jesus Christ. According to Barth, the qualitative difference between God and man is the
"theme of the Bible and the essence of philosophy." See Karl Barth, The Epistle to the
Romans, 6th ed., trans. Edwyn Hoskyns (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1933), 10,
365; see also Van A. Harvey, "Neo-Reformed Theology," A Handbook o f Theological
Terms (London: Samuel Bagster and Sons, 1964), 162-163, hereafter cited as "Harvey,
Theological Terms. ’’
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events, causing them to happen, ordaining human personalities for participating in them,
and giving the meaning or interpretation o f the events by means of certain men who God
himself had chosen. But as has been pointed out, this theory has already anticipated a
reduced emphasis on the divine role. Accordingly, only those portions of Scripture that are
connected with redemptive events are to be accepted as revelatory and hence authoritative
and normative. The rest of Scripture is to be regarded as a human product and is
accordingly subject to limitations and errors.
A similar limitation of God's role is also hinted at by the limited verbal theory of
inspiration. In that theory, God is portrayed not as one who overrules and controls the
writers so that they are guarded from any form of error in what they wrote. Rather, he is
presented as one who limits his inspirational activities only to those matters of Scripture
that have to do with man’s salvation and the spiritual-moral well-being of the church. It is
only in that sense that the Bible is inspired, hence inerrant. The rest of the Bible need not
be without errors because God has not chosen to control the writers as rigidly as is
projected by the dictation and verbal-plenary theories of inspiration.
A further limitation of the divine role is seen in revelation as experience—a theory
that ultimately ends up deemphasizing both the transcendence and sovereignty of God by
stressing his immanence and active presence within man. God no longer is seen working
alone from without. Rather, he is portrayed as working from within man and collaborating
with him. No more is God seen as "pouring" into man's mind the contents of revelation
(e.g., the Bible as revelation), or even controlling the time as well as number of persons
who should have that revelation. Neither does God control the content of revelation,
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because in this theory it is difficult to make a distinction between divine revelation and
human spiritual discovery and enlightenment.
This eclipsing of the role of God in revelation is also seen in the theory of
revelation as event theory, particularly one that views revelation as history. This theory
does not permit God to occupy a crucial role in revelation, namely, the interpretation of
history itself. The theory assumes man's natural ability to interpret history, and so
precludes God's part in giving the interpretation. Closely aligned with this theory is the
dynamical theory of inspiration that presents the divine role only as an indirect or
secondary communicator of truths and which further delimits the divine role in inspiration
only to the religious and moral spheres of knowledge. The same can also be said of the
illumination theory. In that theory too the divine role is confined to the supernatural
removal of the mental and spiritual veil so as to enable man to see and express a highly
ingenious and insightful message. In this theory, God is presented as responsible for
setting into motion the religious and moral powers of man so that he can discover for
himself the truths needed for life.
A further reduction of the divine role is also seen in reason as revelation, where the
divine role is completely absent in revelation. God no longer is the author of revelation
because all that needs to be known is assigned and ascribed to human reasoning power.
The power of reason to discover God's will by itself shows how little need there is for
God's involvement. A similar diminution of the divine role is illustrated by the social
theory of inspiration. In that theory, God is hardly seen at work. The making of Scripture
arose out of the community's faith, need, and response to its religious traditions. The
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putting together of the sacred books is seen as an evolutionary process rather than a divine
action.

The Human Role in Revelation-Inspiration: A Synthesis
This section follows the pattern of the one that precedes. The point of commence
ment, however, differs. It begins with those theories that minimize or marginalize the
human role and ends with those that maximize or centralize that role.
Perhaps the first theory that strikes us with its minimization or even negation of the
human role is the theory of revelation as encounter. This theory not only attributes all
revelation to God but creates a wide gulf between God and man, so much so that the latter
is considered as being completely unable to inform himself about God on the basis of his
own natural capacity and power.1 Man's role in revelation is therefore next to nothing. If
there is revelation at all, it has to come from above, not from below. When it does come,
man can, at the most reflect upon it, and the Bible is a result of that reflection.2 A similar
‘Barth, for example, maintains that man, on his own, cannot know God. See Karl
Barth, The Word o f God and the Word o f Man, trans. Douglas Horton (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan, 1935), 179. This also explains why Barth considered himself an "avowed
opponent of all natural theology" (Karl Barth, The Knowledge o f God and the Service of
God According to the Teaching of the Reformation: Recalling the Scottish Confession of
1560, The Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Aberdeen in 1937 and 1938 The
Gifford Lectures Delivered in the University of Aberdeen in 1937 and 1938, trans. J. L.
M. Haire and Ian Henderson [London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1949], 6-12; hereafter cited
as "Barth, Know and Service of God"-, see also Karl Barth and Emil Brunner, Natural
Theology-. Comprising "Nature and Grace" by Dr. Emil Brunner and the Reply, "NO!" by
Dr. Karl Barth, trans. Peter Fraenkel, intro. John Baillie [London: Geoffrey Bles;
Centenary Press, 1946], 75-76; 78-94; hereafter cited as "Barth and Brunner, Natural
Theology").
2"There is no such thing as revealed truths. There are truths of revelation; that is to
say, propositions which express the results of correct thinking concerning revelation. But
they are not themselves directly revealed" (Temple, Nature, Man and God, 317).
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marginalization of the human role is also observed in the theory of the Bible as revelation.
This theory, like the preceding one, keeps man out of reach of revelation, making him
totally dependent upon God. Man is not in a position that he can claim to know the Divine.
He has no natural capacity for that kind of knowledge. Left to himself, he would be
forever fumbling in uncertainties about God's will. Man is totally left to the mercy of God;
and when God finally revealed his will and purpose, man is again portrayed as one
passively receiving and recording it.
A similar depiction of the insignificance of the human role is also presented by the
dictation theory of inspiration, where the Bible writer is reduced to a stenographer who
faithfully, competently, but passively, records all that God dictated. The verbal-plenary
theory of inspiration, however, provides some room for the active human involvement
because it credits language and literary style to the human author himself. Nevertheless, in
substance, man still plays a peripheral role because in things that really matter, such as the
Similarly, Barth also holds that Scripture is only a witness to God’s revelation. It is man's
word about God's Word (CD 1/2, 463). What is human is bound to be limited and fallible
(CD 1/2, 509-510), and should not therefore be directly equated with revelation itself. But
it can, nevertheless, become the Word of God because one does encounter God's Word
through it (ibid., 481-83, italics supplied). The Bible is unique because it is a witness of
the prophets and apostles who were the first witnesses to the unique and contingent
revelation (ibid., 486-490). Scripture should be taken seriously and the church should not
be ashamed to call herself a book-religion (ibid., 494-96). In this sense, the Bible is the
Word of God—not statically but dynamically—through the action of the Holy Spirit (ibid.,
508).
A parallel thinking between Barth and Schleiermacher with respect to Scripture is
noted. While the former looks at Scripture as a definitive witness to revelation, the latter
views it as "the original translation of the Christian feeling [or] consciousness into public
language" (see Richard R. Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion [London: SCM
Press, 1965], 149, 151; see also Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, 593, where a similar
thought is expressed, namely, Scripture is a detailed expression of the "feeling of need"; it
is an expression of Christian piety by a voluntary act of the apostles [ibid., 598]).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

37
content of inspiration and the words to convey it, man has hardly any control over them
because those were divinely inspired.
The scales thus far are tipped in favor of the divine role. But the picture changes
when we consider the other theories. We see this change in the theory of revelation as
event, where there is a conscious and sustained attempt to take into account the human role
in revelation. A recognition of the human role can be seen in this theory when we consider
its unwillingness to regard the entire Bible as revelation by limiting revelation only to
certain biblical events that are characterized as redemptive in nature. The reason for this
limitation is that it sees in the Bible, myths and other unreliable materials that are attributed
to man.1 This theory seeks to explain the human elements in Scripture and to account for
'Note, for instance, Wright and Fuller's account of the origin of the Bible on the
basis of the historical-critical school, which is further based on evolutionary
presuppositions, resulting in their subscription to late dating for most books of the Old
Testament, leading them to reject the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, and accept as
fact the Graf-Wellhausen theory of the Pentateuch (Wright and Fuller, 40-46). All this
naturally detaches the Bible from its divine origin and treats it as a human product that has
come about through a long process of redaction and editing. Part of Wright and Fuller's
acceptance of the critical position is the denial of the detailed reliability of the Bible and a
penchant to speak only in terms of general reliability (ibid., 24).
As far as Pannenberg is concerned, the Bible should be regarded as a record or
testimony to the "indirect revelation" of God himself to the Judeo-Christian communities.
Since it is a witness to this divine revelation through history, the Bible is not to be taken at
its textual level as normative. That is, it is not to be normatively consulted "as a direct
source for theology." The Bible is only a link in the chain of traditions concerning God's
self-disclosure to mankind, the history of this transmission should then be the proper source
for "theological ideas." As such, Scripture should be viewed from the vantage point of
"revelation as history." Its origin is to be understood as a "process" and not as one
"immediately conceived by its authors." See Frank Michael Hasel, "Scripture in the
Theologies of W. Pannenberg and D. G. Bloesch: An Investigation and Assessment of its
Origin, Nature, and Use" (Ph.D. dissertation, Andrews University, 1994), 114-18.
Approaching from this perspective, Pannenberg sees Scripture as containing contradictions
in material details as well as in theological matters. See W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions
in Theology, vol. 1 (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), 193-94.
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them from a human perspective, without explaining them away. Further, there is also the
other aspect of this theory of revelation as event that attempts to portray the human role in a
positive light. It is the one that attributes to man the interpretation of revelation, as
espoused by Wright and Fuller (revelation in history).1 And much more so is the theory of
revelation as history, where we see an implicit confidence in man's mental prowess in
reading revelation off universal history.
A similar emphasis on the human role is also presented by the limited verbal theory
of inspiration. In this theory, man's role enjoys a larger scope, because except for the
soteriological matters, the rest of Scripture reflects a human input.2 And because it is a
human contribution, errors, inconsistencies, and contradictions are not only to be expected,
but form as a solid evidence for a genuinely human element of Scripture. The
pervasiveness of the human role is also presented by the dynamical theory which not only
confines inspiration of the Bible to those areas dealing with the moral and religious
principles, but attributes their origination to the human mind that has been triggered by
divine influence.
JSee note 2 of p. 13 above.
2Davis said, "I also agree with Fuller that the Bible contains historical and scientific
errors. And I agree that such errors have no serious theological or apologetic
consequences" (see Davis, 44, 95-107). Pinnock also considers the following as myths: the
creation in six literal days, the Flood, Lot's wife turning into a pillar of salt, the tower of
Babel, Yahweh's fighting with the sea-monster (Ps 74:13-14), the night hags (Isa 34:14),
the rock that followed Moses in the wilderness (1 Cor 10:4), the saints being raised at the
time of Christ's crucifixion (Matt 27:52), and the sick being healed through contact with
pieces of cloth that touched Paul's body (Acts 19:11-12). These are not only mythical, but
they all legitimately belong to the literary device called "myth," which was commonly used
by the ancients, and which we must accept and treat as such (Pinnock, The Scripture
Principle, 119-20, 123-24, 126).
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The habitual tendency to view the nature of revelation and inspiration from a human
perspective is also illustrated by the theory of revelation as experience. In this case, the
human role is cast in a positive light where man's nature is claimed as being transparent to
the divine presence. This optimistic attitude toward human nature is also indicated by the
enlarging of a possibility for revelation to any man outside of the biblical authors. A
similar stress on the primacy of the human role is also indicated by the illumination theory
of inspiration, where it plainly exhibits an exalted respect for the human mental and
psychical powers by affirming their capacity for generation of divine-like truths.
A maximum reliance on man for revelation is indicated by the theory of reason as
revelation. This theory totally rules out the divine role in revelation, or at best considers it
redundant. The theory eliminates the divine element in revelation because the human mind
is assumed to be tenacious and resourceful enough to arrive at divine principles and
formulations. Man at his best, and with sufficient time, can arrive at or infallibly deduce
God’s existence, nature, and will from the multiplicity of experiences, knowledge bank,
and insights.1 In this theory man's mind is seen as being able to penetrate God's mind;
therefore God is not needed for revelation. The social/ecclesial theory of inspiration
likewise champions the primacy of the human role in the formation of Scripture. This
theory looks at the Bible from an evolutionary perspective and sees its development and
formation to be primarily that of a human endeavor.
Williams, 190.
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Henry's Doctrines of Revelation and Inspiration
During the last few decades, there has been a growing concern over the erosion of
the Bible's authority due to a heavy emphasis on the human role in revelation and
inspiration.1 Strong voices of protest emanated from within a group of conservative
American Protestant scholars called evangelicals.2 They appealed for a return to classical
4 t must be noted that although neoorthodoxy heroically tried to restore the divine
role in revelation, yet it did little to restore the authority of the Bible, because it had come
to understand revelation differently from the view that has been traditionally held.
Consequently, instead of regarding the Bible as revelation, it regarded it only as a human
witness to revelation. And since it is a human work, it is pockmarked with errors and
inconsistencies. (See Lightner, 14-15; David L. Mueller, Karl Barth, Makers of the
Modem Theological Mind Series, ed. Bob E. Patterson [Waco, TX: Word Books, 1992],
55; Bloesch, Holy Scripture, 102-03).
2Dulles (Models, 37-38) calls those American evangelicals "conservative
evangelicals"; while Mark A. Noll prefers to term them "postfundamentalists" (Mark A.
Noll, The Scandal of the Evangelical Mind [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; London: InterVarsity, 1994], 213-215). According to Larry Dean Sharp, American evangelicalism is
generally characterized by its emphasis on the importance of (1) revivalism; (2) experience
of conversion or regeneration as a requisite to salvation; (3) a holy life of worship and
service (piety); and more particularly, (4) the apostolic Gospel (Euangelion); (5) the
Reformation principle of Scriptural authority for faith and practice; (6) a complete system
of Christian ethics—individual and social; (7) apologetics; (8) evangelism; (9) educa
tion/scholarship; and (10) evangelical unity/ fellowship as distinct from the modem
ecumenical movement. See Larry Dean Sharp, "Carl Henry: Neo-Evangelical Theologian"
(D.Min. diss., Vanderbilt University Divinity School, 1972), 12, 31-35.
Because characteristics nos. 5-10 are seen to be more recent than the rest, those
who align themselves with these are also called neoevangelicals. Henry was one of those
responsible for bringing neoevangelicalism to public prominence by his publication of The
Uneasy Conscience of Modem Fundamentalism that soon after became the "manifesto of
Neo-evangelicalism” (see Carl F. H. Henry, The Uneasy Conscience o f Modem
Fundamentalism [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1947]). His efforts in the evangelical social
and political involvement were not only "extraordinary" but made him "the most visible
figure" among evangelicals. Others closely connected with the evangelical cause at about
the same time with Henry were: Harold J. Ockenga, Edward John Camell, and Billy
Graham. See Noll, 212-215, 221-222; Dirk William Jellema, "Ethics," in Contemporary
Evangelical Thought, ed. Carl F. H. Henry (Great Neck, NY: Channel Press, 1957), 130;
see also Bob E. Patterson, Carl F. H. Henry, Makers of the Modem Theological Mind
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Christianity as propounded by the Reformers, by which they meant a return to the Bible as
the revealed Word of God.1 They also underscore the reinstatement of the traditional
understanding of revelation and inspiration, but in a manner that is consistent and rationally
supported. Such heroic attempts epitomize the faith and mission of evangelicals,2 and
foremost among them is Carl F. H. Henry.3 To him belongs the credit for being the
evangelical theologian who has addressed the doctrines of revelation and inspiration with
significant depth and length.4 Since this study focuses on the human role in Henry's
Series (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1983), 14, 39, hereafter cited as "Patterson, CFH"\
Joel A. Carpenter, "Introduction," in Two Reformers o f Fundamentalism: Harold John
Ockenga and Carl F. H. Henry, ed. Joel A. Carpenter (New York and London: Garland
Publishing, 1988).
‘The Bible as the Word of God and basis of ultimate authority has been an unshaken
position of the Reformers. See Timothy George, The Theology o f the Reformers
(Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1988), 315-317; see also George Eldon Ladd, The New
Testament and Criticism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967), 19-33.
2Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th Century Theology: God and the World
in a Transitional Age (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1992), 288; based on the
section titled "Carl F. H. Henry: The Evangelical Alternative to Modernism." This
evangelical endeavor is also meant to deal with the crises of modem theology as well as
Western civilization itself (ibid., 292, 288, 295-296). According to Hopper, the
disagreement between evangelicals and modem theologians over the meaning of revelation,
marks a major division within Christendom (Jeffery Hopper, Understanding Modem
Theology II: Reinterpreting Christian Faith for Changing Worlds [Philadelphia: Fortress
Press, 1987], 84); hereafter cited as "Hopper II."
3Grenz and Olson, 288; R. Albert Mohler, Jr., "Foreword," in Carl F. H. Henry,
Gods o f This Age o r . . . God o f the Ages? (Nashville, TN: Broadman & Holman, 1994),
v; hereafter cited as "Henry, Gods or God?" -, and Patterson, CFH, 30, 32, 35. Dulles
(Models, 212) likewise considers Henry as "a leading representative" of the conservative
evangelical idea of identifying revelation with the Bible.
“Consult, for instance, his magnum opus—God, Revelation and Authority, 6 vols.
(Waco, TX: Word Books, 1976-1983); and in particular, volumes 2-4, with vol. 4
concentrating on biblical inspiration, inerrancy, and interpretation. Hereafter, reference to
any of these volumes is cited as GRA, followed by the volume number in Arabic numeral.
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doctrines of revelation and inspiration, it is therefore appropriate that I briefly1 introduce
herewith his views on these doctrines in a manner that keeps the human role in sharp focus.

Revelation
Revelation is God's free and voluntary disclosure of himself.2 This disclosure is
primarily meant for mankind's benefit,3 in order that he may have the privilege of knowing
God—his existence, nature, and will—without ambiguity and uncertainty.4 This knowledge.
These volumes (GRA) are in addition to his major articles and similar presentation on the
subjects, that are fully documented in chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation. In brief,
however, and in addition to GRA, Henry’s major treatment of revelation has been found in
the following sources: "Revelation, Special," BDT, 1964, 456-459; this article is reprinted
verbatim in EDT, 1984, 945-948; "Divine Revelation and the Bible," in Inspiration and
Interpretation, ed. John F. Walvoord (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), 253-278; hereafter
cited as "Henry in Walvoord"; various issues of Christianity Today—examples: "Revelation
and the Bible," Parts 1, 2, Christianity Today, 9 June 1958, 5-7 and 23 June 1958, 15-17;
hereafter cited as "Henry, Revelation and the Bible—1” and "Henry, Revelation and the
Bible—2," respectively; "Basic Issues in Modem Theology: Revelation in History," Parts
1, 2, Christianity Today, 20 November 1964, 17-20 and 4 December 1964, 13-15; and in
"Seminar on Revelation," Seminar held in Indianapolis, IA, 18-20 July 1969, Special
Collections, E. S. Bird Library, Syracuse University Syracuse; sources written by Henry
and stored in this library are hereafter cited as "Special Collections." (In this connection, it
may also be mentioned that a similar collection of Henry's works, and responses to them,
has been made by Rolfing Library, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Deerfield, IL
60030, which I visited). Primary sources for Henry's treatment on inspiration include:
"Inspiration," BDT, 1964, 286-289; “Inspiration: Honoring the Bible as the Word of
God"; "The Authority and Inspiration of the Bible," The Expositor's Bible Commentary
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979), 1:3-35 [hereafter cited as "Henry in Gaebelein"];
"Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 1984, 145-148; and "Inspiration," NIDCC, 1974, 512.
‘A presentation of Henry's doctrines of revelation and inspiration is given in
chapters 2 and 3 of this dissertation.
2GRA 2:8.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
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however, is limited only to God’s own choosing and determination. That is, revelation
does not exhaust his mystery, which means that God "transcends his own revelation."1
Moreover, since revelation is for humans, it is necessary that every human being gains
access to it. Accordingly, God, in his own wisdom, chose to have revelation inscripturated, thus making it available to mankind in the form of Scripture, namely, the Bible.
It is in the Bible that the revelation of God is available to us.2 The Bible is "the
conduit and reservoir" of divine revelation;3 it is the written revelation.4 God has revealed
himself "in the whole canon of Scripture which objectively communicates in propositionalverbal form the content and meaning of all God's revelation."5 Furthermore, Henry holds
that revelation is rational, because it comes from the divine mind, which is rational in
nature.6 In fact, revelation is defined by him as a rational communication of divine truths.7
‘Ibid., 2:9.
2Henry, "Revelation and the Bible—2," 15-16; Thomas Reginald McNeal, "A
Critical Analysis of the Doctrine of God in the Theology of Carl F. H. Henry” (Ph.D.
dissertation, Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1986), 52.
3Henry, Seminar, 7; R. Albert Mohler, Jr., "Carl F. H. Henry," in Baptist
Theologians, ed. Timothy George and S. Dockery (Nashville, TN: Broadman Press, 1990),
527; hereafter cited as "Mohler, Baptist Theologians." See also Carl F. H. Henry, The
Protestant Dilemma: An Analysis o f the Current Impasse in Theology (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1949), 101.
“Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 76.
5GRA 2:87.
6Carl F. H. Henry, "Footnotes: The Fortunes of Theology," Part 3, Christianity
Today, June 9, 1972, 30.
7A s Henry sees it, the significance of the rationality of revelation is that without a

rational disclosure of God's nature and ways, religion loses its objective truth. Moreover,
only a rational and objective revelation can yield a valid knowledge of the living God. See
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However, Henry cautions against identifying revelation with reason itself; that is, with the
arrival at divine truths and teachings through reasoning. Human reason is neither the
source nor the creator of truth;1 God is the creator and source of truth, and truth is made
available through revelation and inspiration.2 Revelation, then, is "the only source of truth
a man has.''3 For that matter, all truth is revelational.4 Moreover, since revelation is
rational, all men can understand revelation.s
The identifying of revelation with the Bible? implies that revelation is objective as
GRA 3:370; 433-438; Mohler, Baptist Theologians, 527.
•"Human reason is not a source of infallible truth about ultimate reality. Human
intelligence is not infinite, and left to itself, man's reasoning all too evidently reflects his
finitude." (GRA 1: 91). See also Henry, "Seminar," 36; Kis, 222; "Theology for the Tent
Meeting," Time, 14 February 1977, 82.
2Kis, 222; Walter E. Johnson, "A Critical Analysis of the Nature and Function of
Reason in the Theology of Carl F. H. Henry" (Th.D. diss., New Orleans Baptist Theol
ogical Seminary, 1989), 224. See also GRA 4:332, where Henry disagrees with James
Barr, who says that Henry gives reason an unlimited role in theology; see also Carl F. H.
Henry, "Jesus as the Ideal of Christian Ethics," Christianity Today, 4 February 1957, 13.
3Henry, "Seminar," 36.
“Ibid.
SGRA 4:250.
‘’The Bible is "an objectively inspired revelation" (GRA 3:206); it is a "proximate
revelation" (GRA 1:229). The Bible is "special revelation in its trustworthy form”; it is
"the written revelation." See Henry in Walvoord, 256; idem, "Inspiration," NIDCC (1974):
512; see also idem, "The Priority of Divine Revelation: A Review Article," review of
Models o f Revelation, by Avery Dulles, Journal o f Evangelical Theological Society 27
(March 1984): 78, where Henry approvingly quotes Warfield for saying that the Bible is
"God's full and final revelation."
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well as propositional,1 or a concept that is linguistically expressed in a sentence form that is
either true or false and therefore can be believed, doubted, denied, or affirmed. This view
inevitably brings Henry into conflict with all subjectively-oriented theories of revelation?
In his opinion, any nonobjective theory of revelation will only result in an immunity to
revelation, and consequently in a person's excuse for rejecting it.3 Henry's repeated
criticism of such theories is that they lead to the dangers of subjectivism, mysticism, and
skepticism,4 from which only an objective revelation can protect us.s
Henry’s espousal of the Bible as God's revelation leads him to reject any theory of
revelation that undermines the Bible's status as the Word of God, either in part or in whole.
Therefore, any selective usage of the Bible "makes a mockery of divine revelation."6

Inspiration
I now turn briefly to Henry's view of inspiration. For him, inspiration has to do
‘Henry not only places Christ as God's supreme and climactic revelation, but adds
that Christ’s words and activities are just as revelatory as is his person. In him revelation
manifests itself as being both objective and propositional. His person and words and works
belong together (GRA 3:206).
2Patterson observed that Henry's criticism of the subjectively oriented theories of
revelation is worked out mostly against neoorthodoxy (see Patterson, CFH, 137).
3Henry, "Inspiration," BDT, 287.
“GRA 3:100, 279; GRA 4:53. See also David Lee Weeks, "The Political Thought
of Carl F. H. Henry" (Ph.D. diss., Loyola University of Chicago, 1991), 312.
SGRA 3:431.
6Henry says that we are not to accept as Scriptural or revelational only that which is
christological or religious in nature. To do that would mean to compress and limit divine
disclosure. The plenary nature of its inspiration precludes us from reducing Scripture to a
particular criterion. See GRA 3:208; see also GRA 4:48, 60, 426; and GRA 6:57.
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with the direct "activity" and involvement of the Holy Spirit in the prophet’s or apostle's
communication of revelatory matters through speech and writing.1 Since the primary locus
of inspiration is the biblical text,2 inspiration refers to the Holy Spirit's supervision3 of the
Scripture writers so that even the very words used are an outcome of inspiration.4 The
consequence of this tight supernatural superintendence of the writers is an inerrant,
infallible, and trustworthy autographic scriptural text.5 Inspiration therefore guarantees the
reliableness o f the written revelation and becomes for us authoritative and normative.6
Henry further says that inspiration does not imply that the Bible is a product of
divine dictation.7 Such a view, he says, can lead to the acceptance of a set of lifeless
dogmas, or a relapse to Catholic ritualism that involves no genuine faith.8 Neither does
lGRA 4:129, 144; Patterson, CFH, 114.
2GRA 4:94, 143-144. Inspiration rests on the writings and not on the writers (GRA
4:74-76). The emphasis on inspiration falls on the text as the authoritative Word of God
and not on its modus operandi (Henry in Walvoord, 275-76). For that matter, the mode of
inspiration itself is a mystery (GRA 3:11, GRA 4:213, 277; idem, Protestant Dilemma,
77).
3Henry, "Henry in Gaebelein," 25.
4Only the words of the autographs were inspired (GRA 4:213). Note: Henry uses
interchangeably both "superintendence" and "influence" (ibid., 129).
SGRA 4:178, 234, 239-240. It is inspiration that makes the writings trustworthy and
guarantees truth (GRA 4:213; idem, "Inspiration," BDT, 286). The difference between
inerrancy and infallibility in Henry is treated in the third chapter of this dissertation.
6GRA 4:47-48. It is inspiration that distinguishes between canonical and
noncanonical writings (GRA 2:13).
7Carl F. H. Henry, "Theologian Carl F. H. Henry Analyzes the Chicago Statement
on Biblical Inerrancy," Eternity, February 1979, 45; GRA 4:206.
8Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 80; GRA 4:141.
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Henry concur with the dynamical theory, because for him everything that the Bible
teaches—including astronomy, botany, geography—is trustworthy, although not necessarily
exhaustive or comprehensive.1 Moreover, it is impractical to separate doctrine from fact,
as the scientific and the ethico-religious often permeate each other.2 Neither is inspiration
to be explained only as a human witness to revelation, (against the revelation as encounter
theory) and far less is it to be equated with illumination (against the illumination theory of
nspiration), because illumination belongs primarily to the readers and hearers of Scripture.3
Nor is inspiration to be identified with a corporate (or social) process of writing, compiling,
and redacting of Scripture (against the social/ecclesial theory of inspiration), because the
phenomenon of inspiration was limited only to the prophets and apostles and terminated
with them.4 Consequently, Henry endorses the verbal-plenary theory of inspiration without
any reservations, even going to the extent of saying that its rejection renders the normative
use of the Bible "quite impossible.1,5
Henry's Doctrines of Revelation-Inspiration: A Synthesis
from the Perspective of the Human Role
The preceding sketch of Henry's doctrine of revelation points to the following
emphases and implications: if revelation is God's voluntary disclosure of divine will and
‘GRA 4:42.
2GRA 4:187-188. See Henry’s criticism of the dynamic theory in Carl F. H.
Henry, "Yea, Hath God Said . . . ?" in Christianity Today, 26 April 1963, 26-28; 45-47,
review of The Inspiration of Scripture, by Dewey M. Beegle.
3GRA2:13; McNeal, 52.
4GRA 2:14-15; GRA 4:259.
5GRA 4:66-67. For additional defense of plenary inspiration, see ibid., 254-255.
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truth, then truth itself has a transcendent source. As such, it is impossible for man to arrive
at truth or revelation independent of God's impartation. Revelation as a divine disclosure
also indicates that God does not want to leave man to figure out for himself concerning his
origin, duty, and destiny. Furthermore, Henry’s emphasis on the rational nature of
revelation implies that man has a mental capacity to recognize and understand revelation.
The fact that revelation is inscripturated and is identical with the Bible also means that
revelation is readily and objectively accessible to all, so that everyone can read and
rationally comprehend, irrespective of his being a believer or not.1
Henry's identification o f revelation with the Bible also leads him to the emphasis on
the objective and propositional nature of revelation. This stress naturally points to the
question of the reliability of that which has been written—especially in view of the fact that
it was men and not angels who wrote it. Henry answers this by his doctrine of inspiration,
where he shows that one can completely be assured of the trustworthiness of inscripturated
revelation because its human writers wrote under the superintendence of the Holy Spirit.
The synthesis of Henry's two doctrines can therefore be shown to follow a pattern:
God communicates revelation to man. In order for this revelation to be trustworthy he had
it humanly recorded in written form under a strict supernatural superintendence
^'Revelational truth is intelligible, expressible in valid propositions, and universally
communicable. Christianity does not profess to communicate a meaning that is significant
only within a particular community or culture. It expects men of all cultures and nations to
comprehend its claims about God and insists that men everywhere ought to acknowledge
and appropriate them. If they reject the truth, or refuse to become Christian, it is not
because the truth of revelation is unintelligible, incommunicable, or invalid" (GRA 1:229;
see also Carl F. H. Henry, Toward a Recovery of Christian Belief, The Rutherford
Lectures [Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 1990], 105).
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(inspiration), down to its every word. In this way we see Henry treating inspiration as a
counterpart of revelation. In his own words, "inspiration is a correlative of revelation.1,1
Moreover, since the focus of this dissertation is on the human role in Henry's
doctrines of revelation and inspiration, that role needs to be amplified and highlighted.2 In
Henry's exposition, man has been found to play a significant part in both the phenomena of
revelation and inspiration. Since revelation is rational and propositional, man is
accordingly portrayed engaging his mind as well as linguistic capacity in receiving
revelation.3 That is, man is shown having the mental and verbal capacity to receive and
understand God's revelation. This capability to understand revelation is important in order
that he may communicate it to the rest of his fellowmen. But in this communication man is
shown as one highly dependent upon the Holy Spirit. And because of this supernatural help
(inspiration), what he wrote was inerrant, hence trustworthy and normative.

Statement of the Problem
While observing the way Henry presents the human role in his doctrines of
revelation and inspiration, it appears that there is a discordance of portrayal of that role. At
the level of revelation, man is depicted as naturally competent in using his cognitive and
linguistic capabilities for receiving and understanding revelation independent of divine help.
This competence and independence, however, seem to vanish during inspiration, as is
‘Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 145.
2Chapter 5 of this dissertation elaborates on the human role in Henry's doctrines of
revelation and inspiration by means of an analysis of that role.
3Henry also speaks of revelation in terms of a communication from God's mind to
man's mind (see GRA 4:285).
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evidenced by the fact that man has to depend heavily upon the Holy Spirit, including even
for his choice of words as he writes the content of revelation. We wonder if this sudden
change in man's ability is just an apparent disharmony or a case of inconsistency on the
part of Henry?

Justification of the Problem
We have already noted that as far as Henry is concerned, man has no problem in
understanding revelation. The reason is because revelation is both rational and verbal.
These characteristics of revelation correspond with man's rationality and linguistic
capability. Given the fact that the same man and revelational content are involved at both
the events of revelation and inspiration, and assuming that man's memory of the
propositional content of revelation does not disappear the moment he begins to put it in
written form, it is reasonable to expect that to a certain extent, man should be able to carry
out that writing in a somewhat independent fashion. However, Henry's disallowance of
such a human capability in inspiration does not correspond with his unreserved emphasis on
man's natural capacity to receive and understand revelation.

Purpose and Scope of the Study
This dissertation provides a critical study of the human role in Carl F. H. Henry's
doctrines of revelation and inspiration. As stated, his depiction of the human role between
the two doctrines seems to point to a problem of inconsistency. This dissertation seeks to
conduct an in-depth investigation of this problem. I do this by describing, analyzing, and
elevating the human role in both the doctrines of revelation and inspiration.
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An investigation of this nature calls for certain limitations. For instance, although it
is obvious that one has to study the doctrines of revelation, inspiration, and man, yet it is
limited only to Henry’s presentation of these doctrines. Moreover, since this research
concentrates on the human role in revelation and inspiration, the investigation of Henry's
exposition of these doctrines does not take an evaluative and/or critical form regarding
these doctrines as a whole To do that would require a separate dissertation itself. Rather,
it is carried out with an intention of exposing the human role or involvement in revelation
and inspiration. Accordingly, the treatment of the doctrines is largely descriptive.
Nevertheless, the significance of each of the doctrines is also considered in order to
enhance understanding of the doctrines from Henry’s perspective, and to provide an
additional point from which to view the human role.
Furthermore, I also realize that several subjects can legitimately fall within the
ambit of this study, such as the Bible, authority, and truth. But in order to reduce this
study to a manageable size, a direct or independent consideration of these subjects is not
undertaken in this research. With respect to inspiration, two other cognate areas need to be
mentioned: the Holy Spirit's role in inspiration and inerrancy. Since either of these can
very well constitute a separate study, I therefore treat them only to an extent that they
enlarge our understanding of Henry's portrayal of the human role in his doctrines of
revelation and inspiration.

Methodology
This research adopts a methodology that combines description, analysis, and
evaluation. The description provides a fair and objective representation of each of the
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doctrines of revelation, inspiration, and man from Henry’s point of view. In so doing, the
salient features of the doctrines are taken into account. The analysis is particularly limited
to the human role in the doctrines of revelation and inspiration. In this instance, the
various elements connected with the human participation are identified and described. This
is followed by an evaluation, which adjudicates Henry's portrayal of the human role in
terms of consistency or inconsistency. In rounding up, a summary and recommendations
of the study are also provided.

Outline of the Research
Based on the preceding considerations and methodological and procedural steps,
this dissertation is divided into seven chapters. This first chapter provides a brief survey of
the theories of revelation and inspiration with the intention of exposing the human role,
followed by a thumbnail sketch of Henry's doctrines of revelation and inspiration, along
with an indication of his portrayal of the human role therein. The chapter also describes
the problem of the research, furnishes a justification for the study, delineates its purpose
and scope, and outlines the methodology of the investigation.
Chapters 2-4 provide a descriptive study of Henry's doctrines of revelation,
inspiration, and man. Each of the chapters not only unfolds the doctrine as Henry sees it,
but identifies its main features, and points to its significance from Henry's perspective.
Chapter 5 takes an in-depth analysis of the human role in Henry's doctrines of revelation
and inspiration where each of the elements that comprise the human involvement is
identified and elucidated. Chapter 6 evaluates Henry's depiction of the human role. This is
done by juxtaposing the human role in revelation with that role in inspiration, where the
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roles are compared and contrasted. A critical examination of their similarities and
differences is made and an adjudication on the basis of the examination is also provided.
Since fairness and objectivity are essential ingredients to any research, attempts at
explaining Henry's depiction of the human role are also given within his chapter.
However, because of the need to remain within scope, no evaluation is entertained for the
reasons that are provided as explanation. Finally, chapter 7 brings the study to a close.
This is done by providing a summary as well as some recommendations elicited by the
study. The chapter concludes with a suggestion which hopes to bring a balance between
man's role in revelation and his role in inspiration.
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CHAPTER2

HENRY’S DOCTRINE OF REVELATION1

Since the task of this dissertation is to critically ascertain and evaluate the human
role in Henry's doctrines of revelation and inspiration, it inevitably calls for a careful
examination and study of his understanding of these two theological foci. It is only as these
doctrines are comprehensively treated and understood from Henry's vantage point that one
can hope to properly describe and assess his view of the human role. The evaluation of that
view, however, is not conducted in this chapter but deferred to chapter 6 where it is
possible to juxtapose Henry’s portrayal of the human role in revelation and inspiration, and
at the same time, examine the consistency of his presentation of that role in these doctrines.
Further, it is also felt that our understanding of Henry’s doctrine of revelation is
enhanced if we take into consideration some of his presuppositions. With this interest in
mind, I begin this chapter by briefly noting those presuppositions pertinent to the doctrine
that is currently under discussion.
‘In Mohler's estimate, Henry's exposition of the doctrine of revelation is "an awesome
evangelical achievement" (Mohler, Baptist Theologians, 526). Likewise, Ramm feels that
Henry "has written the broadest, the most learned, and most incisive and comprehensive work
on revelation in our current evangelical tradition" (Bernard Ramm, "Good Thinking! Carl
Henry's Magnum Opus," review of GRA 1-2, Eternity, March 1977, 63). A similar estimate
has also been made by Fackre (see Terry L. Cross, "Cognitive and Non-cognitive Aspects of
Revelation: A Comparison of the Views of Karl Barth and Carl F. H. Henry on Propositional
Revelation" [M.A. thesis, Ashland Theological Seminary, 1982], 125).

54
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Presuppositions1
In Henry's judgment, every system—be it geometrical, theological, philosophical,
or otherwise—begins with presuppositions or axioms.2 Thus, the notion of a presupposi‘Henry's emphasis on presuppositions indicates that he has adopted presuppositionalism as an apologetic strategy (see John W. Eddins, Jr., review of GRA 6, Perspectives in
Religious Studies 11 [Spring 1984]: 73). For a recognition of Henry as a presuppositionalist,
see also Mark Ellingsen, review of GRA 1-3, Dialog 23 (1984): 233; idem, review of GRA 46, Dialog 24 (1985): 74; Kenneth S. Kantzer, "Unity and Diversity in Evangelical Faith," in
The Evangelicals: What They Believe, Who They Are, Where They Are Changing, ed. David F.
Wells and John D. Woodbridge (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1975), 48; and McNeal, 1,
9, 11. Henry himself prefers to call his method a "rational presuppositionalism" (Henry,
Toward a Recovery, 105-06; see also Richard M. Wade, "Rationalistic Presuppositionalism:
An Exposition and Analysis of Carl F. H. Henry" [M.A. dissertation, Trinity Evangelical
Divinity School, 1990]). On the other hand, John Warwick Montgomery takes strong
exceptions to Henry's presuppositionalism (see John Warwick Montgomery, Faith Founded on
Fact: Essays in Evidential Apologetics [Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 1978]). Note:
sections of this book contain Montgomery's persuasive counterreply to Henry's
presuppositional approach to apologetics, in favor of the evidential approach. See especially
pp. x-xi, and the Introduction (pp. xvii-xxv), where Montgomery rejects Henry's
presuppositionalism. See also ibid., 155-176 where Montgomery enlarges his reply against
presuppositionalism in favor of evidentialism. For Henry's own compelling defense of
presuppositionalism, see Henry, Toward a Recovery o f Christian Belief.
Not all of Henry's assumptions are mentioned here. However, they are also found in
Henry, Uneasy Conscience, 62, 68-69 (Note: This book is also available in facsimile form
under another title, Two Reformers of Fundamentalism: Harold John Ockenga and Carl F. H.
Henry, ed. Joel A. Carpenter [New York: Garland Publishing, 1988]); Carl F. H. Henry,
Confessions o f a Theologian: An Autobiography (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1986), 325; idem,
"The Concerns and Considerations of Carl F. H. Henry," interview, Christianity Today, 13
March 1981, 21; see also McNeal, 44; 108-109, 306; Johnson, 48, 52, 57-58; and Mohler,
Baptist Theologians, 526.
2Henry, Toward a Recovery, 45, 64. "Axioms are never deduced or inferred from
other principles, but are simply presupposed. No axiom is arrived at by reasoning; as the
starting point, an axiom is therefore in the nature of the case beyond proof. . .
undemonstrable, pre-philosophical, permanent, . . . and accepted as a matter of faith."
Therefore, "Christian axioms are no more or no less rational than any other set of axioms."
And it is from a certain set of "controlling axioms" that "every system's theorems are
subsequently deduced.” (Henry, Toward a Recovery, 64; idem, Confessions, 325; GRA
1:227). With respect to the difference between, or contradictions of the axioms of a believer
and those of a nonbeliever, Henry admits the reality of such a situation and attributes it to the
Fall. However, he maintains that this difference in no way prevents a meaningful dialogue
between human beings because they are all made in God’s image. In other words, it is by
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tionless observer is "fictional'' because such a person is not to be found.1 “A presuppositionless methodology is an absurdity and, in fact, an impossibility. "2
Even if empiricists may and do deny it, all systems are based on axioms; without initial
axioms nothing can be demonstrated. Natural science is impossible unless one assumes
that meaningful correspondence exists between the laws of thought and the order of the
external world.3
The day is long past when science could claim special honor on the ground that it does
not traffic in metaphysical concerns. Without some metaphysical assumptions, science
can hardly get on the way. Some of the most noteworthy advances in modem
experimental physics have been engendered by imaginative metaphysical theories.
Natural selection, gravitational fields, atoms and electrons are among the invisible
postulations of science.4
In the case of Christian religion, two basic axioms are emphasized: the ontological,
which presupposes the living God, and the epistemological, which recognizes divine
means of this image that enables man to enter into a dialogue (GRA 1:400).
McNeal observes that Henry's "axiomatization and system . . . follows Gordon Clark”
(McNeal, 89). Perhaps this is due to Clark's influence on Henry who himself admits as
follows: "To no contemporary do I owe a profounder debt, however, than to Gordon Clark, as
numerous index references will attest" (GRA 1:10; see also Carl F. H. Henry, "Introduction:
A Wide and Deep Swath," in The Philosophy o f Gordon H. Clark: A Festschrift, ed. Ronald
H. Nash [Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1968], 16). For a criticism of
Henry's following Clark's philosophy, see Alan Padgett, "A Critique of Henry's Summa,"
review of GRA 1-6, TSF Bulletin, January-February 1986, 28-29.
•GRA 5:25.
2GRA 4:388. "No historian or scientist actually proceeds without presuppositions.
Empiricists always operate on presuppositions which they cannot prove by their own
methodology. Even evolutionary theory would collapse except for certain presuppositions that
cannot be scientifically proved. The scientific and historical approaches to meaning thrive on
secretly negotiated lend-lease arrangements on which non-Christian scholars arbitrarily refuse
to pay overdue interest rates and they ultimately deny any indebtedness to the theistic view"
(GRA 1:231; see also Carl F. H. Henry, "Science and Faith," Faith and Thought 104 [1977]:
53-54).
3Henry, Toward a Recovery, 64.
“Henry, "Science and Faith," 54.
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revelation.1 The two imply each other: Without the living God there can be no divine
revelation, and without revelation, we would not know that God exists.2

The Ontological Axiom3
For Henry, God is the ontological first principle. Christian theism begins with this
presupposition, and from it flows all its other principles and concepts.4 We must therefore
begin with God to get to anything.5 One’s concept of the Deity is crucial because it has the
lHenry, Toward a Recovery, 68; italics original; GRA 1:225, 219-220, 396. "That
God can be known, that divine revelation is rationally given and is to be rationally understood,
is a basic presupposition of biblical theology" (GRA 5:381). "God is not the Great Perhaps,
the clueless shadow character in a Scotland Yard mystery. Far less is he a nameless spirit
awaiting post-mortem examination in some theological morgue. He is a very particular and
specific divinity, known from the beginning solely on the basis of his works and self
declaration as the one living God" (GRA 2:7; see also GRA 5:10).
2Henry, Toward a Recovery, 68, 43, 64, 74; see also Gary Eugene Farley,
"Authority in Contemporary Christian Ethics: A Study in How One May Know the 'Will of
God’ as Discussed in the Writings of Carl F. H. Henry" (Ph.D. diss., Southwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary, 1966), 6; Robert A. Traina, review of GRA 1 & 2, New Review of
Books and Religion 1 (May 1977): 7; Ellingsen, review of GRA 1-3, Dialog, 23; Bob E.
Patterson, "Carl F. H. Henry: Apologist of Evangelical Orthodoxy," Part 1, Journal o f the
Minister's Personal Library 1 (1979): 4; hereafter cited as "Patterson, JMPL 1."
3"The living God is the original Christian's axiom, both ontically and noetically, for
God discloses himself in revelation as the God who is eternally there. . . . He is the eternal
living God, nothing less, nothing other." He not only is the God who is, but also the God who
stands, and stays.” "God . . . 'stands' . . . [on] the ground of his own existence;. . . [and]
' s t a y s that is, he governs through providence and whose governance will be climaxed at the
eschatological consummation. His Word likewise, stands; and because he stands, he is
therefore able to promise to stand with us. If we are to stand, and not fall on the day of
judgment, we should "stand in, with and under him" (GRA 5:10-11, italics original).
4Carl F. H. Henry, Remaking the Modem Mind (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1946),
171; GRA 1:219; Patterson, JMPL 1, 4; see also Diana Hochstedt Butler, "An Interview with
Carl F. H. Henry," TSFBulletin 10 (March-April 1987): 17; hereafter referred to as "Henry,
in Hochstedt Butler”; GRA 5:9.
5Patterson, JMPL 1, 4.
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potential of turning into an "Archimedean lever" with which one can fashion an entire
worldview.1
While Henry has dealt extensively with the doctrine of God,2 yet in the context of
the doctrine of revelation, two of his emphases on God should be noted, namely: the self
disclosed God3 and the rational God. The first emphasis points to his self-revelation as a
voluntary act, divinely manifested as a testimony of love and grace for mankind;4 and the
second points to his rationality as that which characterizes his nature and will.3
‘Ibid.; see also Henry, Remaking, 215.
2Henry's discussion of God has been carried out in Notes on the Doctrine of God
(Boston: W. A. Wilde Pub. Co., 1948); Carl F. H. Henry, Gods o f This Age—or God o f the
Ages? ed. R. Albert Mohler (Nashville, TN: Broadman and Holman Publishers, 1994);
hereafter cited as "Henry, Gods or God?"; and especially in GRA 5—6; see also idem. The
God Who Shows Himself (Waco, TX: Word Books, 1966), 1-18. For a critical study of
Henry's concept of God, see McNeal's doctoral dissertation that has already been referred to in
chapter 1 this dissertation.
3One of Henry's commonly used qualifiers for the Deity is that of a self-disclosing or
self-revealing God. See Henry, "Science and Faith," 54; idem, A Plea for Evangelical
Demonstration (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1971), 76; hereafter cited as "Henry, A Plea"; idem,
"What Is Christianity?" Bibliotheca Sacra 123 (April-June 1966): 110; idem, "The God of the
Bible and Moral Foundations," in The Christian Vision: Man and Morality, ed. Thomas J.
Burke (Hillsdale, MI: Hillsdale College Press, 1986), 8,22; and idem, "TTie God of the Bible
Versus Naturalism," in Christianity and World Revolution, ed. Edwin H. Rian (New York:
Harper and Row, 1963), 234.
4GRA 5:9, 36, 49. God's nature does not necessitate his activity (ibid., 317). We
must note that Henry is against those who make love "as the foremost or conditioning divine
attribute. Whenever love triumphs at the expense of holiness, whenever love takes priority
over righteousness, we have moved outside the scriptural orbit" (Carl F. H. Henry, Aspects of
Christian Social Ethics [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964], 169); idem, "John," in Biblical
Expositor: The Living Theme o f the Great Book, with General and Introductory Essays and
Exposition for Each Book of die Bible, vol. 3, ed. Carl F. H. Henry (Philadelphia: A. J.
Holman Co., I960, 1973), 158.
5Henry, "Seminar," 2. See also Carl F. H. Henry, Conversations with Carl F. H.
Henry: Christianity for Today (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1986), 86; idem, The God
Who Shows Himself, 1; and GRA 5:481.
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The Epistemological Axiom
Revelation is the "heartbeat of Christian knowledge,1,1 and the foundational
principle in any theological investigation and search for truth.2 It is "the source o f all truth,
the truth o f Christianity included,"3 Only through revelation can we really and authentically
know God and his nature.4 For Henry, revelation occupies a sure and superior epistemic
avenue because of the fact that the empirical method5 does not provide any basis for
affirming or denying supernatural realities as it deals only with the perceptibles. Neither
can the method validate moral norms, nor confirm past historical events with absolute
‘GRA 5:39.
2GRA 5:39; Mohler, Baptist Theologians, 526; GRA 1:215-18.
3GRA 1:215, italics original.
4Henry, Confessions, 304; GRA 5:9, 138-140.
5Against those who look to science as the valid and ultimate means to epistemological
certainty, Henry points out that science, with all its spectacular successes, does not orient itself
to the finding out of what is "objectively true" but only "what is useful," because its main
purpose is that of prediction and control (Henry, "Science and Faith," 54-55; idem, "Science
and God's Revelation in Nature," Bulletin o f the Evangelical Theological Society 3 [Spring
I960]: 31, 33). Moreover, it is unwise to look to science for epistemological solutions because
it is perpetually revising its conclusions (ibid., 33; idem, "The God of the Bible Vs.
Naturalism," 236; idem, "The Cultural Relativizing of Revelation," review of Christianity in
Culture, by Charles H. Kraft, Trinity Journal 1 [fall 1980]: 163; see also Henry, "Science and
God’s Revelation in Nature," 34). Because of this revision is it dangerous for the church to
covet science's honor by making its teachings look "scientifically acceptable" (idem, "The
Bible and Modem Science," in Holman's Study Bible: RSV[Philadelphia: A. J. Holman,
1962], 1194). For Henry’s discussion on the relationship between science and religion
(Christianity), see GRA 1:270, 203-04, 212; Carl F. H. Henry, "Theology and Evolution," in
Evolution and Christian Thought Today, ed. Russell L. Mixter (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1959), 221-230; Henry, "Science and Faith," 55; idem, "The Christian Scholar's Task in a
Stricken World," Christian Scholar's Review 17 (1988): 475; and idem, "Introduction," in
Quest for Reality: Christianity and the Counter Culture, by Carl F. H. Henry and others
(Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1973).
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certainty. The empirical method consequently leads us to several options, and not to a final
certainty about anything.1
Revelation comes in the form of general and special revelation, both operating
"side by side with each other. "2 But important as it may be, general revelation gives us
only an "elementary knowledge" of God and his judgment, whereas special revelation fur
nishes us with an adequate amount of this knowledge.3 In this connection, four important
characteristics of special revelation should be noted: God is both a personal and rational
being; revelation is likewise personal and rational. Since he reveals himself intelligibly and
objectively to mankind,4 revelation is propositional and inscripturated.5
Before turning to a fuller description of Henry's view of revelation, we also need
to consider briefly his view of man implied within this doctrine. This not only helps us to
better understand his exposition of the doctrine, but enables us to discern more clearly the
human role in that doctrine.

‘GRA 1:85.
2Carl F. H. Henry, "The Ambiguities of Scientific Breakthrough," in Horizons of
Science: Christian Scholars Speak Out, ed. Carl F. H. Henry (New York: Harper and Row,
1978), 100; GRA 4:12.
3Henry says that man's sin necessitates special revelation (GRA 1:223; Carl F. H.
Henry, The Drift of Western Thought, W. B. Riley Memorial Lectures, Northwestern Schools
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951), 114.
4GRA 3:375.
SGRA 3:248.
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The Imago Dei-Bearing Man1
Man was created for intelligible relationship and fellowship with God.2 In order to
make that relationship possible, God endows him with the imago Dei, which is the point of
contact with the Deity,-3 the means through which God confronts mankind.4 The imago Dei
forms a bridgehead for divine-human relationship.5 The nature of this relationship,
however, is based on divine revelation given in the form of general and special revelation.6
Since the nature of revelation is conceptual and verbal-propositional, man needs a medium
or agency that can recognize and interpret revelation. This agency is the imago Dei.1 Its
especially rational and moral nature8 makes it ideal for dealing with divine revelation in a
meaningful and profitable manner.9 And because of the possession of this imago man is
‘An extended exposition of Henry's doctrine of the imago Dei is presented in chapter
4 above.
2GRA 1:228.
3GRA 1:409.
“GRA 2:133; Henry, "Man," BDT, 1964, 340-41; idem, "Revelation and the
Bible-2," 17.
5GRA 1:409; GRA 3:271, 248.
6GRA 3:271; 248-49.
7GRA 2:124; see also Carl F. H. Henry, "Image of God," EDT, 1984, 545.
8Henry, Toward a Recovery, 109.
9GRA 4:12; 124-25; Carl F. H. Henry, "Stewardship of the Environment," in
Applying the Scriptures: Papers from ICBI Summit III, ed. Kenneth S. Kantzer (Grand Rapids:
Academic Books, 1986), 474.
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therefore held responsible at the judgment for his misappropriation or ignorance of
revelation.1

Nature of Revelation
Henry conceives revelation in two traditional ways: general revelation and special
revelation.2 It is important that we look into their respective meanings as well as their
relationship to each another. We first begin by defining the term "revelation."

Definition
Henry defines revelation as a breaking of the divine silence,3 a voluntary4 divine
impartation of the knowledge of God's self and truths pertaining to us.5 Revelation is a
self-disclosure of the Deity's will for mankind.6 It is a divine communication of objective
knowledge pertaining to the nature of God as he is, both in his eternal glory and in his
'GRA 2:31; GRA 6:414, 506-07.
2Henry, A Plea, 77; and idem, "The Ambiguities of Scientific Breakthrough," 100.
3GRA 3:275; 405. "Revelation is a divinely initiated activity, God's free communi
cation by which he alone turns his personal privacy into a deliberate disclosure o f his reality"
(GRA 2:8, italics original).
4It is God who initiates and determines the how, why, what, when, where, and who of
revelation (Henry, "Seminar," 2, 4; GRA 2:8-9; and GRA 3:405). Revelation is not an
"inescapable necessity"; neither is it an "ontological inevitability, but solely because God wills
it thus" (GRA 3: 405; GRA 3: 375).
SGRA 3:283.
6Ibid„ 275; GRA 2:77.
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relationship to man.7 In brief, revelation is a supernatural disclosure to man of what was
previously hidden.1 This concept has also been rephrased by Henry in the following lines:
Revelation is that activity of the supernatural God whereby he communicates
information essential for man’s present and future destiny. In revelation God, whose
thoughts are not our thoughts, shares his thoughts with man; in his self-disclosure God
unveils his very own mind; he communicates not only the truth about himself and his
intentions, but also that concerning man's present plight and future prospects.3

General Revelation
General revelation4 is also called primal or cosmic-anthropological or universal
revelation.s It is "general" because it is directly accessible to all persons irrespective of
their racial or cultural background. General revelation is given through the avenues of
nature, history, the human mind, morality, and conscience.6 Through these avenues God
shows his eternal power and glory,7 and points to himself as the eternal sovereign creator to
‘GRA 5:98.
2GRA 4:276.
3GRA 3:457.
4"The terms general and special revelation are preferable to the terms natural and
supernatural, since the term natural suggests a type of revelation that is not supernatural in
source and content (as all divine revelation must be) and thus implies that revelation in nature,
history and mankind is independent of God's initiative" (GRA 2:86).
SGRA 2:84, 86; GRA 3:460.
6GRA 3:171; GRA 2:84—87, 133-34, 247-56. The main texts used by Henry in
connection with general revelation are Rom 1:17-22; 2:14-16; Acts 14:17. In relation to man,
nature and history are external; and reason, conscience, and morality are internal (GRA 1:159;
GRA 3:460).
7GRA 4:111.
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whom mankind is morally accountable.1 By means of general revelation, God "continually
bombards man,"2 "pervades his thoughts, motives, deeds, and all his goings and
comings."3
General revelation is intimately connected with special revelation. Both have the
Logos-Christ as their source,4 and are therefore rational in nature, and accordingly, do not
conflict with one another.5 The two are complementary, continuous, and comprehensively
united,6 standing one behind the other.7 Henry further elaborates their relationship in the
following remarks:
:GRA 1:409.
2GRA 2:10; GRA 1:279; McNeal, 52.
3GRA 1:150-151.
4"The Logos of God—preincamate, incarnate, and now glorified—is the mediating
agent of all divine disclosure. He is the unique and sole mediator of the revelation of the
Living God" (GRA 3:203). "Revelation is given only through and by the Logos of God"
(ibid., 205). "In depicting the role of the Logos as God’s revelatory agent, the Bible avoids
two costly exaggerations: first, it avoids the notion that divine revelation is given only in Jesus
of Nazareth (the nature of revelation being here made exclusively salvific); second, it avoids
the notion that the revelation given outside Jesus of Nazareth occurs independently of the
Logos. Instead, the Logos-doctrine of Scripture preserves the existence both of a universal and
of a particular revelation. In its delineation of the Logos, it maintains a crucial link between
the general revelation of the eternal Christ in the cosmos and human history, and the special
redemptive revelation in Jesus Christ and Scripture.
The divine revelation in Jesus of Nazareth is not to be taken independently of all other
divine revelation but stands in an inseparable and intimate relationship to the totality of God's
disclosure" (ibid., 207).
5Ibid., 460; Johnson, 99-100; GRA 1:341.
6Henry, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 457; GRA 3:433.
7Henry, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 457; GRA 2:9; GRA 3:433, 209; Carl F. H.
Henry, Christian Personal Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957), 156; hereafter cited as
"Henry, CPE"; GRA 3:209.
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The very commandments given to man-in-sin in a "thou shalt not” form suggest as their
presupposition a "thou shalt" addressed to man on the basis of creation. Special
revelation does not supersede general revelation, but rather republishes the moral
knowledge enjoyed by man in the state of integrity. Divine revelation is one. It
represents a comprehensive unity. There is but one truth and one good.1
The above statement shows that without general revelation, special revelation would not be
intelligible. Were it not for the former, man would not know that he is a sinner.2 In fact,
general revelation emphasizes his guilt3 and therefore serves as a precondition of special
revelation.4 General revelation also provides man with a cognitive guide for wise decision
and action.s It makes him aware of the need for meaning, purpose, and value for his life.6
‘Henry, CPE, 156. The relationship between general and special revelation is also
described by Henry as an "interconnected organic whole" (Henry, Gods or God? 80).
2Henry, Notes, 68.
3Henry, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 457.
“Special revelation presupposes general revelation (GRA 2:122).
5GRA 3:460.
6GRA 1:146.
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Special Revelation1
Although general revelation is important, yet in itself it is incomplete. For
instance, it cannot directly reveal God's purposes,2 nor impart to man knowledge
concerning Jesus Christ (nature and work) and human destiny.3 Further, man himself, on
account of his sinful nature, distorts general revelation, intentionally thwarts it,4 and dilutes
‘Henry is aware that the idea of special revelation is not welcomed by modems
because it implies that "God could not be a God of love and justice if he gave a special
revelation to one people, and did not give it everywhere. Henry responds by asking:
"Where did the Western world get its overpowering conviction of the love of God anyhow?
Plato's God was not a God of love. Aristotle's God would have by-passed John 3:16. It
was from the special disclosure of God, in the Hebrew-Christian tradition that the Western
world derived its concept of a God who loves man enough to send his Son into the world,
and of a God who takes sin so seriously that his holiness requires atonement for sin. If
man is regarded as standing in normal relationship with God, if sin really makes no ultimate
difference, God can be regarded as under all kinds of antecedent obligations to universal
humanity. But once it is seen, as biblical revelation emphasizes, that God takes sin
seriously, that sin and redemption are the issues upon which eternal destiny turn, that man
is not on speaking terms with God, that God reacts to sin so violently that there is nothing
man can do to save himself, then the significance of a divinely communicated once-for-all
revelation is [made clear]" (Carl F. H. Henry, Giving a Reason for Our Hope [Boston: W.
A. Wilde Co., 1949], 32-33; this work is also reprinted as Answers for the Now Generation
[Chicago: Moody Press, 1950]; see also idem, The Drift, 108, 110, 114).
2GRA 4:111.
3GRA 3:471.
4GRA 3:460; idem, The Drift, 116. Man's revolt against God is due to his pride,
which is at the root of sin (ibid., 117), resulting in the dulling or suppressing of general
revelation. Consequently, this gives rise to other religious systems like Hinduism,
Buddhism, and other great systems of philosophy (see also Carl F. H. Henry, interview by
Boxter Kharbteng, 18 April 1994, Kantzer Wing, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School,
Deerfield, IL: hereafter cited as "Henry, interview by author"). Because of general
revelation, it implies that "all men and all religious traditions have some elements of truth
in their competing and quite contradictory viewpoints." In view of this, "it is possible to
denominate [nonbiblical religions] . . . as false religions in contrast with Christianity, as the
one true religion in which is retained not only what elements of truth exist by virtue of a
general revelation, but in which these elements are freed from the distorting and vitiating
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and even suppresses it.1 He bends towards sin and lacks the moral ability to align himself
with the higher sentiments of his conscience.2 Therefore general revelation needs to be
supplemented with special revelation,3 which intensifies and republishes its content.4

Special Revelation as Scripture5
While general revelation is accessible to all men in general, special revelation is
special because God made it available only through the prophets and apostles who sooner or
later and with the help of the Holy Spirit, wrote it down for us in the form of Scripture,
reinterpretation of man as a sinner in revolt against the one true God, and in which alone
man is told that he is a sinner so at odds with God that man cannot possibly save himself,
yet that the holy God is merciful and provides redemption in the gift of his Son, Jesus
C hrist.(H enry, Giving a Reason, 36-37.
‘GRA 1:160; GRA 5:405. Sinful man wills down general revelation on account of
his pride. See Henry, The Drift, 116-17; see also Henry in Walvoord, 253; and Henry,
interview by author.
2Henry, CPE, 270; see also Henry, interview by author.
3GRA 3:433. "The sinfulness of man in Hebrew-Christian theology goes hand in
hand with the necessity for special divine revelation" (Henry, The Drift, 98).
4GRA 1:223; see also GRA 3:460, where Henry says that "special scriptural
revelation sets forth the propositional content of general revelation."
sAs far as Henry is concerned, 20th-century theology teaches us two important
lessons: first, the concept of a personal God is viable only where God makes himself
known in self-revelation; and second, only where the divine will is scripturally encapsulated
can divine revelation completely escape mystical generality and ambiguity (Henry, "The
Christian Scholar's Task," 485).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68

namely, the Bible,6 which is the "proximate and universally accessible form of authoritative
divine revelation"1 whose finality is to be exerted upon mankind.2
However, Scripture is only a segment of special revelation.4 Jesus Christ, the
God-man and only Savior of mankind,5 is also special revelation. His person, words, and
actions likewise constitute revelation.6 In fact, he is the Logos who is the eternal Christ,
the agent, goal, and climax of special revelation.7 In him, "the source and content of
‘Henry, "Inspiration," NIDCC, 512.
2GRA 1:229.
3Carl F. H. Henry, "American Evangelicals in a Turning Time," in Theologians in
Transition, ed. James M. Wall (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 44; see also idem, "The
Road to Eternity: A Travel Guide for the ’80s," Christianity Today, 17 July 1981, 71,
where Henry calls the Bible a "remedial revelation." For the identification of revelation
with Scripture, see idem, "Who Are the Evangelicals?" in Evangelical Affirmations, ed.
Kenneth S. Kantzer and Carl F. H. Henry (Grand Rapids: Academie Books, 1990), 93; and
Henry, "The Priority of Divine Revelation," 78.
4Henry in Walvoord, 255-56.
SGRA 3:99. Henry's Christology is sympathetic to the Chalcedonian formulation
(see Carl F. H. Henry, The Identity o f Jesus of Nazareth [Nashville, TN: Broadman Press,
1992], 89, 95, 106-107; and idem, Protestant Dilemma, 202-07).
6GRA 3:76, 181. Jesus Christ is "God acting, and when He speaks, He is, in turn,
God speaking with divine authority and divine infallibility" (Kenneth Kantzer, quoted
appreciatively in GRA 3:76). "The words and works of Jesus Christ are creatively and
cohesively interrelated" (ibid., 76). Jesus Christ as revelation is not simply his message,
but "more comprehensively, his total self-manifestation—his mind and acts and teaching"
(ibid., 181). Note: In this instance, James Daane distorts and misrepresents Henry's
position because he makes Henry view Christ only as the means or medium for revelation
and not revelation himself (see James Daane, "What Is Truth?" review of GRA 3, The
Reformed Journal 30 [May 1980]: 28).
7GRA 3:207, 165, 167. For the identity of the preexistent Christ with the Logos,
who later was incarnated in Jesus Christ, see ibid., 205-06.
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revelation converge and coincide."1 Special revelation is therefore "crowned by the
incarnation of the living Word and the inscripturation of the spoken word. ”2 Viewed in this
way, special revelation is then personal, historical, verbal, and redemptive.3
Formally speaking, however, special revelation for Henry is "broader" than
Scripture and Jesus Christ4 because God had personally revealed himself to, as well as
communicated with, Adam and other biblical patriarchs, and had acted redemptively on
behalf of his people. Most of these communications, however, were pre-written or non
written and are therefore no longer accessible to us.5 The same can also be said about the
divine acts that are mute unless divinely interpreted.6 For this interpretation we are
‘GRA 2:11, italics original; see also GRA 3:9, 11, 165, 170, 205, 207; Henry in
Walvoord, 254; Henry, "Seminar," 4-5.
2Henry, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 457; see also GRA 3:207.
3Henry in Walvoord, 270; idem, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 457; idem,
Protestant Dilemma, 216; GRA 4:276.
4Henry in Walvoord, 255; see also Henry, CPE, 264; and idem, Protestant
Dilemma, 86.
sHenry, "Revelation and the Bible—2," 16.
6The OT views God's redemptive acts as a fulfillment of divinely given prophecies
(GRA 3:258). God's redemptive acts are always accompanied with "divinely constituted
meaning" or "interpretation" (ibid., 259, 267). "The concentration of revelation in divine
historical acts, and the deliberate exclusion from such historical manifestation of any divine
disclosure of the meaning of such acts, entails many theological difficulties. Not only does
it suspend the interpretation of biblical redemptive acts uncertainly upon human reflection
and conjecture, but it also expressly contravenes what the prophets say about the God who
acts and speaks, and in the end makes biblical acts no less than biblical truths vulnerable to
secular erosion" (ibid., 262). "If God acts and leaves the interpretation to us, of what use
could this sort of 'revelation' be? What rules could we use to interpret the action, since ex
hypothesi no information is ever revealed? We would be as much in the dark about God
after this sort of revelation as we were before" (Keith Yandell, quoted approvingly in GRA
3: 266; see also Carl F. H. Henry, Frontiers of Modem Theology [Chicago: Moody Press,
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dependent on Scripture.1 That is, only in Scripture are we given the true meaning of God's
redemptive acts because he himself, through his Spirit, imparted it to the sacred writers.2
Events and their scriptural interpretation are therefore not to be separated because both
form an indissoluble unity.3 With respect to the primacy of Scripture as revelation, Henry
goes on to explain it as follows:
The universe is a divine creation, that God proffers forgiveness to fallen mankind, and
of much else that we have already indicated about God and his Christ, is available to us
only in the Scriptures. The Bible is, in fact, the only knowledge-basis we have for
anything we say about the person and work of Christ, about his distinctive authority,
and about the authority he conferred upon the aposdes.4
Without the Bible, we have no other way of knowing him,5 and all that Christianity has to
say about Jesus Christ would fall on deaf ears and lose all credibility.6
The Bible is an "authorized summary" of all God's revelation whether it be in the
universe, or in redemptive history, or in Jesus Christ.7 Therefore whereas it is true that
1966], 65).
lGRA 2:13.
2GRA 2:106; GRA 4:27; Carl F. H. Henry, "Postscript: Reply to Morris
Ashcraft," Review and Expositor 71 (Spring 1974): 226; idem, Protestant Dilemma, 95-96,
101.
3GRA 2:310; Carl F. H. Henry, "Footnotes: The Theology of the Zigzags,"
Christianity Today, 11 September 1970, 37.
4GRA 4:27. "Ontologically," Jesus is the "high point" of special revelation, but
"epistemologically," the sacred Scriptures are that special revelation (Carl F. H. Henry,
"Epistemology," BDT, 1964, 198.
SGRA 3:106; GRA 4:27.
6GRA 3:106.
7Ibid., 223.
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special revelation had taken place elsewhere outside of the Bible, yet materially, the Bible is
the only special revelation that we have.1

Purpose of Special Revelation
Another way of understanding special revelation in Henry is by looking at it from
the perspective of its purpose,2 which, for him, is integral to the overall comprehension of
this doctrine. "Divine revelation” he says "is given fo r human benefit, offering us
‘Henry in Walvoord, 255-57; see also Alan Richard Purdy, "Carl Henry and
Contemporary Apologetics: An Assessment of the Rational Apologetic Methodology of
Carl F. H. Henry in the Context of the Current Impasse Between Reformed and
Evangelical Apologetics" (Ph.D. dissertation, New York University, 1980), 463; hereafter
cited as "Purdy"; and Donald G. Bloesch, review of GRA 3-4, The Christian Century, 9
April 1980, 415. Henry maintains that there is no revelation apart from Scriptures
(Protestant Dilemma, 82; see also GRA 2:19, 15-16; and Henry, "Revelation and the
Bible—2," 16). He also holds the OT-NT combination as a complete Bible, each and
jointly, as being God's revealed and normative Word, and views their unity as an organism
(GRA 3:101, 103). Perhaps it is for this very reason that he is against the American Bible
Society's inclusion of the Apocrypha the Bible, and sees this as an influence of the Roman
Catholic Church. If the Apocrypha is to be included at all, it must be done under a separate
section, clearly marked, and not by interspersing its books among the inspired writings.
But Henry realizes that this proposal will not be acceptable to those concerned. A better
way is to produce separate editions for both Catholics and Protestants (Carl F. H. Henry,
Evangelicals at the Brink o f Crisis [Waco, TX: Word Books, 1967], 22). For further
comments on their (Old and New Testaments) complementary relationship to each other as
well as their individual uniqueness, see ibid, 30-47, 102, 135; Henry, The Drift, 26; GRA
4:34-38; and Carl F. H. Henry, "Is the Bible an Errant Book?" Capital Baptist, 28 May
1981, Special Collections; hereafter cited as "Henry, Capital Baptist”).
Henry also explicitly admits the end of revelation as well as inspiration with the
aposdes (GRA 4:147, 242, 259). When asked if reason, or tradition, or canonization, or
mere confession had been responsible for this closure, he said, "All of them enter into it."
When asked again if his belief in the end of inspiration with the apostles was more a
question of confession than an outcome of reason, his reply was, "Well, I don't know that I
can really answer that" (Henry, interview by author). However, when Henry says, "The
Spirit of God has vouchsafed one authentic tradition, the inspired prophetic-apostolic
writings" (GRA 4:147) he seems to credit the canon to the work of the Holy Spirit.
2GRA 3:460-461; Johnson, 109-111.
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privileged communion with our Creator in the Kingdom of God. "l In order to make this
communion meaningful God, through revelation, discloses information concerning himself2
as well as his intentions and will for man.3 In this way, special revelation permits us to
know God personally as he is, as well as his provisions such as his forgiveness, the new
life, and the final judgment for our sins.4 This means that it is only through revelation that
we come to know God's nature, ways, will, and word.5 And being special revelation, the
Bible serves for us as the epistemological access to God, that is indispensable in our
ongoing relationship with him.6 Consequently, the Bible is the source and ground of all
truth7 and theological investigation.8 It provides vital answers to questions on ontology,
‘GRA 2:8, 31; italics original. In ibid., 31-35, Henry expounds Jesus' various
ministries and acts which he undertook on behalf of man, and for his blessing.
2Without special revelation, ’’God would be not simply Deus absconditus (obscure,
hidden), he would be Deus dubitandus (God always in doubt)" (Henry, "Seminar," 3).
3GRA 2:31.
4Carl F. H. Henry, "Reply to Objections to Special Revelation," 1-2, Special
Collections, box no. 8, hereafter cited as "Henry, Reply to Objections." No other
publication data are provided for this manuscript. Note: Collections of Henry's writings in
E. S. Bird Library, Syracuse University are stored in boxes and serially numbered (see also
note 4, p. 41 above).
sMohler, Baptist Theologians, 527; Carl F. H. Henry, "The Authority of the
Bible," in The Origin o f the Bible, ed. Philip Wesley Comfort (Wheaton, IL: Tyndale
House Publishers, 1992), 19; hereafter cited as 'Henry in Comfort"; GRA 2:13, 135; and
GRA 4:42, 111; GRA 3:413, 418; Carl F. H. Henry, Christian Countermoves in a
Decadent Culture (Portland, OR: Multnomah Press, 1986), 108; and GRA 4:52.
6Henry, Seminary, 7; idem, Protestant Dilemma, 76.
7GRA 5:336; see also Henry, Toward a Recovery, 50.
8Mohler, Baptist Theologians, 526. The Bible is also the basis for verifying truth
(ibid.).
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epistemology, cosmology, existence, and eschatology,1 enabling us to settle the myriads of
speculative statements about God,2 and dispelling much (though not erasing all) that is
mysterious about him.3 In this way, we see that special revelation "bridges the epistemic
gap" between God and man.4
Furthermore, the Bible functions as a divinely fashioned instrument for confronting
human beings everywhere with the necessity of personal spiritual decision and dedication.5
It plays the role of the most penetrating critic by confronting us with "our broken love of
God, our dull sense of justice, our shameful moral nakedness, our waning sense of ethical
duty, our badly numbed consciences, our clutching anxieties, the ghastly horrors and brutal
violence of this era. "6
Characteristics of Special Revelation
Rational Revelation
In considering the character of special revelation, Henry often qualifies it in terms
of two key words: rational and prepositional. By rational he means that "what God reveals
‘GRA 1:409.
2GRA 2:8.
3Henry, "Seminar," 3.
“McNeal, 130.
SGRA 3:92.
6Carl F. H. Henry, Carl Henry at His Best: A Lifetime o f Quotable Thoughts,
foreword by Charles Colson (Portland, OR: Multnomah, 1990), 28; hereafter cited as
"Henry, Henry at His Best. " The efficacy of the Bible is due to the fact "that God himself
is pledged to be its invisible and invincible herald; he tolerates no fruitless proclamation of
his Word; he has ordained fulfillment of its mandated mission" (GRA 4:493; see also GRA
2:17).
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is something that men know, and know as something true. It is true not only in terms of a
decision to take it as true, but true for all men whether they make a decision or not.
Rational revelation therefore stands for intelligible divine communication given in
conceptual form.2 It is God speaking his mind intelligently in human speech to a human
agent.3 Regarding the rational character of revelation, we may note the following of
Henry's comments:
In whatever mode God speaks,4 his divine revelation is a mental act, for it seeks to
convey to the mind of man the truth about the Creator and Lord of life, and to write
upon the spirit of man God's intelligible holy will. Every mediating alternative not only
sacrifices the cognitive significance of divine revelation, but also dissolves revelation
itself into a vaporous and insignificant concept.3
The Christian faith is a rational faith that rests on revelational fact and truth, a faith
grounded in the self-disclosure of God in Christ as the ultimate reality and the ultimate
reason. It calls therefore for reasonable reflection, reasonable decision, and reasonable
service.6
‘Henry, "Seminar," 33; Carl F. H. Henry, "Science and Religion," in Christian
Faith and Modem Theology, Contemporary Evangelical Thought, ed. Carl F. H. Henry
(New York: Channel Press, 1964), 86.
2GRA 3:248, 471; GRA 4:74; Henry, "Seminar," 6.
3GRA 2:12; Henry, "The Concerns and Considerations of Carl F. H. Henry,” 20.
“Henry does recognize that besides Jesus Christ and Scripture, special revelation
was also given in a variety of modes—dreams, visions, oracles, theophanies, lots, and
historical events (GRA 2:79-81). This means that special revelation is not and cannot be
limited exclusively to Jesus Christ and the Bible (see p. 69 above). However, Henry does
not give much weight to these other modes because they are not available anymore (ibid.,
80). Jesus Christ is no doubt considered supreme revelation, but even this fact too is
available only through Scripture (see p. 68 above). So in revelation what counts most is its
message. That is revelation's "center" (Carl F. H. Henry to Boxter Kharbteng, 30 July
1996).
SGRA 3:271.
6GRA 1:272.
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The rationality of revelation is also based on the Logos who is the eternal Reason
or Mind of God.1 In fact, God's essence is itself rational,2 and this explains the rationality
of whatever God reveals.3 In other words, the rational nature of revelation is entirely
dependent upon God's own rational nature.4 One cannot be maintained without maintaining
the other.5 And because revelation is rational it is therefore reasonable that it address
man's mind and will.6
Further, a disregard for rational revelation leads to an epistemic eclipse7 of God,
that can have a disastrous result such as was exemplified by the death-of-God-theology.8
This lesson from history not only teaches the indispensability of rational revelation but also
shows that without this revelation, Christianity itself would evaporate,9 and all theological
speech about God would be opaque.10 Seen in this context, evangelical theology can lay
[GRA 2:203, 302; GRA 3:205, 215-16, 238, 167.
2Henry, "Seminar," 33-34; idem, "Fortunes-3," 30; GRA 3:167; Johnson, 106.
3Henry, "Seminar," 36; GRA 3:170.
4GRA 1:233.
sHenry, "Science and Religion," 86; GRA 3:471.
6GRA 3:248, 171. Although revelation has its claim upon the whole man, yet it is
his mind that is especially the object of this claim. Elsewhere, Henry says that revelation is
addressed to man's reason, and is therefore transcultural (see Henry in Gaebelein, 29).
7Carl F. H. Henry, "The Fortunes of Theology," Part 2, Christianity Today, 12
May 1972, 32; hereafter cited as "Henry, 'Fortunes-2.'"
“McNeal, 111.
9Johnson, 106.
10GRA 3:472.
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claim to relevancy only as it boldly proclaims the biblical emphasis of the relationship
between revelation and reason.1 In further stressing the importance of rational revelation,
Henry makes the following critical comments regarding those who oppose it:
Those who rule out rational revelation as a way of knowing God must concede that their
postulation about God-in-relation-to-us, finds no support in the experience of many
people, nor is it impervious to the possibility of emotive delusion.2
When loosed from the constraints of rational divine revelation, religious imagination
plunges man readily into spiritual idolatry; creative imagination confers an imagined
reality and dynamic power upon the nonexistent to shape and direct cosmic and human
‘Carl F. H. Henry, "Lectures 1957: Christian Reformed Minister's Institute," 30,
Calvin College Campus, Grand Rapids, MI, 4-7 June 1957, Special Collections; hereafter
cited as "Henry, Lectures 1957”; see also GRA 4:101, where Henry regards revelation and
reason as the most effective armory for truth.
As to reason, Henry identifies it with the intellect as distinct from the will,
emotions, and sense experience (Johnson, 2), and is defined by Henry as "the mind of God
or the mind of man, which ideally operates in accordance with the innate, a priori, objective
laws of formal logic" (ibid.). "Reason is man’s logical capacity, the mind of man in action;
it is the thinking self. Logic, or the laws of reason, are descriptive statements of how
reason ideally functions" (ibid., 59).
"Reason is a divine attribute, and the laws of reason are definitive of God's nature
and descriptive of his will" (GRA 5:335); see also Henry, "The God of the Bible vs.
Naturalism," 234-37; idem, "The Bible and Modern Science," 1194; and idem, "The God
of the Bible and Moral Foundations," 22). Although God is the "basic structure of the
ultimately real world . . . , yet because of his rationality, it can also be said that "reason is
the essential foundation of ultimate reality" (GRA 5:374) which provides man the basis for
the intelligibility of the universe and human experience (ibid., 337, 352-53, 382, 361, 355),
and serves as an instrument for organizing and drawing inferences (GRA 1:226-27; Henry,
Remaking, 215). The faculty of reason or rationality is given by God as a gift to man
(Johnson, 224), not to create or establish truth—God only can do that—but to use it as an
instrument for testing, recognizing, and elucidating truth (GRA 1:215, 225, 228; GRA
3:12-13; GRA 5: 336; Johnson, 224; GRA 1:232, 226; Patterson, "JMPL— 1," 5; idem,
CFH, 65). In other words, reason's role is limited: it cannot create truth, but it can
recognize and comprehend it (Johnson, 224; 141; Mohler, Baptist Theologians, 526;
Henry, Remaking, 215). Reason is neither to be equated nor contrasted with revelation;
rather, reason is the means by which we comprehend revelation (ibid., Remaking, 215).
2Henry, "Science and Religion," 86.
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affairs; it becomes the playground of imaginary idolatrous divinities, those sham-gods
of both primitive and literate cultures.1
Only a rational revelation can provide a universally valid knowledge of God.2
Without it, all talk about him would be but mere symbol and myth,3 leading ultimately to a
moral as well as theoretical agnosticism about God-in-himself,4 and to an exclusion of the
very possibility of God telling us anything about himself. The absence of rational
revelation can also result in Christian theology losing its ability to define God's
transcendent relationship to the world and to man,5 undermining its effectiveness in
confronting the secular forces that grip our generation,6 and diminishing its capacity to
attack a non-Christian worldview.7

Prepositional Revelation
For Henry, revelation is not only rational but prepositional. In fact, revelation is
known to be rational because it is prepositional; for no meaningful communication of
cognitive elements is possible without propositions.8 But what is a 'proposition'? Henry
‘GRA 5:77.
2Ibid., 87.
3Ibid.
4Ibid.
sIbid., 89-90.
6Ibid., 93.
7Weeks, 75.
8GRA 3:449.
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says that it is an intelligible or declarative statement that is either true or false?; a rational
declaration, capable of being either believed, doubted, or denied. "2
We mean by prepositional revelation that God supematurally communicated his
revelation to chosen spokesmen in the express form of cognitive truth, and that the
inspired prophetic-apostolic proclamation reliably articulates these truths in sentences
that are not internally contradictory.3
Overall, prepositional revelation stands for the self-revealing God speaking in intelligible
words, sentences, and syntax, thereby objectively revealing himself and his purposes.4
Having made clear what he means by prepositional revelation, Henry goes on to
justify this affirmation. According to him, prepositional revelation is necessary because its
absence can lead us to doubt what God tells us, or even to question that he intends to tell us
anything.5 For example, it is only by means of the prepositional teaching of Jesus Christ
lHenry, Conversations, 84.
2GRA 3:456, 430. Henry concurs with Gordon Clark, who observed that aside
from imperative senses, and a few exclamations in the Psalms, the Bible is composed of
propositions. These give information about God and his dealings with men. Ibid., 456,
228.
3Ibid., 457; Henry, Conversations, 84-85.
“Carl F. H. Henry, "Boundary Disputes: 'Third Wave' Thinkers Argue for a New
Theological Center," World, 15-22 July 1995, 25; Henry, Conversations, 84; GRA 3:446.
God reveals himself intelligently and truly. Since truth is the property of sentences and not
of words per se, then revelation is necessarily prepositional (GRA 3:449, 453). Denial of
prepositional revelation leads to reductionistic theology, "to a game of dart-throwing at a
nebulous infinity" (Henry in Gaebelein, 23; idem, in Walvoord, 270; idem, The God of the
Bible vs. Naturalism," 234; and GRA 2:12; GRA 3:248; see also Carl F. H. Henry, "The
Interpretation of the Scriptures: Are We Doomed to Hermeneutical Nihilism?" Review and
Expositor 71 (1974): 215; hereafter to be cited as "Henry, Are We Doomed?” (This article
was reprinted verbatim in GRA 4:296-315); Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT (1984):
147; idem, Conversations, 84-85; GRA 3:453, 455; Carl F. H. Henry, "Trouble at the
Peak," World, 12-19 August 1995, 25.
SGRA 4:198.
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and the apostles that we distinguish between members of the Trinity as Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit. Experience is hardly able to make these distinctions.1 For that matter, even
predictive prophecies are purely dependent upon prepositional revelation.2 Aside from
verbal communication,
revelation in the full and saving sense cannot take place at all. For no public historical
happening, as such (an exodus, a conquest, a captivity, a crucifixion, an empty tomb),
can reveal God apart from an accompanying word from God to explain it, or a prior
promise which it is seen to confirm or fulfill. Revelation in its basic form is thus of
necessity prepositional; God reveals Himself by telling us about Himself, and what He
is doing, in His Word.3
The importance of prepositional revelation for Henry is also intimated by means of
‘Ibid., 461.
2Henry points to the disadvantages of the crisis theology for its denial of verbal
revelation which, in the nature of the case, renders the presence of the predictive elements
impossible (see Henry, The Gideon, 17).
3James I. Packer, quoted affirmatively in GRA 3:461. Having made clear what a
prepositional revelation is, Henry goes on to ward off any possible abuse or misuse of a
prepositional truth or revelation. He warns that we are not to reduce all search for truth to
empirical verification. Nor are we to further "reduce the search to linguistic investigation"
and thereby "trivialize truth" as is the case with analytic philosophy (ibid., 3:449). "Unless
propositions are rehabilitated to speak not merely of grammatical elements, but of
categories of truth, reality, and fact, that is, unless there is some implied commitment to the
deeper task of philosophy as an avenue to reality, the inevitable consequences—as in the
case of linguistic philosophy—are the absurdity of all expression and the demotion of
communication to noises emitted by a human myna-bird” (ibid., 3:449). Furthermore,
Henry also cautions against the concentration on a word instead of on a sentence or
proposition as the carrier of meaning. Such attempts have led to unfulfilled results (ibid.,
453). "The primacy of the sentence over the word is one of the most secure findings of
linguistics" (ibid., 447). While recognizing the possibility that a new meaning or special
nuance can occasionally be introduced by a particular New Testament Greek word, yet in
no way does that justify one to consider the New Testament Greek as the Holy Spirit
language (ibid., 453). In this instance, Henry endorses James Barr who insists upon the
understanding of the New Testament words and sentences in the same semantic sense as
was used and understood by the Hellenistic speakers of that time (James Barr, quoted in
ibid., 453; see also ibid., 302).
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his criticism against D. E. Nineham,1 who holds that God, through his Spirit, reveals
internally to each believer the meaning of the revelatory events. Henry confronts Nineham
on this by stating that the latter's position provides no method by which one can determine
the identity between the reader's meaning and that of the biblical author, or to reconcile
between the numerous conflicting meanings that individual readers hold. It is only when
revelation is propositional that one can determine whether the reader's meaning is biblical
or not.2 A similar conveyance of the value of propositional revelation is also seen in his
reaction to John Marsh who regards divine acts/actions as revelatory in exclusion to words
or propositions that explain or interpret those acts. In reply, Henry counters that "without
a revealed interpretation of history, we can find no objective meaning in it, since we lack
the information necessary for comprehending its meaning normatively.1,3 In other words,
Henry wants to tell us that it is propositional revelation alone that can prevent us from
falling into theological uncertainty and skepticism.4 To those who reject propositional
revelation on the basis of the culturally conditionedness of human language, Henry replies
by pointing out that such an assumption, if it were true, could also be doubted because it,
too, is culturally conditioned. However, if the assumption is not true, then we need not be
*In the absence of propositional revelation "even the contention that God is Truth,
or that he is personal Subject, has no universal validity, but is merely an assertion of
intense individual conviction" (ibid., 432; see also ibid., 430-38, where Henry exposes the
weaknesses of a nonpropositional, noncognitive revelation as propounded by Kant, Barth,
and Bultmann).
2Ibid., 59-60.
3Ibid., 260-61.
4Ibid., 435; GRA 4:128.
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detained by the assertion.1
Propositional revelation conveys divine information that is vital for man's present
and future. To deny the informational character of revelation2—which Henry also calls
"word-revelation"3—in favor of a non-cognitive, non-verbal or subjective revelation as
proposed by neoorthodoxy,4 is to disclaim that God can be known objectively or
cognitively. In that case, then, all God-talk is at best only a talk about "God-in-relation-tous, since we are allegedly cut off from knowledge of God as he objectively is."5 As Henry
sees it, denial of propositional revelation has consequently led recent modem theology to a
subsequent replacement of the supernatural divine Self with the human self as the center of
revelation.6 Therefore, only a propositional revelation can be the basis of doctrines and
truths, as well as the means for making sense of the divine call for obedience and decision.
Without that revelation, such a call can neither be logically analyzed nor answerable to the
claims of truth. In the absence of propositional revelation, no rational creature is under
‘GRA 3:436.
2Ibid., 458. "Whatever else may be, revelation is communication" (ibid., 173).
See also ibid., 173, 429, 457; and GRA 2:159, where Henry stresses revelation as
communication.
3GRA 3:416.
4Henry told Cross that a noncognitive revelation will ultimately lead to "theological
suicide" (Cross, 127).
SGRA 3:430. The denial of the cognitive knowledge of God is seen by Henry as a
product of Kantian epistemological speculation (ibid., 430-32).
6Ibid., 431.
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obligation to obey the call.1
More importantly, for Henry, the fact that Jesus and the apostles take seriously
what is written in the Old Testament Scriptures as God’s word, and expect others to do
likewise, indicates that they consider revelation to be propositional.2 It is to these very
Scriptures that Jesus referred to as divinely authoritative teaching when he introduced them
with the words, "Truly, truly, I say unto you.”3

Other Characteristics of Special Revelation
Besides being rational and propositional, revelation is also personal, historical,
progressive, and once-for-all.4 When Henry claims that revelation is personal he means
lIbid., 433. For Henry's defense of propositional revelation vis-a-vis a nonpropositional, subjective form of revelation, see ibid., 429-438. Henry's emphasis on
revelation as objective and verbal-conceptual is clearly seen in his survey of contemporary
theology where he shows that the weaknesses and consequent deaths of modem theologies
are due to their neglect of propositional revelation. This state of affairs in theology now
provides a propitious opportunity and advantage for evangelicals to invite the world to "a
formidable alternative" in revelation (see Carl F. H. Henry, "Cross-currents in
Contemporary Theology," in Jesus o f Nazareth: Savior and Lord, ed. Carl F. H. Henry
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966], 19, 21).
2GRA 4:229-230. Some of the passages Henry cited as evidence for propositional
revelation are: Matt 4:4; Luke 24:25, 27; Mark 12:24. Henry also points to Brunner
(major advocate of the neoorthodox view of revelation) who said that the OT recognizes the
words of the prophets as being the words of God (Brunner, cited in GRA 3:461). In
support of the verbal nature of revelation, Henry further cites Deut 18:18-20 and Ezek
13:13 which stress (especially the former) that a true prophet spoke only the words that
God had put in his mouth. Rom 3:2; Acts 7:38; Heb 5:12; and 1 Pet 4:11 were also used
to point out that "the oracles of God" (logia) refer to revelational utterance or revealed
truths (see GRA 3:461-462).
3GRA 3:462.
“Ibid., 459; GRA 2:87; GRA 4:276; see also Henry, "The Cultural Relativizing of
Revelation," 158-59; idem, Twilight o f a Great Civilization: The Drift Toward NeoPaganism (Westchester, IL: Crossway Books, 1988), 116; idem, The Drift, 108, 114; and
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that God as a personal being acts, speaks, and reveals.1 Revelation conies from a personal
God, through a personal Agent (Jesus Christ), to human persons—the prophets and
apostles.2 This personal character of revelation accordingly rules out its identification with
"merely a personal confrontation or a subjective stirring on the fringe of history. "3 Such a
claim belongs to the cults, not to biblical religion.4
Revelation is also historical.5 It was given at a certain time and place, and to
specific individuals, namely, the prophets and apostles.6 It occurred in the form of deeds
and words.7 It took place in Jesus Christ's life, death, and resurrection, and it will happen
again at his second coming.8
idem, The Identity o f Jesus, 70.
■GRA 2:151; GRA 5:13.
2Henry, "Seminar," 4; GRA 2:151-52; GRA 3:406.
3Henry, Frontiers, 66.
4GRA 3:431, 434.
sFor extended comments on the historical character of revelation see Henry,
Frontiers, 41-64.
6Ibid., 73-74; 266, 405-06, 434; see also Henry, A Plea, 53; idem, The God Who
Shows Himself, 3-4, 6, 74). "That God accomplishes his sovereign purposes in history is
affirmed by the Pentateuch and by the Gospels, by the prophets and the aposdes. The Old
Testament writers refer repeatedly to God's activity in history, the Gospels speak of God's
providential and redemptive involvement in the world. From the Christian standpoint any
denial that God is sovereignly active in history reflects a basic departure from the classic
texts” (GRA 2: 258).
7Ibid., 260-61.
8GRA 3:300. Henry is an ardent believer in the second coming of Jesus Christ and
the consequent future life characterized by the replacement of the present life with the "full
manifestation of the kingdom of God" (ibid., 24). Henry believes that day is not far off. It
is "soon to break upon us," and "draws ever closer." "The last days are moving toward the
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Furthermore, revelation is also progressive. There is a forward direction: a
movement from general to special revelation, from the OT to the NT,1 and on to the
eschaton ("eschatological revelation").2 For Henry, the progressive character of revelation
does not imply repeated or ongoing revelation. This progression is only in terms of a
movement from promise to fulfillment. It refers to the dynamism between these two points,
beginning with the messianic promise in Gen 3:5, and onto the fulfillment of that promise
in the history of the OT prophets and the Israelite nation of their time, as well as in its
consummation in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ and the subsequent
last day, even as the last day will move toward the last hour, before the dawn in
consummation of the Lord's return . . . in glory" (ibid., 26, 24, 21-22).
Henry's faith in the soon return of Jesus is graphically illustrated by the way he
ended his autobiography: "I had spanned a long lifetime in a short reverie about my
anticipated final flight to the Father's house. On that trip there would be no carry-on
baggage other than God-given moral and spiritual assets, and with Christ as the pilot I
would travel first-class. I could be thankful for a sound mind, for eyes that welcomed
trifocal lenses as the world began to fade, and that my time-worn body still slept
comfortably at least in one position while it awaited a resurrection replacement without need
for quinidine sulphate, Wigraine or extra-strength Bufferin. Suddenly I remembered Vance
Havner’s Prayer, 'Lord, get me safely home before dark’" (Confessions, 407; see also
Carl F. H. Henry, "Will Christianity Outlive Its Critics?" Modem Age 33 (1990): 127-28;
Carl F. H. Henry, "Making Political Decisions: An Evangelical Perspective," in Piety and
Politics: Evangelicals and Fundamentalists Confront the World, ed. Richard John Neuhaus
and Michael Cromartie [Washington DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1987], 102).
lThe New Testament "widens the horizons of the Old [Testament]" (GRA 3:459;
GRA 4:213).
2"The progressive nature of revelation is first manifested when God revealed
himself redemptively in external history in unique saving acts, particularly in the history of
the Hebrews and in the resurrection of Jesus Christ, in the Old Testament, the exodus of
the Hebrews from Egypt through God’s power; and, in the New Testament, the exodus of
Jesus from the tomb from death." (Henry, "Seminar," 5). Progressive revelation is also
seen in terms of promise, fulfillment, and the future end-time (GRA 2:71; GRA 3:206;
GRA 2:16).
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inspired interpretation of his ministry by his apostles as is recorded in the New Testament.1
After this, there is to be no more revelation except at the eschaton when it will finally
clarify some matters that are now obscure.2 In other words, on this side of eternity, Henry
holds that revelation as well as inspiration had ceased with the NT.3 In this sense,
revelation is also once-for-all.
By maintaining the traditional view of the closure of the canon with the NT, Henry
submits that man had been given adequate instruction and information necessary for his life
in his relation to God, himself, and other fellow humans.4 This position again confirms the
once-for-allness of revelation. Henry elaborates on this concept as follows:
God's inspiration is vouchsafed only in a special time and special place and special way,
and not always and everywhere. Least of all is it available to twentieth-century man in
a command performance that aims to satisfy an experimental scientific approach to
God. According to the evangelical view, special revelation and divine inspiration
pertain only to prophetic and apostolic proclamation; the phenomenon of inspiration
does not continue into the present day, even on a sporadic basis.5
Besides, when God makes his final eschatological revelation, it is no longer for
redemption but judgment of man's use of the previous revelations. At that time
‘GRA 3:104, 126.
2Ibid., 459. "God transcends his own revelation. There is more to the truth [about
him] than what he has revealed and there is more to the meaning of God than is exhausted
in his disclosure. [For] we know only what God has chosen to reveal" (Henry,
"Seminar, "3).
3GRA 4:154, 259,409.
“Ibid., 409; see also Henry, "The Cultural Relativizing of Revelation," 158.
SGRA 4:154; see also Henry, "The Cultural Relativizing of Revelation," 158.
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history will be consummated, and all of sin and evil will be "subjugated by righteousness."1

The Significance of Revelation
To speak of the significance of revelation is to ask, Why is Henry so much
concerned with revelation? What implications or justifications does he see in crusading for
this doctrine? From an investigation of Henry's doctrine of revelation, it appears that the
crusade arises out of his desire to underscore the importance of the following: the
indispensability of biblical theism; the need for a sure foundation of religious epistemology;
and the necessity of a fixed knowledge.

The Indispensability of Biblical Theism
Revelation implies God—his existence, or reality as Creator, Sustainer, Revealer,
Redeemer, and Judge2—a concept that Henry describes variously as biblical supematuralism, biblical theism, or Christian theism.3 Without biblical theism one is likely to come up
with many options such as polytheism, atheism, or anything in between.4 The loss of
^ e n ry , The God Who Shows, 4; GRA 3:126-27.
2GRA 6: 35; Henry, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 457; GRA 2:121. In Henry's
view, the Thomistic arguments for the existence of God produce the probability that God
exists, whereas the existence of God based on revelation leads to the certainty of his
existence (Henry, Remaking, 196-99; see also idem, "The Reality and Identity of God,"
Part 2, Christianity Today, 28 March 1969, 12-13; hereafter cited as "Henry, The Reality
and Identity"—2."
3GRA 6:8, 31-33; GRA 5: 32-33.
“Henry in Gaebelein, 5.
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biblical theism can result in an imminent decay and destruction of Western civilization,-1 the
inability of comprehending a transcendent revelation; skepticism with regard to the
possibility for a positive identification of certain events as supernatural; doubt concerning
Scripture's power in unveiling the eternal world and the misfortune of having to make
oneself do only with "private mystical experiences that can exert no validity-claim over
against other contrary and contradictory views. "2
lIt is Henry’s firm conviction that whatever cultural and material achievement
and/or greatness Western civilization has been able to experience so far is due to its original
alignment with biblical or Christian theism. Any straying from it is bound to spell doom
(see GRA 4:23; Carl F. H. Henry, "Metaphysics and Ethics," BDCE (1973): 73-74; idem,
"The Christian Scholar's Task," 474). Henry warns: "Take warning, America: to lose this
Book is not simply to lose a light, but the Light, God's lamp to our feet, God's light on our
pathway" (see Carl F. H. Henry, Faith at the Frontiers [Chicago: Moody Press, 1969], 73;
see also Eric J. Miller, "Carl F. H. Henry and Christianity Today. Responding to the Crisis
of the West, 1956-1968" [M. A. thesis, Deerfield, IL: Trinity Evangelical Divinity School,
1994], iii). Miller also pointed out that Henry joined Christopher Dawson, Richard
Weaver, and Reinhold Niebuhr in a "cultural critique that views the societal rejection of
Christian theology and ethics as disastrous" for the future of America as well as Western
civilization as a whole (Miller, ibid.). According to James Emery White's observation,
Henry's thesis of the dependence of Western civilization's well-being on biblical theism is a
perpetuation of the conviction of Peter Marshall, David Manuel, and Francis A. Schaeffer
(see James Emery White, "The Concept of Truth in Contemporary American Evangelical
Theology [Ph.D. diss., Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1991], 29-30). White's
study is based on five American evangelical authors: Van Til, Francis A. Schaeffer, Carl
F. H. Henry (White, 131-161), Millard J. Erickson, and Donald G. Bloesch.
Henry feels that because biblical theism has been replaced with naturalism,
Western society has actually entered a "new dark age." Right now, Western civilization is
"somewhere between high noon and midnight"; to be precise, it is in the twilight zone, and
sunset is sure to come upon American or Western society, and for that matter, upon the rest
of human civilization. However, Henry exhorts believing Christians that they should do
something about it, as there is yet some hope. The future of the Western culture should be
our concern, and battle. See Henry, Gods or God? 288; 12-15; 138-39; 284; 92. In this
context, Henry readily agrees with Brunner, who said: "If the Bible goes, the best of the
West goes also” (Emil Brunner, quoted in ibid., 136, 183; see also Henry, CPE, 13-17).
2GRA 6:35.
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Perhaps one of the persuasive ways Henry tries to impress the indispensability of
biblical theism is by means of his bold, unsparing attack against any atheistically based
worldviews1 such as naturalism and secular humanism, to name but two.2 In Henry's
viewpoint, naturalism, which now dominates virtually the entire Western intellectual
world,3 is "the reigning monarch"4 and the most formidable foe of biblical religion.5
Naturalism holds that nature is ultimate because it is the only reality that there is. Man is
an animal, and therefore is accountable to no one.6 Truth and right are intrinsically timebound and changing,7 and human life as well as the cosmos has no intrinsic meaning and
^ e n ry said that it was the rejection of Christian supernaturalism that brought in
the reign of Nazism and Communism (ibid., 8).
2By denying the supernatural, naturalism has become the number one objector to
special revelation (see Henry, The Drift, 79, 85, 91-92). Note: in this work Henry
provides analysis and criticism of naturalism (see also Richard Alan Purdy, "Carl F. H.
Henry," in Handbook o f Evangelical Theologians, ed. Walter A. Elwell [Grand Rapids:
Baker, 1993], 263-264; hereafter cited as "Purdy, Handbook"). For a brief criticism of
secular humanism, see Carl F. H. Henry, The Christian Mindset in a Secular Society:
Promoting Evangelical Renewal and National Righteousness (Portland, OR: Multnomah
Press, 1984), 87-90; Weeks, 55. "The Western world's spiritual struggle," says Henry,
"is now mainly posed between Christian theism and deteriorating humanism or raw
naturalism" (Gods or God? 198).
3GRA 1:135; Henry, in Hochstedt Butler, 18; Henry, "American Evangelicals in a
Turning Time,” 47-48.
4Henry, Gods or God? 45.
5GRA 6:32-33.
6GRA 1:137-38. "A naturalistic worldview disposes of all finalities and absolutes
in the universe" (GRA 1:142-143, 136).
7Henry, CPE, 23.
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purpose.1 Accordingly, naturalism dismisses the otherworldly stance of Christianity as a
grand delusion.2 Because of these presuppositions, naturalism is therefore regarded by
Henry as the Western world's (as well as Christianity's) number one enemy since it
"launches the deepest, most thorough and logically most consistent denial of
supematuralism, "3 regards divine revelation and authority retrogressive, and demotes the
Bible to a book of legends and myths.4 Consequently, naturalism advocates human
autonomy.5
In a similar vein, Henry sees secular humanism just as dangerous and considers it a
ubiquitous adversary of America.6 In fact, it should be observed that Henry's criticism of
lGRA 1:137-38,- Carl F. H. Henry, "The Undoing of the Modem Mind," in
Evangelical Roots: A Tribute to Wilbur Smith, ed. Kenneth S. Kantzer (Nashville: Thomas
Nelson, 1978), 109.
2The danger of naturalism to Christian theism is again cogently expressed by
Henry in the following words: "Naturalism's mindset and willset is hostile to the entire
body of miracles and supernatural. It disputes the Hebrew-Christian view in its totality. It
teaches that empirical scientific method alone gives us reliable information. It categorizes
the supernatural as legend and myth. It reduces ultimate reality to impersonal processes
and quantum events. It limits knowledge to tentative inferences. It denies the very
possibility of ever knowing ultimate and abiding truth" (Henry, Gods or God? 80; see also
idem, Christian Countermoves, 11). Secular naturalism denies revelation, "exposes man
and the world to wide reaches of chance and change, . . . deluges reality with
comprehensive contingency, total transiency, radical relativity and absolute autonomy"
(GRA 1:137, italics original).
3GRA 6:32-33.
4Henry, Gods or God? 2.
sIbid., 47. It was self-autonomy that led to Hitler's extermination of 6 million
Jews, Stalin’s murder of 15 million Russians, and Mao's killing of 30 million Chinese
(ibid.).
6Henry, Gods or God? 25. Some of the basic premises of secular humanism are:
"Reality is reducible to impersonal processes and quantum events; all existence is time-
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secular humanism often overlaps with his criticism of naturalism, and perhaps it is for this
reason that he usually keeps them together.1 However, since Henry has also addressed
them separately, I likewise maintain this procedure.
Secular humanism, in Henry's viewpoint, has become the covert and beguiling
metaphysical framework of Western university learning and politics,2 and has infiltrated
even the church.3 Secular humanism’s genius is to disavow the transcendent as an
intolerable barrier to human freedom, and to reduce reality to "impersonal processes and
quantum events"4 that are time-bound and dated.5
bound and perishable; theological, philosophical, and moral principles are
culture-relative and subject to revision; human beings autonomously and creatively impose
whatever values history and the cosmos bear" (ibid., 197).
Sometimes Henry uses the terms "naturalism" and "secular humanism"
synonymously (see ibid., 15, 280; GRA 2:32-33).
2Henry lists four "key concepts" that arise out of naturalism and have also become
the "masked metaphysics, the covert conceptuality of modem liberal learning." They are:
diffuse dependence, total transiency, radical relativity, and absolute autonomy. It short,
modem education is antitheistic, and repudiates "a divinely given truth and morality, and . .
. rejects a supernatural purpose in nature and history. . . . " See Henry, The Christian
Mindset, 84-86, 90. See also idem, Christian Countermoves, 39 where Henry points to the
Enlightenment as being the cause for the above-mentioned situation in modern education.
3Henry, Gods or Godl 15, 28, 181, 197, 288.
4Ibid., 283; see also GRA 2:123.
5"If indeed all truth and meaning are culturally conditioned, no basis remains for
selectively exempting certain preferred biblical specifics. If we elevate culture-conditioning
into a formative principle, and insist that biblical theology falls within a culture-relative
context, then the principle of relativity to culture applies not only to this or that isolated
passage—whether about the seriousness of sexual sins or the role of women in the church; it
extends also to the scriptural teaching that 'in Christ there is neither male nor female' or
that we are to love God with our whole being and our neighbors as ourselves, or that it is
sinful to covet a neighbor's wife or possessions. It will not do to exhibit certain doctrines
as the special strength of biblical religion if we simultaneously dismiss other teachings on
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Because human life is regarded as only animal flesh,1 secular humanism has been
responsible for the decline of human values shown by the 50 million fetuses that are aborted
by Americans in a single decade.2 In other words, Henry sees secular humanism as
"channelling" into raw naturalism.3 Viewing the above reasons as dangerous and
subversive to the well-being of society, he accordingly presses for the acceptance of biblical
theism as the best alternative to naturalism and secular humanism.4

A Sure Foundation for Religious Epistemology
If revelation, as has already been pointed out, is the intelligent self-disclosure of
God concerning his nature, will, and purpose for man,5 then this means that his knowledge
of God is no more a question of guesswork or mere inference from nature and history.6
The fact that sinful man, in order to serve his own comfort and convenience, constantly
the basis of pervasive cultural dependence" (GRA 5:404).
^ e n ry , Gods or God? 198.
2For Henry's aversion to abortion, see Henry, Christian Countermoves, 57-61;
idem, "Will Christianity Outlive Its Critics?" 124; idem, "The God of the Bible and Moral
Foundations," 14-15.
3Henry, Gods or God? 284.
4Ibid., 81; see also Henry, Giving a Reason, 15-16, 84-85; idem, Twilight of
Civilization, 126-128, 177, 169, 138. In Henry's view, the recovery of interest in special
revelation is one of the gracious providences of our century. It is this recovery that checks
Western Christianity from sliding into natural theology and ultimately to humanism and
naturalism (Carl F. H. Henry, Evangelical Responsibility in Contemporary Theology
[Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957], 64-65; see also idem, "American Evangelicals in a
Turning Time," 41-49).
5See also Henry, "The Reality and Identity—2," 14.
6Henry, "Epistemology," B D T(1964), 184-185.
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avoids and distorts or even suppresses his awareness of God through general revelation
(Rom l:18ff.),1 shows his need for another form of revelation—namely, special redemptive
revelation, so that through it, man can be restored to the true knowledge of and fellowship
with God.2 This redemptive knowledge is held out to man epistemologically in the sacred
Scriptures.3 Accordingly, it also implies that "as systems of thought, the great religions
and philosophies must be viewed not simply as inadequate but false.1,4 Further-more, since
this knowledge has been conveyed by the omniscient God, it means that Scripture, as "the
content of revelation, has a genuine knowledge-status. "5
% id „ 185.
2See Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 94, 97; and idem, "Inspiration," NIDCC, 512,
where Henry says that the basic purpose of revelation is soteriological.
3Ibid. Our knowledge of God's nature and attributes is based upon Scripture. Any
claim for knowledge of God outside of Scripture can lead to "some god other than the one
living God" (GRA 5:49-50, 99). Henry also points out that in Scripture, this kind of a
knowledge comes from the Hebrew word "yada" and the Greek gindsko, which is
knowledge of the "most intimate" kind such as "in sexual intercourse between man and
wife" (Gen 4:1, 17, 23; Matt 1:25), and in personal communion with God (John 14:7;
17:3; Henry, "Epistemology," BDT, 185).
“Henry, "Epistemology," BDT, 185. In Henry's opinion, nonbiblical religions are
logically inconsistent (Purdy, Handbook, 262), or at least assumed to be inconsistent. The
Christian's duty is then to show this inconsistency in a nonbeliever's religion and
consistency in his own (GRA 1:237-38, 264, 401). This implies rational consistency as the
criteria forjudging true and false systems (Henry, "Epistemology," BDT, 185). Pinnock,
however, criticizes Henry on this point, stating that in order to succeed in that endeavor,
one "would first have to show the inconsistency of every system humankind has known to
eliminate the possibility of a rival, and then he would have to show the logical consistency
of the Bible axiom. Think of the learning that would be needed to master all extant systems
and the problem of showing the Bible's logical consistency given its pluriform character"
(Clark H. Pinnock, Tracking the Maze: Finding Our Way Through Modem Theology from
an Evangelical Perspective [San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1990], 47).
5Henry, "Epistemology," BDT, 185.
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The Necessity of a Fixed Objective Knowledge
Henry emphasizes the significance of revelation as an alternative to overcoming
subjectivism.1 His reaction to nonrational, nonverbal revelation is especially seen via his
strong and unsparing criticism of neoorthodoxy (in the person of Karl Barth)2 and
existentialism.3
‘GRA 1:95.
2In Henry's view, it was Barth and not Bultmann who posed a greater danger to
evangelical theology (Mohler, Baptist Theologians, 524). For some of Henry's major
criticisms against Barth, see GRA 3:225-29; 466-69; GRA 4:156, 158, 199, 261-67, 271;
Carl F. H. Henry, Fifty Years o f Protestant Theology (Boston: W. A. Wilde, 1950), 59-60,
101-102; idem, The D rift, 119-122; and for his criticism of Brunner, see Henry, Protestant
Dilemma, 10-115. Bultmann's theological downfall is briefly recounted in Henry,
Frontiers, 22-24, 26-28.
3According to Johnson (p. 210), neoorthodoxy and existentialism have been the
main targets of criticism for Henry throughout his literary career. In the case of
neoorthodoxy, Henry often picks upon its initiator, Karl Barth, and reacts to him
intensively and extensively (Garbiel Fackre, "Carl F. H. Henry," in A Handbook of
Christian Theologians, ed. Martin E. Marty and Dean G. Peerman (Nashville, TN:
Abingdon Press, 1992), 592, note 14; hereafter cited as "Fackre, Handbook" ', Patterson,
CFH, 137). In Henry’s observation, neoorthodoxy's greatest impact was in the modernist
seminaries and least in the secular academic campuses (Gods or God? 197, 307).
However, its lifespan was short. By the 1950s, it had already collapsed in America. Its
downfall was due to its failure "to honor Scripture as authoritative conceptual-verbal
revelation" (Patterson, CFH, 100). For a continuation of his criticism of neoorthodox or
dialectical theology, see Henry, Fifty Years, 80-82, 103-04; idem, CPE, 257-258. See also
David F. Wells, "Word and World: Biblical Authority and the Quandary of Modernity," in
Evangelical Affirmations, ed. Kenneth S. Kantzer and Carl F. H. Henry (Grand Rapids:
Academie Books, 1990), 158. For Henry's criticism of contemporary existentialism, see
Henry, Remaking, as well as his follow-up volumes, Protestant Dilemma and Giving a
Reason.
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Against Henry's contention for prepositional revelation, neoorthodoxy argues for a
nonpropositional, nonobjective, and personal character of revelation.1 Revelation in this
sense is a wordless divine event within a person.2 It is neither rational nor proposi-tional,3
and hence does not communicate divine truths and purposes.4 The Bible is only a "fallible
witness" to revelation and therefore not normative for Christians.5 The errors and
contradictions in the Bible only confirm its fallibility.6
In reaction to Barth, Henry regards the former's doctrine of revelation and the
Word of God as "troublesome,"7 because it leads to skepticism and subjectivism.8 If one
follows the implications of Barth's argument, no one could know that God intends to tell us
anything. Barth's rejection of prepositional revelation would mean that even Jesus Christ
‘GRA 4:200, 468. In Henry's estimation, of all 20th-century theologians, Barth
has been the most influential in rejecting the prepositional form of revelation (GRA 3:466).
The Barthian alternative either means that "God gives us only unshareable gobbledegook or
that the Bible is just a book of human guesses" (Henry, "Concerns and Considerations,"
20).
2GRA 4: 200.
3GRA 3:164, 282-283. Perhaps it is because of Barth’s denial of the rationalpropositional character of revelation that he is also against natural theology (ibid., 3:208).
4Henry, "Concerns and Considerations," 20.
5GRA 3:100. The Bible, in neoorthodoxy's view, has only a functional and not
cognitive authority. It becomes or is the Word of God when revelation takes place or when
God's voice is heard within the person of faith (Henry, "The Chicago Statement on Biblical
Inerrancy," 44).
6GRA 4:200.
7Ibid., 199.
8GRA 3:225, 435, 466; 261, 459. Henry points the finger at Kant for laying the
foundation of subjectivism (see Purdy, Handbook, 265-66).
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ceases to speak to us as God as soon as he addresses us in intelligible sentences.1 Such a
position would destroy intelligible religion, and Christianity would lose objective criteria as
the basis for knowledge.2 Consequently, it would disable a person from distinguishing
between religions or "between the one and the all,"3 or even in making sense of one's own
experience.4 A subjective or noncognitive revelation leads to "theological relativism,'6
because no opinion can be more significant than another.6 Consequently, it would
incapacitate Christianity for competing with secular views of life and history.7 A subjective
revelation also unwittingly encourages an atheistic trend because it nurtures the seeds of
prejudice against objectively revealed truths in theology.8
^ a r l Barth, cited in Gordon H. Clark, Barth's Theological Method (Philadelphia:
Presbyterian and Reformed Pub., 1963), 132, and quoted in GRA 3:468.
2GRA 3:468. Henry points out that a nonintellective revelation totally contradicts
what any reader of the Gospels can easily discover. Jesus identified Peter's affirmation of
his messianic divine sonship—"Thou art the Christ, the Son of the living God"—as an
explicitly supernatural revelation: "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona: for flesh and blood
hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Farther which is in heaven" (Matt 16:16-17, KJV;
ibid., 3:434).
3GRA 3:100.
4Henry, "The God of the Bible vs. Naturalism," 234.
5Ibid., 434. Henry also says that it is the rejection of Scripture as God's
authoritative Word that has "spawned" confusion concerning the nature of the Christian
religion and has made 'W hat is Christianity?’ such a vexing question (Henry, "What Is
Christianity?" 114).
6GRA 3: 459.
7Henry, "The God of the Bible vs. Naturalism," 234.
8GRA 6:52.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

96
Henry also sees a similar problem with existentialism, which views revelation as an
internal decision and subjective response.1 Such an idea of revelation not only does away
with objectively ordered structures and universal meaning, but tends to rely on human
emotions and will. Besides, existentialism regards as virtuous whatever makes one feel
good, and reduces religious doctrines to mere verbalizations of inner experience.2 The
consequence of such a view of revelation is that it dispenses with man's answerability for
his personal rejection of the light of revelation, and renders him impervious to revelation
itself.3 Such a revelation is apt to lead to a "situational theology,'4 and to the danger of
identifying one's subjective impressions and personal decisions with divine disclosure and
demand.s Therefore only a fixed and objective revelation can save us from the dangers of
neoorthodoxy and existentialism.

Summary and Conclusion
We have seen that Henry's doctrine of revelation arises from his assumption that
God is the self-revealing God—not that he cannot help revealing himself, but because he
voluntarily chooses to do so for his own glory, purpose, and will.6 That is, Henry wants to
lGRA 3:220-221.
2Henry, Gods or God? 4.
3GRA 3:220.
4Ibid., 3:222.
5GRA 3:433.
6"If one believes in a sovereign mind and will, in God who personally speaks and
conveys information and instruction, then the propositions of scriptural inspiration lie near
at hand" (GRA 3:428).
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especially underscore the supernatural origin of revelation. Initially, God reveals himself,
his power, and deity through general revelation. However, after the Fall, this revelation
was incorrectly or even wrongly used by sinful man, so that God saw the necessity of
supplementing it with another, namely, special revelation. The latter is more significant
because it is redemptive in its purpose.1 Moreover, special revelation is rational because it
comes from God’s mind, which is rational, and is directed towards man's mind, which is
also rational by virtue of his bearing the imago Dei.2 Such a rationality assures
meaningfulness and intelligibility of divine revelation.
Further, since revelation is meant for man, it is also given in the form that is
familiar to him, namely, in propositional human language. The combination of these two
lCarl F. H. Henry, "Inspiration," NIDCC (1974), 512; idem, Gods or God? 321.
According to Henry, the basic purpose of special revelation is redemption. As such, its
content is accordingly redemptive in character (GRA 2:86-87; Henry, Protestant Dilemma,
94, 97). Special revelation is redemptive because it publishes the good news that the holy
and merciful God promises salvation as a divine gift to man, who cannot save himself
(OT). This promise has now been fulfilled in the gift of his Son in whom all men are called
to believe (NT). "The gospel is news that the incarnate Logos has borne the sins of
doomed men, has died in their stead, and has risen for their justification. This is the fixed
center of special redemptive revelation" (idem, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 457). "In
redemptive revelation, God discloses himself in the once-for-all saving acts of JudeoChristian history, particularly in Israel's exodus from Egypt and the consequent founding
of the Hebrew nation, and in Jesus' resurrection from the tomb and the consequent
founding of the Christian church. And he is disclosed in Jesus Christ the incarnate Logos.
He is revealed, moreover, in the prophetic-apostolic Word, in the whole canon of Scripture
which objectively communicates in propositional-verbal form the content and meaning of all
God's revelation" (GRA 2:87).
2GRA 2:248. For Henry's stress on God as one "who establishes and undergirds
the cosmic significance of reason and logic" and "the logicality of faith," see Carl F. H.
Henry, "What Is Man on Earth For?" in Quest fo r Reality: Christianity and the Counter
Culture, by Carl F. H. Henry and others (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1973),
159. For his emphasis on the rational God and subsequent rational revelation, see also
Henry, "The God of the Bible vs. Naturalism," 234-37.
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forms—rational and propositional—is again significant for Henry because it means that
revelation is objective and universally shareable.1 In addition, a revelation that is both
rational and propositional is the best antidote against subjective or noncognitive forms of
revelation, which Henry feels are not publicly useful as they cannot be shared, lending
themselves to religious pluralism, relativism, contradictions, and "theological suicide."2
Finally, there is another aspect to special revelation that Henry eloquently
defends—namely, the written dimension, or Scripture/Bible. Henry states that although
revelation is not identical with the Bible, yet the Bible is identical with revelation? The
Bible is the "conduit and reservoir" of divine revelation.4 It is God's Word. And because
it originates from him, it is therefore the highest authority and ultimate norm by which all
things are to be judged and measured, including the church's actions and teachings.5
The following chapter conducts a similar study of Henry's doctrine of inspiration.
A proper understanding of his ideas on revelation and inspiration is mandatory if we are to
come to grisp with his depiction of the human role in them.
^ h e shareableness of revelation is crucial for Henry especially when he holds that
evangelism is the "primary duty" of the church without which it will face "extinction." See
Carl F. H. Henry, "America's Future: Can We Salvage the Republic?" Christianity Today,
3 March 1958, 7; idem, "The Road to Eternity," 32.
2Cross, 127.
3Henry, The Gideon, 19.
4See p. 43 above.
5Henry, Gods or God? 248; idem, Conversations, 3, 189; idem, Evangelical
Responsibility, 67-68; idem, Christian Countermoves, 113.
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CHAPTER 3

HENRY’S DOCTRINE OF INSPIRATION

The aim of this chapter is to conduct a careful study of Henry's doctrine of
inspiration so as to provide a wide exposure of the human role portrayed therein. The form
of presentation o f the doctrine is broadly similar to the one adopted in chapter 2 and is done
with the primary intention of providing a logical setting for a proper understanding of the
human dimension in Henry's doctrine of inspiration.

Presuppositions
Chapter 2 began with a synopsis of Henry's presuppositions in the context of
revelation. This chapter likewise calls for a further look into his presuppositions, the
consideration of which is also expected to deepen our comprehension of his doctrine of
inspiration. It may also be noted that, since there is a close correlation between revelation
and inspiration,1 their presuppositions are similar and, in some ways, are an elaboration of
those already presented in the preceding chapter.
lHenry says that inspiration is the correlative of revelation. Both often converge
(Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 145; GRA 4:160). Inspiration rises out of revelation
and is an intrinsic ground for positing revelation (GRA 4:70; see also GRA 3:12).
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The Triune God
God is that eternal supernatural Being, three persons1 in one essence,2 containing in
him all the perfections and attributes3 of infinity, immutability, omnipotence, omniscience,
immortality, truth, love, goodness, justice, light, righteousness, mercy, wrath, and
lMIt is God who makes himself known in self-revelation, who authorizes us to speak
of what neither the nonbiblical religions nor secular philosophy discerned, namely, that
three eternal personal distinctions coexist in the one living Godhead" (GRA 5:213; see also
Henry, The Identity o f Jesus, 78. "No fact more directly establishes the uniqueness of the
Christian view of God than that of the Trinity. It is God seen as triune and yet one—the
doctrine of Trinitarian theism—which by a single declaration sets off the Christian view of
God from all others" (Henry, Notes, 114). "Some critics consider orthodox representations
of the Trinity a mathematical monstrosity; the doctrine, they contend, is as fallacious in its
claim for the three-in-one God as is the formula 3 x = 1 x. But this description patently
distorts the doctrine. Christian theology affirms neither that three gods are one God nor
that three isolated persons are one God. Rather, it affirms three eternal personal distinctions
in the one God, in short, 3 x in 1 y. Such a formulation is both intelligible and noncontra
dictory. It is, moreover, far less complex than most mathematical formulas that engage
modern-day scientists" (GRA 5:165). For a further discussion on the Trinity, including its
significance, see ibid., 167-170, 186, 188-89, 191, 195, 210, 212-13, 215. "The Bible is
monotheistic from core to circumference. From its beginnings Christianity is no less
irreducible monotheistic than Judaism. It unwaveringly joins the Old Testament in insisting
that the living God reveals himself as the one and only God" (ibid., 169).
2"God's essence and attributes are identical." The attributes constitute God's
essence. God is "a living unity of perfections that coordinately manifests the divine
essence. To explicate the attributes is to explicate the nature of God. The attributes may
[also] be thought of as divine activities. [And] the activities are God's divine qualities or
attributes. [God is therefore] "a living personal unity of properties and activities" (ibid.,
130, 127). Similarly, the substance of God is, in the primary sense, nothing other than
God himself; the divine substance is not an essence distinguishable from divine personality
or from the divine attributes but is the very living God. God is therefore substance as
existent reality, as opposed to nonbeing or mere appearance and shadow" (ibid., 11).
3Henry sees no reason for making a distinction between "perfections" and
"attributes." Both can be used interchangeably. However, according to him, there are two
categories of divine perfections or attributes: those that God shares with his creatures
(communicable) and those that belong only to himself (incommunicable) (ibid., 99).
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judgment.1 These attributes indicate him to be the truly sovereign one who also created all
things out of his own sovereign free will.2 In his sovereignty he predestines and/or
foreordains. But this foreordination does not preclude man's free will. For instance, the
crucifixion of Jesus Christ was both a divine foreordination and a human responsibility
(Acts 2:23).3 Because God is sovereign, all nations, rulers, heavenly spirits, and angels are
answerable to him; for it is he who decides their fate. Therefore he alone is to be
worshipped, because he alone is worthy of that.4
As a triune God, he is Father, Son, and Spirit.5 As God the Father, he is the
lIbid., 135-136, 13, 81-82.
2Henry, The Drift, 133; GRA 5:167. "[God is] free to create if and as he wills, free
to provide or not to provide salvation for fallen creatures, free to covenant or not to
covenant with the Hebrews or any other peoples or with none at all. He is free also, if he
wills, to graft Gentiles into the plan of redemption, to call out a penitent church for global
witness concerning his ready forgiveness in Christ, and even to consummate history by
final judgment on all men and nations" (GRA 6:76).
3GRA 5:284.
“Henry, Twilight, 119-20; GRA 6:21, 72, 110, 422; GRA 5:17; Henry, The God
Who Shows, 10; GRA 3:22, 65-66, 12.
SGRA 5:168, 187, 191. God's name [not names] is Father, Son and Holy Spirit;
and yet that name is also his "inmost being" (Henry, Notes, 114, 116, italics original).
These three personal distinctions within the divine essence, however, should not be
confused with polytheism, or tritheism, or unipersonalism. The Christian concept of God
is a "trinitarian monotheism" (ibid., 116). Christian theism "is three-fold in his oneness"
(ibid., italics original). Knowledge of this triune God, however, came only after the
incarnation of the Logos as Son, but the OT does provide hints of the trinity (ibid., 117).
"Eliminate [the] incarnation—as Judaism and Mohammedanism refuse to acknowledge
it—and the case for trinitarian theism is not inevitable for faith; because triunity becomes
the insight of faith only when God is seen as the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ—that in
Him God has come in person" (ibid., 118).
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independent, transcendent creator, and preserver;1 as God the Son, he is the sole agent of
creation, mediator of revelation and redemption, the final judge of mankind,2 and the
accomplisher of creation's goal.3 As God the Holy Spirit, he is the personal instrumentality
by whom God, through the Logos, inspires the prophetic-apostolic oral and written
proclamation.4 The Holy Spirit is the communicator and conveyor of divine knowledge
and/or truths, the author of Scriptures5 as well as their illuminator and interpreter.6 It is he
‘GRA 1:34; GRA 5:11-12, 17, 67. "Were it not for his staying power, man and the
world would crumble into dust and disappear into nothingness" (GRA 5:17).
2,'[At the judgment,] he will finally vindicate eternal righteousness throughout the
cosmic and creaturely world, and transform it into a new heavens [sic] and a new earth.
Someday the righteous Lord will summon us into his presence and never will God stand
taller than when the impenitent wicked stand trial and he acquits the penitent on the ground
o f Christ's substitutionary death alone, while he condemns the perverse who have spurned
the proffer of redemption. God will reign in full and final triumph when death is conquered
and Christ the Victor restores all things to the Father's authority (1 Cor 15:28); righteous
ness will once again prevail throughout the created sphere, and evil will meet its decisive
doom. Only that which has its stay in God who stands, stoops and stays will abide, and
abide forever" (GRA 5:17; GRA 3:65-66; GRA 4:213. For a fuller exposition of Christ's
second coming and the ensuing final judgement, see Carl F. H. Henry, "Jesus Christ and
the Last Days,” in Prophecy in the Making: Messages Prepared fo r the Jerusalem
Conference and Biblical Prophecy, ed. Carl F. H. Henry (Carol Stream, IL: Creation
House, 1971), 169-183.
3GRA 3:16, 67.
4GRA 4:272; 276.
SGRA 2:13; GRA 4:272; GRA 4:280. Scripture is the "product of the Holy Spirit"
(ibid., 419). He is the inspirer of the originals (ibid., 250).
6In Henry, illumination refers to the "ever-increasing Christian enlightenment in the
inspired prophetic-apostolic revelation." The Spirit illumines the truth, not by unveiling
some hidden inner mystical content behind the revelation . . . , but by focussing on the
truth of revelation as it is. The Spirit illumines and interprets by repeating the grammatical
sense of Scripture; and by leading us to the expressed teaching of the text (GRA 4:129,
252, 276; GRA 3:203). But in so doing he in no way alters or expands the truth of
revelation (GRA 4:283). However, Henry does also acknowledge that there is more to
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also who regenerates, indwells, sanctifies, and guides believers.1

Fallen Man
Man is the crown of creation,2 endowed with moral righteousness,3 and especially
created for spiritual and rational-verbal relationship with God.4 This exceptional status
provides him with a unique prospect for eternal fellowship with the Deity.3 But a disaster
struck him when he fell into sin. This fall, however, was not due to any inherent flaw in
his nature but rather to his own choice.6 Since he revolted against God, man is now a
sinner, and powerless to save himself.7
illumination than what he has said; but that is something which Scripture itself has not
informed us any more than it has about the how of inspiration and divine incarnation in
Jesus Christ (GRA 4:277). On the mystery of the modus operandi of inspiration, see also
ibid., 213; 277; and Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 77.
‘GRA 4:272.
2Henry, "John," 157.
3Henry, The Uneasy Conscience, 68.
4GRA 3:376.
sHenry, "John," 157.
6Henry, The Uneasy Conscience, 69; GRA 1:34; and Carl F. H. Henry, "Man's
Dilemma: Sin," in The Wordfo r This Century, ed. Merrill C. Tenney (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1960), 16-17. "Man’s transgression . . . was . . . not an inevitable con
comitant o f human fmiteness but rather as issuing from an act of voluntary rebellion. In
such a framework there was little room for a philosophy of the inherent goodness of man"
(idem, Remaking, 59; see also idem, Protestant Dilemma, 219, where Henry says that
man’s fall was an abnormal rather than a normal happening and in no way was it based on
his nature).
7Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 97, italics original; idem, Remaking, 69; idem, CPE,
105, 191, 392-93. In contrast to the biblical teaching about the condition of man after the
Fall, the evolutionary philosophies furnished the modem mind with a cosmic guarantee of
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The Fall brings about a "radical defect" in man's nature.1 It deprives his original
righteousness and enslaves him to a perverted will, which inevitably results in the
undermining of the realization of his ideals and distorting of his moral insights.2 Man is the
problem of problems,3 and the most "frustrated species."4 As sinner, he is hopelessly
doomed to death—and would have had no chance of escape had it not been for God who,
out of his own freewill and holy love,5 delivered him through Jesus Christ, who is the only
human perfectibility (Henry, Remaking, 62). "To consider man potentially or essentially
good unbends the biblical view of sin" (GRA 6:259). Henry, "John," 157; GRA 2:526.
Henry pointed to the debate between Brunner and Barth on the effects of the Fall upon the
imago Dei and natural theology. Briefly, Henry is on the side of Brunner who is against
Barth for advocating a complete eradication of the imago by the Fall. He is also on the side
of Brunner for espousing general revelation, but differs with his reduction of this revelation
to conscience. However, Henry agrees with both Barth and Brunner for their rejection of
natural theology; but disagrees with their view of revelation as nonobjective, nonrational,
and nonpropositional (see GRA 1:396-99; GRA 2:127-28; GRA 3:164; 282-283, 431, 496;
and Henry in Gaebelein, 6). For a complete account of the debate between Brunner and
Barth, see Brunner and Barth, Natural Theology.
lHenry speaks of "the fierce sinfulness of man" (GRA 2:26).
2Henry, CPE, 181; idem, Protestant Dilemma, 19; idem, Remaking, 59, 265.
3Carl F. H. Henry, New Strides o f Faith (Chicago: Moody, 1972), 15.
4GRA 1:143.
sHenry, Notes, 111; idem, "John," 157, 159; idem, "Reply to Objections," 1-2;
GRA 1:34. God’s love stands for his "tender concern for man" despite his sinful ways. It
refers to his desire to rescue man from death to immortality, and in providing him a higher
quality of life fit for eternity. Further, God's love is also to be understood as his grace,
which is "unmerited divine favor." It is only when love is understood in that way that it is
understood aright. Moreover, Henry also holds that God's love does not stand by itself
without his holiness. The two should therefore be emphasized side by side (idem, Notes,
108-11).
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means of salvation.1 However, it is only at the eschaton that man will be completely
regenerated, conformed to Christ’s image, redeemed, and adopted into divine sonship.2

The Inscripturated Revelation
The holy Scriptures are God's special revelation3 and a "unique mode of divine
disclosure,”4 given to chosen men through the medium of human language.5 The Scriptures
bring us not only astonishing information about God's dealings and salvation, but require a
decision that encompasses the whole self. The comprehension of revelation, however, is
not to be confused with the appropriation of salvation. "6 Revelation per se, and even a
knowledge of it, does not bring man salvation. It is what he does with the knowledge of
Scripture that determines the verdict at the judgment day.7
‘Henry, "The Road to Eternity," 38; GRA 3:16; GRA 1:265. "While the classic
moral philosophers and founders of other world religions teach that man may and should
achieve moral perfection by the gradual improvement of his present nature, Christianity
teaches, to the contrary, that only through the atoning death of Christ and the regeneration
and sanctification o f the Holy Spirit is fallen man restored to fellowship with his righteous
Creator and to holiness. The sinner's plight is such, says the Christian religion, that he
needs supernatural rescue; in the terms of Scripture, he requires nothing less than
justification, regeneration and sanctification" (idem, The God Who Shows, 78-79).
2Carl F. H. Henry, "Man," B D T(1964), 341; idem, "Man's Dilemma: Sin," 9.
3GRA2:19, 15-16; Henry, "Revelation and the Bible—2," 16.
4GRA 4:43-44; Henry, "Revelation and the Bible—2," 16.
5Henry says that the regard for Scripture as God's special revelation (or Word) is an
indisputable character of Christian faith and commitment (see Henry in Gaebelein, 26;
Henry, CPE, 264-265).
6GRA 2:44-45.
7Ibid., 44.
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The Nature of Biblical Inspiration
Chapter 2 indicates that Henry's exposition of revelation follows a traditional
understanding. His presentation of the doctrine of inspiration has likewise not deviated
from that understanding. This observation becomes more obvious as the discussion
proceeds. I begin this investigation by looking at Henry's definition of inspiration.

Definition
Henry provides the meaning of inspiration in both negative and positive ways.
Negatively, Inspiration is not God's heightening of the psychic powers or creative energies
of prophets and apostles. Neither is it the striking manifestation of artistic, literary, or
poetic genius of the writer.1 Nor does it refer merely to mental concepts in distinction from
words.2 Rather, inspiration is a supernatural influence upon divinely chosen prophets and
apostles whereby the Spirit of God guarantees the truth and trustworthiness of their oral and
written proclamation.3 More specifically,
Inspiration is that supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit whereby the sacred writers
were divinely supervised in their production of Scripture, being restrained from error
and guided in the choice o f words they used, consistently with their disparate
personalities and stylistic peculiarities.“
*GRA 4:142.
2Ibid., 143.
3GRA4:129, caps original; see also Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 145;
idem, "Inspiration," MDCC, 512. Fackre's study of Henry also yields a similar definition:
"Inspiration means the ever-present concursive operation of the Holy Spirit in the writing
process and the superintendence of the same, so that what is produced is always what God
intends and as such is errorless" (Fackre, Handbook, 591; see also GRA 4:213).
“Henry in Gaebelein, 25; italics original.
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Verbal-Plenary Inspiration
Henry is a subscriber to verbal inspiration, which he also calls the orthodox,
evangelical, or biblical view.1 For him, verbal expression is an integral part of inspiration
because thoughts cannot be expressed without words. Regarding this inspiration, Henry
says:
The text of Scripture is divinely inspired as an objective deposit of language. The
attack on verbal inspiration in the orthodox sense is always an assault on the Bible as a
linguistic revelatory deposit. The biblical and evangelical view does not limit divine
inspiration as an activity internal to the psyche of the writers, but recognizes its
importance beyond the subjective psychology of the chosen prophets and apostles. The
non-biblical notions of inspiration obscure the nature of biblical inspiration by asserting
the inspiration of only the writers, and not of the written truths they enunciate. The
biblical doctrine of inspiration, on the other hand, connects God's activity with the
expressed truths and words of Scripture. The New Testament teaching correlates
inspiration with the sacred writings and their verbal statements. Evangelicals
emphasize revealed truths and verbal inspiration side by side.2
For Henry, the espousal of verbal inspiration not only points to the text (instead of
the writer) as the locus of inspiration, but implies a rejection of non-verbal and subjective
theories of inspiration. What Henry is saying is that we are not to accept the idea of
inspiration that sees it as a Spirit-induced, internal, psychological state of the writer because
such an anthropologically-oriented concept of inspiration is nonbiblical, antibiblical, and
paganistic, and it indicates God's relationship to Scripture as being only "before, above, or
behind the Bible, and hence is prior or superior to the writings." To hold to this nonevan
lGRA 4:144, 162, 66.
2GRA 4:144; see also Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 120; and Patterson, CFH, 112-
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gelical theory of inspiration is to confuse prophetic-apostolic experience with inspiration.1
Henry also says that a subjectively-oriented theory of inspiration leads to the
rejection of objective truth in favor of subjective truth, predisposes one to believe in the
infallibility of the modem worldview,2 limits truth to personal preferences, and betrays a
prejudice against objective transcendently given truths.3 Such a theory rules out universally
valid truth. To hold that all assertions about history and reality reflect the creative
contribution of the knower, is to ask: By what special revelational prerogative was this
profoundly important information, if valid, vouchsafed to its advocates like Heidegger and
Bultmann?4 If one can rely on the exclusive validity of subjective truth as against objective
truth, without revelation and with one’s own historical and cultural limitations, then why
cannot the other rely on the objective truths vouchsafed through divine revelation?
Therefore such claims about subjective truth as being the only truth not only betrays a
prejudice against objective truths transcendently given through revelation and inspiration,
but harbors the prejudice that treats the modem worldview as infallible. What is important
to know is that although the prophets and apostles were limited by their culture and times,
yet "they did not teach as doctrine the doubtful views of the cultures in which they lived. "5
■GRA 4:142-143.
2Because of this dignification of the modem view, Henry maintains that even if the
prophet were to possess the knowledge of the twentieth century, that would not make him
any more infallible than anyone else (ibid., 152).
3Ibid.
“Ibid.
5Ibid.
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In addition to being verbal, inspiration for Henry is also plenary. That is,
inspiration extends to the writings in their totality, in the whole and in the parts,1 including
the very words themselves.2 For this reason it can be said that the word of God and those
of the prophets are coextensive, interchangeable, and identical.3 That is the historic
evangelical teaching.4 Further, "plenary inspiration guarantees the trustworthiness of
biblical teaching in all its parts and minutiae, as well as in the whole. When personal
salvation and eternal destiny are at stake, even the details of Jesus' and the apostles'
teaching are indisputably important."5 Thus, plenary inspiration renders the Scriptures
final and complete.6
Henry also asserts that verbal-plenary inspiration rules out ± e following theories:
dictation, degree, and thought inspiration. Regarding his denial of the first theory of
inspiration, Henry makes the following remarks:
[The idea] that the Holy Scriptures are a product of mechanical dictation [is] untrue to
the Scriptures, unrepresentative of evangelical doctrine, and prejudicial to theological
understanding. Neither the Bible nor standard evangelical theological works teach this
extreme view. . . . Inspiration did not occur ex machina but crowned a long period of
providential preparation involving diverse experiences.7
‘Ibid., 162, see also ibid., 160.
2Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 77; GRA 4:145.
3GRA 4:159, 49-50.
“Ibid., 160.
sHenry's allusion to Warfield, in GRA 4:71.
6Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 77.
7GRA 4:138; 140; 146. For amplification of Henry's rejection of dictation theory,
see ibid., 138-142.
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Moreover, the differing authorial personalities and stylistic peculiarities attested in the
Scriptures also rule out supernatural dictation.1
The evangelical teaching on inspiration likewise precludes the unbiblical notion of
"degrees" of inspiration where some parts of Scripture are held to be more inspired than
others and some not inspired at all.2 To limit inspiration only to certain portions of
Scripture is to pay respect to a philosophical or cultural regnancy in their own time.3 "The
idea of degrees o f inspiration, a notion found in Philo and borrowed from Plato, has no
support in the biblical narratives."4 Similarly, verbal-plenary inspiration also wards off the
notion that only thoughts and ideas were inspired, while the language in which these ideas
are verbalized is left to the unaided faculties of the sacred penman. Such a position is both
theologically and philosophically unsound because "thought of necessity takes shape and is
^ i d . , 138, 150. Though Henry admits that some parts of the Bible are a result of
divine dictation, such as the Decalogue and the words of Jesus, yet he makes it clear that
this is only an exception to the rule (ibid., 348; Henry, "The Chicago Statement," 45).
That is, Henry does not subscribe to the mechanical dictation theory of inspiration (see
GRA 3:411, 415; GRA 4:141, 206; Fackre, Handbook, 591; Henry, Protestant Dilemma,
75).
2GRA 4:160. Henry maintains that no theologian has adduced objective criteria for
discriminating that which he presumes to be errant in Scripture from that which he contends
to be trustworthy. If one assumes that the biblical writers are to be trusted only where their
assertions can be presently validated, one distrusts the writers, finding them credible on
grounds other than their supposed divine inspiration (Henry, "Inspiration," NIDCC, 512).
For the implications of a selective usage of Scripture on the basis of the degree concept of
inspiration, see GRA 4:253-255; see also Carl F. H. Henry, "Biblical Authority and the
Social Crisis," in Authority and Interpretation: A Baptist Perspective, ed. Duane A. Garrett
and Richard R. Melick [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987], 204).
3GRA 4:251.
4Ibid., 160. Logically, Henry's acceptance of plenary inspiration would of itself
rule out degree inspiration.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Ill
expressed in words. If there is inspiration at all, it must penetrate words as well as
thoughts, must mold the expression, and make the language amply the living medium of
the idea to be conveyed.
In order to emphasize the importance or significance of verbal inspiration for the
church, Henry points out that even Barr himself sees the danger in ignoring it. Such an
attitude can lead from the
loss of priority for divine revelation and authority, to the loss also of validity for the
teaching of Jesus, and finally to a welcome for the fallible teaching of contemporary
critics as a divine voice within the church. [In view of this,] it will be well to probe
anew the evangelical insistence on verbal-plenary inspiration on its own terms.2
Henry further stresses the indispensability of verbal inspiration by pointing out that a non
verbal revelation/inspiration predisposes one to the dangers of gnosticism, irrationalism,
skepticism, and mysticism.3
‘James Orr quoted approvingly in Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 120, n. 145.
2GRA 4:151; see also 139-40.
3Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 115; see also GRA 4:158, 267. In support of the
verbal-plenary inspiration of Scripture, Henry indicates that it is also the historic doctrine
of all major Christian denominations (GRA 4:160). In this connection he points to two
major Christian bodies that have taken an exception: the United Presbyterian Church (USA)
and the Roman Catholic Church. The former, at the 179th General Assembly (1967),
abandoned the view of the Westminster Confession that the Bible is the Word of God
written, in favor of the modem critical view. The latter (i.e., Roman Catholic Church),
while still holding to the Bible as the Word of God, yet "nullifies" its (Scripture/Bible)
authority on account of its correlation with oral tradition and particularly with the teaching
authority of the church (ibid., 160-161).
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Inerrant Inspiration1
In addition to being verbal-plenary, Henry also maintains that biblical inspiration
necessitates the acceptance of inerrancy of that which has been written. Thus, inspiration
and inerrancy are inseparable because the latter is logically deducible from, and a necessary
correlative of, the former.2 If one is uncomfortable with the one, he is equally
uncomfortable with the other.3 Henry's justification for this position is that revelation's
purity needs to be preserved if its effectiveness for mankind is to be guaranteed. To do
that, God had to safeguard the human writers of revelation so that they would not introduce
‘Mohler noted that Henry's study of biblical inerrancy is "one of the most thorough
treatments in the evangelical literature" (Mohler, Baptist Theologians, 528). Perhaps
Henry’s prolonged interest in the subject (inerrancy) is understandable when one considers
Rice's observation that "inerrancy is the single most-debated issue among evangelicals"
(Richard Rice, review of GRA 1-4, in Religious Studies Review 7 (April 1981): 112;
hereafter cited as "Rice, review, GRA1-4." According to Henry, inerrancy is an ancient
doctrine of the church, having its origin in the NT period; and has been part of the church’s
life and faith. It was held by the 17th century orthodox Christianity, the Reformers, the
schoolmen, the church fathers, and the Lord Jesus Christ himself who said: "Scripture
cannot be broken”; "Thy Word is truth" (GRA 4:368). Inerrancy, as an issue, has
therefore been a recent phenomenon, no longer than 150 years old (ibid., 367, 369).
2Though Henry admits that inerrancy is not explicitly taught in the Bible, yet the
concept can be shown to be rationally defensible (Carl F. H. Henry, review of The Battle
fo r the Bible, by Harold Lindsell, The Scribe, 1 June 1976, 3; hereafter to be cited as
"Henry, review of The Battle" -, idem, Conversations, 25; GRA 4:367-68). Henry
maintains that there are neither biblical, philosophical, nor theological criteria to distinguish
between what constitutes errant and inerrant statements in Scripture so that a rejection of
inerrancy has little justification. Moreover, the demand for producing the inerrant
autographs is as difficult as it is to produce the errant ones. In fact, it is more difficult to
produce errant than inerrant originals (GRA 4:208; idem, Henry at His Best, 29).
3GRA 4:194. Henry also argues that "if the originals were errant, then textual
criticism would expect to give us no more truthful reading, but only ancient ones" (ibid.,
209). In fact, textual criticism attempts to arrive at the best possible text by assuming the
normativeness and inerrancy of the originals (ibid., 245).
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any form of error in both thought and word. The method God chose to accomplish that
was divine inspiration which resulted in an inerrant written revelation or Scripture.1
But what is inerrancy? It means being completely "free from all falsehood or
mistake and so safeguards the truth that Holy Scripture is entirely true and trustworthy in
all its assertions."2 This is another way of stating that inspiration renders what is written
error-free.3
Henry also defines inerrancy in two other ways: negative and positive; or what is
not and what is inerrancy. Negatively,
1. Inerrancy does not refer to the modem, scientific, or technological type of
accuracy by which we are to verify the biblical data on statistics, measurements, historical
data, or cosmological matters.4
2. It does not mean that the NT quotes the OT verbatim.
3. It does not mean that religious truth is conveyable only in a non-metaphorical or
non-symbolic language.
1GRA4:188, 240, 249.
2Ibid„ 217.
3GRA 2:14; see also Henry in Gaebelein, 35; and GRA 4:206-07, 244, 249.
4Although "the Bible is not intended to be a textbook on scientific and historical
matters, [yet] it does give scientifically and historically relevant information." The Genesis
account of the origin of life, the Exodus, the Gospel accounts of Jesus' life, death, and
resur-rection are all historically and literally true (Patterson, CFH, 118). If we cannot rely
on them (the Gospels and Epistles) to tell the truth then "we can say little or nothing about
Jesus Christ whom they present" (GRA 4:366). "The Bible is conditioned by its
environment, but this does not make it unscientific. The Bible is expressed in the idiom of
its age, but it has important things to say about origins, nature, history and the future"
(Patterson, CFH, 118).
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4. Verbal inerrancy does entail the replacing of Christ as the object of one's faith
with the trustworthy Bible.
5. It does not imply that evangelical orthodoxy is a result or consequence of
accepting inerrancy.1
Positively, however, inerrancy means that
1. "Truth attaches not only to the theological and ethical teachings, but also to
historical and scientific matters insofar as they are part of the expressed message of the
inspired writings. "2
2. God's truth inheres in the very words of the Bible; that is, in the propositions,
and not merely in the concepts and thoughts of its authors.3
3. The original writings or prophetic-apostolic autographs alone are inerrant.
4. "Verbal inerrancy of the autographs implies that evangelicals must not attach
finality to contemporary versions or translations, least of all to mere paraphrases, but must
pursue and honor the best text. "4
lGRA 4:201-204.
2Ibid„ 205.
3Ibid., 205. Inerrancy is not a personal property of the prophets and apostles. It
does not reside in them, nor in their intentions as authors, but only in what they have
written under inspiration (ibid., 175, 224).
“Ibid., 205-10; see also ibid., 178; 210; GRA 2:14; Patterson, CFH, 118-119. In
this connection, Joseph Karanja sums up into 3 points Henry's criteria or conditions for
establishing an apparent error as actual error. The criteria, however, are those advanced
by A. A. Hodge and B. B. Warfield, which are as follows: (1) that the error in question
actually occurred in the autographs; (2) that the interpretation which occasions the apparent
discrepancy is the one which the passage was evidently intended to bear; (3) that the true
sense of the original is directly and necessarily inconsistent with some certainly known fact
of history or truth of science (see Joseph Karanja, "Inerrancy and Sovereignty: A Case
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From the foregoing discussion, inerrancy points to three significant notions for
Henry: (1) that inspiration is the guarantee as well as causal factor of inerrancy; (2) that
inerrancy extends to theological, ethical, historical, and scientific matters, along with
thoughts and words; and (3) that inspiration is an exclusive experience of the prophets and
apostles and therefore only what they originally wrote was inspired and, hence, inerrant.
Elaborating on this exclusivism of inspiration, Henry goes on to state that
inspiration is a one-time occurrence and limited only to "a small company of messengers
who were divinely chosen to authoritatively communicate the Word of God to mankind,"
and not to certain men/women at all times.1 In other words, inspiration terminated with the
apostles and their immediate writings.2 For that matter, even the prophets and apostles
themselves did not always remain under inspiration. And when out of it, they were like
any other men, prone to errors, and in fact "frequently made them."3 This means that
Study on Carl F. H. Henry" [M.Th. thesis, Andrews University, 1990], 43; Warfield
concluded that, so far, these conditions have not been successfully met (Hodge and
Warfield, 36). Nevertheless, this does not mean that there are no difficulties in the Bible
(see two examples in Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 74). But whenever one encounters such
a difficulty, one is asked to recognize the tentativeness of empirical tests; exercise patience
with the assumption that the biblical record would be validated at some future time; and
exercise confidence in archaeological discoveries that might help in the resolution (Fackre,
Handbook, 594). Because of this, Henry is rather optimistic about the possibilities of
resolving any remaining biblical difficulties. But as for now, he does recognize that the
scriptural phenomena are not always compatible with inerrancy. Accordingly, he feels that
it is better to leave some passages unharmonized than to forge them into an artificial or
forced harmony (GRA 4:172; 174-75).
‘GRA 4:152.
2Ibid., 244.
3Ibid., 151. "Inspiration does not put "an end to their [prophets and apostles]
human fallibility" (Henry, "Inspiration," NIDCC, 512).
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"God's inspiration is vouchsafed only in a special time and special place and special way,
and not always and everywhere."1 That is, the phenomena of revelation and inspiration do
not continue into the present day, even on a sporadic basis.2
This limitation of inspiration to the Bible writers also implies a preclusion of
inspiration outside the Bible. Henry gives the following reasons:
[To extend inspiration] to prescriptural tradition and to postbiblical tradition in effect
undermines the historic Jewish and historic Christian insistence on a unique canon of
books distinguished from all others by their divine inspiration. Moreover, it
operatively substitutes a fluid canon of tradition, suspended in turn upon the changing
valuational assessment of the momentarily regnant critical school, which tends to
dignify its preferred views as contemporary church tradition and as the authentic
distillation of the biblical tradition. The writings which are then readily viewed as
exceptionally inspired are those containing the novel constructions of contemporary
critical scholars.3
Moreover, to identify as inspiration anything that a person wills—including even that which
is antibiblical—is to make "pointless" the teaching that Scripture is God-breathed
(2 Tim 3:16).4
It should be pointed out, however, that although Henry emphasizes the importance
of inerrancy, yet he also realizes the need to state its status among the rest of the doctrines
of the church. Although he admits that inerrancy is clearly implied and logically deduced
‘GRA 4:154.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 148.
4Ibid., 153. The tendency to attribute inspiration to pre- and post- and even antiScripture arises out of the philosophy of exaggerated divine immanence which puts all men
and history in the same plane, and raises the modernist to the plane of superior religious
insight because he comes at the end of the evolutionary development (ibid., 153-54).
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from inspiration,1 yet he also acknowledges that it is not explicitly taught in the Bible. As
such,

inerrancy is not the first thing to be declared of Scripture.2 One is not to wholly

rest Christian theism on this doctrine; neither should it be made a primary issue in the
discussion of Scripture;3 nor is it to be used as an identifying badge of evangelical
authenticity.4 Furthermore, rejecting inerrancy does not lead one to repudiate other
evangelical doctrines.s However, as far as Henry is concerned, those who repudiate the
doctrine are not consistent evangelicals,6 and their holding to the rest of the doctrines no
longer can be sustained on the basis of epistemic principle but by an act of the will.7 That
‘Henry, review of The Battle, 3.
2GRA 4:366. Patterson {CFH, 116) pointed out that Henry is not militant on iner
rancy; but wanted "to strike a balance between overbelief (which seeks to protect the Bible
from its own humanity) and underbelief (which expects too little from the biblical text)."
3Carl F. H. Henry, "Reaction and Realignment," Christianity Today, 2 July 1976,
30.
4Carl F. H. Henry, review of The Battle fo r the Bible, by Harold Lindsell, in The
New Review of Books on Religion I (September 1976): 7; see also Henry, Conversations,
23-24.
5Carl F. H. Henry, Evangelicals in Search of Identity (Waco, TX: Word Books,
1976), 55.
6Henry, Conversations, 23-25; italics supplied.
7Henry, review of The Battle, 3. "A volitional faith may also affirm that God can
and does use poor grammar and may equally use errant statements and resort therefore to a
theology of paradox" (idem, Evangelicals in Search, 55). To correlate errancy with
inspiration is to opt for illogicality (GRA 4:154). Rejection of the doctrine of inerrancy is
likely to lead to other concessions and compromises and an unstable epistemology (Henry,
review of The Battle, 3). That is, one cannot simply hold to the doctrine on the basis of
confession alone. It must be supported with theologically reasoned arguments. As
evangelicals, we have the duty of exhibiting "the doctrine's rational roots and openly
display its intellectual fruits" (Henry, Evangelicals in Search, 56).
It should be noted that despite his clarifications with respect to the status of the
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is, how can they assume the errorless of those doctrines when at the same time they deny
the inerrancy of Scripture which is the source of the doctrines?

Autographs and Copies: Their Relationship
Because inerrancy is strictly the resulting effect of inspiration, whatever degree of
identity the copies may have with the originals1 is due to the painstaking expertise and skills
of the copyists and not the Holy Spirit's special action upon them.2 This degree of identity
is further reduced when copies are translated to another language.3 Depending on the
extent of reduction, Henry accordingly assigns varying degrees of value to all families of
doctrine of inerrancy, yet Henry seems to fall back into a defensive position when he says
that one is tempted to ask how often God can err and be God (cf. Heb 6:18; Titus 1:2)
(GRA 4:192). Henry firmly upholds the doctrine's indispensability when he states that the
inerrancy of the autographs is essential because Scripture has to do with the destiny of the
human soul. Only a flawless Scripture can "get at the truth in the clearest possible
affirmation" (Henry, interview by author).
‘Henry is on the side of Westcott and Hort who maintain that the copies are
999/1000 continuous with the originals (Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 73; see also GRA
4:235). This implies that copies do have errors (GRA 4:218, 253). Henry says that copies
are errant because God has nowhere promised the inerrant transmission of the originals
(ibid., 218). Therefore claims for inerrancy are not in principle to be extended beyond the
originally inspired scriptural writings, even if the extant ancient copies, despite minor
textual variations, give the impression of comprehensive identity even in details.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that all copies from the first necessarily contain errors
(ibid., 244). Nothing requires or demands that such reproductions of the inspired originals
be errant, in view of the care exercised in copying important manuscripts, particularly in
copying Scripture (ibid., 220). However, Henry does admit the errancy of copies but only
in the minutiae, not involving any doctrinal faith (Henry, interview with author; see also
GRA 4:225, and 241, where Henry speaks of "errant copies").
2GRA 4:220. The extension of inspiration to copies would imply confusion because
it opens the probability of having everyone staking his claim to inspiration (Henry,
interview with author).
3Ibid., 178, 210, 218.
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texts, versions, and translations.1 The copies and translations, however, are still the Word
of God because they maintain the epistemic and verbal continuity with the autographs,2
including the KJV, which is based on inferior manuscripts.3 Moreover, since the
autographs are no longer available to us, one is completely dependent upon the copies for
knowledge of God’s provision, including his Son, Jesus Christ.4

Infallible Copies5
On the one hand, it is noticed that Henry does not consider copies inerrant because
they were not produced under inspiration. On the other hand, it has also been observed
that he insists upon their verbal and epistemic continuity with the originals. Consequently,
the copies are held by him to be infallible; that is, not prone to error.6 Infallibility for
Henry also denotes that "quality of neither misleading nor being misled and so safeguards
in categorical terms the truth that Holy Scripture is a sure, safe, and reliable rule and guide
lPatterson, CFH, 120.
2GRA 4:210, 218-19, 244, 249.
3Ibid., 210.
“Ibid., 179, 181; GRA 3:76-77.
5Henry says that there is no biblical basis for the inerrancy of the copies (GRA
4:242). He also observes that infallibility is not a biblical term. Like the word
"inspiration,” it entered theological discussion through medieval Latin (ibid., 222). Except
for the KJV rendering of Acts 1:3 as "infallible proofs," later versions do not use the word
because it does not occur in the Greek; nor does it figure significantly in Reformation
theology as a dogmatic concept. It is in the church of Rome that the term (infallibility) is
used with dogmatic status, which can further be traced to Thomas Aquinas who correlated
it with papal infallibility in dogmatic theology (ibid., 222-223).
6GRA 4:246, 249, 204, 253.
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in all matters."1 Although copies are subject to "incidental verbal variation and linguistic
deviation,"2 yet we can trust them because they faithfully convey the propositional truth of
the original,3 and infallibly lead the penitent sinner to salvation.4
Moreover, just as inerrancy has both negative and positive implications, so also
does infallibility.5 On the negative side,
1. Infallibility does not mean that it be identified with inspiration which belongs
only to the originals.6
2. Infallibility is not to be used as a synonym for inerrancy.
3. Infallibility is not a personal property of the copyists and translators anymore
than inerrancy is a personal property of the prophet or apostles; and
4. That all families of texts, versions, and translations are equally adequate.7 On
the positive side, however,
Tbid.,217.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 220.
4GRA 2:14.
sThe points that follow are based on GRA 4:246-253.
6"If there are no inerrant autographs then no objective textual basis exists for distin
guishing fact from fancy, as the confusion of the critics abundantly attests" (ibid., 234).
7Ibid., 245. Henry refers to Bruce M. Metzger's observation that one’s language
cannot fully convey the features of another (ibid.).
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1. Infallibility implies that copies do "reliably and authoritatively communicate"
God's truths and purposes to mankind—especially those that faithfully and accurately follow
the autographs.1
2. Copies "unfailingly direct mankind to God's proffer of redemption" (2 Tim 3:15;
Isa 55:11).
3. Copies are the adequate "conceptual framework" by means of which the Holy
Spirit "impresses upon human beings their created dignity and duty, their ongoing
answerability for moral revolt, and the differing destinies of believers and unbelievers."2
4. Copies expound God's will, purpose, and truth with clarity so that even the
unlearned can understand.3
5. Copies preserve the only sufficient divine rule of faith and conduct both for the
individual and the church.4
‘Ibid., 246-447.
2Ibid., 250.
3The New Testament was written for the masses (ibid., 251-252).
4Ibid., 252.
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Evidences for Biblical Inspiration
The Teaching of Scripture
For Henry, Scripture is the proper starting point for the teaching of inspiration
because, there, the doctrine is explicitly taught.1 The 3800 times where the prophets
declare "Thus saith the Lord" are indicative of inspiration.2 In this connection, Henry
especially refers to two passages as having a direct scriptural testimony to inspiration:
2 Tim 3:14-16 and 2 Pet 1:19-21.3 Let us take a look at the way Henry understands these
texts.

2 Tim 3:14-16
Henry considers 2 Tim 3 :14-164 a classic NT verse on inspiration,5 and rejects the
distinction made by some between "every" and "all" Scripture. For him, a portion of
Scripture is no less inspired than all portions taken together as a whole. However, what is
more significant for Henry is the word theopneustos (vs. 16), translated by some versions
‘Henry, The Gideon, 13; idem, "Inspiration," BDT, 286; idem, review of The
Battle, 3. Henry admits that although inspiration is as clearly taught in Scripture as the
virgin birth, yet "it lies rather in the hinterland" (Henry, review of The Battle, 3).
2Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 82.
3GRA 4:131.
4"But as for you, continue in what you have learned and firmly believed, knowing
from whom you learned it, and how from childhood you have known the sacred writings
that are able to instruct you for salvation through faith in Christ Jesus. All Scripture is
inspired by God and is useful for teaching, for reproof, for correction, and for training in
righteousness" (NRSV).
SGRA 3:424.
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as "inspired" or "inspiration"—either of which is a doubtful or unsatisfactory rendering.
The word is actually to be understood not as "breathing into" but "breathing out," or better,
"God-breathed."1 The difference between "breathing into" and "breathing out" is
significant. The first "merely approximates the Scriptures to revelation, whereas the
second identifies Scripture with revelation;2 that is, God is identified as the author of
Scripture, or the "product of his creative breath."3 Because of this, Henry prefers that
theopneustos be translated as "spirated" instead of "inspired."4
In the same vein, he also prefers "inspiredness" to "inspirating," because the latter
points to "the subjective psychological mood of the writer overmastered by the divine
afflatus,"5 and suggests the inspiration of the writer rather than the text, thus contrasting
between the inspired writer and his text. Henry does not allow such a contrast, because
both writer and text were equally inspired.6 For him, however, holding to the inspiration
of the text is particularly significant because it is only then that one can speak of the text as
the Word of God, authoritative and normative.7 It is this divine "breathing out" that
lGRA 4:130-32, 94; GRA 3:37.
2GRA 4:162.
3Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 145.
“Ibid., 145; GRA 3:37; GRA 4:94.
5Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 146.
6GRA 4:406; see also Henry to Kharbteng, 30 August 1993.
7GRA 4:93-94. "Inspiration is primarily a statement about God's relationship to
Scripture, and only secondarily about the relationship of God to the writers" (GRA 4:143).
Quoting Gordon H. Clark approvingly: "The Bible puts more emphasis on the inspiration
of the words than on the inspiration of the apostles and prophets" (Gordon H. Clark,
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constitutes Scripture as the living Word of God, just as his breathing out of his life's breath
into a lifeless form of dust resulted in a living and real man, Adam (Gen 2:7).1

2 Pet 1:19-21
In 2 Pet 1:19-212 Henry seems to be in favor of extending the phrases "every
prophecy of Scripture" and "the prophetic word” to the entirety of Scripture, irrespective of
their being predictive in nature or not.3 In his observation, this passage (vss. 20-21)
conveys two basic points. Negatively, it disavows the purported human origin of Scripture,
because it is not derived from human inquiry and investigation or philosophical reflection,
but from God.4 It also implies that the prophet or apostle is not a manipulator of divine
powers but simply a divinely chosen spokesman moved and possessed by the Holy Spirit.5
Positively, the passage affirms the divine origin of Scripture (vs. 21).6 Furthermore, this
quoted in Henry, ibid.).
‘Ibid., 131.
2"So we have the prophetic message more fully confirmed. You will do well to be
attentive to this as to a lamp shining in a dark place, until the day dawns and the morning
star rises in your hearts. First of all you must understand this, that no prophecy of
scripture is a matter of one's own interpretation, because no prophecy ever came by human
will, but men and women moved by the Holy Spirit spoke from God" (NRSV).
3GRA 4:132.
“Ibid.
5GRA 2:52.
6GRA 4: 132. Henry objects to the KJV phrasing, "holy men of God spoke," and
favors the NEB, "men spoke from God," because the former does not contrast the divine
over the human origin as does the context of the passage itself, which unmistakably
emphasizes the divine origination of Scripture (ibid.).
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passage provides an additional point that the preceding one (2 Tim 3:14-16) does not;
namely, the special and unique operation of the Holy Spirit in the lives of the Scripture
writers, conveyed by the word phero, meaning "to bring, bear or carry, to drive as by the
wind, to produce, to utter (as a word) or to make (as a speech)."1 This "p/zero-experience"
is therefore significant for Henry because it underscores two important ideas: the divine
origin of Scripture and the certainty of the words of Scripture.2

The Witness of Jesus Christ and the Apostles
Henry stresses that Jesus regarded Scripture (OT) as the Word of God.3 Jesus's
oft-repeated formula, "It is written" (Matt 4:4-10; Luke 4:8), is evident of this high regard
for Scripture.4 Similarly, his assertion that "everything written about me in the law of
Moses, the prophets, and the psalms must be fulfilled" (Luke 24:44) is an indication of his
endorsement of Scripture's inspiration.5 Henry also points to John 10:34-35 as Jesus's
testimony to verbal-plenary inspiration because he took note of the significance of a rather
"incidental" statement such as "ye are gods," saying that even such a statement is also
Scripture and therefore "cannot be broken” (John 10:34; cf. Ps 82:6) or "annulled"
‘Ibid.
2Ibid.
3Henry, "Revelation, Special," EDT, 459; idem, "Inspiration," BDT, 287. For
Henry, there is no contrast between Jesus' authority and that of Scripture. Jesus ranked his
own supreme authority side by side with that of Scripture—not as if they were two indepen
dent authorities, but as identical, Matt 5:17; John 10:35 (ibid.; see also GRA 4:257-58).
4Henry, "Inspiration," BDT, 287.
5GRA 4:75.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

126
(NRSV). By so doing, he indicates that no word or line or phrase of Scripture is to be
ignored, marginalized, or set aside because each has been given under inspiration and
therefore Christ rightfully concluded that "Scripture cannot be broken." In view of this,
Jesus took every OT messianic prophecy seriously, and sought to fulfill it in his own life
and ministry (Luke 24:44).1 Therefore, no word, line, or phrase of Scripture should be
taken lightly, or "presumptively exempted from divine authority.1,2 None can be ignored
because every word has been inspired and is therefore "of irrefragable authority."3
Moreover, Henry also refers to what he calls the "prophetic tradition," which
stresses the inviolable nature of the prophets' utterances because they were the mediators
and promulgators of God's word and will. Consequently, what they spoke is to be
considered as God's speaking. It is for this reason that God is at times identified with the
prophet's mouth (Exod 4:14ff.).4
Henry also makes similar comments about the apostles. Like their Lord and
Master, they too considered the OT as the very Word of God and, hence, "completely
authoritative. "5 Their prefixing of a scriptural word with the phrase "It is written" (Acts
‘Henry also cited the following texts that show Christ’s affirmation of verbal
inspiration of Scripture: Matt 26:31; 26:54; Mark 9:12-13; 14:19, 27; John 13:18; 17:12
(see Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 147).
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 146; GRA 4:133, 160.
“Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 147.
5GRA 4:33-34. For a further elaboration of the apostles' attitude toward as well as
their use of the OT as Scripture and divine authority, see ibid., 135, 137, and 52.
Scriptural passages are also furnished therein.
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1:20; 1 Cor 9:9; 14:21) is indicative of their high esteem for the OT as the Word of God.1
Paul, for instance, regarded the OT as the "oracles of God" (Rom 3:2).2
According to Henry, Jesus also expected us to accord a similar attitude of reverence
for the words of the apostles, because the same Spirit that was with the prophets was also at
work with the apostles (John 14:26; 16:13). Jesus himself as their resurrected Lord and
possessor of all authority under heaven and earth, commissioned them to be the authorized
representatives and interpreters of his ministry and mission.3 Accordingly, the apostles
expected the believers to obey their teaching and exposition of the Gospel (1 Cor 14:37),
because their teaching is authorized by the Holy Spirit (1 Cor 2:13). What they said or
wrote is likewise Scripture (1 Tim 5:18; 2 Pet 3:16; 1 Thess 2:13). Therefore, "a divinely
given word mediated by the Logos of God through prophets and apostles is just as
authoritative as that spoken directly by the incarnate Logos himself. "4 We should accept
that word as God's Word.5
‘Ibid., 34.
2Henry, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 459.
3GRA 4:36.
“Ibid., 36-37. Jesus Christ the incarnate Word was later on inscripturated as the
Word of God (Henry, Confessions, 325).
5Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 147; idem, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 458.
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The Witness of the Holy Spirit
The third evidence for the inspiration of Scripture is the inner persuasion and
testimony of the Holy Spirit through the Bible1 whereby its readers and hearers are lifted
beyond the mere letter to the plane of spiritual life, and to the very presence of God
himself.2 Thus, the Bible becomes not only the means of grace but also affirms itself for us
as the Word of God. Further, the internal testimony of the Spirit regarding Scripture as the
Word of God is also necessitated by the fact that he was primarily responsible for its
production. For this reason he is also its proper interpreter for us.3 But this interpretative
or expositing activity of the Holy Spirit (in the church and the believer's life) does not
bypass or supersede the Holy Scriptures. Neither does it include the communication of new
truths. The Spirit's interpretation is always based upon the divine authority of Scripture.4
‘Henry is aware of the need to balance between the role of the Holy Spirit and that
of Scripture. An exaggeration of the Holy Spirit "leads to the dangerous mysticism in
Christian experience; a neglect of the Holy Spirit may content itself with an outward and
legalistic conformity to spiritual realities without vital regeneration." The evangelical view
calls for holding the two together. The Holy Spirit is the "source of the Scriptures," and
yet he always works and regenerates men through Scripture. The rest of the article is an
exposition of the integral relationship between the Spirit and Scripture, and Henry does this
by means of surveying the Book of Acts to that effect (see Carl F. H. Henry, "The Spirit
and the Written Word," Bibliotheca Sacra 111 [October 1954]: 302-316.
2Henry, The Gideon, 15.
3GRA 4:258.
4Ibid., 259, 262; 275. The Spirit persuades us of the truthfulness of Scripture, but
it does not replace the objective authority of the written Word (Henry, Protestant Dilemma,
82-83).
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Internal Consistency1
The final evidence for the inspiration of Scripture is the absence of "selfcontradiction or incoherence, or unreconcilable affirmations within the Bible. If there
were, its high claims would have been dismissed."2 The critics' accusation that "the Bible
is a hotchpot of contradictions is due to the fact that it clashed with their own naturalistic
philosophies under which they smarted, and not any inner disunity of the scriptural
revelation of God and man and the world. "3
Henry's conviction of the consistency of Scripture seems also to arise from his
antecedent assumption of the rationality and logical consistency of divine revelation (which
is a consequence of the rational nature of God's own mind).4 Since Scripture is
"inscripturated revelation,"5 it cannot therefore be expected to have any inconsistency or
contradiction. "What is logically contradictory cannot be true. A denial of the law of
contradiction would make truth and error equivalent; hence in effect it destroys truth.1,6
•For Henry, consistency is also the hallmark of a true worldview. Consistency is
one of those indispensable tests of a true worldview (see Patterson, JMPL-1, 4).
2Henry, The Gideon, 13.
3Ibid.
4GRA 1:232. Henry claims that "logical consistency is a negative test of truth and
coherence a subordinate test" (ibid., 232-34; Henry, Toward a Recovery, 53, 81, 87).
Accordingly, one does not have to sacrifice his intellect in order to become a Christian
(ibid., 400). And "no philosophy and no religion presses the concern for intellectual and
moral integrity more consistently than does the Bible” (ibid., 264).
SGRA 4:424.
6GRA 1:233. Henry’s conviction of the truthfulness of the Christian faith and the
inadequacy of non-Christian religions leads him to advocate an apologetic strategy which
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Without logical consistency, Scripture's epistemological value would suffer and a vital
means of testing truth would have been lost.1

Other Evidences for Inspiration
Fulfilled Prophecies
As Henry sees it, if God is the author of Scripture, then whatever prophecy
recorded in it "logically necessitates" a fulfillment.2 Thus, the fulfillment of predictive
prophecies indicates that the God of the Bible, unlike the postulated god of philosophy,
knows the future.3 The consummation of biblical prophecies is therefore another
"compelling evidence" for the divine inspiration of the Scriptures.4 For Henry, however,
begins by first showing the inconsistency of the non-Christian faith, followed by the
consistency of the Christian truth (ibid., 233-34; Henry, Toward a Recovery, 87). Further,
although Henry does recognize the possibility of consistency among a variety of mutually
exclusive systems based on their own respective a prioris, yet he also believes that through
several theorems later, any system other than Christianity will ultimately exhibit contradic
tions (Henry, Toward a Recovery, 81; GRA 1:233-37; see also ibid., 237-38, 264, 401). If
the true system is comprehensive, every false system must contain contradictions (Henry,
Toward a Recovery, 88; see also GRA 1:237). Moreover, since God is the only source of
truth (GRA 1:228), it is reasonable to believe that there can be but one comprehensive
system of truth. In the case of Christianity, Henry is convinced that its assumptions are
true, and that it can be demonstrated to this effect without any problem for the nonbeliever
to see it with his mind’s eye (Henry, Toward a Recovery, 105). Nevertheless, Henry does
admit that "final verification or demonstrative proof of the truth of any metaphysical
overview is presently impossible" (ibid., 88).
1Henry, Toward a Recovery, 81.
2Ibid., 75; see also Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 146.
3GRA 4:348.
“Ibid., 17. For Henry's reply against Barr's denial of predictive prophecies in
Scripture, see ibid., 347-48. In this connection Henry also points out that fulfillment of
prophecies goes against liberalism because of its bias against the supernatural, and also
against neoorthodoxy because of its opposition to propositional revelation (ibid., 17). As
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the fulfillment of scriptural prophecies is not so much because God controls and determines
the course of history,1 but because "we are dealing with what the Holy Spirit tells and
foretells, with divinely inspired data, with what is known by special revelation, with what
the Spirit communicates in a definitive way. "2

Testimony of Church Fathers and Reformers
According to Henry, the verbal inspiration of Scripture is testified to by the church
fathers like Origen, Irenaeus, Polycarp, and Augustine. For that matter, even the early
fathers maintained the complete inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. These men held to a
high view of Scripture and "knew no other doctrine than that of an inspired and trustworthy
Scripture."3 However, evangelical theology does not accept the Bible's inspiration merely
on account of the church fathers. It did that strictly on the strength of the Bible's claim
about itself, and the fathers are only witnesses to this claim.4
The Protestant Reformers likewise held a similar view of inspiration. While Henry
acknowledges their christocentric approach to the Bible, along with their emphasis on the
dynamic relationship of the Spirit and the Word of God, yet he also maintains that both
an example of fulfilled prophecies, Henry points to the OT temple sacrifices and those
prophecies that have to do with the Messiah's coming. All these were fulfilled in the life,
death, and resurrection of Jesus (see Henry, "Jesus Christ and the Last Days," 171-172).
lQRA 4:75.
2Ibid.
3Henry, The Gideon, 15-16. In this instance, Henry not only enlists the church
fathers as witnesses to the inspiration of Scripture, but uses their names for support of
inerrancy (see GRA 4:370-373).
“Henry, The Gideon, 15-16.
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Luther and Calvin understood Scripture as the "objectively given linguistic statement of the
divine mind and intention. "l

The Significance of Inspiration
The Means of Access to Revelation
Henry says that revelation and inspiration are to be emphasized side by side.2 He
shows the intimate relationship between these two doctrines by pointing out that inspiration
is the means through which revelation is made available to mankind. This point is clearly
underscored by his identifying revelation with the Bible, and by making the latter the
product and/or achievement of inspiration.3 Further, based on Henry's arguments in favor
of propositional revelation, the question of its accurate transmission—not excluding its
preservation—is also crucial. This is brought about only by means of inspiration.
Inspiration is therefore part of the revelatory process.4
4Ibid., 17, 258. In bringing the Reformers on his side, that is, as those who held to
the verbal and inerrant inspiration of Scripture, Henry cites M. Reau's Luther and the
Scriptures and Calvin's The Institutes, vol. 4, part 7, p. 3; vol. 1, sec. 5, p. 13; and Opera
70, p. 383. See Henry, The Gideon, 15-16; idem, Protestant Dilemma, 71-72; GRA
4:375. For those supporting Henry's position see also Theodore Muller, "Luther and the
Bible,” in Inspiration and Interpretation, ed. John F. Walvoord (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1957), 7-108; and A. Skevington Wood, Captive to the Word. Martin Luther: Doctor of
Sacred Scripture (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1969).
2GRA 4:144.
3Ibid., 256, 262.
4GRA 4:233. It is only by means of inspiration that the prophets and apostles can
"articulate faithfully" God's revelation without "misrepresenting neither truth nor fact, but
instead preserve us from the accretions of legend and myth to which both oral tradition and
an unfixed literary tradition are prone" (GRA 3:96); Kis, 260.
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The Means of Access to Jesus Christ
The preceding chapter shows that Henry regards Jesus Christ as the goal, theme,
content, and climax of revelation.1 It is in him that revelation converges and coincides.2
But one's knowledge of Jesus Christ, however, is available only through the inscripturated
revelation or the Bible.3 "We have no way of returning to the historical Jesus except
through the Bible.1,4
The Spirit reveals the Christ of the Book through the Book, there is no revelation of
Christ apart from the Scriptures. All that we know of Christ is conveyed to us through
the Scriptures which interpret to us the Living Christ whom the Spirit discloses; we
know nothing about Christ beyond the Written Word except the living experience of
Him, and our conviction that it is he depends not alone upon the testimony of the Spirit,
but also the witness of the written Word which the Spirit enlivens.5
The above point becomes obvious when one recollects the primary arguments of
Henry regarding revelation and inspiration, namely: (1) the indispensability of revelation;
(2) the soteriological—hence, christological—motif as being the primary feature of
revelation;6 and (3) the cruciality of inspiration as the supematurally chosen means of
inscripturating revelation.
lGRA 2:11; GRA 4:216; Henry, The Gideon, 5; GRA 3:9; Ronald H. Nash, "Yea,
Hath God Said?" review of GRA 1-2, in Christianity Today, 1 April 1977, 42; GRA 2:11.
2See p. 69 above.
3GRA 4:27; GRA 3:95.
“GRA 3:95.
5Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 82-83.
6In Henry, all revelation is christological and, hence, soteriological (Henry,
Protestant Dilemma, 9; see also idem, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 457; GRA 3:46, 460;
Johnson, 100; see also note 1, p. 97 above).
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The Guarantee of Reliableness of Biblical Authority
William E. Hordern pointed out that authority lies at the heart of Henry's doctrines
of revelation-inspiration.1 A similar observation was also made by Mohler when he said
that "Henry's theological system has given scriptural authority more attention than any
doctrinal issue. "2 Indeed, one sees this to be the case with Henry when he says that the
first affirmation of the Bible about itself is its authority.3 The prophets and apostles
likewise directed their "first and foremost" attention to scriptural authority—not inspiration
or inerrancy.4 The authority of the Bible should be central, or else it would spell the death
of Christianity and the decay of Western civilization.5
After having emphasized the importance of biblical authority, Henry goes on to
point out that authority is ultimately based on the reality of God in his revelation.6 But
Henry has also shown that God’s revelation is available only by means of inspiration. As
such, although the two—authority and inspiration—
are distinguishable doctrines, they are nonetheless correlative. The Bible is
authoritative because God, the revealer of divine truth and redemptive grace authorized
selected spokesmen to communicate his specially disclosed word to mankind. These
‘Referred to in Sharp, 76; Patterson, CFH, 106.
2Mohler, Baptist Theologians, 524.
3Henry, Conversations, 24.
4GRA 4:41.
5Ibid., 23.
6Henry, Conversations, 37.
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authoritative spokesmen, however, affirm their message to be God-breathed
[itheopneustos], that is, given by the Spirit through them.1
Moreover, although Henry maintains that the doctrine of authority of Scripture should
receive priority over that of inspiration, yet he doubts biblical authority "will long survive
if the doctrine of scriptural inspiration is truncated or dismissed."2 After all, it is from
inspiration that scriptural authority derives its credibility.3

Summary and Conclusion
Inspiration is that special supernatural influence and superintendence of the Holy
Spirit over the prophets and apostles during their preaching and writing of the divinely
revealed truths.4 This supervision5 was so comprehensive that whatever they said or wrote,
including the very words, was divinely selected or approved, resulting in a flawless or
errorless Scripture.6 The inerrant nature of their speech or writing, however, was true only
when acting under inspiration. Otherwise, and outside of it, the prophets and apostles were
just as fallible and erring as any human being, and subject to all the cultural and historical
lGRA 4:71.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 68, 75.
“See also ibid., 256.
5With reference to the Holy Spirit’s role in inspiration, Henry, like his predecessors,
namely, B. B. Warfield and A. A. Hodge, uses the term "superintendence" to refer to the
meaning of inspiration (GRA 4:129, 141, 233). Hodge and Warfield also stated that the
essence of inspiration is superintendence (Hodge and Warfield, 6).
6GRA 4:144-145.
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limitations of their time.1 In other words, inspiration did not occur to them throughout
their lives; nor did it continue after them. Hence, of all men, only the Bible’s prophets and
apostles had the privilege of the experience of inspiration.2
The locus of inspiration, however, falls more on what the prophets and apostles
wrote than on what they experienced. In other words, inspiration refers essentially to a
linguistic revelatory deposit identified with the text of Scripture.3 It is "primarily a
statement about God’s relationship to Scripture, and only secondarily about the relationship
of God to the writers. "4 Moreover, since what they wrote is available to us in the form of
the Old and New Testaments, only the books belonging to these two Testaments are
accordingly inspired. However, the Bible we now have is based only on copies (and
perhaps a copy of copies) of the originals (autographs). Technically understood, one
cannot therefore regard any of our version as inerrant,5 for inspiration quality belongs only
to the autographs.6 Nevertheless, the copies are highly reliable and trustworthy because of
‘Henry is aware of the objection against verbal inspiration on the basis of cultural
limitations of the prophets and apostles. His reply is that the objection is "self-refuting
nonsense" because it would mean that even what the objector says or adjudicates is not
worthy of trust because he too is limited by his own culture. "In fact, the most
sophisticated moderns have shown themselves capable of believing amazing and even
incredible myths such as the Nordic superiority, Negro inferiority, evolutionary
utopianism, technocratic scientism, the coming Communist kingdom and so on" (Henry in
Gaebelein, 28, 19; see also GRA 4:151; Henry, Twilight o f Civilization, 115).
2GRA 4:151.
3Ibid., 144.
4GRA 4:143.
SGRA 2:14-15; GRA 4:220, 225, 236.
6GRA 4:241.
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the fact that they are 99.9 percent continuous with the originals.1 As such, we can still
consider the extant copies inspired (theopneutos), though only in a derivative sense.2 Like
the originals, the copies too are "cognitively dependable carriers of objectively inspired
truths.3 "Copies reliably and authoritatively communicate the specially revealed truth and
purposes of God to mankind." They "retain the epistemic consequences of divine
inspiration of the inerrant prophetic-apostolic autographs." In view of this, they, along with
the translations, are also the Word of God.4 Because of this, the copies are not only to be
honored as the Word of God,5 but are just as normative as the autographs. Copies are
binding upon believers at personal as well as corporate levels.6
Thus far, we have familiarized ourselves with Henry's doctrines of revelation and
inspiration. Their study is important because they provide the primary environment for
viewing Henry's portrayal of the human role in these doctrines, as well as material for
% id., 235. Henry credits the infallibility of the copies to a "special providence of
God" (ibid., 241).
2The existing copies of Scripture, while not inerrant, nonetheless bear an authority
and trustworthiness superior to that of the pope of Rome even when he speaks in his office,
and substantially and principally the copies reflect the theopneustic quality of the propheticapostolic autographs (ibid., 225, 253). The derivative theopneustic quality that the copies
have also points to the nature of their authority, which is likewise derivative (ibid., 253).
3Ibid., 253.
4Ibid., 246, 248, 218-19.
5"Copies reliably and authoritatively communicate the specially revealed truth and
purposes of God to mankind." They "retain the epistemic consequences of divine
inspiration of the inerrant prophetic-apostolic autographs." In view of this, they, along with
the translations, are also the Word of God (ibid., 246, 248, 218-19).
6GRA 4:242, 75.
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evaluating that role. In order to ensure a correct understanding of the human role, there is
also a need to address Henry’s doctrine of man. After all, if revelation and inspiration are
given for man's sake, then it should be assumed that Henry must already have certain
presuppositions about human nature which he then relates them to his description of the
human role in revelation and inspiration. The following chapter accordingly provides his
view of man.
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CHAPTER4

THE DIVINE-HUMAN POINT OF CONTACT
IN HENRY'S DOCTRINE OF MAN

Henry's Portrayal of M an in Aquinas and B arth
Although the focus of this chapter is on the point of contact between God and man,
yet the rationale for this contact point is evident only by looking at the doctrine of man in
Henry. This can be done by a combination of two approaches: (1) Henry's reactions to
those anthropological views that contradict his; and (2) his direct and independent
description of man. The first approach is just as relevant as the second because Henry’s
own views are often given a clearer presentation in the light of his apologetic reactions to
those views that undermine his. In this case, Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth are chosen as
the media through which Henry depicts his view of man. The reason for choosing these
authors is that Henry has reacted to them in an extended fashion. Moreover, Aquinas's
concept of man is contrary to Barth's concept, and Henry's reaction to them exposes his
own view of man with greater precision and clarity.
The presentation begins by looking at Aquinas's and Barth's views of man
respectively, followed by Henry's reaction to them. A summary of his portrayal of man
follows each of his reactions. The portrayal is then supplemented with a sketch of Henry's
direct presentation of his view of man. This approach is expected not only to yield a fairly
139
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clear and balanced picture of the man whom Henry visualizes, but also see more clearly
Henry's justification concerning his view of the divine-human point of contact. Further,
the examination of Henry's doctrine of man is also mandatory for the thesis of this
dissertation. It is only as one has a clear understanding of the man Henry has in mind that
one can truly appreciate the human role in his doctrines of revelation and inspiration.

A Brief Sketch of Thomas Aquinas's View of Man
Since the goal in this section is to obtain a clearer picture of Henry's view of man
via his reaction to Aquinas, the scope of the presentation of Aquinas's view of man is
accordingly limited to those points that Henry interacts with him.
Man is a "compound of soul and body. ”I This makeup, however, is not to be
thought of as two unrelated parts held together by force; rather, they are an organic unity.
The soul, which is divinely created, incorporeal, subsisting,2 hence imperishable,3 has been
‘Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, Latin Text and English Translation;
Introductions, Notes, Appendices and Glossaries (Leicester, England: Blackfriars; New
York: McGraw-Hill; London: Eyre & Spottis-woode, 1970), la. 75, 4. The style of
citation ("la. 75, 4") is one adopted internationally for Aquinas’s Summa. Each entry
indicates part, question, and article, in that order. Thus, "la" stands for prima pars, "75,"
the question number, and "4" the article number. Other parts of the Summa are likewise
indicated as prima secundae (Ia2ae), and secunda secundae (IIa2ae).
2A subsisting soul means that it has an "existence completely its own, unshared with
any other" {Summa, vol. 11, Glossary, s.v. "Subsistence, subsistent").
3Ia2ae. 83, 1; la. 75, 2. For Aquinas's persuasive argumentation regarding the
incorruptibility or imperishability of the soul, see la. 75, 6. In his view, there is a
difference between the animal soul and that of man. The animal soul is not subsisting, that
is, not having an independent mode of existence, whereas the human soul is subsisting (la.
75, 6; Summa, vol. 11, Glossary, s.v. "Subsistence, subsistent"). The souls of brutes are
produced by a certain material force, whereas those of humans are produced by God (la.
75, 6).
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"infused into"1 the body, constituting the latter's "formative principle," and "the root
principle of life in living things.1,2 It is the soul that gives form to the body. In fact, the
soul "is the form3 of the body. Its substance4 is the form of the body."s It "is the one and
only 'form ' in which the 'body' exists," so that it is improper to treat the soul and body
separately. Thus, man is neither "mere soul" nor mere body6 but a psycho-physical unity.7
The soul is also the "intellective principle"8 of man; or "the principle of the art of
understanding. "9 As such, man is also a "rational" being.10 It is the soul that furnishes him
the faculties of reason and will by means of which he performs voluntary actions11 from
1Ia2ae. 83, 1.
2Ia. 75, 1.
3'Form ' refers to "the essential nature of a thing, that which specifies it to be this
rather than that" (Thomas Aquinas, "Form," A Summa o f the Summa: The Essential
Philosophical Passages o f St. Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica. trans. The Fathers of
the English Dominicans, ed. and annot. Peter Kreeft [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1990],
Glossary, 28; hereafter cited as "Kreeft," preceded by a reference from the Summa—if the
case applies).
“'Substance' points to "a being that exists in itself rather than in another" (Kreeft,
Glossary, "substance," 30).
5Ia2ae. 83, 2; see also la. 76, 1, 4, 6.
6Ia. 75, 4.
7Ia. 75, Introduction, xvi.
8Ia. 75, 6; 4; la. 79, 4.
9Ia. 75, 2.
10Ia2ae. 85, 2.
llIa2ae. 1, 1; Ia2ae. 6, 3; la. 85, 1.
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whence arise moral acts.1 By virtue of being a rational creature, man accordingly has the
capacity for knowledge. Actually, it is innate in him; he is bom with that capacity:
However, since man is an embodied soul, he knows only through the avenues of the senses.
In other words, although the soul is the "intellective principle"3 in man, yet because of its
organic unity with the body, it understands only through the senses in the form of images,4
and the effects of God.5 This means that "the soul understands nothing without imagery,
and there is no imagery apart from the body."6 This understanding, also called "natural"
understanding, "extends just so far as it can be led by sensible things; from these, however,
our understanding cannot reach to the divine essence. "7
Aquinas provides a reason why man's knowledge, including his knowledge of God,
is not a knowledge of the essences. As far as he is concerned,
sensible creatures are effects of God which are less than typical of the power of their
cause, so knowing them does not lead us to understand the whole power of God and
thus we do not see his essence. They are nevertheless effects depending from a cause,
1Ia2ae. 6, 4, ad. 2; Ia2ae. 1, 3.
2Ia2ae. 17, 7; see also GRA 2:135.
3Ia. 75, 6.
4Ibid.; see also GRA 2:119. "The proper activity of the soul . . . is to understand
by means of images" (ibid.). Knowledge by natural reason "depends on two things: images
derived from the sensible world and the natural intellectual light by which we make abstract
intelligible concepts for these images" (la. 12, 13).
5Ia. 12, 12.
6Ia. 75, 6.
7Ia. 12, 12.
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and so we can at least be led from them to know of God that he exists.1
This is another way of stating that as natural creatures, and on the basis of natural reason,
we can know only that God is, but not what he is.2 This form of knowledge is what
Aquinas called analogical. For in his view, "it is impossible" to predicate anything
univocally (wholly the same) of God and creatures,3 because "every effect that falls short of
what is typical of the power of its cause represents it inadequately. '4 However, this does
not mean that Aquinas supported equivocal (wholly different) knowledge of God as is in the
difference between the propositions: "milk is good" and "God is good." The reason why
"it is impossible for the soul, as it is in this life, to see the essence of God is because the
soul has its "being in corporeal matter, . . . hence, . . . cannot by nature know anything
except what has its form in matter or what can be known through such things. "5
Aquinas also held that this analogical knowledge of God exists universally in "a
general and somewhat confused manner. "6 Accordingly, it cannot provide an absolute
proof that God exists anymore than one's knowledge of a man coming to one's house is
‘Ibid.
2Ibid.; italics original; see also GRA 2:55, 105; GRA 1:184.
3Ia. 13, 5.
4Ibid.
5Ia, 12, 11. Aquinas also adds that there is such a thing as the knowledge of God's
essence, but this can come only by means of grace (la. 12, 13) and is limited to the
"blessed" (la. 12, 1). This is also called "a more perfect knowledge" of God than the one
that is obtained by natural reason (la. 12, 13).
6Ia. 2, 1 (Fairweather). Note: This source is taken from Thomas Aquinas, Nature
and Grace: Selections from the Summa Theologica o f Thomas Aquinas, trans. and ed. A.
M. Fairweather (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1954).
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really that of Peter, though the latter is the one expected.1 And so to the question whether
God's existence can be demonstrated, Aquinas replied by pointing to "two kinds of
demonstration"—through the cause and by means of its effects.2 "When an effect is more
apparent to us than its cause, we reach a knowledge of the cause through its effects." Since
an effect "always" depends "on some cause . . . , a cause must exist if its effect exists. We
can demonstrate God’s existence in this way, from his effects which are known to us, even
though we do not know his essence. "3 Accordingly, Aquinas submitted the following five
proofs or ways:
1. Man perceives things in motion. Since that which moves presupposes a mover,
it means that behind innumerable movers there should be a first mover.
2. We perceive an effect as well as its cause. Behind all the causes there should be
an efficient cause.
3. We perceive not only a thing in existence, but also the possibility for its
nonexistence. Behind all contingent existents, there should be a necessary external and
eternal existent.
4. We perceive good and perfection in nature. Behind them all there should be one
that is infinite in goodness and perfection.
5. It appears that all things seem to move toward certain respective ends or goals.
Behind these ends, there should be one supreme intelligent being who is guiding and
•la. 2, 1 (Fairweather).
2Ia. 2, 2 (Fairweather).
3Ia 2, 3. For proofs of God's existence based on the cause-effect relationship, see
la. 2, 3.
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controlling them with his wisdom.1
Aquinas had pointed out that this kind of knowledge cannot avail for man all that
needs to be known. For this reason God had to supplement it with divine revelation.2 But
even "revelation does not tell us what God is."3 Nevertheless it is indispensable for
mankind because only through revelation can certain truths of Christianity (e.g., the
Trinity) be known.4 Divine revelation therefore provides us with divine light that assists
our natural light of reason to attain a more profound understanding "from the images."5
The implication here is that while faith and reason are independent, yet reason is of service
to the Christian faith—especially for those who do not believe in the authority of Scripture.6
For example, besides ascertaining God's existence, reason also can tell us his oneness.7
Moreover, since no one would "believe unless he saw that they are worthy of belief,"8
reason with its ensuing natural theology is therefore useful in serving as a praeparatio for
belief in the Christian faith. In other words, although reason does not produce faith—for
‘la. 2, 3. For Henry's criticism of Thomas's Five Proofs, see GRA 2:104-123; for
a historical background of the proofs, see GRA 1:184, 78.
2Ia. 1, 1, 3. The human soul has "imperfect understanding" (la. 79, 4).
3Ia. 12, 13.
4Ia. 12, 13; see also GRA 1:184-85, where Henry criticizes Aquinas for not making
revelation the only source for knowledge of God and his ways, including knowledge of his
existence and immortality of the soul.
5Ia. 12, 13.
6Ia. 2, 2.
7Ia. 3, 2.
82a2ae. 1, 4, ad. 2.
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faith is God's gift1—yet it does play an important role prior to faith.2
The rational nature of man also renders him with a capacity for sin.3 When he
sins4 (actual sin), which he does, including Adam (original sin),5 the soul is deranged.6
Consequently, through the sin of his first parent, Adam, man completely lost the original or
primordial justice.7 However, his natural good—"the good of nature" that "consists of
being, living, and understanding,"8—is not destroyed or diminished by sin;9 rather, it is the
"natural inclination to virtue that is diminished."10 Sin issues from the will (which is one of
the powers of the soul), just as an inordinate appetite for food "results from the will
lThomas Aquinas, Commentary on Saint Paul's Epistle to the Ephesians, trans.
Matthew L. Lamb (Albany, NY: Magi Books, 1966), 95-96.
22a2ae. 1. 5, ads. 2-4; see also GRA 1:331, where Henry says that Aquinas
regarded natural theology as "the vestibule of revealed theology," or the praeparatio
revelatio (GRA 2:105).
3Ia2ae. 85, 2.
4Sin is a privation, but "it is more than mere privation." As it is inherited from
Adam, sin has the character of guilt and a habit, and a "corrupt habit" at that (Ia2ae. 82, 1
[Fairweather]).
5Original sin is passed on through the semen as its "instrumental cause" (Ia2ae.
83, 1).
6Ia2ae. 83, 1 (Fairweather). The essence of sin is constituted in a "disordered
disposition which has resulted from the dissolution of the harmony which was once the
essence of original justice, just as bodily sickness is the disordered disposition of a body
which has lost the equilibrium which is the essence of health" (Ia2ae. 82, 1; Fairweather).
7Original justice stands for man’s original rightness with God, or man’s rightness as
his primordial condition {Summa, vol. 8, Glossary, s.v. "Justice, Jastitia").
8Ia2ae. 83, 1 (Fairweather)
9Ia2ae. 85, 2 (Fairweather); Ia2ae. 83, 1 (Fairweather)
10Ia2ae. 85, 2 (Fairweather); ibid., 83, I (Fairweather).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

147
consenting to gluttony.1,1 Only that part of the soul “which can be moved by the will is the
subject of sin."2 The body however bears its penalty of sin.3

H enry's Reaction to Aquinas
Though Aquinas's view of man is that of a unified body and soul, yet it is the soul
that receives focus and emphasis. The soul, as an intellective principle, provides man with
a capacity for understanding and cognition. With its aid man is able to know God's
existence and attributes, though indirectly. Such knowledge, analogical as it may be, is a
necessary aid and preparation for man in receiving special revelation. This activity of
reason continues despite human sin.
In responding to Aquinas, Henry points out that acceptance of his epistemological
position can be a “costly error. "4 After showing the limitations as well as untenability of
Aquinas's fivefold proofs for God's existence,5 Henry goes on to state that
the attempt to concentrate the case for theism upon observations from the not-God,
while neglecting the reality of God in his revelation, has led to more than the erosion of
the power of God in modem life; it has also betrayed modem philosophy and theology
into a time of intellectual sterility. . . . Over and against empirical philosophy, which
presumes to derive the knowledge of God from an examination of nature or from an
analysis of the cosmos or o f history, the Reformers insisted on the basis of Holy
Scripture that Christian theology has a wholly different foundation, namely, divine
revelation. Affirmation of the living God, they insisted, rests not on inferences from
lIa2ae. 83, 1,2; Ia2ae. 83, 3.
2Ia2ae. 83, 2-4; ibid., 81, 1-3.
3Ia2ae. 83, 1, 2.
“Ibid., 89.
5See ibid., 105-113; see also GRA 5:84-90; and Henry, Notes, 46-53.
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man and the world but on God's supernatural disclosure.1
Aquinas's proofs can, at the most, point to the probability of God's existence. It is only as
God chooses to reveal himself that we can know that he exists.2 Observations from the notGod cannot lead us to God. It is like "venturing to hatch a live chicken from an empty
eggshell. "3 Accordingly, Henry holds that fallen man cannot "translate general divine
revelation into a natural theology that builds a secure bridge to special revelation. "* That
is, Henry does not believe that man can construct an epistemic link to God by starting with
himself in the way Aquinas suggested through his proofs. The acceptance of man's
inherent ability in showing God's existence demotes divine initiative in revelation,5 makes
man as the theological starting point, and, in effect, deifies man himself.6
From this reaction it seems apparent that Henry seriously objects to Aquinas's
correlating natural theology with general revelation. For Henry, this correlation is not
legitimate and/or possible because of (1) the express nature of supernatural revelation;
(2) the epistemic predicament of finite man; and (3) the invalidity of the empirically based
‘GRA 2:119.
2Henry, Remaking, 196-199; GRA 1:184-85.
3GRA 2:119; 24; GRA 1:274.
4GRA 2:117.
5Ibid.
6Ibid., 120. In Henry's observation, modernist Protestantism follows Thomism to
the extent that it presupposes man's inherent or natural capacity to generate theology on the
basis of his own experience and inner resources, independent of revelation. Thus,
modernist Protestantism forsakes "theology for anthropology and for humanism" (ibid.,
121; 120).
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arguments for theism.1 More important, natural theology should be rejected because "man
volitionally—and invariably so—distorts the disclosure of God in the cosmos and in
history. "2 "Man in sin . . . deflects and caricatures general revelation in terms of
polytheism, atheism, or some other perverse alternatives" and even "turns aside from it."3
Moreover, the fallen nature of man has so affected his epistemic capacity that apart from
special revelation, he "can no longer be psychologically sure . . . which intellectual
representations [of God] are authentic or corrupt. Man's rebellion dilutes the content of
general revelation. "4 For a further clarification of his position, Henry makes the following
statement:
Evangelical theology does not repudiate universal divine revelation in nature and man;
rather, it insists on its indispensable importance and priority. But nature and man are
not the decisive referents through which we are to characterize the transcendent
supernatural. The projection of God from nature and man leads to false gods rather
than to the self-revealed God of the Bible. "5
Moreover, man's finitude as well as his corrupted nature deprives him of his ability "to
expound general revelation accurately, even if he has the logical competency to do so.”
And yet this in no wise rules out general revelation; neither does it question the relevance
LGRA 2: 123. The Thomistic notion that there is a fundamental likeness of man to
his Creator cannot be demonstrated by philosophical reasoning apart from transcendent
divine revelation. "But once intelligible divine revelation is admitted, a methodology other
than empirical analogy is available for arriving at knowledge of God's attributes" (GRA
5:86). Henry also denies the possibility of knowing from human experience that God
perfectly possesses all the attributes. Such knowledge depends on revelation (ibid., 87).
2GRA 2:122-23 .
3GRA 3:460; see also GRA 2:122.
4GRA 5:93.
5Ibid., 90; see also GRA 2:117.
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of reason to theological realities.1 That is, although man has the rational capacity to do
theology, yet because of his finiteness and fallen, rebellious nature, his theology is bound to
be a distorting and unauthentic one.2 Besides, the acceptance of natural theology would
also imply an undermining of the uniqueness and significance of special revelation because
it would then act only as "a crown that caps natural theology elaborated by man in sin. "3
Henry also rejects Thomism because in his view, it places an unquestioned trust in reason
and experience as sources of truth. As far as he is concerned,
apart from divine revelation neither human reason nor human experience as a whole is a
source of divine truth. Neither mankind nor the world is a source of the knowledge of
divine realities. Human reason is an instrument for knowing the truth of God, but it is
not the originating source of divine truth. The Bible acknowledges only God and God
alone as the giver and source of divine revelation.4

A Summary of Henry's Portrayal of M an in Aquinas
We have seen that Aquinas's presentation of man is that of a confident, selfassured, and fairly independent being, who correctly uses reason along with the senses in
enabling him to arrive at the knowledge of God's existence and attributes. On his own,
man capably uses natural revelation as an overpass to natural theology, and converts the
latter into an effective praeperatio for special revelation. Put in other words, Aquinas is
quite sure that there is a permanent point of contact in man for God. By virtue of the light
of reason, man can, to a reasonable extent, ascertain God's reality.
•GRA 2:122-23.
2Ibid., 123.
3Ibid., 117.
4Ibid., 73; 133.
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While agreeing with Aquinas that man has not lost his gift of reason,1 Henry holds
that its competency lies not in finding out God or truth, but in understanding his revelation.
Such is the case because reason has been affected (by the Fall) to the extent that man no
longer uses it correctly in finding out God's existence, will, and plan for him. Despite his
"logical competency," finite sinner does not have the "disposition and ability to expound
general revelation accurately. "2 For this reason man needs special revelation whereby his
apprehension of God in general revelation is supplemented and corrected. Moreover, when
it comes to man's response to the knowledge of God, his situation is worsened by his
rebellious and inordinate will that constantly acts like an irritant distractor of reason,
preventing it from moving on the right path. Man's perverted will so affects his reason that
he ends up in frustration, uncertainty, and distortion of what he knows regarding God and
truth.3 Besides, man's very finiteness—including pre-fall Adam—rules out the possibility of
rising from his own reason and experience to a knowledge of God who is a "living,
personal, ethical and infinite God," who is at the same time the "Law-giver and Judge.'4
So instead of the active role that Aquinas attributes to reason, Henry casts it in a passive
role, making reason depend on God for knowledge of himself. But once a divine disclosure
is made, reason can and does become active either by rejecting or distorting revelation, or
even accepting it.
‘Ibid., 135.
2Ibid„ 123.
3See pp. 66-67, 148-49.
“GRA 2:117.
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So on the question of the point of contact between God and man, Henry is neither
in total agreement with Aquinas nor in total disagreement with him. While Henry agrees
with Aquinas on the significance of reason as a point of divine-human contact, he disagrees
with him that man has an active, initiative reason, capable of positively ascertaining God's
existence and attributes. As Henry sees it, man is constantly rebelling and distorting God's
revelation in the universe.

A Brief Sketch of Karl Barth's View of Man1
The preceding section shows Henry's reaction to Aquinas's optimistic and high
view of man. This section, on the other hand, looks at Henry's reaction to Barth's
pessimistic and low view of man. The approach of presentation is similar to the one
adopted for Aquinas. The limits of the sketch are likewise determined by the issues Henry
raises against Barth, especially those related to human nature. The following first few
pages provide a sketch of Barth’s view of man, followed by Henry's reaction to that view,
and a subsequent consideration of the divine-human point of contact in the context of that
reaction.
Man is God's creation,2 created not because God needs him but out of his own free
will and sheer grace. In fact, "the ground of creation [itself] is God’s grace. "3 Man's
origin also issued from a covenant that preceded creation—a covenant that "God is man's
^ o r an exhaustive exposition of Barth’s doctrine of man, see Karl Barth, CD III/2.
2Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 62-63; see also CD III/l, 185.
3CD III/2, 13; Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 57, italics original.
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God and man is God's man."1 This covenant forms the basis of meaning and goal of
creation.2 Further, a covenant implies that man has to be fashioned with the capacity for
relationship.3 For this reason God created him in his own image, or in God's likeness.4
Now the term "image of God" does not refer to a particular
quality of man. Hence there is no point in asking in which of man's peculiar attributes
and attitudes it consists. It does not consist in anything that man is or does. It consists
as man himself consists as the creature of God. He would not be man if he were not
the image of God. He is the image of God in the fact that he is man. [The image of
God does not refer to the] intellectual and moral talents and possibilities of man, to his
reason and its determination and exercise. It is not something which distinguishes him
from the beasts, but in that which formally he is in common with them, viz. that God
has created him male and female, that he is this being in differentiation and relationship,
and therefore in natural fellowship with God. The only thing that we are told about the
creation of man, apart from the fact that it was accomplished by the Word of God in
and after the image of God, is that 'God created male and female.'5
The term 'image of God' is therefore an analogy of relationship between man and woman
on the one hand, and between man and God on the other. It is a relationship that "is
reflected both in the relationship of God to the man whom He has created, and also in the
relationship between the I and the Thou, between male and female, in human existence
itself."6
‘Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 63; idem, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction,
trans. Grover Foley (Chicago: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 20.
2Barth, Dogmatics in Outline , 63.
3CD III/l, 184.
4Ibid., 184.
5Ibid., 185.
6Ibid., 196.
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Man was also gifted with "a good gift" of ratio (reason)1 and freedom.2 With his
rational faculty he can "distinguish that two and two equals four instead of five. "3 Because
of his freedom man can make choices. And tragically, he chose to rebel against God, and
thereby sinned.4 As a result of this rebellion, man has turned into "a sinner, a real sinner
before God;”5 "a sinner through and through."6 "Man has now become a tarnished mirror
in which the glory of God can no longer be reflected. "7 "The image of God [is] utterlie
[sic] defaced in man."* He is totally and radically corrupt.9 Man's sin, however, is not
inherited from Adam.10 "Adam is not a fate which God has suspended over us. Adam is
LKarl Barth, Table Talk, recorded and ed. John D. Godsey (Richmond, VA: John
Knox Press, 1962), 31; italics original.
2Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, 63; CD IV/2, 511.
3Barth, Table Talk, 31.
4Barth, Table Talk, 92. "Sin [is] man's strife with God" (CD 1/2, 40). Sin also
consists in his "aberration from the grace of God and its command, his refusal to show the
gratitude he owes to God and the concomitant freedom and obligation, his arrogant attempt
to be his own master, provider and comforter, his unhallowed lust for what is not his own
[as well as his] falsehood, hatred and pride" (CD II/l, 305; see also Barth, Knowledge and
Service o f God, 50.
5CD III/3, 307.
6Karl Barth, in Brunner and Barth, Natural Theology, 87.
7Barth, Knowledge and Service o f God, 50; see also CD III/2, 26-27.
*From the Scottish Confession of 1560, quoted in Barth, Knowledge and Service of
God, 50; see also GRA 1:397.
9CD IV/1, 510; see also CD III/2, 29; CD 1/1, 51.
10Barth treated the story of Adam as a legend or a saga (Barth, Dogmatics in
Outline, 54; CD 1/2, 509). Accordingly, his interpretation of what he called "the biblical
tradition" (ibid., 510) is far from the traditional version. For instance, he said that Adam's
fall had nothing to do with our fall. He has not "bequeathed" it to us. "He has not
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the truth concerning us as it is known to God and told to us.1,1
Man as sinner is helpless. He cannot find his way to God. There is no point of
contact between him and God except in Christ, or through the Spirit.2 In fact, when Paul
said that he is crucified with Christ and the life he now lives is a life of faith in Christ (Gal
2:15-21), he thereby points up that there is no "continuity b u t. . . discontinuity between
God and man. "3 Since the life in the flesh has no continuity with God, it is therefore
crucified and what has been destroyed can no longer be repaired.4 Thus all "attempts to
rise from the human to the divine" are futile.s Man can "never" discover revelation that
way.6 Moreover, the nature of revelation itself precludes him from having access to it, for
revelation is an unveiling of God's own person as Word who later was incarnated in the
person of Jesus Christ.7 Accordingly, revelation is "a happening, not a thing." It is an
poisoned us or passed on a disease" (CD IV/1, 509). "No one has to be Adam. We are so
freely and on our own responsibility. Although the guilt of Adam is like ours, it is just as
little our excuse as our guilt is his." We are like Adam just as Adam was like us (ibid.,
509-10).
lCD IV/1, 511.
2Barth, "No!" in Barth and Brunner, Natural Theology, 90.
3Ibid., 92.
4Ibid., 93.
5CD 1/2, 2, 50.
6Ibid.,2.
7Karl Barth, The Faith of the Church: A Commentary on the Apostles' Creed
According to Calvin's Catechism, trans. Gabriel Vahanian (New York: Meridian Books,
1958), 39. The Word is further identified with Jesus Christ who became flesh (CD III/3,
307; CD 1/1, 130-31, 134). "Revelation in fact does not differ from the Person of Jesus
Christ" (CD 1/1, 134).
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This radically personalistic idea of revelation places man in a perpetual waiting
posture. Further, since traditional theology identifies Scripture or the Bible with revelation,
Barth found it necessary to spell out his position with respect to Scripture. For him the
Bible is the Word of God or revelation only in a derivative or mediated sense (CD 1/1,
131). Prophets and apostles were witnesses to revelation. What they wrote—the Bible—is
likewise "the witness of divine revelation" (CD 1/2, 462-63), and that is the way it "wished
to be regarded." Accordingly, it should not be treated as "a book of oracles; it is not an
instrument of direct impartation." Its truths should not be identified with revelation itself.
"If it tries to be more than witness, to be direct impartation, will it not keep us from the
best, the one real thing, which God intends to tell us and give us and which we ourselves
need?” Since it is a witness, the Bible is therefore "not identical with that to which it
witnesses, but it sets it before us" (CD 1/2, 463). The Bible is "only a human word" about
revelation and yet it is united with revelation because the latter is the "basis, object and
content of the Bible" (ibid.). Scripture is the Word of God "so far as God lets it be His
Word, so far as God speaks through it" (CD 1/1, 123). Through the operation of God's
grace and the work of the Holy Spirit the Bible can—and "must"—"from time to time,
become God's Word" (Barth, Table Talk, 26; CD 1/1, 131; for Barth's extensive treatment
of the doctrine of the Holy Scriptures see also CD 1/2, 457-740; for a good summary of the
same see Barth, Evangelical Theology, 26-36).
As a human witness, the Bible is also pockmarked with human limitations and
weaknesses. In fact, the prophets and apostles "whom we hear as witnesses speak as
fallible, erring men like ourselves" (CD 1/2, 507, 528-29; see also GRA 4:198, 156, 19697; GRA 2:145; and Carl F. H. Henry, "The Dilemma Facing Karl Barth," Christianity
Today, 4 January 1963, 28). The prophets and apostles "shared the outlook and spoke the
language of their own day." They were men of their times, "historically related and
conditioned." Therefore what they say may offend us either in terms of philosophical,
historical, ethical, religious, or theological matters. In the Bible "we can establish lacunae,
inconsistencies and overemphases. ” These consequently rob Scripture of its character as
witness to revelation (CD 1/2, 509). It is "only the miracle of faith and the Word," and of
God's grace that overcomes this offense (ibid., 507, 509, 528-29).
Concerning Barth's view of the Bible in relation to revelation see also GRA 2:14344; Henry, Evangelical Responsibility, 57; GRA 4:157-58; Henry, Fifty Years, 101; idem,
The Drift, 122, 132; GRA 2:145. If Barth credited the fallibility of Scripture to the
deficiency of human propositions, Henry wonders how Barth can hold a fallible witness to
be at the same time an indispensable witness. Henry's conclusion is that Barth is guilty of
contradiction by trying to develop a theology "in terms of irreconcilable axioms" (GRA
4:200; see also GRA 3:285). It is like trying to simultaneously ride "two uncoordinated
moving horses on a merry-go-round" (GRA 4:199). Henry also charges Barth with
"colossal inconsistency" that ends up in burdening his Dogmatics with confusion. For
example, at times Barth seemed to identify Scripture with revelation (CD 1/1, 304), and yet
at other times he denied that identity (CD 1/2, 499; GRA 3:466-67). As Henry sees it, that
puts Barth on the horns of a dilemma for it is one thing to charge the prophets and apostles
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"encounter" where God reveals himself "for man."1 Man's knowledge of God likewise
comes only as God is willing to initiate it; only as he makes himself apprehensible in
Christ.2 He alone has to create the "conditions" for that knowledge in man; that is, he no
with errors and contradictions, and quite another thing to take what they have written as
"categorical authority." In view of this situation, Barth will have to make a choice: "If
independent apologetics and natural theology are to be consistently abandoned, Barth must
accept the Reformation view of verbal and plenary inspiration; but if the prophets and
apostles are guilty of error, Barth must use some historical, scientific, or other secular
criterion and sit in judgement over the Word of God" (Henry, "The Dilemma Facing Karl
Barth," 28).
■Barth, Table Talk, 26. Henry's presentation of Barth's view of revelation is found
in several places of GRA and others of his writings. See, for instance GRA 2:127-28, 14344, 159; GRA 4:264; see also Carl F. H. Henry, "God as a Problem,"Christianity Today,
13 February 1970, 32, where Henry provides a similar version of Barth's idea of revelation
as "God's personal self-communication to man, consummated internally by responsible
trust. Revelation occurs only in person to person confrontation; it includes no communica
tion of concepts or truths about God, but is the self-impartation of divine love, issuing in
responsive faith and fellowship." Although Henry complains about the vagueness of
Barth's notion of revelation (GRA 2:144; GRA 4:158, 197, 199), yet this definition
frequently occurs in Henry as the Barthian meaning of revelation (see GRA 2:145; GRA
1:190; see also Henry, "Are We Doomed?" 199, 204; idem, Evangelical Responsibility,
57; idem, Protestant Dilemma, 53-54, 79-80; idem, The Drift, 122).
Barth's subjective and personalistic nature of revelation points up that it does not
occur in history and nature (GRA 1:191; GRA 2:144). However, it does occur throughout
history because men experience it now and in the future (GRA 2:159, 277; GRA 4:158,
198). Furthermore, since revelation does not occur in objective secular history, Barth
accordingly rejected the identification of revelation with either Scripture or Jesus of
Nazareth (GRA 4:158, 156; GRA 2:144), because revelation is neither objectified nor
possessed, but experienced and remembered (GRA 2:277, 311; CD 1/2, 3, 59, 28).
2CD II/l, 199, 207; see also CD 1/1, 223-24. To claim that man on his own can
understand the Word of God is to negate the role of grace, for "God's Word ceases to be
grace or grace itself ceases to be grace when we ascribe to man a disposition toward this
Word, a possibility of knowledge independent of it and peculiar in itself, over against this
Word" (CD 1/1, 221). "Men can know the Word of God . . . so far as God wills that they
should know it." Without this divine will there is only human disobedience. It is only in
the presence of God's will that this "disobedience is removed" (ibid., 223-24).
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longer has within himself the natural capacity for God.1
From this it also follows that even God's existence is known only as he alone
determines that man should know him.2 So in order for man to know God's Word, he
should be ready for it, be open to divine grace and faith. It is only in the presence of faith
that this knowledge takes place and/or is made possible.3 And faith arises from the Word
of God.4 General revelation, reason, and natural theology cannot deliver man this
knowledge. Whatever knowledge claim this theology makes concerning God is bound to be
unauthentic and, hence, untrue.5 In fact, natural theology is man's encroachment on God.6
On his own, he cannot know God as Lord, Creator, Reconciler, and Redeemer.7
Furthermore, although we are totally dependent on God's revelation in Jesus Christ for any
knowledge of God,* yet this knowledge is not one that has "parity'' with God's knowledge.
Neither does it imply "disparity. "9 Rather, both similarity and dissimilarity are involved,
lBarth, "No!" 89; CD 1/1, 273; CD 1/2, 265; see also GRA 1:397; GRA 5:369.
2CD 1/1, 75.
3Ibid., 261; see also GRA 5:51, 369.
4CD 1/1, 271.
SCD II/l, 103-05; 109-10.
6Ibid., 79-84. For Henry’s elaboration on Barth's rejection of general revelation,
see GRA 2:127-28, 144, 89; Carl F. H. Henry, "Where Is Modern Theology Going?"
Bulletin o f the Evangelical Theological Society 11 (Winter 1968): 6. For a similar
discussion of Henry's elaboration on Barth's antipathy to natural theology, see also GRA
2 : 121- 22 .
7CD II/l, 75-79.
*Barth, "No!" 71.
9CD II/l, 224.
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and at best it is analogical.1 It is necessarily so because human language is a product of the
"creaturely nature of this world . . . [and] conditioned by the limitations of humanity.,c In
fact, man's language about God "is the language of the perse faithless and antifaith reason
of man. "3 Moreover, although the analogies are very much human in origin, yet it was
God who taught us to use terms like father, son, arm, mouth, and ear when talking about
him.4 While such analogies provide only a partial knowledge of God, they are nevertheless
truly effective because of the operation of divine grace in us.5
In addition to being our only source of knowledge about God, Christ is also the
true man, because in the incarnation he, the Word, ’’became flesh, flesh of my flesh, "6 but
without sin.7 Christ is "the real, genuine, true man, man placed before God.”8 In fact, the
real man is not found anywhere else other than in Christ.9 He is the key to understanding
‘Ibid., 225; see also GRA 5:369, GRA 3:186, 226, 228-29.
2CD 1/1,390; 51.
3Ibid., 30.
4CD II/l, 230-31.
5Ibid., 231-36; CD III/4, 41. "Grace is . . . no spiritual power residing in the man
of this world; no physical energy residing in Nature; no cosmic power in this earth. Grace
i s . . . the Power of God (i.16). Grace is altogether 'Yes'; it is salvation, comfort, and
edification" (Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, 103).
6CD III/3, 307.
7CD 1/2, 40, 90.
8Ibid., 40; see also ibid., 109; CD III/3, 306.
9CD II/2, 43.
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man.1 Hence, Christology is the basis for anthropology.2 Jesus Christ is also the election
man and the elect man.3 " ' Election' means that man is plucked like a brand from the
burning.1,4 "And because God looks at man in Jesus Christ, His election of man to
fellowship with Him" is therefore made possible.5

Henry's Reaction to Karl Barth
At first sight it seems as if Barth's version of revelation is in accord with Henry’s
because both describe the concept as a divine self-revelation.6 A similarity is also seen in
the fact that both stress the transcendent nature of revelation: that it comes only from God
and not from man is Henry’s constant emphasis as much as it was for Barth.7 Henry is also
•CD III/2, 23, 41, 43, 46.
2Barth, Knowledge and Service o f God, 48; idem, Against the Stream: Shorter Post
war Writings, 1946-52 (London: SCM Press, 1954), 186-90. "The Word of God [Jesus
Christ] is [anthropology's] foundation" (CD III/2, 20).
3Barth, Knowledge and Service o f God, 74; italics original.
“Ibid., 74-75.
sIbid., 76; italics original. Barth's stress on God's sovereignty, the sovereignty of
his grace, divine election, and Jesus Christ's substitutionary life and death are so strong
that he seems to convey the idea of universalism of some sort (see for instance, ibid., 6987). In fact, for Henry, Barth is certainly a universalist (see GRA 4:198; 259; GRA 6:412;
507; Henry, Evangelicals at the Brink, 26; idem, Aspects o f Christian Social Ethics, 148150).
6When Henry speaks of revelation he often refers to it as God's "self-revelation" or
"self-disclosure" (Henry, The Drift, 114; idem, Christian Countermoves, 9-10; 15; see also
n. 5, p. 58 above).
7Revelation issues "from the mind and will of God," says Henry (GRA 3:248; GRA
2:86; see also Henry, "Evangelicals in a Turning Time,” 49; idem, Protestant Dilemma,
80).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

161
on the side of Barth when he rejects natural theology,1 although for a different reason.2
However, as far as Henry's theological relationship to Barth is concerned, there are more
disagreements than agreements so that the two stand opposed to each other. For although
Henry stresses revelation as God's self-revelation/disclosure, yet he also holds that this
disclosure is an objective, cognitive, and/or a rational-verbal phenomenon that conveys true
information about God and man,3 and is universally available.4 Because of the rationality of
revelation, no "astronomer, biologist, chemist, philosopher, or physicist [is required] to
check his mind at the door" in order to avail revelation.5
‘Since Henry's reaction to natural theology has already been treated in the section
dealing with Aquinas, no further treatment is deemed necessary at this juncture.
2Henry calls attention to the debate between Brunner and Barth over the question of
the effects of the Fall upon the imago Dei and natural theology. Briefly, Henry is on the
side of Brunner who is against Barth for holding to the complete eradication of the imago
by the Fall. Henry is also with Brunner for the latter's espousal of general revelation, but
disagrees with his reduction of this revelation to conscience. However, Henry agrees with
both Brunner and Barth in their rejection of natural theology; but disagrees with them for
their view of revelation as nonobjective, nonrational, and nonpropositional (see GRA
1:396-99; GRA 2:127-28; GRA 3:164; 282-283, 431, 496; and Henry in Gaebelein, 6).
For the debate between Brunner and Barth on natural theology, see Brunner and Barth,
Natural Theology.
3See pp. 43, 62-63, 57, 59, 80-82, and 108 above; Henry, "Are We Doomed?" 215;
GRA 3:375; 456-57; Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 55; idem, Faith at the Frontiers, 132.
"In revelation God speaks out his mind, the truths about himself as well as his intentions for
man (GRA 3:457). "Revelation in the Bible is essentially a mental conception: God’s
disclosure is rational and intelligible communication. [It] is addressed to the mind and will
of human beings. As such it involves primarily an activity of consciousness that enlists the
thoughts and bears on the beliefs and actions of its recipients" (ibid., 248).
4Carl F. H. Henry, "The Reality and Identity of God," Part 1, Christianity Today,
14 March 1969, 3; idem, "Evangelicals in a Turning Time," 49; GRA 4:300. Barth limited
revelation to believers (GRA 1:396-97).
SGRA 1:264.
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In further contrasting his own view of revelation with that of Barth's, Henry says
that the former "replaces the God who has spoken by the speaking God."1 That is, Barth’s
idea of revelation does away with the Bible as God's revealed Word, and reduces revelation
to a personal experience. Whereas Henry says that revelation is changeless, once-for-all,
and limited to the prophets and apostles, Barth said that it continues today and in the
future.2 For Henry, revelation is objective and independent of our response; but for Barth
it is subjective, and dependent upon our response.3
Henry is also in discord with Barth because the latter limited revelation only to the
transcendent Word and made a disjunction between Jesus of Nazareth (i.e., Jesus Christ)
and revelation,4 and between Scripture and revelation.s For Henry, Jesus of Nazareth is
revelation; his "words and works together embody the creative Word of God. In him the
Word of God is both audible and visible."6 He is "the zenith of divine revelation.1,7
‘In this instance, Henry refers to Jude 3: "The faith once delivered to the saints"
(Henry, The Drift, 119).
2"In Barth's view, divine revelation has no extension in time but occurs afresh each
time" (GRA 2:277).
3Henry, The Drift, 119-20.
“For Barth, revelation and the transcendent Word of God are identical; so is the
Logos Christ; but Jesus of Nazareth is not identical with revelation or Christ (Henry,
Frontiers in Modem Theology, 54). He is only a witness to Christ (idem, Evangelical
Responsibility, 60); only a "pointer" or "witness" to revelation (idem, The Drift, 121; see
also note 1, p. 154 above).
sHenry, "Where Is Modem Theology Going?" 10; GRA 4:157-58.
6GRA 3:178; 206.
7Henry, Evangelical Responsibility, 60.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

163
Scripture likewise is revelation. It is "written revelation.1,1 Barth's concept of revelation is
therefore a disservice to Christianity because it dissolves the authority of Scripture "into a
vague mysticism,"2 or "revelation-mysticism, or gnosticism."3
Henry likewise disagrees with Barth’s repudiation of general revelation and regards
it as a "costly error"4 because God is known everywhere through general revelation "even
where special redemptive revelation is unknown" (with Aquinas).s
Men have inescapable knowledge of God on the basis of God's self-revelation through
nature (Rom. 1:20), and God is, moreover, nowhere in the external course of things
without a witness (Acts 14:17). Mankind, to whom the revelation is addressed, is
lighted by the Logos (John 1:9) and the moral law is "written on their hearts" (Rom.
2:15, RSV) so that men know that the self-revealed God justly punishes those who
flaunt his will (Rom. 1:32). The revelation of God invades and penetrates the very
mind and conscience of every man, despite the fact that, in face of this very revelation,
men do not choose to know God (Rom. 1:28).6
Because general revelation provides the elementary knowledge of God's reality, every
‘Henry, Fifty Years, 101-02. Henry observes that during Barth's last years he began
giving importance to the rationality, objectivity, and historicity of revelation. But that
effort (CD II, 234; 150-53; CD II/2, 210) was too halting, too little , and too late (Carl F.
Henry, "Chaos in European Theology: The Deterioration of Barth's Defenses," part 2,
Christianity Today, 9 October 1964, 19; idem, "Justification by Ignorance: A NeoProtestant Motif?" Journal o f the Evangelical Theological Society 13, Part 1 [Winter 1970]:
4; GRA 2:180; GRA 3:285; 466).
2Henry, "Man's Dilemma: Sin," 15; 20; idem, Fifty Years, 101-02; see also GRA
4:157, where Henry points out that Barth's disjunction between Scripture and Word of God
destroys "any significant view of Scripture [as well as] the revelation of the Word o f God
attested by Scripture. ”
3GRA 4:158.
4GRA 2:89.
5Ibid., 129-30; 143.
6Ibid., 130; italics original; see also GRA 4:12; and Henry, Toward a Recovery, 57.
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human person is answerable at the judgment day for the way he relates himself to it either
positively or negatively.1 In Henry’s understanding, special revelation presupposes general
revelation.2 Though different, yet the two forms of revelation operate side by side; one
cannot be subordinated to the other.3 They are interdependent.4 Special revelation enables
human beings to "assess fully” general revelation,s and general revelation furnishes the
requisite "intelligibility" for special revelation,6 as well as provides man an "occasion for
revolt and estrangement."7
Henry also disagrees with Barth's analogical knowledge of God just as much as he
disagrees with Aquinas. Human language should not be made a hindrance to a univocal
knowledge of God. For if it is, then "there arises the question whether God himself would
or could use it. "8 In that case it would imply "the inability of Jesus of Nazareth to
communicate God's truth and Word in any but a broken way."9 Moreover, if human
language cannot put us in direct contact with reality, then even this very statement itself
‘GRA 2:89; GRA 4:12. Henry says that it is through reason and conscience that
man comes to know God's reality—his divinity and power (GRA 4:12).
2GRA 2:90.
3See also p. 60 above.
4Carl F. H. Henry, "The Ambiguities of Scientific Breakthrough," 100; GRA 2:90.
5GRA 2:90.
6Ibid., 122. For Henry's exposition of general revelation see ibid., 91-103.
7Ibid., 86.
8Gordon Clark, quoted in GRA 3:287.
9GRA 3:287.
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would have to be rejected.1 For if knowledge is to be perceived only in terms of an image
or representation and not in terms of "a truth or proposition," then how is one to explain
"the knowledge of a tree or a song?" In other words, there is "a point of identity with what
God and man know. "2
If one begins with the basic presupposition that knowledge is possible (if it is not, we
could not affirm even this), then our minds must grasp what is known. If what is
known is not Reality, then we do not know anything . . . ; the mind must have the
Reality itself. If it does not, we could not know that an image resembles it.3
For "if truth is not the same for God and man then it is humanly impossible for man to
possess truth about God."4 Moreover, in the end, the Barthian theory of knowledge results
lIbid., 225.
2GRA 2:54. "The fact that we know only 'in part,’ however, does not destroy the
validity and trustworthiness of the portion of knowledge we have through divine disclosure.
That God does not reveal himself to man exhaustively does not mean that he does not reveal
himself truly. To say that man cannot fathom fully all the depths of God’s being is not to
assert divine unknowability." "We know God’s hiddenness only through his revealedness;
apart from his revelation no basis would exist for speaking of God as hidden, or for
speaking of God at all. There might be a hidden possibility of God, perhaps, but certainly
not a hidden God, not a God who transcends his revelation. God’s hiddenness is the
obverse side of his free sovereign self-disclosure; revelation is the presence and activity of
the hidden One in an unveiling.
It is impossible therefore to erect either God’s revealedness or his hiddenness into
a speculative principle that expounds God’s nature and ways whether rationalistically or
agnostically. The hiddenness of God is not a premise to which a biblical theologian may
appeal in order to relativize revelation. Man 'lives and moves and has his being’ in God
from the beginning of his life. The Bible begins with the self-revealing God. Only on the
basis of God’s own disclosure, in fact, can we affirm God’s transcendence even of his
revelation. There is no support for the hiddenness of God in the familiar passage, ' For as
the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways and my
thoughts than your thoughts’ (Isa. 55:9, RSV), inasmuch as in context this passage appeals
for receiving and appropriating God’s truth" (ibid., 54; italics original).
3Ibid., 225.
4GRA 2:54.
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in skepticism1 and a capitulation to Kantian epistemology.2
Barth's rejection of general revelation and natural theology also goes against
Henry’s anthropology who, contrary to Barth's insistence upon the total destruction of the
imago Dei, holds to its survival,3 which he usually sees as comprising the rational and
moral aspects of man,4 and through which agency he apprehends general revelation.5

A Summary of Henry's Portrayal of Man in Karl Barth
From the foregoing presentation of Barth's thoughts on man and his relationship
with God, it is obvious that Barth's view of man is a low and negative one. This
pessimistic view is a result of his belief in the doctrine of man's total corruption on account
of sin, and a subsequent loss of all permanent point of contact with God. Therefore any
relationship and knowledge of God can be made possible only as God in his grace, through
man's openness to faith and obedience, chooses to do so. However, the knowledge of God
brought about by this divine confrontation is personal, nonintellective, and subjective. It is
an experiential knowledge that can only be remembered but not possessed.6 Such
•GRA 3:229.
2Henry, Remaking, 301. For Henry's rejection of Kantian epistemology see GRA
2:131-33; and for his affirmation of univocal knowledge as opposed to analogical
knowledge (see GRA 1:237-38; 388).
3Henry, Christian Countermoves, 14; idem, Protestant Dilemma, 160.
4Henry, Toward a Recovery, 109; GRA 2:133; 160.
5Henry, Toward a Recovery, 57; GRA 1:388.
6"God's revelation has no extension in time, no worldly history, it is never . . . a
possession. It is never 'being', but always an expected or remembered 'act'" (Barth,
according to Henry in GRA 2:277).
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knowledge is indirect and analogical.
Against this Barthian anthropological scenario, Henry says No! Man is not that
totally destitute and helpless. Barth's position is a demeaning exaggeration of man's real
situation. To the extent that man is a sinner, Henry agrees with Barth. That man needs
divine help, grace, and forgiveness, Henry does not deny. His doctrines of sin, Christ, and
atonement testify to this.1 However Henry does not agree with Barth that man is totally
deprived of the capacity for God as well as for comprehending and believing divine truth.2
Such a situation would be true only if the imago Dei were completely obliterated, which is
not the case.3 Though sullied by the Fall, the imago still survives—especially in its rational
and moral dimensions (with Aquinas).4 Because of the imago Dei, man has a permanent
point of contact with God externally in nature and history, and internally in reason,
conscience, and morality. Through these avenues he comes to know God, his eternal
power, and divinity.5 Therefore man is held answerable before God's judgment day for
revolting against the knowledge of God in general revelation.
lSee Henry, "Man's Dilemma: Sin,'' 3-20; on the atonement, see ibid., 16; idem,
Christian Countermoves, 22; idem, "Who Are the Evangelicals?" 77; 94; idem,
"Justification by Ignorance?" 6; GRA 5:80; 233; GRA 6:334-35; 413; 434.
2Seepp. 150-51 above.
3The image is sullied but not "totally shattered" (GRA 2:136; Henry, "The God of
the Bible and Moral Foundations," 8).
“GRA 2:135.
5Henry, Toward a Recovery. 57; GRA 4:12; see also pp. 63-64, 163 above. Human
reason though "not a source of divine revelation," is "a divinely-ordered instrument for the
recognition of revelation" (Henry, Gods or God? 227).
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Furthermore, although the imago Dei does not make man a part of God,1 yet it is
nevertheless the channel through which God communicates with him directly, conceptually,
and rationally. Since the image is God's and not man’s image of God, it implies that there
is a genuine and direct correspondence between man's knowledge of God and God’s
knowledge of himself. The only difference is that whereas man knows only by means of
divine revelation and in a limited scope, God knows by virtue of his being God and knows
it necessarily, comprehensively, and eternally.2 Because of the imago Dei in man, God was
able to reveal himself, his nature, purpose, and will to man not only through general
revelation, but more specifically and clearly through special revelation that was vouchsafed
to the prophets and apostles under inspiration, who later passed it on to us in written form
as Scripture.3

A Recapitulation of Henry's View of Man
in Aquinas and Barth
From Henry's reaction to Aquinas and Barth we note that Henry wants to avoid
two kinds of exaggerations regarding man:4 that which overestimates his capability to arrive
independently (of revelation) at an authentic knowledge of God, his nature, and ways by
means of his reasoning powers and the senses (against Aquinas); and that which overstates
'GRA 2:124.
2GRA 5:376, 12.
3GRA 4:42.
“Concerning Henry's caution against the exaggeration of the human mind in one way
or the other, see GRA 2:124; Henry, Gods or God? 225. Man is neither "totally
discontinuous" nor "totally continuous" with God (Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 137, n. 9).
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man's corrupt and sinful state to the extent that man is believed to have lost all capacity for
God or the capability to understand revelation (against Barth). The following four points
further clarify Henry’s own view of man and the latter’s relationship to God:
1. Man's problem lies not in a lack of natural capacity to know and understand
general revelation but in his inability to interpret that revelation correcdy and arrive at a
natural theology that prepares him as a qualified candidate for the reception of special
revelation (against Aquinas).1 The problem that stands in the way for such an otherwise
noble enterprise is not so much his noetic deprivation but his rebellious, alienated, and
recalcitrant will.2
2. Man still bears the imago Dei even in his fallen state. As such, and to a certain
extent, there is still a point of contact between him and God, especially at the rational and
moral levels (against Barth).
3. On account of the image of God, man's knowledge of the Deity is identical with
his knowledge of man at that point (against Aquinas and Barth).3
4. The imago Dei in man likewise holds him morally responsible for manipulation,
distortion, and rejection of revelation.
Thus far, we have seen Henry's view of man from the perspective of his reaction
to Aquinas and Barth. In order to get a total or broader picture of Henry’s view of man,
we also need to take into consideration his description of man independent of his reaction to
^ e e pp. 143-45, 147 above.
2See pp. 103-04 above.
3Henry describes the relationship between God's mind and man's mind as a
"hinterland relationship” with the two coinciding at certain points (GRA 5:382).
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any other view. After that is done, a summary follows that recapitulates the major
emphases of the man that Henry has in mind.

Henry's Doctrine of Man
Man's Creation and Fall
The first man, Adam, came from his Creator’s hands some 6,000-10,000 years
ago.1 Besides being "the highest form of created existence,"2 man was also a "unitary
personality" of body, soul, and spirit, and enjoyed a state of "pristine perfection.”3 Man
‘Henry, "The Bible and Modem Science," 1193; GRA 6:213; 225; GRA 2:127.
Henry does admit however that the Bible provides no precise age for the antiquity of either
man or earth (GRA 6:226). Henry also says that once human existence is correlated with
evolution, then man himself has lost his own significance. "At best [he is] a cosmic tramp
destined for oblivion" (Henry, "Introduction," in Quest fo r Reality).
Henry endorses creation ex nihilo (GRA 6:37; 120). In his view the creation story
of Genesis is to be understood literally and not as a myth or symbol (ibid., 116). However,
while stating that the doctrine of creation is the "bedrock foundation of every major
doctrine of the church," Henry assumes that the Bible does not require a six twenty-fourhour-day creation (ibid., 119; 220). With respect to the creation of "species" but not
"kinds,” Henry seems to be predisposed to theistic evolution as the means for their
emergence (see Henry, "Theology and Evolution," 197).
2GRA 4:16; see also GRA 6:200; Henry, Gods or God? 230.
3While Henry holds that man is a "harmoniously unified self" (Carl F. H. Henry,
"Distinction Between Conservative and Liberal Theology," The Watchman-Examiner,
2 December 1948, 1224; see also idem, "Christ’s Resurrection and Human Destiny,"
Christianity Today, 27 April 1973, 9), yet he also maintains that man is a compound
creature whose body "houses a soul" (idem, "The Final Triumph," in Foundations of the
Faith: Twelve Studies in the Basic Christian Revelation, ed. David J. Fant [Westwood, NJ:
Fleming H. Revell, 1951], 183; see also GRA 5:383 where Henry regards man as a
"psycho-somatic entity"). Henry holds that these dual aspects of man are not "different
entities" but rather "different functions of the one psychic life of man" (Henry, "Image of
God," 548; GRA 2:17). Henry believes that at death the soul "survives in the intermediate
state" and is reunited with its body at the resurrection (idem, "Image of God," EDT, 548).
At the resurrection man will be reconstituted into a corporeal being (ibid., 548); Henry,
"Man’s Dilemma: Sin," 13; idem, Protestant Dilemma, 129. Note: Henry's detachment of
the body from the soul seems to contradict his previous emphasis on man's organic unity.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

171
was fashioned "for personal and endless fellowship with God, involving rational
understanding (Gen. l:28ff.), moral obedience (2:16-17), and religious communion (3:3),"l
made possible by the image of God in him. The imago is the faculty through which God
"ongoingly confronts" and addresses man.2
One day, however, a tragedy struck Adam when he fell into sin—not out of the
necessity of his created nature3—but out of his own "deliberate choice" to go against the will
of his Maker, which is what sin is all about.4 The result was terrible: all of mankind, and
lHenry, "Image of God," EDT, 548; 546; GRA 1:150; 228; GRA 2:125. The
objective of man's creation is for God's glory and obedience; "for reasonable knowledge
and service of his Maker" (idem, "What Is man on Earth For?" 159-60; idem, "The Nature
of God," in Christian Faith and Modem Theology, Contemporary Evangelical Thought, ed.
Carl F. H. Henry (New York: Channel Press, 1964): 74; see also idem, "Christianity and
Medical Frontiers," Journal o f the American Scientific Affiliation 30 (September 1978):
102; idem, Evangelicals at the Brink, 8; idem, "Epistemology," BDT[1964], 185; see also
idem, Gods or God? 81; 225; 230). "Man is made to know and love and serve God and
under God, is to reclaim the earth and mankind for the Creator’s holy purposes. Only if
man lives in the light of this scriptural perspective can he escape ensnarement by ancient or
modern myths" (GRA 1:153).
2GRA 2:133.
3Henry, The Uneasy Conscience, 68-69; see also GRA 6:272-73.
4Henry, "Man's Dilemma: Sin," 17; idem, Protestant Dilemma, 140, 144. "Sin is
neither necessary nor natural and normal for man; it stems rather, from the voluntary act of
rebellion" (GRA 4:607). "Sin is a deliberate choice" (idem, "Man's Dilemma: Sin," 17); a
voluntary act (GRA 4:607; Henry, "The Ambiguities of Scientific Breakthrough," 110;
idem, The God Who Shows, 81); and a disposition of the heart (GRA 4:607). Man is a
"sinner in thought, word, and deed" (idem, "Man's Dilemma: Sin," 15). In this respect
Henry also concurs with the traditional definition of sin which is "a lack of conformity to
God's moral law either in act, disposition, or state" (ibid., 18). In his analysis of sin
Henry concludes that at its root lie pride and selfishness (ibid., 18; idem, The Drift, 116;
see also Carl F. H. Henry, "Our Lord's Virgin Birth," in Man's Need and God’s Gift,
Readings in Christian Theology, ed. Millard J. Erickson [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976],
313, where Henry emphasizes man's sinfulness; see also idem, "Biblical Authority and the
Social Crisis," 218. Henry also says that the depth of sin is radical and its range is
extensive, ibid. 218.
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not just certain individuals, inherited Adam's sinful nature.1 Every person "suffers from
the guilt of Adam's transgression, inherits a defiled nature and is exposed to penal evils."2
Man's state from that day onward changed from sinlessness to sinfulness.3 Here is how
Henry describes that tragedy:
The fall of man was a catastrophic personality shock; it fractured human existence with
a devastating fault. Ever since, man's worship and contemplation of the living God
have been broken, his devotion to the divine will shattered. Man's revolt against God
therefore affects his entire being; he is now motivated by an inordinate will; he no
longer loves God nor his neighbor; he devotes human reasoning to the cause of spiritual
rebellion. He seeks escape from the claim of God upon his life and blames his fellow
man for his own predicament. His revolt against God is at the same time a revolt
against truth and the good; his rejection of truth is a rejection of God and the good, his
defection from the good a repudiation of God and the truth.4

Man's Nature: The imago Dei
When Henry considers the nature of man he seems to correlate it exclusively with
the imago Dei or image of God.5 Says he: "The Bible answers the question of the nature of
■Henry, "Man's Dilemma: Sin," 16-17; 13.
2Henry, CPE, 181. Henry also makes plain that it is not only Adam's transgression
that man is implicated in but also "his own transgression of the will of God." Adam's sin
"does not destroy [man's] moral responsibility in personal decision (ibid.).
3Ibid., 16-17; idem, Protestant Dilemma, 160. That man is a sinner by nature is
constantly and strongly affirmed by Henry. See idem, "Distinction Between Conservative
and Liberal Theology," 1224-26; idem, "Modem Education and the Secularistic Tide," The
Watchman-Examiner, 11 October 1951, 966; idem, "The God of the Bible vs. Naturalism,"
228.
4GRA 2:135.
5Henry, "Image of God," EDT, 545. In Henry's understanding the term "image"
and "likeness" (e.g., Gen 1:26 and 5:3) are used interchangeably or synonymously (ibid.,
546). Although man is created in God’s image, yet he bears that image only in certain and
not in all respects (or even in most). The "personality of God is far more complex and
intricate than that of created life" (GRA 5:167). Henry cites the following passages for the
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man by pointing to the imago Dei,"1which he defines as that "cohesive unity" of the
rational, moral, and spiritual faculties of man.2 These faculties "interact with and condition
each other."3 The imago also includes the conscience, freedom of the will, self-conscious
ness, and self-transcendence.4 It is the image of God that sets man apart from and elevates
him above the animals in degree and kind.s The imago not only prevents man from degra
dation to animality6 but "supplies the continuing conditions of humanity,"7 "provides . . . a
sense of personal worth and peculiar destiny,"8 enables the correlation of the "meaningful
ness of God-language with all other meanings and experiences of his daily existence, "9
biblical teaching of the image of God: Gen 1:26, 27; 5:1, 3; 9:6; 1 Cor 11:7; Col 3:10; Jas
3:9; and Ps 8 (idem, "Image of God," EDT, 546).
‘Henry, "Image of God," EDT, 545.
2GRA 2:125; GRA 1:397; GRA 3:300; 460; Henry, "Image of God," EDT, 546;
idem, "Man," BDT, 340-41.
3GRA 2:125; GRA 1:397; Johnson, 218; Henry, "Image of God," EDT, 546; idem,
"Man," BDT, 340-41; GRA 3:300, 460.
4Henry, "Man," BDT, 341; GRA 2:133; 126; Henry, Remaking, 58; idem, "John,"
157, 159; idem, "Reply to Objections," 1-2; GRA 6:223; Henry, Remaking, 244. Man's
uniqueness is derived from his likeness to, as well as consciousness of, God (GRA 6:20304).
5Henry, "Man," BDT, 341; GRA 2:133; 126; Henry, Remaking, 58; idem, "John,"
157, 159; idem, "Reply to Objections," 1-2; GRA 6:223; Henry, Remaking, 244. "The
Bible does not discriminate man from the animals in terms of morphological considerations,
but rather in terms of the imago Dei" (idem, "Image of God," EDT, 548).
®Henry, Remaking, 58; idem, "Image of God," EDT, 545.
7GRA 1:145; 151.
8Ibid., 144-45; 151.
9GRA 3:376.
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furnishes him with an idea of God,1 and serves as the means for a relationship with the
Creator.2 The imago constitutes man's core, and invests him with "inherent dignity,"
"infinite value and sacredness of human personality."3 The imago points to man's unique
connection and kinship with God without implying that he is part of or in the same order
with God (against pantheism).4
By making the image of God as the definitive contrast between humans and
animals, Henry indirectly points to creation as the primary context vis-a-vis those who want
to view the image only from the Christological or eschatological perspective.5 That is,
although Henry does not deny the Christological dimension of the image,6 yet he wants to
point out that the "redemption-image" (eschatological) "presupposes" and "anticipates" the
"creation-image" and the latter takes precedence over the former.7 The "creation-image"
‘Ibid., 389.
2GRA 2:125.
3Henry, "Image of God," EDT, 545.
4Ibid.; GRA 2:124. Although Henry believes that man bears the image of God only
in certain respects, yet that image is nevertheless an "exact resemblance" of God's own
image. To clarify, Henry points to the resemblance of the image of the incarnate Christ to
that of God's (Henry, "Image of God,” EDT, 546).
5Henry, "Image of God," EDT, 547.
^The doctrine of the image of God is framed "in the setting of divine creation and
redemption (ibid., 545).
7GRA 2:125. Henry compares the two (creation-image and redemption-image) as
follows: (1) The creation-image was once-for-all wholly given at the creation of the first
Adam; the redemption-image is gradually fashioned. (2) The creation-image is conferred in
some respect upon the whole human race; the redemption-image only upon the redeemed.
(3) The creation-image distinguishes man from the animals; the redemption-image
distinguishes the regenerate family of faith from unregenerate mankind. (4) The creation-
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implies a "state" and the "redemption-image," a "relation." As a relation the imago points
to man's personal "standing before God," resulting in a progressive restoration of the
image, but limited to the redeemed or the regenerate family of faith.1 As a state the imago
stands for that fixed element gifted "at creation" and possessed by every human person
irrespective of whether he/she is a regenerate or unregenerate.2 This universal possession
of the creation-image points to the obvious indication that "in some measure," though
blurred and sullied, the image "still universally survives the fall."3

The Formal Aspect of the imago Dei
Henry further subdivides the imago Dei into two aspects. "The divine image in
man after as well as before the fall embraces both a formal aspect and a material content. "4
Regarding their condition after the human progenitor fell into sin, Henry also states thus:
"The fall of man is not destructive of the formal image (man's personality) although it
image is probationary; the redemption-image is not (Henry, "Image of God," EDT, 547).
‘Carl F. H. Henry, "Evangelicals and the Social Scene: God's Plan for Salvation
and Justice," in The Ministry of Development in Evangelical Perspective: Symposium on the
Social and Spiritual Mandate, ed. Robert Lincoln Hancock (Pasadena, CA: The William
Carey Library, 1979), 99.
2Henry, "Image of God," EDT, 546-47. Since the "imago Dei survives in every
man" (GRA 1:405; Henry, Twilight, 33), it follows that all can understand special revela
tion, irrespective of their cultural differences (Henry, "American Evangelicals in a Turning
Time," 1062; idem, "Are We Doomed?" 201; see also Daane, "What Is Truth?" 28).
3GRA 1:405; Henry, Twilight, 33; idem, "God's Word to a Nation in Decision,"
Religious Broadcasting 15 (April 1983): 25; idem, "The God of the Bible and Moral
Foundations," 8. According to Henry even the human fetus bears the image of God (Henry,
"Stewardship of the Environment," 480; and idem, "Will Christianity Outlive Its Critics?"
124; idem, "The Bible and Modern Science," 1193).
4GRA 2:130.
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involves the distortion (though not demolition) of the material content of the image. '4 The
formal side of the imago is comprised of the "basic forms of reason" and "structures of
morality." Without the forms of reason, man2
could never intelligibly discriminate God from the not-God, right from wrong, truth
from untruth. Only if man is logically lighted, and not simply morally or spiritually
involved independent of intelligence, can he be meaningfully aware of responsible
relationships to God and other selves and to the cosmos. If man made any sense of his
own experience, the laws of logic must intrinsically have qualified the imago Dei.
From the first, man as man possessed reasoning capacities and rational discernment on
the basis of creation. All distinctively human experience presupposes the law of
noncontradiction and the irreducible distinction between truth and error; man cannot
repudiate these logical presuppositions without sacrificing the intelligibility of what he
says and does and his own mental coherence. Reason illuminates divine revelation by
furnishing the concepts for truth not only about man and nature but also about God and
by discriminating the true God from false gods, revelation from pseudorevelation, and
true from false religion.3
Similarly, without the structures of morality, man would be incapable of making
a distinction between good and evil and between right and wrong [as "genuine
objective"] irreducibles. Moreover, he was endowed with conscience—with the "good
conscience" which approves what is right and disapproves what is wrong; he did not as
yet have a "bad conscience" because of moral disobedience. Anyone who demotes all
'Henry, "Image of God," EDT, 547; see also GRA 3:374.
2The forms of reason are identified with "the laws of logic" or "the categories of
thought” (GRA 2:126; GRA 3:222). Reason refers to the capacity to think along logical
lines. It is "the mind of God or the mind of man, which ideally operates in accordance with
the innate, a priori, objective laws of formal logic." That is, these laws "are descriptive
statements of how reason ideally functions" (Johnson, 59). "Reason is [also] a divine
attribute, and the laws of reason are definitive of God's nature and descriptive of his w ill,”
(GRA 5:335; 337, 374; Henry, "The God of the Bible Vs. Naturalism," 234-37; idem,
"The Bible and Modem Science," 1194; and idem, "The God of the Bible and Moral
Foundations, 22). Although God is the "basic structure of the ultimately real world . . . ,
yet because of his rationality, it can also be said that reason is the essential foundation of
ultimate reality" (GRA 5:374).
3GRA 2:126; see also ibid., 134; GRA 4:58; Henry, "Revelation and the Bible-2,"
17; idem, "Man," BDT, 340-41. All men have the formal side of the imago-, therefore all
"conceptualize in the same way" (GRA 2:133).
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ethical distinctions to relativity and considers conscience an irrelevancy is not only
morally perverse but also a candidate for insanity.1

The Material Content of the imago Dei
The material content of the imago refers to experiential knowledge of God such as
the heathens' cognition of God’s divinity and power.2 It pertains to the possession of moral
light by every human person and to his/her capability for revolting against that light.3 Such
a knowledge can be "as a liberating power found in a life of commitment to his holy will;
or it can be a knowledge which condemns the sinner to his sinful deeds. "4 In its most ideal
form it existed before the Fall when man
personally . . . truly and intimately knew Elohim as his Maker; . . . knew . . . that
God's revealed will defines the good, and . . . knew specific elements of that will that
placed him under God's command. [Man] knew . . . that truth is what God thinks and
says, and by divine communication he also knew and treasured in his heart certain
truths enunciated by his Maker. Indeed, man in God's image knew God himself to be
the truth and the good, the Creator and Lord of all; he knew reason and conscience as
God’s enablements to recognize and approve the true and holy Lord. Created man knew
God's revealed truth and declared will, and love, trusted and obeyed him. His
fellowship with God was unbroken; he lived a moral life in truth, a life consonant with
God’s revelation pulsating through the imago Dei. To God he gave his whole heart, his
undivided self; God's light and law were his highest fealty and felicity.5
Unfortunately, because of sin, none of that "original righteousness remains." In its place is
‘GRA 2:126.
2Ibid., 128-29.
3Henry, Toward a Recovery, 45, 58; GRA 2:129.
4GRA 2:129.
5Ibid., 134.
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a "horrendous spiritual and moral chasm" between man and God.1 therefore, man, in
God's presence, is always and inevitably a sinner.2 Consequently, even his "best acts are
still the performances of a sinner. ”3 Man is so awesomely “depraved," ridden with
"corruption, guilt," a "defective will," and a "fallen nature”* that even in "his best moments
he is constantly in revolt against revelation and involved in the consequences of that
revolt."5 Actually, his "story is a story of revolt."6 He is preoccupied with it.7 As an act
of insubordination, man wills 'down', suppresses general revelation, twists, warps, and
tapers it "to what is more compatible and congenial with an alienated will. ’8 The Fall
reduced man to "depravity."
*GRA 4:607-08; 610.
2Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 140.
3Ibid.
4Henry, "Man's Dilemma: Sin," 4; 8; 17; idem, Protestant Dilemma, 140; see also
idem, "The Ambiguities of Scientific Breakthrough," 103; idem, CPE, 383.
5GRA 2:135; 122-23; GRA 3:460.
6Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 160; see also idem, Gods or God? 223, where Henry
talks of man's "volitional rebellion," and "sinful human’s rebellion against the light of the
Logos." In the category of revolters "against the living God," Henry places the secular
idealist, theistic philosopher, proponent of non-biblical religious outlook, and the atheist
(idem, Gods or God? 223). Regarding the non-biblical religions, Henry views them as the
"end-result of this revolt. On the one hand, they are a response to universal divine
disclosure, on the other hand, they are a deflection and dilution and distortion of it that
constitutes as a warped effort to bridge the gap between an alienated God and his alienated
creatures" (ibid., 222).
7GRA 2:135.
8Henry, Toward a Recovery, 57; 109. For Henry's portrayal of man as a willful,
rebellious being, see idem, Protestant Dilemma, 146; 160; GRA 2:88; 127; 129-30; 13537.
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[It] affects him in the entirety of his being—in volition, affection and intellection. But
this hardly means that man cannot comprehend God’s revelation, or that he cannot do
so prior to the regenerative or illuminative work of the Holy Spirit; far less does it
mean that man's rational capacities are wholly nullified. The fall conditions man’s will
more pervasively than his reason. Man wills not to know God in truth, and makes
religious reflection serviceable to moral revolt. But he is still capable of intellectually
analyzing rational evidence for the truth-value of assertions about God. If the noetic
effects of the fall were totally and utterly damaging, thus making man incapable of
thinking aright and immune to the rational validity of the basic categories of logic (e.g.,
the law of contradiction), then no rationally persuasive case could be mounted for or
against anything whatever.1
Henry again says that although man's response to general revelation is "broken,"
"evasive," and oblique, yet the fact still remains that he has contact with general revelation,
except that
he does not fully meet i t . . . in a truly answering fashion; his presuppositions are
wrong; he perceives . . . the knowable in wrong perspectives; he directs his faith
wrongly; he 'derails' his thinking by forming wrong concepts, judgements, theories,
and so forth'; he thus perceives the knowable in accordance with wrong theoretical
constructions.2
Hence, man’s problem is not that he cannot understand revelation but that the Fall has so
affected the will that he sets his face against God, distorts divine disclosure in the cosmos
and in history,3 and "translates religious reality into a nondescript spiritual realm or into
imaginative reconstruction of reality such as those of the pagan Gentile world that the
‘GRA 1:226-27. "Sin affects man's psychological activity, and hinders his ability to
think correctly [though] it does not affect the laws of valid inference. True propositions are
universally true now, as they were before the fall and as they always will be" (GRA 2:13536). "Logic, the law of contradiction, is not affected by sin. Even if everyone constantly
violates the laws of logic they would not be less true than if everyone constantly observed
them" (Gordon H. Clark, quoted in GRA 2:136).
2H. G. Stoker, quoted appreciatively in GRA 1:160.
3GRA 2:123.
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apostle Paul indicts in Romans."1 Because of his rebellious nature, man has lost the
capability to deduce from general revelation a dependable meaning.2 Consequently, he is
usually wrong in his ethical judgments. And even when he is correct, his inner alienation
from God and his present moral predicament prevent him from being certain.3 In other
words, "the fall conditions man's will more pervasively than his reason" (with Aquinas).
That although the perspicuity of God's universal revelation remains undimmed,4 yet man
wills not to know God in truth, and makes religious reflection serviceable to moral revolt3
Perhaps that is why Henry says that man's problem is basically spiritual.6 In such a
pathetic, unregenerate state, man is as good as dead.7 However, Henry believes that this
‘Henry, Gods or God? 223.
2Henry, CPE, 156.
3GRA 3:460; see also Henry, "Man," BDT, 340-341.
4Henry, Gods or God? 223.
5GRA 1:226. See also Rice, review, GRA 1-4, 110, where he observes that in
Henry "the consequences of the fall are more volitional than noetic."
6Carl F. H. Henry, "Distinction Between Conservative and Liberal Theology,"
1224.
7GRA 4:610. Man's sinful and rebellious state incapacitates him from delivering
himself. His lot can only be changed by Jesus Christ (GRA 4:608). He is man's best and
only hope for salvation (Henry, "Man’s Dilemma: Sin," 15, 20; GRA 4:608). Only in
Christ will man ever hope to get rid of his sins and rebellious nature. And only through
him will he get to taste a sinless life of glorification in the age to come (Carl F. H. Henry,
"The New Image of M an," in The Scientist and Ethical Decision, ed. Charles Hatfield
[Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1973]: 172). On that day man will either be
justified and ushered into eternal life of fellowship with God or condemned and assigned to
the fiery flames (GRA 6:414; 506-12).
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distortion and revolt are "progressively" reversed and corrected in the lives of believers;1
but it is only at the eschatological future that the image of God is fully restored in the
redeemed sinners.2
Further, Henry not only says that the formal side of the image of God has not been
totally destroyed by the Fall,3 but he insists upon its precedence over the material content of
the imago Dei. Note, for instance, the following statements:
But in contemplating the divine image in man, it should be clear that the rational or
cognitive aspect has logical priority. The Johannine Prologue declares that man by
creation is lighted by the Logos (John 1:4, 9), that is, logically lighted. The aposde
Paul, moreover, exhorts Christians as their "logical service" (literal) to present their
bodies "a living sacrifice, holy and acceptable to God" (Rom. 12:1, RSV). The
restoration of sinful man to his created image includes logical considerations. Light in
John's Gospel has both rational and moral connotations.4
The surviving imago assures the human intelligibility of divine disclosure, preserves the
universal validity of human knowledge, and correlates God's inner revelation to man in
the mind and conscience with God's external revelation in nature and history. It
qualifies man not only as a carrier of objective metaphysical truth about God's nature
and ways, but more particularly as a receiver of the special revelational truth of
redemption.5
The cognitive aspect of the imago is the "essential basis of moral responsibility and of
lHenry, "Evangelicals and the Social Scene," 99.
2Carl F. H. Henry, "The New Image of Man," 172, 176; see also GRA 3:22; 130;
Henry, The Drift, 50-51; idem, "Image of God," EDT, 546; and idem, "Jesus Christ and
the Last Days," 180.
3See note 4, p. 164 above, and also p. 172 above; see also GRA 3:222 where Henry
says: "The f a ll. . . has not destroyed man’s rationality"; see also GRA 1:228, where
Henry confirms the intactness of man's reasoning capacity shown by the Spirit's using of
truth "as the means of persuasion and conversion."
“GRA 2:125-26.
5Ibid., 130.
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meaningful religious experience."1 Were it not for rational capacity, man would not know
truth and God, and would not therefore be held responsible for his revolt against light.2
Without the formal aspect of the imago, he would not be able to "communicate intelligible
truth, nor could intelligible revelation be appropriated by him or meaningfully addressed to
him. "3 It is because of the imago's preservation that man is "still capable of intellectually
analyzing rational evidence for the truth-value of assertions about God."4
Reason provides man the basis for the intelligibility of the universe and human
experience,5 and serves as an instrument for organizing and drawing inferences.6 The
faculty of reason or rationality is given by God as a gift to man,7 not to create or establish
truth, but to use it as an instrument for testing, recognizing, and elucidating truth.8 Reason
is neither to be equated nor contrasted with revelation; rather, it is the means by which we
lIbid., 128; italics supplied.
2GRA 1:409. Man is gifted with "responsible knowledge of his creator and created
reality" (GRA 3:171; italics supplied).
3GRA 2:136; GRA 3:222; Henry, "Man," BDT, 340-41.
4GRA 1:227. "Reason [is] an instrument for organizing data and drawing inferences
from it, and as a logical discriminating faculty competent to test religious claims" (GRA
1:226)
SGRA 5:337, 352-53, 382, 361, 355.
6GRA 1:226-27; Henry, Remaking, 215.
7Johnson, 224.
8GRA 1:215, 225, 228; GRA 3:12-13; GRA 5: 336; Johnson, 224; GRA 1:232,
226; Patterson, JMPL 1 ,5 ; idem, CFH, 65; Johnson, 224; 141; Mohler, Baptist
Theologians, 526; Henry, Remaking, 215.
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comprehend revelation.1 It is reason that furnishes man with meaningfulness in what he
says and does, in his spiritual and moral experiences, his relationship to God, the cosmos
and other selves, and it provides him with "mental coherence. "2
Because of this critical role that Henry assigns to reason, the latter therefore seems
to occupy prominency in Henry's understanding of the image of God. Note again the
following comments: "The image of God . . . specially embraces all psychic elements that
elevate man above the animal world, although, of course, any beclouding of the rational in
human experience will confuse everything else. "3 In relation to God, "humanity bears the
divine image only in some respects, most notably [the] rational and moral capacities.1,4

A Summary of Henry's View of Man
When Henry wrote an article on man for Baker Dictionary of Theology,5 his first
sentence begins with: "Who is man?" After having yielded only one-half of a column of
space to the various answers given by naturalists, idealists, pantheists, and modem science,
Henry quickly passes on to his own answer, namely, that he is the image of God. The rest
of the space (seven columns) is given to an in-depth exposition of the image.6 This
1Henry, Remaking, 215.
2GRA 2:126.
3Ibid., 133; italics supplied.
“Henry, Toward a Recovery, 109; italics supplied; see also Henry, "Image of God,"
EDT, 548.
sSee Henry, "Man," BDT, 338-342.
6Henry's article on the image of God in BDT is republished verbatim in EDT.
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observation is significant because it means that the imago Dei constitutes man's essence,
and through it, he enjoys a unique connection and kinship with God.
It is by means of this image that God confronts man and addresses him on rational,
personal, moral, and spiritual levels. The rational, however, takes precedence over the
others, as it is the one that renders everything else intelligible. For this very reason,
whenever Henry speaks of the imago, what initially strikes him is its rational aspect. Man,
therefore, is first an intelligent or rational creature. So, if revelation is to be recognizable
and appealing to man, it must necessarily be rational.
The possession of the imago Dei also means that man "can know the God of
creation and created reality—though not exhaustively, to be sure, but nonetheless truly.
That is, man has a univocal knowledge of God. However, because of the Fall and his
subsequent willful and revolting nature, man habitually manipulates and reduces this
knowledge to a level and shape that serves his own alienated and hostile nature. This
rebellious propensity accordingly renders him incapable of interpreting general revelation
rightly, making it all the more necessary for special revelation.
Now that the divine-human point of contact—according to Henry—has been
clarified, and his view of man adequately sketched, chapter 5 pursues with an analysis of
his portrayal of the human role in revelation and inspiration.
‘GRA 1:160.
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CHAPTER 5

AN ANALYSIS OF HENRY'S PORTRAYAL OF THE HUMAN
ROLE IN REVELATION AND INSPIRATION

The examination of the human role in Henry’s doctrines of revelation and
inspiration is treated in this chapter and the one that follows. Chapter 5 analyzes the human
role within these two doctrines, and chapter 6 evaluates Henry's presentation of that role by
means of a comparison and contrast of man's role in revelation with his role in inspiration.

Man's Role in Revelation
In an attempt to see the human part in revelation, one can approach it by
considering several key aspects of Henry's doctrine of revelation where the role of man
becomes more evident. Henry's treatment of revelation highlights at least three such
crucial moments: the origin, the reception, and the conveyance of revelation. Each of these
is considered separately under the following subheads: man's role and the origin of
revelation, man as receiver of revelation, and man as carrier of revelation.

Man's Role and the Origin of Revelation
Chapter 2 of this dissertation has already addressed Henry's doctrine of revelation
with its implications. A closer examination of that doctrine reveals that the answer to the
question of the origin of revelation is implicit in its nature. That is, the fact that
185
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revelation is defined as a voluntary divine disclosure of God's truth and will for mankind1
implies that revelation can originate only from God and at his own discretion and
determination. This is true for both general and special revelation. Furthermore, such a
conception predetermines human position and role, as we shall see below.

The Transcendence of Revelation
Henry has pointed out that revelation is a divine voluntary activity or event by
which God discloses to man truths concerning his nature, ways, will, and purpose for man.
It is a process by which God communicates to man information vital for both his present
and future.2 In other words, revelation is a divine method whereby God chooses to open up
himself to man by sharing his thoughts and unveiling "his very own mind. "3 In short,
revelation is an informational disclosure of divine truths for man, oriented towards his
soteriological needs.
Henry also said that this divine revelatory activity takes place in two forms—general
revelation and special revelation.4 The avenues of general revelation are nature, history,
mind, and conscience;5 and those of special revelation are Jesus Christ and Scripture.6
lSee pp. 42, 62-63 above.
2GRA 3:12-14; see also pp. 42, 71-72 above.
3See pp. 75-76 above, and note 7, p. 160 above; GRA 3:457.
4See pp. 63-64 above.
5See p. 62 above.
6See pp. 65-66 above. We have already been told by Henry that special revelation is
broader than Christ and Scripture because in times past God had specially communicated
with some human beings, including Adam, and in a variety of ways. Those divine
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Each of these forms o f revelation constitutes an indispensable and individual facet of God's
comprehensive disclosure.1 General or universal revelation provides man with a knowledge
of God's eternal power as creator and sustainer, as well as awareness of man's guilt on
account of his distortion and suppression of, and revolt against, this revelation.2 That is,
general revelation furnishes the basis of man's moral and spiritual accountability.3 Special
revelation, on the other hand, republishes the propositional content of general revelation,4
discloses the full implications of general revelation and of human sinfulness,5 and especially
informs man of the divine plan of redemption.6
The connection of Christ and Scripture to special revelation is further clarified when
Christ is considered as the ontological high point of special revelation and Scripture as the
communications, however, are no longer available to us. Therefore the focus of special
revelation falls squarely on Jesus Christ and Scripture (see pp. 66-70 above; see also GRA
2:87-88).
!GRA 2:88.
2See pp. 66, 92, 148-49, and 179-80 above. Man's distortion of God's general
revelation occurs when he disregards, or stifles, or suppresses it (GRA 4:12). Such a gross
human abuse of revelation not only testifies to his corrupt nature but implies that revelation
safeguards human will in the sense that man is left free to express his rebelliousness and
hostility toward it.
3GRA 2:85-86.
4Seepp. 65 , 67 above.
5In Henry's view, special revelation has an "epistemological priority over general
revelation" (GRA 1:223). This priority is due not to the obscurity of general revelation, or
man's inability to know it, but to the fact that "Scripture as an inspired literary document
republishes the content of general revelation objectively over against sinful man’s reductive
dilutions and misconstructions of it. Furthermore, special revelation proclaims God's way
of redemption to sinful man in his guilty condition" (ibid.).
6GRA 2:85-87.
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epistemological high point of revelation.1 The reason for considering Scripture as the
epistemological high point of revelation lies in the fact that it is only through Scripture that
we have access to a knowledge of Jesus Christ, both of his person and work.2 In Henry’s
view, Scripture is the authorized summary of all God's revelation, whether it be in the
universe, in redemptive history, or in Jesus Christ.3 It is the proximate and universally
accessible form of authoritative divine revelation4 and the epistemological conduit and
reservoir of divinely revealed knowledge.5 This capital epistemic function that Henry
ascribes to Scripture ultimately leads him to identify revelation with the Bible.6 Hence,
every teaching and revelatory claim must be tested and verified on the basis of its
conformity to the Bible.7 Henry even goes so far as to state that the Bible is the only
special revelation that we have.8 There is no revelation apart from Scripture.9 The Bible is
revelation.10
Further, in both forms of revelation, Jesus Christ is the sole agent. There is no
‘See note 4, p. 70 above; see also GRA 1:224.
2See pp. 70, 131-32 above; emphasis supplied.
3See p. 70 above.
4GRA 1:229.
5See p. 43 above.
6See pp. 43, 71 above.
7GRA 1:215, 229; GRA 3:46.
8See p. 70 above.
9See note 7, p. 70 above.
10See note 3, p. 68 above.
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other revelation outside or independent of him. He is the exclusive mediator of all divine
revelation. As preincarnate Logos, he was behind general revelation.1 He enlightened and
still enlightens every person.2 Likewise, in his incarnate state he was both the agent of
special revelation and special revelation itself,3 so that in him both "the source and content
o f revelation converge and coincide.”* His person, words, and acts constitute revelation. In
that sense, Jesus Christ is not only the agent of revelation, but its goal and climax.s
As already stated, the above delineation of revelation has been carried out with the
purpose of addressing the human role at the inceptive stage of revelation. From that
perspective, two observations are in order: (1) revelational activity is exclusively limited to
God, and (2) Jesus Christ is the only agent of revelation. Both of these assertions indicate
the transcendent dimension of revelation. In other words, Henry affirms emphatically
together with Barth that revelation can originate only from God,6 and criticizes Aquinas for
placing faith in human reasoning as naturally capable of knowing truth and reality without
divine help.7 Both Henry and Barth disavow any capacity of man to build an epistemic
‘See p. 64 above; also note 5, ibid.; and pp. 68-69 above.
2GRA 1:228; GRA 2:84-85.
3See pp. 68-69 above; see also pp. 162-63 above.
4See p. 68 above.
sIbid.; see also note 3, ibid.; GRA 1:214; GRA 2:87.
6See pp. 62-63, 153-55 above.
7GRA 1:84, 87.
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bridge to God through natural theology.1 Put in other words, Henry's emphasis on the
transcendence of revelation for its source as well as agency bars man from claiming any
independent discovery of truth and reality, and denies any human role whatsoever in
producing revelation. Human reason is inadequate to unravel all the enigmas of life.2 God
alone is the ultimate ground for each act of knowledge and certitude for any genuine truth
available to man.3

The Transcendence of Truth
The preclusion of man from the inception of revelation can further be evidenced by
looking at Henry's understanding of truth. He defines truth as the content of what God
thinks, says, and wills.4 Truth is what is in his mind, his ideas.5 In other words, truth
depends on the sovereignty and transcendence of God, who sovereignly upholds the truth;
and establishes and preserves whatever is true.6 "All truth is a revelation of the one true
'GRA 2:86,73, 184, 135, 105; GRA 5:84-87; GRA 1:331.
2GRA 2:226.
3GRA 1:328; GRA 2:86.
4Henry, Toward a Recovery, 50; Henry, "Will Christianity Outlive Its Critics?" 130;
GRA 5:334; Henry, "Seminar," 9. God wills according to the laws of reason; that is, the
laws of reason are descriptive of the activity of God's will (Gordon Clark, quoted
approvingly in GRA 5:335).
SGRA 5:358; Henry, A Plea, 74; Danne, 27.
6GRA 5:334. God is "the author of all meaning, the foundation of all facts; his
thought is ultimately decisive for all predication'' (GRA 5:334).
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God"; therefore "there is but one system of truth,1 and truth finds its meaning in Jesus
Christ who is the Truth."2
But Henry also says that God's mind "consists of rational propositions.”3 Truth is
therefore a divine concept or thought that is propositional—or one that can be articulated in
sentences.4 In addition, truth is characterized by logical consistency (without contradic
tion)5 and coherence (all its parts are integrally united or held together).6
Henry also holds that all truth7 is the revelation of the one true God;8 hence, all
truth is revelatory.9 Because God is the revelational source of all truth,10 including the truth
‘"There can be only one system of truth, however many theoretical models might be
constructed" (GRA 1:237).
2Henry, Giving a Reason, 36.
3GRA 5:337; see also note 7, p. 73.
4GRA 3:457. "Christianity contends that revelational truth is intelligible,
expressible in valid propositions, and universally communicable" (GRA 1:229).
^'Consistency is a negative test of truth; what is logically contradictory cannot be
true. A denial of the law of contradiction would make truth and error equivalent; hence in
effect it destroys truth" (GRA 1:233). "Without noncontradiction and logical consistency,
no knowledge whatever is possible" (ibid., 232). "Truth is self-destructive unless
noncontradictory and governed by the canons of reason" (ibid., 90).
6GRA 1:215, 237; italics original; see also Peter A. Angeles, Dictionary of
Philosophy (1981), s.v. "Consistent"; "Coherence."
7For Henry the distinction between theological truth and other forms of truth is that
theological truth is "divinely authorized, infallibly certain, and biblically attested; all other
claims for truths are subject to correction and at most are but probable" (GRA 1:228).
8Henry, Giving a Reason, 36; GRA 1:228.
^ e n ry , Gods or God? 206.
10GRA 1:228; Henry, Toward a Recovery, 50.
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of Christianity, mathematics, logic, law, and cosmic order,1 there can then be only one
system or order of truth,2 and these branches of knowledge accordingly provide the
possibility for a coherent coordination with each other.3 That is why philosophy and
theology should not be confined to separate compartments of the human mind; for all life,
history, and culture find their meaning only in relation to him and derive their ennoblement
only through the resources resident in him.4
Now, if truth is what God thinks, and if one knows this divine thinking only
through revelation, then truth is the content of revelation,5 and the latter is the only source
of truth.6 In other words, revelation is a "divine communication of truths."7 This direct
and intimate connection between revelation and truth at times leads Henry to treat the two
synonymously.8 So he says: "Revelation is [God's] disclosed truth."9 "Reason is a
‘GRA 1:215; Henry, Toward a Recovery, 70.
2Carl F. H. Henry, "Christian Education and Culture," Christianity Today, 10
November 1958 , 4; idem, Toward a Recovery, 113; idem, "Seminar," 17.
3GRA 1:95.
4Henry, "Seminar," 17; see also idem, "Christian Education and Culture," 4; GRA
3:280; Henry, Giving a Reason, 36-37; idem, CPE, 148.
s,,The character of revelation as truth and not simply as acts" should be
Christianity's primary emphasis (Henry, Frontiers, 65-66).
®GRA2:73; GRA 1:228.
7GRA 3:302.
8It should also be noted that in Henry's discussion of the tests of truth, revelation is
often treated synonymously with truth (see GRA 1:232-33).
9GRA 1:228.
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divinely gifted instrument enabling man to recognize revelation or truth.1,1 Moreover,
Henry's identification of the Bible with revelation, and his insistence upon Scripture as a
"verifying principle" of truth,2 as well as his asking that we seek revelation "in truths,"3
further point to the convergence of revelation and truth in his theological system. Because
revelation is the only source of truth, the latter accordingly bears the dignity and authority
of revelation so that it can be viewed as revelation itself.
The point stressed here thus far is that inasmuch as revelation is transcendent or
supernatural, so also is truth transcendent. This direct and exclusive connection of truth
with God as its sole author is further displayed in the following statement:
If divine revelation and not human reason is the source of truth, then man's mind
cannot be viewed as inherently qualified to unravel all the enigmas of life. To say that
man's mental powers are virtually divine contradicts both the basic Christian axiom that
God in his transcendent revelation is the only source of truth and its related emphasis,
namely, that finite and fallen man even though gifted with the divine image is dependent
upon revelation. When human reasoning is exalted as the source of truth, then the
content of truth is soon conformed to the prejudices of some influential thinker or
school of scholars, or it may be conformed to the current consensus of opinion,
sometimes dignified by the expression "the universal human consciousness.4
With regard to the relation of the human mind to truth, Henry again says: "Christian
theology denies that the human mind or human reasoning5 is a creative source of
lIbid., 228, 226; italics supplied.
2GRA 1:215; italics original. The Bible as the verifying principle means that all
theologico-ethical propositions are to be in conformity with biblical criteria (GRA
1:230, 232).
3GRA 4:46.
4GRA 1:226; see also GRA 2:73, 41, 130.
sNote that the terms "human mind" and "human reasoning" are used synonymously;
italics supplied. Henry understands reason as an objective intellective faculty in man that
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revelational content; its proper role is not to fashion revelation or truth,1 but rather to
recognize and elucidate it. "2
The transcendent nature of both revelation and truth determines and explains the
preclusion of man from any role at the point of their origin. In addition, Henry indicates
two more reasons for excluding human involvement in the inception of revelation, namely,
human finiteness and sinlessness.

The Finitude of Man
The following statement from Henry elaborates man's finiteness (limitedness)3 and
the "epistemic predicament"4 that arises out of this creaturely limitation:
Human reason is not a source of infallible truth about ultimate reality. For human
intelligence is not infinite, and left to itself man's reasoning all too evidently reflects his
finitude. All speculative interpretations of reality and life projected on the basis of
human insight and ingenuity—modem no less than ancient—are merely provisional in
character. Whether arrived at by sustained scientific inquiry or disciplined philoso
phical reasoning, they are destined inevitably to revision and replacement. So limited is
human life that no man has time or opportunity to gather all the information relevant to
a comprehensive world-life view, and even if he could, volitional or emotional pres
sures upon the human spirit prejudice every man's interpretation of the data. This best
explains the fact that brilliant minds using the same canons of reason interpret reality in
amazingly diverse ways, and expound competing views with compelling force.5
thinks and cognizes, organizes data and draws inference in accordance with the laws of
formal logic (GRA 1:226-27; Henry, Remaking, 215).
^ o t e again that the terms "revelation" and "truth" are used synonymously; italics
supplied.
2GRA 1:226.
*CDEL, s.v. "Finite."
4GRA 2:123.
5GRA 1:91.
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For Henry, man is God's creation.1 By definition, no creature can mount to
equality with its creator. If man cannot know the thoughts of another person, much less
can he know God's thoughts. And because truth is what God thinks, man can know truth
only as God chooses to reveal it to him.2 Therefore, man has no capacity to create truth.
He has to depend on God for its revelation.3 God alone is the giver and source of divine
truth or revelation.4

The Sinfulness of Man
The exclusion of man from the inception of revelation is further indicated by
Henry's correlation of revelation with man's need for it as a sinner. For instance, Henry
points out that human sinfulness goes hand in hand with the necessity for special
revelation.5 Sin causes a moral barrier or a gulf between God and man, and special
revelation is required to deal with this problem of overcoming the separation.6 In addition,
‘See pp. 61, 103, 151 above.
2GRA 2:54; GRA 3:13; GRA 5:336.
3GRA 1:88, 91.
4See pp. 148, 188 above; see also pp. 62-63 above. The stress on God as the sole
source o f revelation and truth is highly significant for Henry. His advocacy of God as the
source o f all authority (GRA 4:24) and of his Word (Scripture) as the Christian's ultimate
norm for faith and practice (GRA 4:15) can stand only as man is denied the capacity for
creating truth. Once it is admitted that man can know truth on his own, the possibility for
the erosion of God's authority is set in motion.
5Henry, The Drift, 98.
6Ibid., 110.
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sin creates in man a spirit of rebellion against God and his will,1 resulting in obstruction of
truth and production of several contradictory systems of knowledge.2 Sin enslaves man's
mind and blinds it in the face of the light by which he stands constantly condemned.3
Special revelation, on the other hand, informs man of his true state and of the consequences
brought about by sin. It shows him the solution to his predicament. Thus, God alone is
capable of bridging the gulf and overcoming the epistemic barrier created by sin. As a
sinner, man is cut off from God, the source of revelation and truth, and therefore
disqualified from generating truth, as human powers and ingenuity are hopelessly limited
and perverted by sin.
The foregoing section has underscored the exclusion of man from the inception of
revelation. Henry arrives at this conclusion on the claims that revelation as well as its
content (truth) is an entirely transcendent phenomena, and also from the fact that man
himself is a finite and sinful being. However, since man is the object of divine disclosure,
human involvement must be sought at another stage of the revelatory process.

Man as Receiver of Revelation
Since revelation is addressed to man, he necessarily has a role to play. Henry calls
this role "receiver" of revelation.4 The question here is whether this role is passive, active,
lSee note 3, p. 103 above; and pp. 149, 151-52 above.
2GRA 1:91.
3Ibid., 105.
“GRA 2:130; see also ibid., 13, 151, and GRA 3:78, 480, where Henry speaks of
the prophets and apostles as "recipients" of revelation. We must note the emphasis is on
the fact that man is a receiver, not an experiencer of revelation as in Barth.
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or a combination of the two. Furthermore, since this study concerns man's role in
revelation and inspiration, special revelation is primarily in view.1 However, since Henry
sees revelation as a unified whole,2 coming from the same source—God, existing in two
forms: general and special,3 both being complementary, standing one behind the other,4 and
rational5—it is therefore proper that we do not draw too sharp a contrast between general
revelation and special revelation so that one is made to be of less revelational value than the
other. Both are divine revelation, and response to either is of crucial importance.
Moreover, since the prophets and apostles were exposed to general and special
revelation, what is described here as man's role is likewise applicable to them as well.
Similarly, although terms like "man," "man's role," or "human role" are used primarily
with the prophets and apostles in mind, yet the terms are also extended to all humankind in
general, hence to be understood in a generic sense. The adoption follows Henry's own
practice. The reason for extending the term "man" to all human beings is because
ontologically, Henry does not put the prophets and apostles under a sui generis category.
‘Henry looks at inspiration as a communication of revelation in inerrant written form
(GRA 2:14). This revelation is called special revelation.
2GRA 2:73, 76; Henry, "Revelation, Special," BDT, 457; GRA 3:433.
3ln addition to the two forms of revelation, Henry also adds another: eschatological
revelation (GRA 2:73). The last form is yet future, and Henry does not elaborate on it.
Moreover, with respect to special revelation, the Bible is immediately in view, because
Henry maintains that although Christ is the supreme special revelation, he is known only
through Scripture (see p. 70 above). For our purpose, however, only general and special
(scriptural) revelation are under consideration.
“See pp. 60, 64-65; 161 above.
sSee p. 64 above.
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He does not consider them different from other men in terms of nature or capacity.
Therefore, the prophets and apostles suffer whatever natural limitations and sinful
impediments other human beings suffer. Like all humans they too were finite, sinful, and
erring.1 Similarly, whatever natural endowments the prophets and apostles enjoyed, the
rest of mankind likewise enjoy. As far as Henry is concerned, the only difference that
exists between them and the rest of mankind is in terms of function. To the prophets and
apostles was given special revelation in a once-for-all manner.2 They were the receivers of
God's special revelational truths.3 That privilege, however, ended with them,4 and will not
happen again until the eschaton.5
Before focusing on various human faculties as receiving points of revelation, it is
important to remember Henry’s insistence on the universal experience of revelation by
every human being. This reception is something that is certain, objective, and intelligible,
in which several of man's capacities are involved. For instance, Henry portrays man as
one whose mind, will, conscience, motives, deeds, and life experiences are being
bombarded, pervaded, and invaded by general revelation.6 The forceful impact of
revelation suggests first of all that man is exposed intensely and continuously to revelation.
‘GRA 4:151, 160.
2See pp. 82, 85 above.
3GRA 2:151, 130.
4GRA 4:147, 242, 259.
5See p. 85 above.
6See p. 64 above. Note: In Henry, special revelation is likewise received through
the same avenues as is general revelation.
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Its invasion connotes definite or effective entry into an otherwise inattentive, reluctant,
unyielding person. But once entry is made, revelation pervades or spreads through every
dimension of his being. The penetrating activity of revelation compels him to yield to its
presence. The fact that Carl F. H. Henry recognizes will, conscience, linguistic capability,
and reason as revelation's avenues indicates that man is being impressed by revelation in
his totality. Let us take a closer look at those crucial human avenues through which man
receives revela-tion, and close with the one Henry is most keen in emphasizing, namely,
the human reason.

Human Will
Carl Henry asserts that general revelation is an address of God's will to man's will.1
This means that man engages his will in receiving revelation. The engagement of the will
indicates that man confronts revelation with his volitional considerations: he finds himself
confronting revelation with his heart and emotions. Man realizes that revelation calls for a
response and a decision in terms of either a yes or a no. At this juncture he exercises his
will to display his emotional attitude and disposition to the requirements of revelation. That
is, man sees himself standing at the point of decision, response, and submission to or
rejection of revelation.
In the case of man’s reception of general revelation, the will is far from being
cooperative. In fact, Henry describes man as obstinate, unstable, and rebellious.2 The will
‘GRA 3:248; see also note 5, 158 above; and Henry, "The Reality and Identity of
God—2," 14. Note: The inclusion of the mind as revelation's avenue is deferred to a later
stage when we deal with special revelation.
2Henry, CPE, 105, 146, 166.
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frustrates revelation’s message and operation in his life. In his fallen and rebellious nature,
man wills down and suppresses revelation; he twists, warps, and tapers it to what is more
compatible and congenial with an alienated will.1 Even in "his best moments he is
constantly in revolt against revelation and involved in the consequences of that revolt. ,c At
the epistemological level, then, the will plays a vital part because it has a volitional
capability to shut man from revelation or to submit him to it. However, it is only a
redeemed person who submits to God's revelation. An unredeemed man constantly rebels
against God and distorts his truth.3
If man through his will either turns away from or toward revelation, it means that
human reception of revelation at this stage is an active one. As indicated, however, the
habit of shutting oneself from revelation is characteristic of the unregenerate. This means
that the will can be transformed either to a positive or negative posture. In any case,
receiving revelation requires man's active participation. There is in him that volitional
"switch" that he can either turn on and let the light of revelation fill him or turn off and
shut that light from entering.

Human Conscience
Conscience is a moral aspect of the imago Dei.4 It is "an immediate—yet
lHenry, Toward a Recovery, 57; see also GRA 4:12; GRA 1:226.
2See p. 175 above.
3Henry, CPE, 146, 166, 105.
4"God's image in the human person is itself a means and kind of revelation,
particularly in its irreducible rational and moral aspects" (GRA 3:460).
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implanted—Divine revelation that has a definite conceptual content. The principles of moral
law confront man in and through conscience.nl Whenever conscience assents it validates
the divinely implanted moral law, and reason accuses or excuses as conscience directs.2
Henry also calls conscience the "inner moral voice, the intuitive monitor of the ethical
life. "3 Conscience is that which imparts knowledge of good and evil. It refers to the power
of moral judgment and criticism.
Conscience functions in both preevent and postevent; that is, before as well as after
the act. It operates before the act when it forbids doing something (1 Cor 8:7; Rom 13:5);
similarly, it operates after the act when it condemns, acquits, or approves something that
has been done or committed.4 This condemnation takes the form of guilt and terror. The
knowledge of God's will through conscience is due to its link with God's ethical demand by
creation. “Behind conscience, therefore stands the transcendent authority of God, whose
demand and verdict it mediates to man. "5
Henry also holds that (general) revelation penetrates man's conscience,6 which
serves as a "second" knowing, a "knowing alongside" what is otherwise revealed, and hails
lHenry, CPE, 154.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 513.
4Ibid., 514-15.
sIbid., 515.
6GRA 1:272; GRA 3:460, 481; see also p. 161 above. If by virtue of conscience
man already has some implanted moral truths, the penetration of conscience by revelation
would need clarification. Although I have not observed a clarification in Henry, yet could
the penetration mean that conscience has been given additional truths from without?
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men anticipatively before God’s judgment bar.1 When revelation reaches man's
conscience, he sees himself a sinner, a violator of God's will, and a rebel.2 The penetration
of revelation into his conscience means that man not only knows that he has to make a
decision (the will) for or against revelation, but he is aware that this decision is essentially a
moral one, one that has an ethical dimension in terms of good or evil, right or wrong, for
which he is responsible before God.3 After the Fall, however, man's conscience has lost
the full capacity to function as "a self-sufficient barometer of the moral life," and requires
its reorientation to the specifically revealed will of God.4
Although Henry maintains that elements of the implanted moral law can be found
even in the most depraved human person,s yet that fact itself does not provide an alternative
to the objective divinely revealed precepts such as the Ten Commandments. Man's active
involvement in distorting God's implanted truth (i.e., general revelation) calls for the need
of externally given divine moral precepts.6 In other words, since general revelation is
being manipulated and caricatured by sinful man to meet his perverse alternative, it no
longer is adequate to meet his real needs. Hence, general revelation has to be
lGRA 2:130.
2Henry, CPE, 150.
3Ibid., 150, 157.
“Ibid.
5Ibid., 154.
6Ibid., 155.
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complemented and supplemented with (though not superseded by) special revela-tion.1
While sinful and rebellious man reduces the moral law within, special revelation enlarges
his moral knowledge as well as knowledge of God's own nature and will both before and
after the Fall.2 Hence, special revelation is more comprehensive and complete than general
or universal revelation. Special revelation also expresses the moral law with rational
consistency and objectively addresses man's pride, rebellion, arbitrary speculation, and
distortion of the implanted moral law, and points to him the benefits of God's saving grace
which general revelation does not.3
If by virtue of having been created in the image of God man already has been
equipped with an implanted revelation, then the question of his active involvement in the
reception of revelation does not seem to arise. In this instance, man may remain passive
and yet that does not deprive him of the elements of revelation because he has already been
furnished by creating him in God's image. However, what he does with that revelation
involves an active participation on his part, and the worst that he can do is distort,
misrepresent it, or reject it altogether.

Human Linguistic Capacity
Henry maintains that since revelation comes from God's mind, it is essentially a
mental conception.4 But a concept by itself, albeit divine, is nonverbal and, hence,
‘Ibid., 156; see also pp. 60, 66-67, 161 above.
2Ibid.; GRA 4:111.
3Henry, CPE, 156-57; GRA 4:61.
4GRA 2:53, 12; GRA 3:248.
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inaccessible to the other person.1 In order for a concept to be significant, it must yield
information. To do that, it needs to be conveyed in intelligible sentences and propositions.2
It is therefore Henry's contention that the only way of conveying revelation's concepts is
through verbalization; that is, through the use of human language, for without words it is
impossible to express any thought or idea.3
"A fundamental emphasis of Judeo-Christian religion" is that in revelation "God
speaks his mind intelligibly."4 In fact, "in his redemptive disclosure, God often speaks
before he acts. "s And when he speaks to a human agent he uses man's own language just
as he did when he spoke to Abraham and Moses.6 God in his special revelation has spoken
in sentences and to this the prophets and apostles have attested.7 Therefore, that which God
has spoken is assuredly intelligible to man, the listener.8 Indeed, God has spoken in a
linguistic prepositional form, truth concerning himself and truth concerning man, history,
and the universe.9 Accordingly, God's revelation should be understood as a "rational
lGRA 5:337, GRA 3:302. Revelation as extrarational and extraverbal belongs to the
"rim" of revelation (GRA 3:457).
2GRA 3:302.
3Ibid., 421-22; GRA 4:46, 110, 143, 145 , 205.
“GRA 2:12.
5Ibid., 12; italics original.
6Ibid.; see also ibid., 151; GRA 3:457; Henry, "Concerns and Considerations, 20.
7GRA 3:481.
8GRA 5:337.
9Francis Schaeffer, quoted approvingly in GRA 3:457.
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communication conveyed in intelligible ideas and meaningful words. "2 Thus, man's
language is pressed into service in God's conveyance and man's reception of revelation.
Human linguistic capacity is assumed in God’s intelligible speaking. Because no revelation
can be conveyed without words, human language is therefore part of the nature of
revelation. Its concepts and truths are viable only because they are conveyed in intelligible
human language. Through speech God imparts to his prophets information essential for
man's present and future destiny.3
In view of a direct connection between concept and words, any attempt to vindicate
concepts alone as the primary aspect of revelation goes contrary to its nature, because a
concept without words (nonpropositional) to convey it is unintelligible, let alone true or
false.4 So "if revelation is a communication of sharable truth, it will consist of words,
sentences, and especially propositions or mental judgments,5 and not simply of isolated
lGod is rational and the source of all rationality (GRA 5:337), his revelation is
likewise rational. Since man is also rational, divine revelation is readily intelligibly to him.
2GRA 2:12; italics original.
3GRA 3:457.
4Ibid., 429-30.
5"Truth . . . attaches not to words per se, but to words used together to express
men-tal judgements—i.e., propositions. What is either true or false is the meaning of words
used in logical relationships" (GRA 3:449). Only intelligible sentences have the ability to
com-municate meaningful information and/or truth (ibid., 430). In Henry's usage,
"sentence" is equivalent to a statement (GRA 4:46). At times a sentence is also used as a
synonym for a proposition (GRA 3:481). "Truth is a property of sentences or statements"
(GRA 4:46; GRA 3:449). Henry also points to Ernst Cassirer who said that the primacy of
the sentence over the word is one of the most secure findings of linguistics (GRA 3:44647).
"We shall readily agree with Dodd, of course, that revelation is not to be sought in
isolated words but rather in truths. Words as isolated units of speech are never by
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concepts. Meaningful divine revelation involves communication in intelligible sentences.
Hence, both concepts and words are to be accepted as joined instrumentalities of God's
disclosure. Divine revelation then is "conceptual-verbal" or "rational-verbal," or
"cognitive-verbal."2 So while concepts are implied in revelation, they are nevertheless
revealed in verbalized form.
Viewed from the perspective of the human role, divine communication of revelation
themselves fallible or infallible; truth is a property of sentences or statements, and words
serve this purpose only as meaning referents in a logical, propositional context. But if
divine revelation is intelligibly communicated to man, it is difficult to see how its meaning
and truth can be conveyed without verbalization. If words necessarily involve error in what
is taught, then Dodd's view cannot be taken as gospel truth either; if human nature is
restrictive of God's being and truth, then the consequences for the incarnation of the Logos
are such that Jesus Christ must have been mistaken in his teaching" (GRA 4:46; see also
GRA 3:421).
We have already noted that Henry defines a proposition as an intelligible or
declarative statement that is either true or false; it is a rational declaration, capable of being
either believed, doubted, or denied (see p. 78 above). At times, however, by 'proposition'
Henry means an idea, thought, or belief (GRA 3:446). A judgment, on the other hand,
"constitutes the minimal unit of logical meaning and of objective truth; while a judgment is
mentally affirmed, a proposition is affirmed extra-mentally either in speech or writing.
Propositions or judgments are composed of cognitive elements, but no array of cognitive
elements will in and of themselves constitute meaningful communication unless conveyed or
conveyable in propositional form" (ibid., 449).
‘GRA 3:429-30.
2GRA 2:12; GRA 3:429-30, 248, 251; GRA 4:46, 53, 200. In favor of objective,
rational-verbal revelation, Henry asks: "If self-revelation is contrasted with a disclosure of
information, then on what basis does one propose to distinguish such nonrational 'selfrevelation’ as authentically divine rather than demonic or merely psychological? It is
precisely through our knowledge of divinely revealed information—and not rather in some
other way—that we know the truth about the transcendent God himself and his purposes.
To render even the bare idea of revealed presence intelligibly defensible, one must correlate
that view with a thoroughly cognitive content." To equate revelation only with man’s
experience of God’s presence is to reduce God to an impersonal being. "Apart from
meaningful and true cognitive information, one could not know that a presence is that of
Yahweh, or speak confidently of God's personality and selfhood, or even of transcendent
reality" (GRA 3:458-59).
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in human language implies at least two things: Man's understanding of revelation, and his
ability to communicate it in his own language, both of which are testified to by Henry
himself.1 God's decision to speak to man would be of little public value if that speech is
beyond man's grasp. If God's speaking demands community response, then it should be
assumed that man (i.e., prophet/apostle) is able to tell what God has spoken. That further
implies man's ability to understand revelation, for without that understanding he cannot be
held accountable even if it was verbally revealed. In this way, language has become a
crucial means for human reception of revelation.
Furthermore, man's participation in revelation through speech implies his active
reception of revelation because it requires him to pay close attention to what God is saying.
It causes him to rally the faculties of comprehension, reflection, and memory where he
presumably takes mental notes of significant words, names of persons, events, or places, or
message conveyed by the speaking God. Besides, the weightiness of revelation, the need to
communicate it to the rest of the community, and to ensure its accuracy or purity would
also have probably led man to interact with God for the sake of clarity. In that way man's
task as a receiver of revelation is not only active but made less difficult, and more reliable
and authoritative.

Human Reason
While referring to conscience as one of the entry points of general revelation,
Henry also points to the mind as another avenue.2 According to Henry, revelation comes to
‘See pp. 188, 201-02 above.
2GRA 2:130.
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conscience "through" the mind.1 The mind or reason2 takes priority because revelation is
rational or conceptual. Actually, reason as revelation's means of reaching man with its
truths functions not only for general revelation but for special revelation as well. In this
respect, reason is revelation’s highway. Henry assures us that without this divinely gifted
faculty,3 "no intelligible communication, divine or human, would be possible. "* Reason not
only receives God’s communication, it recognizes and discriminates revelation from
pseudorevelation, tests, and elucidates the truths of revelation.5
This ability of reason to recognize and apprehend revelation indicates that the Fall
has not incapacitated reason beyond its usefulness for receiving revelation. Henry
staunchly maintains that human reason still has the capability to know and understand
^ e n ry to Kharbteng, 29 June 1996.
2At times Henry is found to use mind interchangeably with reason, though the latter
is more precise as it is a faculty of the mind (see GRA 3:248, GRA 1:86-87, 226). The
mind or human reason refers to the operation of the mind of God or the mind of man along
logical lines or in accordance with the objective laws of formal logic (GRA 2:126; GRA
3:222; GRA 1:226; see also Johnson, 59). By means of reason, man is able to organize
data, make inferences, formulate concepts, and draw conclusions (GRA 1:227; Henry,
Remaking, 215).
3GRA 1:228.
4Ibid.; emphasis added; see also GRA 3:248.
5GRA 1:226, 228, 232; see also note 2, p. 76 above; pp. 173-74 above; GRA
1:228. The laws o f reason along with the forms of morality constitute one of the
fundamental elements of the imago Dei (GRA 3:168, 222, 229; GRA 2:133). Therefore
one does not need to sacrifice his intellect in becoming a Christian (GRA 1:400). In fact,
"no philosophy and no religion presses the concern for intellectual and moral integrity more
insistently than does the Bible" (ibid., 264). Accordingly, Christianity calls for "reasonable
reflection, reasonable decision, and reasonable service" (ibid., 272).
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revelation.1 However, this does not mean that man on his own discovers truth. Were that
the case, reason would be given a status of the creator of truth which, as we have already
noted, Henry denies with vigor.2 The truth of revelation can be known only as God reveals
*GRA 1:226-27; see also p. 179 above.
2See pp. 44-45, 148 above; see also Henry, Remaking, 215. A question has been
raised whether Henry as a presuppositionalist apologete belongs to the AugustinianAnselmian or the Thomistic tradition. In the latter, reason precedes faith, and in the
former, faith precedes reason. Johnson contended that Henry belongs to the AugustinianAnselmian tradition (Johnson, 48, 52, 57-58), while McNeal argued that Henry is in the
opposite camp, namely, the Thomistic tradition (McNeal, 108-109). Perhaps a resolution
lies in examining whether or not Henry looks at reason as being autonomous. In the
observations of Johnson (pp. 46, 224) and Kis (p. 222), reason would be autonomous if it
is conceived of as being a creative source of truth, which, as we have already noted, Henry
denies (see p. 142 above; see also pp. 178-185 above, and Patterson, JMPL 1, 5). Reason
is viewed by Henry as an instrument for recognizing truth, and all truth comes from God
(GRA 1:228, 328; see also Johnson, 187). Fackre therefore concludes that it is wrong to
categorize Henry as a rationalist (Fackre, Handbook, 598). In fact, Henry himself cautions
against the danger of reason becoming an obstacle to accepting revelation on account of its
pride (see Carl F. H. Henry, Reply to Objections, Special Collections, 3. No other
publication data are available concerning this manuscript). However, Henry does acknow
ledge that his theological methodology is that of rational presuppositionalism (Henry,
Toward a Recovery, 112).
Henry’s position on reason can further be seen in his criticism of Thomas Aquinas.
He sees in Thomism an attempt to use and trust reason as a tool for proper and adequate
knowledge of God independent of revelation and Henry interprets this as a revolt against
revelation (Henry, "Special Revelation," BDT, 457; see also Johnson, 46-47). Henry
further states that Aquinas ignored the sin factor in man that prevents him from knowing
God as he is known in his revelation (see p. 142 above; see also Richard H. Wameck, "The
Theology of Carl F. H. Henry" [M.S.T. thesis, Concordia Seminary, June 1968], 65, 20203). In other words, it matters little the amount of inferences Aquinas makes from sense
data, for by so doing, he can never know the reality of God (Henry, Evangelicals at the
Brink, 8). Likewise, Henry's rejection of Aquinas's proofs is based on his rejection of
Aquinas's trust in reason and philosophy as creators of truth independent of revelation
(GRA 1:36, 78, 184-85); Henry, Remaking, 202). It may also be pointed out that it is
precisely the same reason that leads Henry to reject natural theology (see pp. 140-41
above), because knowledge of God is possible only when the initiative comes from God to
man and not the other way around (Henry, Remaking, 313-14; GRA 1:85-95; GRA 2:120,
123; see also Johnson, 46-47; Weeks, 27).
For a detailed and critical examination of the role of reason in Henry’s theology,
see Johnson's dissertation. His work not only carefully describes Henry's position but also
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it to man.1 But when that takes place man understands it. As far as the degree of reason's
comprehension of truth or revelation is concerned, Henry describes it as "perspicuous"2
(plain to the understanding).3 Faith is therefore not needed in the understanding revelation.
If man needs to have faith in order to understand revelation, it means that he can have an
excuse for not understanding it.4
The mental clarity of revelation is also indicated by Henry's assertion that when
man knows God's truth, he knows it univocally. That is, there is a point of identity
(univocity) between God's thought and man's understanding of it (against Aquinas's and
Barth's analogical knowledge of God).5
If there is no point of identity in what God and man know, . . . then man has no truth
about God. If no proposition means to man what it means to God, so that God's
knowledge and man's knowledge do not coincide at any single point, it follows by
rigorous necessity that man can have no truth at all.6
This univocal knowledge is possible because man's mind, to a certain degree, finds a
corresponding likeness to God's mind by the very fact that he was made in God's own
tries to correct McNeal, who sees Henry as one who places priority of reason over faith.
JGRA 3:12-13; GRA 5:336; see also pp. 148, 188, 190 above.
2GRA 4:351; Henry, "Are We Doomed?" 201; GRA 3:248. Henry also claims that
general revelation is "lucid" (see Henry, Toward a Recovery, 57).
3Webster's New American Dictionary (1995), s.v. "Perspicuous”; hereafter cited as
"WNAD."
“GRA 4:210. Those who have faith, however, may be "more sensitive and
receptive to the subtler nuances of the biblical teaching" (ibid.); see also Henry, Gods or
God? 250-51; see also pp. 44, 48 above, note 6, p. 75 above, and p. 191 above.
5See pp. 165-66 above.
6Gordon Clark, quoted in GRA 2:54.
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image. Because of this correspondence, the message of revelation remains true for both
God and man irrespective of the latter's response to it. This identity between man's
understanding and God's clearly indicates that man does know—and knows truly1—
God's truth and communication.2
It may be argued that if man’s understanding of revelation is due to the fact that its
rational nature conforms to man's rational mind, then his part in that understanding or
receiving of revelation is passive. However, this is only partially hue because no cognitive
activity can be passive as it requires concentration, imagination, reflection, remembrance,
and perhaps repetition of the data, and so on. Henry himself has already pointed out that
the mind engages in discriminating between revelation and pseudo-revelation as well as in
elucidating it for public consumption. Such a multiplex involvement of the mind in the
process of understanding revelation portrays man as being at a high level of active
involvement in the reception of revelation.

Man as Carrier of Revelation
Having assured us that man has a comprehensive intellectual grasp of revelation,
Henry argues further that this understanding is necessary because if revelation is not
rationally cognized it cannot be communicated meaningfully.3 After all, revelation's
content is meant to be shared and not kept private,4 and the possession of revelation is
LGRA 2:54.
2GRA 2:54; GRA 1:237.
3GRA 1:228.
4GRA 3:429.
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antecedent to its sharing. The type of possession of revelation that is sharable in an
objective, persuasive, or authoritative manner is one that is rationally perceived through a
linguistic medium. An experience of the encounter type as in Barth, by the very nature of
the case, is subjective and noncognitive, which leaves little room for sharing in a
compelling manner and thereby defeats the very purpose of revelation, which is the
communication of God’s mind and will to man's mind and will.1 From Henry's point of
view, only a rational-verbal or conceptual-propositional revelation can fulfill the task. It is
for this reason that man can confidently occupy himself as a "carrier" of revelation.2
Just what the term "carrier" means in Henry is not immediately self-evident.
However, this could also indicate that he uses it with a conventional meaning in mind. The
word "carrier" refers to one who transmits/communicates or serves as a medium for
transmitting/communicating.3 Moreover, besides "carrier" Henry also uses other words
like "conveyors," "bearers," and "communicators" with reference to the human role in
revelation.4 He likewise says that the prophets were commissioned to communicate
revelation.5 As conveyors and bearers of revelation, at least two things are involved:
memory and verbal articulation. Both of these are stressed by Henry, as is evidenced
below.
1Ibid.; see also note 3, p. 161 above.
2The term is provided by Henry himself (GRA 2:130).
3CDEL, s.v. "Carry."
4GRA 4:38, 50, 159; GRA 2:12.
5GRA 3:461.
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Memory
If revelation is communicable, it implies that it is remembered. Man's memory of
the content of revelation can be illustrated by Henry's reaction to form critics who hold that
the Gospels are a product of an apologetic creation of the early church.1 In support for his
own position, Henry appreciatively cites Harald Riesenfeld and Birger Gehardsson who
suggest that the Gospels are actually an embodiment of the oral tradition of the sayings and
teachings of Jesus. This oral tradition came about as a result of his command to his
disciples to commit to memory what he said and taught.2 Henry believes that what we have
in the Gospels are testimonies of eyewitnesses and the illuminating role of the Holy Spirit.3
In this assumption, both memory and supernatural help are admitted. Henry also suggests
that a mental retention of the words of Christ could have been made easier because the
apostles might have heard Jesus repeat his sayings and teachings in different situations and
places with "a quite formalized verbal exactitude" or perhaps with slight vocabulary
variations.4 Memory, however, does not pertain only to the "outward shape" of what
Christ said and taught (vox) but to the words (ipsissima verba) as well.5 According to
•See ibid., 84, 88, where Henry says that acceptance of the above suggestion by
form critics is a dangerous alternative.
2Ibid., 84-85.
3Ibid., 87.
“Ibid., 89-90.
^ h e two Latin words, "ipsissima vox” (the very voice) and "ipsissima verba” (the
very words) have often been used in the context of the search for the historical Jesus.
Ipsissima verba refers to the "authentic sayings" of Jesus in contradistinction to those
sayings in the Gospels and elsewhere that have been attributed to Jesus by the Gospel
writers. Those who emphasize the ipsissima vox of Jesus hold that while the words in
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Henry, it is not right to separate voice (message/teaching) from words, for it is the latter
that preserves the former.1 In the case of the apostles, they remembered both the words
and the voice of Jesus.2 The purpose of committing Christ's teachings and words to
memory, however, was accomplished for the sake of preserving the accuracy of his
teachings and spreading them to the whole world.

Verbal Articulation
The prophets and apostles bore God's specially given message to others.3 That
means they possessed the capability to relate what they had heard or were told in revelation.
Understanding of revelation is of course facilitated by the fact that revelation came to the
prophets/apostles verbally in a human linguistic form they were most familiar with.4 In
order to convey any message objectively and cognitively, man needs to resort either to oral
or written means. In the case of the apostles' engagement in the conveyance of the
revelation of Jesus Christ, Henry says they might have done that either by quoting verbatim
(out of memory) or perhaps by restating it with some variations, or a combination of both.5
question may not be the actual words of Jesus, yet they accurately express his mind and
intention (see Richard P. Soulen, "ipsissima verba; ipsissima vox," Handbook o f Biblical
Criticism (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1976), 83.
‘GRA 3: 89.
2Ibid„ 88-89.
3GRA 2:12.
4GRA 3:88.
5Ibid., 89-90. Henry feels that this apostolic freedom to present Christ's revelation
could also have been the reason for the existence of several gospels of Jesus Christ (ibid.,
90).
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Despite this variation, however, the apostles still preserved Jesus's sayings and teachings
with "singular precision and accuracy."1
In a discussion of Jesus in the context of revelation Henry makes it clear that
Jesus's person and his words are revelation.2 If Christ's words or sayings have been
mentally preserved by the apostles with "singular precision and accuracy" then it means at
least two things: that what they recorded in the Gospels as being Christ's words are truly or
authentically the very words of Jesus himself; and so there is a degree of verbal continuity
between revelation and Scripture. Similarly, what the prophets said to be God's words are
likewise God’s very words, and not just mere attribution. According to Henry, this is
evidenced by the 4,800 times that the prophets said, "Thus saith the Lord. "3 If Scripture is
identified with revelation,4 then whatever we have in Scripture cannot be materially
different from what was revealed; otherwise, Scripture cannot be equated with revelation.
As to the percentage of verbal continuity between the words of revelation and those of
Scripture, Henry provides no specific answer. However, his emphasis on the clarity of
revelation5 could imply that God, during revelation, would have used as many words as
were needed for man to understand so that the latter could in turn convey God's revelation
with accuracy and clarity. If in revelation God conveys divine concepts or truths through
‘Ibid.
2See note 7, p. 44, pp. 159-60 above; and GRA 2:12-13.
3Henry to Kharbteng, 25 September 1996.
4See pp. 67-70 above.
5See pp. 209-10 above.
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human speech or language and man understands as well as remembers what was revealed,
then any variation between the words heard during revelation and the ones that occur in
Scripture is only to the extent that an oral form is different from a written form. In that
case, slight verbal variation can be assumed as Henry himself has admitted.1 For this
reason, Henry could say that Scripture is an authorized attestation of God's very speech and
acts to us in human language.2 Hence, we are not to make a distinction "between human
language-act and divine speech-act, ”3 for the prophets/apostles received from God both
message and words. And they themselves testified to this when they "preface their reports
with 'Thus saith the Lord!"’4 Indeed, God’s voice is synonymous with his words as Peter
has shown when speaking of Jesus's baptism, saying, "This voice from heaven we
ourselves heard"—"a voice which said: 'This is my Son, my Beloved, on whom my favour
rests'" (2 Pet 1:18, 17, NEB).5 Based on the trustworthiness of the prophets and apostles,
one is therefore not to contrast between God's words (logos) and the words (hremata) of
the Bible because the word of God is available only as "intelligible truth expressible in
human language and sentences. The Bible supplies no basis for a theory that the logos of
God must be something other than an intelligible or written word. '6 Therefore what the
LSee p. 220 above.
2GRA 1:232; GRA 4:52.
3GRA 3:417.
“Ibid.
sIbid., 410-411.
6Ibid., 482. In Henry’s attempt to identify the Word of God (logos) with the words
used to convey information about the logos, he points to some 13 instances in the Gospel of
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Bible says and the words used to convey that meaning should not be differentiated.1 God's
word is to be understood in terms of the words written in Scripture.2
"Every word (of the Old Testament) was the authentic voice of God. "3 There
should not be any disjunction between vox (voice of God) and ipsissima verba (his words),4
because God's voice is reliably expressed in rational-verbal form.5 Were that not the case,
then God has not spoken at all.6 God uses not merely thoughts but words in revelation.
Since Scripture is inscripturated revelation, we therefore have God's Word as well as God's
words.7 Scripture is God's speech; so are its words.8 Therefore there should not be any
distinction between God's speech (utterance) and the words of Scripture.9 And because
God used human language in revelation, what we have in Scripture are the words of God in
the words of men.10 Accordingly, there is an identity between what the prophet says and
John where he says that the Gospel uses logos in terms of "a proposition or propositions to
be believed and regarded as normatively expressive of Christ" (see ibid., 482-487).
JGRA 4:50, 52.
2GRA 2:12-14.
3James S. Stewart, quoted approvingly in Henry, "Inspiration," BDT, 286.
4GRA 3:95.
5Ibid., 89.
6Ibid., 408.
7Ibid., 423.
8Ibid., 424.
9Ibid.
10Warfield, quoted in GRA 4:159.
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what God says and intends.1 Moreover, since God reveals through human speech,2 what
the apostles wrote came from what God spoke so that the words of Scripture are at the same
time the words of God.3
The human role is significant in a propositional revelation. When revelation comes
propositionally, it indicates that man actively brings himself to attention in order that he
may hear and understand the truths of God. In propositional revelation, then, man is seen
actively grasping objective, cognitive words with his ears, retaining them in his mind,
ready to relate to others what he has heard in revelation; that is, ready to be its conveyor.

Man's Role in Inspiration
We have noted man's role in revelation and God's desire for him (prophet and
apostle) to communicate to other human beings what has been revealed. To carry that out
Henry says that man needs supernatural help, which he calls inspiration. However, while
Henry acknowledges the inspired oral proclamation of revelation by prophets and apostles,4
his felt need for an uncorrupted, written, objective, and authoritative revelation leads him to
direct the focus of inspiration on the text.5 As he sees it, an orally given revelation is
subject to distortion and corruption so that over the years it would consequently lose purity,
•GRA 3:429.
2Ibid.
3Ibid., 422.
4GRA 4:407, 32.
5See note 2, p. 46 above; pp. 108-09 above, and note 3, p. 125 above.
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authenticity, and credibility.1 So when Henry uses the word "inspiration" he usually refers
to the process by which divine revelation is inscripturated in written form.2 What needs to
be seen now is how Henry portrays man's role in inspiration, whether he is actively or
passively involved, or whether both of these elements can be recognized, and most
importantly, how man's role in inspiration compares to his role in revelation.
The analysis of man's role in inspiration follows the pattern used for revelation.
The adoption of this methodological approach is appropriate in view of the fact that both of
these are divine activities, where inspiration is a correlative of revelation,3 with inspiration
rising out of revelation and is an intrinsic ground for positing revelation.4 The two also
often converge as is the case with the epistolary writings of the New Testament^
Moreover, using the same pattern also helps us make a more vivid comparison with or
contrast between the human role in revelation and that role in inspiration. Accordingly, the
following pages consider the human role in inspiration from three viewpoints: Man and the
origin of inspiration; man as a receiver of inspiration, and man as a carrier of inspiration.
‘GRA 4:32.
2Ibid., 129; see also Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 101. In view of Henry's emphasis
on inerrant inspiration, the following definition by Hodge and Warfield aptly conveys his
notion when they say that inspiration refers to "the errorless expression in language of the
thought designed by God" (Hodge and Warfield, 16). "Revelation is the fact of divine
communication; inspiration is the means of divine communication’’ (see note 1, p. 30
above).
3Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 145; GRA 4:160.
4GRA 4:70; see also GRA 3:12.
5GRA 4:160.
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Man's Role and the Origin of Inspiration
The Transcendence of Inspiration
Henry says that inspiration is not to be identified with the extraordinary creative
activity of man's psychic powers, energies, artistic, poetic/literary genius, or imagination,
engendered by a supernatural quickening.1 The naming of these respective human
capacities could indicate Henry’s recognition of a possibility or probability of achieving a
work of wonder on account of a supernatural heightening of latent human talents and
creative energies. The product of such an inspiration is nevertheless a human one because
it originates from within man's own potentials that have been fired up by an external force
or agency. The agency serves only as a catalyst or stimulator which induces the various
faculties and creative energies of a person into an activity that results in an extraordinary
product. The greatness of the product is not due so much to the external agent as to man's
own inner potentials at work under this external influence. In this case, the agent (e.g.,
Holy Spirit) serves only as a secondary force that provokes and arouses man's own
energies to operate at their highest level of creative achievement.
It is precisely this scenario that Henry wants to avoid with regard to inspiration. He
categorically denies the attribution for the origination of inspiration to a creative action of
man’s native talents and energies that are triggered by the Holy Spirit. Such a view would
lead to a conclusion that the Bible is essentially a human product where the Holy Spirit has
only a secondary role.
'See p. 106-07 above.
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It should also be noted, however, that Henry does not refer to these human
aptitudes or capacities in a derogatory or dismissive manner. While he might recognize
that man possesses those talents and creative energies, yet he makes it clear that the
inspiration of the prophets and apostles is not to be identified with an intensified activity of
any of these human traits or talents, even if that activity is superaaturally induced.
Whereas these are all naturally furnished in both men and women, Christians and nonChristians, inspiration of the prophets and apostles (or Bible writers) is something that is
supematurally accomplished not from within but from without. As such, man has no claim
or share in the origination of inspiration.
That the source for inspiration is the Holy Spirit, not man, is also clearly indicated
by Henry's affirmative statement on what inspiration is, namely, a "supernatural influence"
upon the Bible writer during his recording of revelation.1 Henry’s keenness on this
attribution of inspiration to the Holy Spirit as its originator is also indicated by two other
emphases: inspiration of the text and the meaning of theopneustos.

Inspiration of the Text
Although Henry does not deny the inspiration of the writers,2 he does not want to
rest the focus there. What matters most is the inspiration of what the writer wrote—the
text.3 It seems for Henry that stress on the inspiration of the writer rides too close to a
subjective or human origin of inspiration which Henry eschews just as much as he does a
‘See p. 107 above.
2Henry, "Inspiration," MDCC, 512; GRA 4:152, 154.
3Seepp. 107-08 above; GRA 4:144.
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subjective revelation. Identifying inspiration with the writer instead of with his writing(s)
takes one to the territory of the pagans who portray inspiration as a "subjective mood of the
writer overmastered by the divine afflatus."1 In Henry’s opinion, then, emphasis on the
writer instead of the text as the locus of inspiration is a nonevangelical or nonbiblical
position2 because it concentrates inspiration upon man instead of upon his writing, and
consequently depreciates God as the author of the text in order that it may properly be
considered his Word or revelation.3 So, although in principle Henry does not deny the
inspiration of the writer, yet he is least at ease with that notion because he feels that it
"indicates God's relationship to Scripture as being only before, above, or behind Scripture,
and hence, prior or superior to the writings.4 That is, Henry stresses God's direct
connection or intimacy with the writings (Scripture) so that what it says can be identified
with what God says. Viewed from this perspective, the inspiration of the writers should be
considered only of secondary importance, whereas that of the text of primary importance.5
By insisting on the text—and not its writer—as the locus of inspiration,6 Henry is not only
suggesting that the Bible is God's written revelation, but also that inspiration, being an
‘Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 146; see also idem, "Inspiration," BDT, 286.
2See p. 108 above.
3Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 146.
4See p. 108 above.
5See p. 46 above, note 3, p. 125 above.
6GRA 4:74-76.
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activity of the Holy Spirit,1 originates outside of man so that he cannot claim any role in its
origination.

Theopneustos
Henry’s emphasis on the transcendence of inspiration—hence, man's preclusion
from the inception of inspiration—is also seen in his preference to translate theopneustos as
"spirated" (breathed out) instead of "inspirated" (breathed into).2 For him, "inspiration"
(breathing into) somehow seems to suggest the likelihood of an interpolation of human ideas
into the otherwise sacred writings. Spiration (breathing out or God-breathed) on the other
hand, clearly excludes man from any substantive contribution to inscripturation, so that
Henry could appropriately say that Scripture is the product of God's breath.3 Henry’s
preference for "spiration" seems to suggest a deliberate marginalization of human
involvement and responsibility in inspiration. Such a picture of human participation is quite
different from the one portrayed in revelation, where man is shown to be heavily and
actively involved. Spiration points to man's lower or marginal involvement in inspiration,
as he appears to remain passive and dependent, serving more or less as an instrument
through which God breathes than one who is personally and engagingly involved in the
writing process.
‘Henry, "Inspiration," NIDCC, 512.
2See pp. 122-23 above.
3Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 145.
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Man as Receiver of Inspiration
It has already been pointed out that man has no part in the origination of inspiration
because that phenomenon is an exclusive activity of the Holy Spirit, hence transcendent.
However, the fact that man is a medium of inspiration, or of the Spirit's influence, indicates
that he must play some role in inspiration, but perhaps at a different level.
Although the term "receiver" is not used by Henry in connection with inspiration,
yet the idea of man as the receiver of inspiration is clearly present because the Bible writers
were given inspiration during their inscripturation of revelation. In that respect they can
also be properly considered as recipients of inspiration. The kind of reception, however, is
quite different from that discussed in revelation. In this case, man is a recipient of the Holy
Spirit's influence for inscripturating divinely revealed truths,1 and not a recipient of
information as is in the case with revelation. In inspiration no new revelation or additional
truths are given. The objective o f inspiration is to enable man to put into written form what
was already revealed.2
What interests us at this juncture is how the human function is portrayed during the
reception of inspiration; or how man relates himself to that supernatural influence called
inspiration. One can perceive the answer by looking at the way Henry describes the
writer's activity during writing. Before considering that activity, however, it is necessary
that one first take into account Henry’s depiction of the preparation of the writer.
lGRA 4:129.
2GRA 2:14.
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Preparation of the Writer
In considering man's role in inspiration, one needs to take into cognizance that
God's choice of the writer is in no way comparable to one's choice of a volunteer.
According to Henry, the selection of the writer was made long before the prophet or apostle
ever wrote Scripture. Previous to the wielding of the quill, the prophet/apostle had to go
through "a long period of providential preparation involving diverse experiences."1 But
what type of preparation does Henry have in mind?
In view of explicitly identifying himself with Warfield’s doctrine of inspiration,2
Henry's mention of this supernatural preparation seems to be a shorthand statement of
Warfield’s own belief concerning this preparation, which he describes as follows:
The production of the Scriptures is, in point of fact, a long process, in the course of
which numerous and very varied divine activities are involved, providential, gracious,
miraculous, all of which must be taken into account in any attempt to explain the
relation of God to the production of Scripture. He prepares a man, by birth, training,
experience, [and] gifts of grace. [The preparation could involve being] born with just
the right quality of religious sensibility, [receiving] just the right hereditary inclination,
[getting] precisely the right religious example and training, [exposing to] circumstances
of life in which his religious tendencies should be developed precisely on right lines;
[given] just the right experiences to quicken in him the precise emotions he would be
called upon to express, and finally [being] placed in precisely the exigencies which
would call out their expression. When we give due place in our thoughts to the
universality of the providential government of God, to the minuteness and completeness
of its sway, and to its invariable efficacy, we may be inclined to ask what is needed
beyond this mere providential government to secure the production of sacred books
which should be in every detail absolutely accordant with the divine will.3
The detailed nature of Warfield's statement hardly calls for additional explanation
'Ibid., 140; 146.
2Ibid., 141, 159-60, 163, 165, 168-69, 172-73, 176, 183; Sharp, 76.
3Benjamin B. Warfield, "Inspiration," ISBE (1982), 2:846-47.
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or expansion. What is obvious is that there has been an extensive and intensive divine
preparation of the sacred writers. Beginning from or even before birth, the preparation is
elaborate and meticulous. Among other things, the readiness of the writer involves genetic,
mental, emotional, experiential, and religious grounding.
Furthermore, what is also significant about this preparation is that the varied
experiences that the writers went through are attributed to divine initiative and activity,
characterized either as providential, gracious, or miraculous. All these are necessary for
the production of Scripture. The writer's birth, religious experience, training, and gifts of
grace are all divinely measured and ordained. This shows that man is not only thoroughly
prepared for the work of inscripturating revelation, but is also intensely conditioned by
supernatural power so that whatever emotion is displayed during writing, literary skills and
method adopted, or sensitivity registered are a result of this supernatural conditioning or
preparation and can be attributed to none other but the Spirit. It is to be noted, however,
that no such preparation is needed for the revelation experience. This signals a cardinal
difference between the human role in revelation and inspiration. If God's choice of the
writer was from or even before birth, then the question of exercising his (writer's) will or
volition seems no longer a real possibility.
With the preparation over, Henry moves on to a consideration of man’s part during
the writing process. The discussion is divided into the following subheads: originality of
the writer, man as agent of the Holy Spirit, man's role in the divine-human concursus or
confluence, and man's role in relation to the words of Scripture.
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Originality of the Writer
Because of this extensive supernatural preparation of the writer, one wonders if it is
still relevant to consider the need for an overwhelming influence of the Spirit upon the
prophet/apostle during writing. Such a consideration naturally leads one to ponder on the
freedom of the Bible writer, for it is only as he is allowed to exercise his own freedom as a
writer that he can claim to be original in his writing. Is the writer free in this exercise?
Does Henry’s reference to the "very human features" of Scripture1 imply that the writer
was so permitted to exercise that freedom that it can be said he left his own mark and
personality on what he wrote?
Henry's response to questions such as these seems to elicit a yes-and-no answer.
One the one hand, he says that we are not to consider the Bible writers as mere "divine
amanuenses, penmen or secretaries."2 That is, if the writer is only an amanuensis it means
that he writes from dictation or copies what another has written.3 That kind of role or
operation does not provide any room for self-expression or originality. In Henry's view,
the prophet/apostle enjoyed more freedom than penmen and secretaries do. He supports
this statement by arguing that the Bible writers freely engaged themselves in "historical
research, logical reasoning, ethical thought, religious aspiration,"4 and enjoyed the right to
express their own "personality, stylistic peculiarities, vocabulary range, and personal
■GRA 4:160.
2Ibid., 142.
3WNAD,

s .v .

"Amanuensis."

“Warfield quoted in GRA 4:159.
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preferences" in their writing of Scripture.1 Actually, they were even free to state and
summarize the message of Jesus in a manner that would truly convey his thought.2
But having said that, Henry moves quickly to the next affirmation, namely, that the
writers executed all this under the prevailing assistance, superintendence, direction, and
control of the divine Spirit,3 or under his inspiration.4 The question is then, how does one
account for human freedom and the Spirit's comprehensive control over man's writing? Or
how can one claim that this supernatural control of the writers is consistent with their
human freedom and disparate personalities?5 Henry’s only answer is that it is a mystery;6
its "how" lies in the hinterland just as is the virgin birth of Christ.7 The significance of
Henry’s admission of the freedom and originality of the writer is seriously questioned when
one considers Henry’s correlation of the writing process with the immediate and heavy
controlling activity of the Holy Spirit.

Man as Agent of the Holy Spirit
By looking into the Holy Spirit's relation to man in inspiration, one can obtain a
7GRA 4:207; see also ibid., 150, 142; GRA 3:424.
2GRA 3:91; see also ibid., 93.
3Warfield quoted in GRA 4:159; GRA 3:91.
“GRA 3: 93. Henry also quotes Hodge and Warfield where they identified divine
inspiration with divine superintendence (GRA 4:141).
5Henry in Gaebelein, 25.
6GRA 4:213, 277; Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 77.
7Henry, Conversations, 25.
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fuller view of man’s role in that phenomenon. Henry himself makes a direct and intimate
connection between the human writer and the Holy Spirit. The consideration begins by
looking again at Henry's definition of inspiration:
Inspiration is that supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit whereby the sacred writers
were divinely supervised in their production of Scripture, being restrainedfrom error
and guided in the choice o f words they used, consistently with their disparate
personalities and stylistic peculiarities}
The definition clearly points to the Holy Spirit as actuating the writer. As an
influencer, the Holy Spirit sways and conditions man in such a manner that he elicits
responses that are divinely desirable.2 Besides influencing, the Holy Spirit also
superintends the writer. This superintendence, however, is not just a matter of watching
and directing from a distance.3 According to Henry, the oversight involves restraining and
guiding the writer. But what is included in this supervision? Henry thinks that it could
embrace the safeguarding from error in thought or word, the choice of words or dictation,
or a varied combination of these and other possibilities.4
Henry enlarges this notion of divine influence and superintendence by quoting
Warfield:
The Spirit is not to be conceived as standing outside of the human powers employed for
the effect in view, ready to supplement any inadequacies they may show and to supply
any defects they may manifest, but as working confluently in, with and by them, eleva
ting them, directing them, controlling them, energizing them, so that as his instruments,
‘See p. 107 above.
2WNAD, s.v. "Influence."
3GRA 4:159.
4Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 77.
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they rise above themselves and under his inspiration do his work and reach his aim.1
Though Henry himself has not expanded on the meaning and implication of the
above words in italics, yet one can gain a greater appreciation of their significance by
considering them in the light of the task at hand, namely, the inscripturation of revelation in
written form. Keeping this in mind, the writers' elevation seems to refer to the raising or
enhancing of the level of their mental, religious, moral, and linguistic capacities to a state
higher than they would otherwise enjoy. Moreover, the elevation does imply that man in
his natural state is inadequate for the task of inscripturating revelation independent of
supernatural help. For instance, the apostles depended upon the Holy Spirit to bring back
to their memory all the things Jesus said, and even to help them understand what they failed
to grasp during his physical presence with them.2 They also relied on the Holy Spirit even
in the choice of words.3
That man is heavily dependent upon the Holy Spirit during inspiration is also
indicated by the giving of the Holy Spirit’s mind to the writer.4 Since man's mind is the
control center of his activities (internal and external), the giving of a supernatural mind
would certainly facilitate or even automate this superintendence. What happens then to the
writer's own mind under such a situation? Henry does not provide an answer. But if man
is possessed by the mind of the Holy Spirit, is it likely that this can result in the hindrance
‘Warfield, quoted in GRA 4:159-60; italics supplied.
2GRA 3:91-92, 95.
3See p. 107 above.
4GRA 3:91.
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or suppression of the writer's own intellectual and literary creativity and freedom?

Man's Role in the Divine-Human Confluence
Henry provides another important window through which we can view the human
role during inspiration. It is by means of the term "confluence," or "concursus"1—words
that refer to "the simultaneous agency of God and man in one and the same event, whether
historical (Acts 2:23) or literary (2 Pet 1:21). "2 In the interest of obtaining a clearer
understanding of the term, it may be pointed out that it would be a misunderstanding of
Henry if the word was conceived in a manner of a confluence of two streams of water
where both not only freely penetrate each other but also bring along their negative as well
as positive properties to the confluence. This caution is significant because Henry affirms
that "both thoughts and words are a divine product in view of the divine-human
concursus."3 If thoughts and words are those of the Holy Spirit, what, then, is man's role
in the confluence? Henry's response is telling when he says that "it is not quite correct to
speak of a dual authorship or of a divine-human coauthorship of Scripture. "4 This clearly
shows that Henry does not allow equal share of contribution between the writer and the
Holy Spirit. In that respect even the very use of the word "confluence" does little to
recognize the human role. By giving preponderance to the Holy Spirit in inspiration,
‘Ibid., 160, 424.
2GRA 4:142, 159-60.
3Ibid., 206.
4Ibid., 142, italics added.
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Henry accordingly places him as the only real and ultimate author of Scripture.1
But if prophets and apostles are not to be regarded as cocreators of Scripture,2 what
position did they occupy as writers in relation to the Holy Spirit? Henry answers this
question by alluding to Barth's notion: "They were auctores secundarii"—secondary
authors.3 In view of this subsidiary or secondary role of the human writer, Henry also
takes exception to the use of Christ's divine-human nature as an analogy for the nature of
Scripture (e.g., divine-human book). In his view,
while each [Scripture and Jesus Christ] involves divine and human, each does so in
distinctive ways; the God-man and God-book are not equivalent analogues. In the
incarnation one divine person assumes sinless human nature alongside his eternal divine
nature; in inscripturation the divine Spirit selectively superintends fallible and sinful
human beings in the inerrant oral and written proclamation of God's message.4
As explained in the above statement, Henry’s objection to the christological analogy
for the nature of Scripture is due to the following: (1) that one is a person and the other a
book; (2) that although both Christ and the Bible have their divine and human aspects, yet
the Bible cannot be thought of as having a divine nature in the way Christ has it in his own
person; and (3) Christ's human nature cannot be compared to that of the human writers
because his was sinless while that of the Bible writers was fallible and sinful,5 making it
•Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 145-46; idem, "Inspiration," NIDCC, 512;
GRA 4:159.
2GRA 4:206, emphasis added.
3Ibid., 142; see CD 1/2, 505.
4GRA 4:160. "If to assume authentic human nature Christ needed to share in human
fallibility, we have lost Jesus as an inerrant teacher of doctrine” (ibid., 150).
5"Inspiration did not put an end to the human fallibility of prophets and apostles."
That is, outside of inspiration "they remained fallible men prone to mistakes, and frequently
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necessary for them to be supematuraliy supervised in order to keep them from error in
their writing of Scripture. So the human writers were not allowed to express themselves
freely in the writing process. The analogy therefore does not suit Henry's emphasis on the
passive and dependent role of the writers.

Man's Role and the Words of Scripture
It has already been pointed out that in Henry's understanding the function or
purpose of inspiration is the inscripturadon of "divinely revealed truths in verbal form.1,1
Since "ideas are humanly inexpressible apart from words,"2 the choice of words in the
recording of revelation is obviously of paramount importance. For this reason Henry feels
that the doctrine of inspiration should be directly connected with the expressed truths and
words of Scripture3 because "improperly phrased ideas fall short of being a communication
of truth."4 Accordingly, Henry correlates the "verbal linguistic formulation” of Scripture
with "the pneumatic initiative and activity of God. '6 In another place he also claims that
"the Holy Spirit safeguarded the writers from error by superintending the choice o f the
made them" (ibid., 151).
LGRA 4:129; see also pp. 45, 106-07, 197, and 224 above.
2GRA 3:422; see also GRA 4:46, 145, where Henry argues for the indispensability
of words in the communication of truth.
3GRA 4:144, emphasis supplied.
4See p. 102 above.
5GRA 3:424.
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words they used."1 Henry's conviction of the impossibility of conveying one's thoughts or
ideas without words leads him to conclude that both the thoughts and words of the Bible are
a divine creation,2 the product of a single divine mind3 and his creative breath.4 If in
inspiration man cannot choose his own words, then it seems that his role in inspiration is no
higher than that of a secretary or amanuensis, let alone author. Perhaps this could be the
reason why Henry prefers to call man a secondary writer,5 because his contribution is more
superficial than deep, or more auxiliary than primary.

Man as Carrier of Inspiration
When the role of man as a carrier of revelation was examined, we identified it with
his ability to communicate or convey the truths of revelation.6 This means that it is part of
man's task to share the content of revelation with others. Before the act of sharing several
things have been noted: man has received, understood, remembered—and still
remembers—revelation, and has the linguistic capability to articulate its truths. What is
important to note is that Henry does assume that man uses competently the faculties of will,
'GRA 4:244, 167, emphasis supplied. See also his definition of inspiration (p. 107
above) where Henry uses almost an identical phrase: "The sacred writers . . . were
. . . being restrained from error and guided in the choice of words they used." We must
not forget that Henry limits inspiration only to that which originally came out of the biblical
author’s pen, that is, the autographic text (see pp. 114, 136).
2GRA 4:206, italics added.
3Ibid., 218.
4Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 145.
5See p. 233 above.
6See pp. 214-215 above.
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conscience, reason (understanding), memory, and speech in the conveyance of revelation.1
This acknowledgment is useful for our consideration of man’s role as carrier of inspiration.
In view of the fact that inspiration is given for the sake of conveying/communicating
revelation in writing,2 the engagement of the faculties of reasoning, memory, and speech is
equally needed. In fact, Henry admits their use. For instance, he says that during
inspiration, three things occur:
1. The Holy Spirit helps man to understand revelation—including things that Jesus
said and did and other matters in the Old Testament that are applicable to him.3 The Spirit
accomplishes this by sharing with man his own mind.4 But what should be pointed out is
that when Henry describes the human role in revelation, man is not given nor does he need
supernatural help in understanding revelation. His ability to understand comes easily and
naturally. If man does not need the direct help of the Holy Spirit at the level of revelation,
why should he need it now with such intensity at the stage of inspiration? What has
happened to that lucid human comprehension of revelation that Henry testifies of?5 Does
man suddenly lose his grasp of revelation the moment he begins to write it down?
2. In inspiration the Holy Spirit brings to man's memory all the things that Jesus
lSee pp. 196-97, 198-200, 205-10, 210-11, and 215-16 above.
2See p. 132 above, note 3, 197 above, and p. 220 above.
3GRA 3:91.
4See p. 231 above.
sSee pp. 44, 47, and 208-14 above.
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said and did.1 But this is different from what happens to man in the conveyance of
revelation. There, man can remember the content of revelation to the point that he can
repeat it verbatim, or even present it in different words without losing any of the original
meaning.2 Does it mean that man's memory becomes incapacitated the moment of
inscripturation? If the Holy Spirit brings everything into remembrance, does it not also
imply that revelation itself is repeated during inspiration?
3.

Man is given help with the choice of words used in the writing of revelation.3

Again, it is not clear what has happened to the fact that revelation comes in propositional
form or in man's own language, as well as his capacity to remember that which has been
revealed. Moreover, man is able to elucidate revelation. Is it therefore not reasonable to
hold that writing is made easier because of the nature of revelation and the correspondence
of human nature with it? Is inspiration in disharmony with human nature?

Summary Conclusion
This chapter delves analytically into the question of the human role in revelation and
inspiration. While analyzing the human involvement in revelation, it was observed that
Henry initially distances man from revelation in terms of its inception. That is, man has no
part in the origination of revelation, including truth as its content. Henry furnishes four
reasons: the transcendence of revelation, the transcendence of truth, the finiteness of man,
as well as his sinfulness. At this stage then, man has no role to play. It is only at the stage
‘GRA 3:91.
2See pp. 215-16 above.
3See pp. 107, 234-35 above.
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of reception and conveyance of revelation that man is involved.
As a recipient of revelation, man uses various faculties such as his will, conscience,
linguistic capacity, and mind or reasoning power. The word "receiver" may connote
passivity because it portrays man at the receiving end—one who can do nothing to obtain
revelation but wait until God gives it to him. However, we also noted that human active
participation characterizes the reception of revelation.
First of all, when it comes to general revelation Henry refers to the necessity for
revelation to bombard, invade, and penetrate the mind, will, and conscience. This indicates
that man is actively resisting revelation. And yet if he is to be accountable before God, he
needs to be exposed to revelation. Henry particularly points to man’s will as actively
engaged in open revolt, disregarding revelation, and revising it to accommodate to his
selfish and sinful motives. Man’s rebellious attitude during the reception of general
revelation when juxtaposed with his attitude during the reception of special revelation shows
that it cannot simply be taken for granted that man will receive revelation. Like the
prophets and apostles, he must first of all subordinate or bring his will to submission before
God can reveal to him truths otherwise unknowable. In this respect, man is actively
involved in revelation because he has to make a decision whether or not to accept or reject
the role God wants him to occupy in that disclosure. So while the reception of revelation is
a mental act, yet the rebellious will can frustrate that reception.1
As to the conscience, Henry provides two depictions of the human role, namely,
passive and active. Because conscience refers to the implanted moral law, man does not
•Henry to Kharbteng, 25 September 1966.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

238
have to take any initiative in acquiring revelation. It is already given to him at creation.
However, an active mood is also evident at this level because man actively engages himself
in ignoring and distorting conscience. In Henry's own words, "reason accuses or excuses
as conscience directs."1 In this instance the conscience does play an active role in the
reception of revelation because it can deliberately turn a blind eye to revelation or respond
to it in a positive manner. That is, conscience can either live up to revelation's demands or
muffle its voice.
When man's role is considered at the level of his linguistic involvement in
revelation we see him actively engaging his mind and ears in receiving revelation and
deploying his memory and linguistic skills in conveying it to others. Similarly, the
engagement of his reasoning power to receive revelation is just as active because the
attempt to understand per se calls for an active effort, where several of human powers and
faculties are summoned to accomplish the task of understanding or realizing the cognitive
value or transparency of revelation. When in contact with revelation, man's mind is seen to
be discriminating and testing revelation or truth. His reasoning power tests truth to verify
whether or not it is really truth. When convinced, he then elucidates revelation/truth, or
makes it intelligible to others by "clear explanation or careful analysis. "2
The active way man uses his will, conscience, linguistic skills, and reason in
receiving revelation indicates that Henry’s presentation of the human role in revelation is
lHenry, CPE, 154; see also ibid., 146, where Henry says that man's distortion of
the moral content of the imago is so severe that the content can no longer serve as a basis
for the moral precepts of special revelation.
2Webster's Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged
(1986), s.v. "Elucidate."
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quite different from the utterly passive Barthian portrayal of the human role in the reception
of revelation.1
When one speaks of the elucidation of revelation, it also indicates that man is its
active carrier or communicator. At this stage, two more closely related activities are
assigned to man. Henry tells us that the apostles could recall from memory Jesus' words
and teaching with precision either verbatim or with some verbal variation. This indicates
that when man receives revelation it remains in his memory in the form of intelligible
propositional truths that can be recalled as needed. Such an ability of course is necessary if
man is to fulfill his role as a carrier or conveyor of revelation. After all, of what
significance is a revelation that cannot be remembered? What public utility does it have if it
cannot be shared? However, because it is harder to remember than to forget, retaining
revelation in one's mind takes conscious and deliberate efforts. To that extent one can also
discern man's deliberate and active participation at this level of revelation. Man's active
role in revelation is further indicated by the fact that the apostles could restate or summarize
revelation.2 Here one sees not only a human capacity to present revelation in different
creative literary forms, but also his freedom to do so.
With respect to the human role in the inception of inspiration we observe that man
lAs Barth sees it, man, being totally corrupt (see p. 154 above), does not have the
natural capability to know revelation or 'W ord of God* (CD 1/1, 191-93 [ET, 1975 ed.]).
If man is to hear or know God's Word, God himself has to help him do that through the
power of his Word (ibid., 194-96, 223). Even if one talks of the experience of God's
Word, that, too, is made possible by God alone (ibid., 199-200). Divine utterance is
something which cannot be anticipated. It comes as an "event o f . . . grace" through faith
which is also created by God’s Word (ibid., 224).
2See p. 228 above.
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has no part in it whatever. There is nothing in him that can be identified as a source of
inspiration. The phenomenon is not immanent in either man's psychic faculties or creative
energies. Inspiration is purely an action of the Holy Spirit. It is a transcendent or
supernatural influence1 that is made available to man during his inscripturation of
revelation.
The analysis moved to the next stage where man is seen playing the role of a
receiver of inspiration. While his reception of revelation refers to its cognitive
apprehension, his reception of inspiration pertains to an experience of the Holy Spirit's
influence, guidance, and superintendence during the inscripturation of revelation.2 Did man
do anything that would qualify him to receive inspiration? The answer is obviously no
because he did not ask that he be chosen for the task. It was the Holy Spirit who chose and
even prepared him beforehand for that responsibility. Acquirement of every experience
and skill has been as a result of a divine arrangement or provision in order to qualify man
perfectly for the task.
This human passivity is also exhibited in Henry’s emphasis on the Holy Spirit's
rigid and comprehensive control of the writers during the writing process. While Henry
may claim that man enjoyed freedom of diction and choice of a literary style or form to
convey revelation,3 yet that claim seems to lose force in view of this divine preparation and
programming of the human person. Whatever emotional, mental, and literary sensitivity a
‘Henry, "Bible, Inspiration of," EDT, 145; idem, "Inspiration," BDT, 286.
2GRA 4:129.
3See p. 228 above.
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prophet or apostle exhibited in the process of writing Scripture would have been a result of
this intensive and detailed preparation; otherwise, the preparation itself would have hardly
any importance.
The passivity of the writer is also vividly highlighted by his being elevated,
directed, controlled, and energized by the Holy Spirit during inspiration.1 For that matter,
even when man and the Holy Spirit are supposed to be operating conjointly in the writing of
Scripture, yet no human contribution is acknowledged for the product of this divine-human
effort. As far as Henry is concerned, despite the confluence, both the thoughts and words
of Scripture are a divine product.2 Henry also assures us that man did not have much
control over what he wrote because that control had been taken over by the Holy Spirit who
actively superintended even in the choice of words.
Regarding the question of man's role as a carrier of inspiration we have noticed that
there are differences when compared with the same role in revelation. In carrying
(communicating/conveying) revelation, man has the requisite faculties for executing that
responsibility. He has the will to decide for or against the task, the reasoning power to
understand what is to be conveyed, the linguistic capability to elucidate, as well as the
memory to retain revelation. Those faculties operate freely and competendy independent of
supernatural assistance. Man's operation as a carrier of inspiration, on the other hand, is
described in significantly different terms. It appears as if Henry is dealing with a different
person than the one involved in conveying revelation. For instance, as a carrier of
‘See p. 229 above.
2See p. 235 above.
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inspiration, man is charged with putting it into written form. But he is totally unqualified
for the task. He needs to be prepared in advance, because none of his natural capacities are
adequate to carry out the responsibility to a satisfactory level. And even after the long
preparation for writing, man still needs the overwhelming help of the Holy Spirit. His
comprehending faculty requires supernatural aid to grasp adequately what he is about to
write. His memory needs to be reinforced; he requires divine inspiration or help of the
Holy Spirit to expand his understanding and help him recall the data of revelation.
Furthermore, man does not have the right words for writing revelation. So he again finds
himself being guided by the Holy Spirit in the choice of words.
The fact that inspiration is the means by which man (prophet/apostle) puts into
written form the revelation he has been given, shows that the same man is actually under
consideration. In that respect, the divergence of the roles of man in revelation and
inspiration can be significant. Chapter 6 critically evaluates this difference of Henry’s
depiction of the human role in his doctrines of revelation and inspiration.
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CHAPTER 6

THE HUMAN ROLE IN HENRY'S DOCTRINES OF REVELATION
AND INSPIRATION: AN EVALUATION

The Importance of a Consistent Portrayal of the Human Role
The previous chapter has analyzed Henry's portrayal of the human role in his
doctrines of revelation and inspiration. It has identified and described the various elements
that comprise the human role in the two doctrines. This chapter evaluates the portrayal.
The criteria of evaluation is based on the correspondence or consistency between the human
role in revelation and that role in inspiration. The significance of harmony or consistency
between the two roles is indicated by four considerations:
I.

According to Henry, the content of the product of inspiration (i.e., Scripture) is

identical with the content of revelation.1 On the one hand, man's task in revelation is to
receive and convey revelation; on the other hand, his responsibility in inspiration is to
transfer the content of revelation into writing. The real difference between revelation and
inspiration is then in terms of form, not content. In revelation, the content (truth) is given
through intelligible human speech and stored in the memory; in inspiration, the content of
revelation is retrieved from memory and made available in written form. That
xSee pp. 215-19 above; see also pp. 67-70 above.
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being the case, man's role in these phenomena should likewise correspond to the degree of
the identicalness of their content.
2. God has adapted the content of revelation to man's nature so that man can relate
to it meaningfully. Revelation's nature is so compatible with man's nature that he can
receive it with his will and conscience. Because revelation is rational, man's rational mind
can likewise understand it. The prepositional character of revelation likewise helps him to
receive its truths in his own language, and share them with others. If during revelation
man employs competently his different capacities to receive and convey revelation, so
should he also be expected to use those very capacities and carry out his role with equal or
similar competency at the stage of inspiration.
3. God has created man for fellowship and communication.1 This implies that the
capability for communication is something natural to man. If revelation has already been
tailor-made for him, then his ability to communicate it either orally or in writing should be
one that can be carried out in a somewhat independent manner.
4. Man was divinely prepared for the task of inspiration. The preparation itself
points to his furnishing and equipping beyond that which he has already been naturally
endowed with. During inspiration man should then all the more be able to carry out the
task of writing the contents of revelation with a facility that is reminiscent of that displayed
at the time of reception and conveyance of revelation.
‘See pp. 61, 103, 170-71 above.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

245

Nature and Function as Criteria of Evaluation
This evaluation follows a comparison and contrast of the human role in the
doctrines of revelation and inspiration. To proceed with such a task, one needs a criterion
or perhaps a set of criteria by which to verify similarity and contrast. Since the evaluation
pertains to Henry’s own presentation, it is necessary that the criterion/criteria be identified
from within his own exposition of the doctrines of revelation and inspiration.
In this instance, nature and function (or purpose) have been identified and adopted
as the criteria. Their adoption is based upon Henry’s emphasis that both revelation and
inspiration are meant for man. If the purpose of revelation is to serve man, then it would
necessarily have to be given in a form that he can assimilate. Thus, human nature would
have to be taken into consideration. Revelation’s purpose would therefore have to be
adjusted to man's nature. Similarly, his role in revelation would likewise have to be
determined by the nature of revelation because he could be expected to participate in it only
if revelation itself is of the type that man can actually be intelligently involved in. The case
with man’s place in inspiration is similar. If the purpose of inspiration does not respect
man's nature, then neither can he be engaged in it authentically. Therefore inspiration's
nature will also have to be of the kind that facilitates man's mindful participation in it.
Only when nature and function are properly correlated can one say that revelation and
inspiration have realized their goal.
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Furthermore, the use of nature and function as criteria is equally significant when
considered from the standpoint of Henry as an apologist.1 In fact, his presentation of the
doctrines of revelation and inspiration is made apologetically. Accordingly, his manner of
exposition of these doctrines is characterized by a consciousness of and reaction to other
competitive views that he strongly disagrees with—particularly the neoorthodox view.2 And
Henry does that by singling out Karl Barth as the focal point of attack.3
The Barthian or neoorthodox view of revelation described as subjective, irrational,4
noncognitive,s non-propositional,6 and continuous—and of inspiration that locates in the
reader and hearer,7 is seen by Henry as dangerous to the cause of Christianity because it
‘Patterson (CFH, 163) considers Henry as an instinctive apologist.
2Johnson observed that neoorthodoxy has been Henry's main target of apologetical
attack throughout his literary career (Johnson, 210; see also Patterson, CFH, 137, and
Cross, 127). See GRA 5:100 where Henry dismisses the neoorthodox view of the Bible as
fallible, and holds that if it is accepted, it would have resulted in dissolving the authority of
the written revelation into a vague mysticism (Henry, Fifty Years, 101-02). Note:
According to Harold J. Ockenga neoorthodoxy is a new form of liberalism (see Harold J.
Ockenga, "From Fundamentalism, Through New Evangelicalism, to Evangelicalism," in
Evangelical Roots: A Tribute to Wilbur Smith, ed. Kenneth S. Kantzer [New York: Thomas
Nelson, 1978], 41).
3See notes 3 and 4, p. 93; pp. 93-96, and 160-61 above.
4It is probably because Henry considers the neoorthodox view of God as a
"stuttering God" that revelation from such a God is bound to be irrational (Henry, "The
God of the Bible vs. Naturalism," 232).
^ h e consequence of a noncognitive revelation is theological suicide (Cross, 127;
based on Henry's correspondence with Cross).
6See note 1, p. 94 above, where we are told that Henry regards Barth as the most
influential 20th-century theologian in encouraging the rejection of propositional revelation
(see also GRA 1:192-93).
7GRA 4:136.
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undermines the religion's epistemological foundation and authority. To solve that problem
Henry argues strongly for a rejection of the Barthian teaching and presses for the espousal
of the evangelical—which he also calls the 'biblical'—view of revelation described as
rational, objective, prepositional, inscripturated, and once-for-all,1 and of inspiration which
focuses on the text rather than on the writer, hearer, or reader.2 The rejection of the
Barthian concept of revelation and inspiration also leads Henry to reject Barth's doctrine of
man3 and his portrayal of the human role in revelation and inspiration.
Henry's line of defense for the evangelical position takes two forms: first, he makes
a painstaking clarification of the nature of revelation, inspiration, and man so that their
superiority against the neoorthodox view is based on scriptural grounds.4 Second, Henry
shows a serious concern for the function of revelation, inspiration, and human beings in
God's great plan of salvation. The significance of nature and function is indicated by
correlating them, where function is adjusted to, dependent upon, or determined by nature.
In the interest of clarifying the relationship between function and nature as well as
their significance for the evaluation, Henry's correlation of these is provided herewith.
lSee pp. 82, 85 above.
2See note 2, p. 46 above; pp. 107-08 and note 7, p. 123 above.
3See pp. 163-66 above; cf. note 5, p. 160 above.
4See chapters 2-4 of this dissertation where Henry clarifies his doctrines of
revelation, inspiration, and man.
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Function of Revelation and Nature of Man1
1. Revelation discloses God's existence,2 because man by nature cannot know
divine existence independent of God's disclosure.3
2. Revelation shows God's nature and ways, because if man cannot know God's
existence without divine disclosure then, a fortiori, he cannot know God's nature and ways
either.4
3. Revelation discloses divine will, purpose, and truths to and for man's benefit,
because in his finite and sinful state man cannot know them, let alone create them.5
4. Revelation appeals intellectually to man's mind, because it is rational and he is
rational.6
5. Revelation addresses man propositionally, because man is a speech-using
creature.7
6. Revelation informs man's need of salvation, because he is a sinner.8
Chapters 2-5 have already dealt with nature and function of revelation, inspiration,
and man. What is being indicated here is a recollection of what has already been provided
in those chapters.
2See pp. 57, 62-63 above.
3See p. 57 above.
“See note 3, 161 above; p. 168 above.
sSee note 1, p. 44 above; note 2, p. 76 above; 182 above.
6See pp. 73-77 above.
7See pp. 77-82, 215-19 above
8See pp. 103 above; note 3, 172 above; and pp. 178-79.
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7. Revelation penetrates man's mind, will, and conscience,1 because God made him
a responsible moral agent who needs to be informed before he is judged.2
8. Revelation respects man's freedom, because man is a will-endowed being who
can accept or reject revelation.3

Function of Man and Nature of Revelation
1. Man does not and cannot create revelation or truth, because it is transcendent or
divinely originated.4
2. Man receives revelation from God,s because revelation is shareable.6
3. Man understands revelation,7 because it is rational and because he is rational.8
4. Man communicates revelation, because it is conceptual-propositional,9 and
because it is given for humanity in their predicament.10
•See p. 201 above.
2See pp. 60, 174, 197 above.
3See pp. 201-203 above.
“See pp. 44, 150, 186-94 above.
5Seepp. 62-63, 186-90 above.
6See pp. 211-14 above.
7See pp. 44, 48, note 6, p. 75; note 2, p. 175 above; 208-11 above.
"See pp. 73-77 above.
9See p. 206 above.
10See pp. 42, 195-96 above.
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5.

Sinful man revolts against revelation, because coming from God, it is holy,

accusing, and demanding.1

Function of Inspiration and Nature of Man
Prior to considering the function or purpose of inspiration, we need to point out
Henry's emphasis on the Holy Spirit as the agent of inspiration. It is he who, decades
before the event of inspiration, prepares man thoroughly for it, over a long period of time.
The preparation implies that man is not inherently qualified to carry out the task of
inspiration. During the writing process, the Holy Spirit energizes, influences, guides,
supervises, and controls the writer. He brings to man's memory all the things Jesus said
and did, because finite and sinful man cannot retain them to the degree that God requires.
He also expands man's comprehension of revelation. Such actions of the Holy Spirit upon
the human agent during inspiration are indispensable because:
1. Inspiration's primary task is to inscripturate revelation—a task which sinful and
erring man cannot carry out to God's expectation of inerrancy.2
2. Inspiration helps man with the choice of words in writing the truths of revela
tion, because he is finite and erring and may consequently make a poor selection of words.3
‘See pp. 103, 148-49, 171, 178-79
2Seepp. 102, 228, 112-15 above.
3See pp. 107, 234-35 above.
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3. Inspiration guarantees inerrancy1 of inscripturated revelation, because by
definition, sinful and fallible man cannot, on his own, record revelation inerrantly.2
4. Inspiration makes revelation available for posterity (permanence)3 in objective,
written form, because man cannot mentally retain revelation accurately and permanently
over a protracted period of time.4
5. Inspiration produces Scripture or inscripturated revelation5 to serve as final
authority for individual Christians and the church,6 because man is unable to fashion truth
on his own and therefore cannot stake his claim to final authority.7
lSee pp. 112-13. It is significant to note that in Henry's 25-page answer to the
question: "Who are the evangelicals?" three-fourths of the space has been used for the
defense of inerrancy as the proper character of inspired Bible to which evangelicals
subscribe, (see Henry, "Who Are the Evangelicals?" 69-94). This points to the fact that
Henry correlates inspiration with inerrancy, where the latter is treated as an implicate of the
former (GRA 4:191, 193; Carl F. H. Henry, "Carl F. H. Henry on Evangelical Identity,"
interview by Wes Michaelson and Jim Wallis, Sojourners, April 1976, 27). Further
comments on inerrancy are deferred to the latter part of this chapter.
2See note 2, p. 233 above.
3See pp. 219-20 above.
4See p. 220 above; see also GRA 3:91 and GRA 4:36, 26.
5See p. 45 above; GRA 3:96.
6See p. 98 above.
7See note 1, p. 44 above; note 5, 167 above; and p. 182 above.
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Function of Man and Nature of Inspiration
1. Man does not and cannot generate inspiration from within himself, because that
phenomenon is not natural but supernatural.1
2. Man inscripturates revelation faithfully and inerrantly, because inspiration,
being a supernatural influence and a power over him, is able to achieve inerrancy despite
his fallibility.2
3. Man yields to inspiration for the correct choice of words during writing,3
because being a divine activity, inspiration is able to accomplish that quality of choice
which finite, sinful, and erring man cannot.4
4. Man is supposed to reproduce revelation in unerring written form, but he is
unable to recall that which has been revealed because his fmiteness and sinful limitations
have adversely affected his memory power. He therefore needs the supernatural power of
inspiration to do the recalling.5
5. Man is to express the truths of revelation through carefully chosen words so that
its transmission is executed accurately. But his depraved nature prevents him from
conceiving such words, leading him to rely on inspiration for the words.6
‘See p. 107; see also pp. 225-26.
2See p. 233 above.
3See p. 236 above.
4See pp. 234-35 above.
5See p. 236 above.
6See note 1, p. 126 above.
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A careful look at the correlation of nature and function shows that a harmony is
evident when man's nature and function in revelation are considered within that
phenomenon's nature and function. A similar harmony or correspondence also prevails
within the phenomenon of inspiration. However, this correspondence seems to break down
the moment human nature and function in revelation are correlated with, or related to, his
nature and function in inspiration. Since the importance of the presence of a correspon
dence between the two roles has already been indicated,1 1 now show how Henry's
portrayal of the human role in revelation does not correspond with his depiction of that role
in inspiration. This is done by comparing and contrasting the two roles in table 1}
Except for entries number 1 and 11, which show varying degrees and forms of
similarity between Henry's depiction of the human role in revelation and inspiration, the
rest of the entries clearly indicate a significant difference of that depiction.
At the revelation level, man is presented as having the natural capacity to receive
and convey revelation independent of any supernatural help. The man that we find in
inspiration, on the other hand, is one who is naturally unqualified. He is full of sinful
defects. He needs first to be subjected to a long period of training and preparation before
he can assume the responsibility of a writer.
Whereas in revelation (#2) man receives vital information from God, in inspiration,
man engages himself in writing down the given revelation. At the level of revelation man is
depicted as one naturally equipped for the event (#3), but in inspiration he is portrayed as
^ e e pp. 244-45.
2For the table, see pp. 254-56 above.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

254
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF MAN’S ROLE IN REVELATION AND INSPIRATION
Man's Role in Revelation

Man’s Role in Inspiration

1. Revelation is a transcendent activity. By
nature, finite and sinful man is incapable of
such an activity. Therefore man has no part
in the inception of revelation (see pp. 18690 above).

1. Inspiration is transcendent activity.
Accordingly, man has no part or access to
it unless God himself makes it available to
him (see pp. 221-22 above).

2. Man receives divine information or
truths from God (see pp. 186, 205 above).

2. Man does not receive any new truth or
revelation. His duty is to inscripturate the
truth/revelation already given (see p. 225
above).

3. Man is naturally qualified to receive
and convey revelation (see pp. 196-99,
211-13 above).

3. Man receives supernatural influence,
guidance, and superintendency from the
Holy Spirit as he writes or inscripturates
the truths of revelation. Such a
supernatural enablement is necessary
because man is not naturally qualified to
write revelation (see p. 233-34 above).

4. Man engages his will, conscience,
linguistic capacity, and reason freely and
independently, though at times reluctantly,
to receive and process revelation (see pp.
199-211 above)

4. Man's independence and freedom seem
to be restrained by the overwhelming
influence, superintendence, and control of
the Holy Spirit (see pp. 228-29 above).

5. Man uses his will in the reception of
revelation (see pp. 200-01 above). This
implies that he makes a conscious decision
whether or not to respond to revelation and
its demands. Man can turn down that
privilege. In fact, his tendency—as in the
case of receiving general revelation—is to
rebel against revelation. Hence, he has to
be invaded and bombarded with revelation
in order that he may not be left with any
excuse for not responding to it (see pp. 62,
64 above; note 2, p. 172 above). Such a
situation indicates not only man’s active
involvement in revelation but his freedom
in it as well.

5. Man’s will is not mentioned. Is it
conditioned by the preparation and
overwhelmed by the Spirit?
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Table 1—Continued.__________________
6. Man uses conscience for receiving the
moral elements of revelation. Thereafter,
the conscience can regard or disregard the
moral terms of revelation (see pp. 201-203
above).

6. Conscience is not acknowledged.

7. Man's linguistic capacity receives
revelation's truths in the way one normally
receives information, because revelation
comes to him verbally and propositionally
by means of God's speaking in the
language that man understands (see pp.
201-04 above).

7. Man depends upon the Holy Spirit for
words to be used during writing (see pp.
107, 234-35 above). What happens to his
linguistic capacity?

8. Man's reason understands the content of
revelation. That understanding does not
come as a result of faith. The rationality of
revelation, plus the rational nature of his
own mind makes this comprehension a
reality. Man's understanding of revelation
is identical (not equal) with God's under
standing of it. Furthermore, man's grasp
of revelation is so perspicuous that he can
make it clear to others (see p. 194 above).

8. Man's grasp of revelation is inadequate,
thus making it necessary for the Holy Spirit
to help him have a full understanding of
revelation by sharing His mind with the
writer (see p. 231 above; GRA 3:91).

9. The lucidity of revelation to man's
mind indicates that his grasp of revelation
is inerrant.

9. Man's writing of revelation would have
been errant had it not been for the Spirit's
safeguarding and supervision that results in
an inerrant Scripture (see note 3, 106
above, and 112-13 above).

10. Man remembers what has been
revealed to him. The apostles, for
example, could recite from memory Jesus's
sayings and teachings (see pp. 215-16
above).

10. The Holy Spirit brings back to
memory all that Jesus said, taught, and did
(see p. 231 above). The memory that has
thus far retained revelation is inadequate.

11. Man receives special revelation in a
once-for-all manner and not repeatedly.
Further, that reception is limited only to
the prophets and apostles. There is to be
no more revelation until the eschaton (see
pp. 83-84 above).

11. Man receives inspiration only during
the written transmission of revelation.
That reception, moreover, is limited only
to the prophets and apostles, and does not
continue to the present day even on a spo
radic basis (see pp. 47, 85 above; and GRA
4:154).
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Table 1—Continued.

12. Revelation comes unerringly in man's
own language (see pp. 77-79, 204 above).

12. Man is to write revelation in his own
language. Yet his sinful nature hinders
him from doing that unerringly.
Consequently, he has to depend completely
upon the Holy Spirit who in turn elevates,
influences, guides, and controls man in a
comprehensive fashion to the very words
used (see pp. 230-31 above).

one lacking the necessary qualifications for the task. During revelation (#4) man is
presented as one who functions independently and competently, whereas at the stage of
inspiration he is seen as passive and overwhelmingly dependent upon the Holy Spirit. In
revelation we see man engaging his will in the reception of revelation (#5); with it he can
choose either to accept or disregard revelation. He can decide to submit to its terms or
rebel against it. Man also uses his conscience (#6) in desceming the moral elements and
implications of revelation because by virtue of creation, he is inherently equipped to do
that.1 In fact, the moral voice of revelation is so clear to the conscience that the latter is left
with one of two choices: either to validate or suppress that voice. In inspiration, on the
other hand, neither the will nor the conscience is mentioned. The way the Holy Spirit deals
overwhelmingly with man could betray the possibility of a divine disregard of human
conscience and will, thus resulting in a violation of the human person where man is made to
be less in inspiration than what is acknowledged of him at the level of revelation.
^ e e pp. 201-03 above.
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Henry also points to the prepositional (verbal) nature of revelation (til) that enables
man to receive it. That is, revelation is divinely imparted in human speech or language,1
and man understands it just as he normally does in a conversation with another human
being. This means that in revelation man is God’s communication partner. Since man is
naturally equipped with linguistic and prepositional capacities and these are needed in
writing, it is expected that those faculties be equally used during inspiration. But such is
not the case. Rather, at this juncture, man is depicted as totally incapable of writing by
himself the truths of revelation without the comprehensive help of the Holy Spirit.
If revelation is heard in his own language and grasped by reason alone, why can it
not be expressed in written propositions on the basis of reason alone? If man can be trusted
to receive and convey revelation, can he not be relied upon to put in writing without having
to be superaaturally controlled all the way to words'f If man receives revelation
lSee pp. 204-05.
2Emphasis mine. In fairness to Henry, it must be acknowledged that he denies that
the Bible writers functioned as amanuenses and stenographers (see p. 228 above). That is,
Henry rejects a mechanical or dictational view of inspiration (see p. 106 above; see also
Henry, "The Chicago Statement on Biblical Inerrancy," 45). The question, however, is
whether he follows that through. For instance, how is one to understand Henry's emphasis
that the "verbal linguistic formulation" of Scripture is a result of the "pneumatic activity
and initiative of God" (see p. 234 above)? Or that both the thoughts and words of Scripture
are a divine creation, and product of God's breath (ibid.)? Or that despite the divine-human
confluence, both words and thoughts are a divine product? (see p. 235 above). Again, how
is one to regard his emphasis that the writers were guided by the Holy Spirit "in the choice
of the words they used" (see p. 234 above)? In fact, in one place Henry surmises the
modus operandi of inspiration as follows: "It could either be a safeguarding from error in
thought or word, or divine superintendence in the choice of words, or dictation or varied
combinations of these and other possibilities" (Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 77).
Does not such a presentation of the human part in inspiration betray some form of
a dictation? James Leo Garrett acknowledges that those who hold to verbal inspiration with
inerrancy cannot avoid the charge that they actually espouse the dictation theory of
inspiration (James Leo Garrett, Jr., Systematic Theology: Biblical, Historical, andEvangel-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

258
authoritatively, inerrantly, and propositionaily, and understands as well as remembers that
which has been revealed, it seems surprising that he is not allowed to communicate or
participate in an active and personally authentic manner in the origination of Scripture. I
grant that the mode of relation between human nature and function in revelation can be
different from that in inspiration because the activities are different. However, to portray
(in inspiration) a human being with a different nature, and ignore the potentially positive
contribution to writing by reason, memory, man's linguistic capacity, and the prepositional
as well as the cognitive transparency of revelation, is suspect.
Further, one may also grant that writing is not the same as speaking, one may not
always be able to execute the two with equal skill. Yet in view of the identity of content or
substance between revelation and inspiration,1 one questions if it is necessary for Henry to
draw such a sharp contrast between human nature and function in revelation and human
nature and function in inspiration. For instance, we know that in order to be a competent
writer one needs to: (1) understand the subject matter; (2) have an ability to retain it in his
memory, and (3) acquire an adequate command of the language in which that subject is to
be expressed. In our observation of man's nature and function in revelation, we find all the
above are clearly present in man, as shown by the fact that he (1) understands the message
ical, vol. 2 [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990], 117). Trembath, likewise, says that regard
less of what the advocates of verbal inspiration say, what they teach concerning inspiration
is in all respects dictational (Trembath, 189). After all, is not the writing down of words of
another person the essence of dictation? In such a situation the writer cannot claim author
ship for what he writes, nor a significant contribution to the product. Because of Henry's
emphasis on word inspiration, one then wonders with Trembath if he has fallen into an
evangelical camp that denies the word 'dictation' but not its effects (Trembath, 183).
‘See pp. 21-16 above.
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of revelation, (2) remembers it, and (3) elucidates or explains it to others. Whereas Henry
acknowledges the efficient, independent function of these human faculties in revelation, he
has not done so in his doctrine of inspiration.
In revelation man is depicted as one who has a mind or reason capable of recogniz
ing and comprehending the revealed truths (#8). His cognitive grasp of revelation is so
satisfactory that he is able to elucidate it.1 In inspiration, on the other hand, man needs the
Holy Spirit to help him with the understanding of revelation. The question is, what
happens during inspiration to human reasoning that was capably functioning in revelation?
Has something gone wrong with it so that man now needs the Holy Spirit to bring him the
comprehension? If human reason which is unaffected by sin can perform well in
revelation, must it not also remain unaffected by sin in inspiration and perform just as well?
It seems incongruous to point to man's sinfulness as cause for his inability to execute his
role competently in inspiration, and then at the same time stress his utter competence in
revelation because sin has not affected reason. Is it not possible that one faculty effective in
the task of grasping revelation could retain the same measure of aptitude for inspiration as
well?
The necessity for such a wide difference between the human role in revelation and
his role in inspiration is also questionable when viewed from Henry's emphasis on the
integral and unitary nature of man's being.2 How can the "awesome fact of human
‘See p. 208 above.
2See pp. 170-71 above.
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depravity"1 not have affected man's mind so that he does not need supernatural help in this
lucid understanding of revelation? Being the same person in both revelation and
inspiration, how can the individual portrayed in inspiration, as affected by sin and all its
defects, be barely affected by them during revelation so that he can grasp it inerrantly?
Does Henry's admission that the Fall affects the entirety of man’s being (his volition,
affection, and intellection/ not call for a similar help from the Holy Spirit during revelation
as during inspiration? The two tasks of grasping revelation and then communicating
it—either orally or in writing—are so closely tied together that one directly depends on the
other. To take the risk at the level of revelation and then to refuse to do the same at the
level of inspiration is misleading, at best.

Reasons for the Inconsistency of the Human Role
In order to be fair with Henry as well as help the reader understand how the
inconsistency in question could have come about, this section identifies some possible
reasons for the inconsistency. Since evaluating the reasons themselves goes beyond the
scope of this dissertation, I leave to the reader to judge for himself/herself whether those
reasons are indeed valid so as to justify Henry's discrepant depiction of the human role in
his doctrines of revelation and inspiration. In this instance, three reasons are suggested:
(1) a reaction to Karl Barth; (2) the inerrancy of written revelation or Scripture; and (3) the
authority of Scripture.
‘Henry, "Man’s Dilemma: Sin," 4.
2GRA 1:226.
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A Reaction to Karl Barth
We have noted that Henry presents his doctrines of revelation and inspiration with
an apologetic spirit. He does that in at least two ways: by showing the advantages of
espousing the evangelical view of revelation and inspiration, and by showing the dangers of
the Barthian teaching o f these doctrines.1 Since Henry's reaction to Barth is under
consideration, it is to this that I now turn.
Fackre pointed out that Henry's engagement with Barth's thought has been both
intensive and extensive.2 In some instances Barth is cited favorably, but in most cases, he
lSee pp. 160-64 above.
2Fackre, 592, n. 14; see also Mohler, Baptist Theologians, 524; Steven Mark
Hutchens, "Knowing and Being in the Context of the Fundamentalist Dilemma: A
Comparative Study of the Thought of Karl Barth and Carl F. H. Henry" (Th.D. diss.,
Lutheran School of Theology, 1989), 92; and notes 3 and 4, p. 93 above). For a concise
presentation of Henry's criticism and consequent rejection of Barth's theology, see Richard
Albert Mohler, Jr., "Evangelical Theology and Karl Barth: Representative Models of
Response" [Ph.D. diss., The Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1989], 116-134; but
for a mediating presentation of the same issue, see Cross, 108-17; see also the criticisms of
Henry's reading of Barth by James D. Smart, review of GRA 1 & 2, Theology Today 34
[July 1977]: 213; and Ramm, "Good Thinking!" 63).
Henry had met Barth in person. His first encounter with him turned out to be a
memorable one, not ju st for Henry himself but for the rest of those present with him that
evening of 1962, during the question-and-answer session with Karl Barth at George
Washington University. After having introduced himself as editor of Christianity Today,
Henry asked Barth whether the resurrection of Jesus Christ was newsworthy for the news
media. Piqued by the way the question was framed, Barth reacted: "Did you say
Christianity Today or Christianity Yesterday?" The 200 academicians and journalists
spontaneously responded with laughter. In response, Henry replied, "Yesterday, Today,
and Forever." More laughter broke out (see Carl F. H. Henry, "My Encounter with Karl
Barth," TSFBulletin 9 [May-June 1986]: 10; or Henry, Confessions, 211). His subsequent
meetings with Barth in Germany, however, were private and interview-like. For that
matter, Henry had also met Bultmann. Comparing the two, Henry said, "Whenever I
conversed with Karl Barth I had the clear sense that, however flawed was Barth's dialectical
theology, I was in the presence of a believer in the gospel. Bultmann, by contrast, had
demythologized the gospel, and seemed to lack the joy and buoyancy of Christian faith
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has been the target of Henry's criticism. In Henry's estimate, Barth is the one 20th-century
theologian responsible for and most influential in advocating irrational revelation and
disavowing propositional revelation.1 Henry also regards Barth as the "progenitor of the
advocates of secular Christianity which . . . abandons modern man to an empirical
scientism by denying that valid truths about God can be propositionally known. "2 Henry
likewise holds Barth responsible for the rejection of the Christian view of God by death-ofGod theologians.3 Without a doubt, the core of Henry's criticism pertains to Barth's
doctrine of revelation, which Henry sees as undermining evangelicalism.4 Acceptance of
Barthian or neoorthodox view of revelation calls for "a thoroughgoing transformation of
evangelical beliefs article by article. "5 Actually, in Henry's eyes, the entire neoorthodox or
dialectical theology poses a threat to evangelicalism, and Barth is at the very center as he is
its champion.6
Based on the above observation of Henry's attitude toward Barth, it seems that
Henry's stress on man's natural capability and readiness for receiving and conveying
revelation has been intensified by his reaction to Barth's stress on man's total corruption
(Henry, Confessions, 243-44, 248).
^ R A 5:365; GRA 3:466.
2Hutchens, 92.
3GRA 1:192.
“Mohler, Baptist Theologians, 524.
sHenry, Fifty Years, 37.
6GRA 1:188.
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and his natural inability to receive God's revelation or word.1 Barth's emphasis on man's
epistemic discontinuity with God and his subsequent natural unpreparedness for revelation2
is countered by man's readiness for revelation in Henry. The human incapability to hear
and receive God's revelation and Word3 leads Barth to stress divine preparation of man by
furnishing him with the gifts of faith and grace so that he can be ready for the revelatory
encounter with God.4 Thus, it is God who creates the conditions in man who makes the
experience of revelation possible.5 By pointing to the will, conscience, reasoning power,
linguistic capacity, and memory as avenues through which man capably receives as well as
conveys God's revelation, Henry indicates that he outrightly rejects Barth's doctrine of
man, let alone his portrayal of the human role in revelation and inspiration. So whereas
Barth emphasizes complete human passivity and incompetency in revelation, Henry
underscores human competency and active involvement in the phenomenon.
When it comes to inspiration, however, Barth's depiction of the human role is one
characterized by freedom and intense involvement. Man is free to write whatever he
understands about the revelatory encounter. He can use all the resources at his command.
However, because what he writes is only a human witness to revelation,6 that witness is
‘See pp. 154 above; see also note 1, p. 239 above.
2See pp. 154-55 above.
3CD 1/1, 191-93 (ET, 1975 ed.).
4See note 7, p. 155 above, note 1, p. 239 above.
5See note 1, p. 239 above.
6CD 1/2, 463. Although the Bible is only a witness to revelation,yet because
revelation is the content of the witness, the Bible is therefore indissolublyunited with
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naturally bound to be imperfect and fallible, containing perhaps historical, scientific, and
theological errors, as well as contradictions and overlappings that are likely to offend and
put off a modem reader.1 In Henry, on the other hand, God does not allow man to
inscripturate revelation on his own. To give him that freedom would be too risky. It
would result in transferring some of his own weaknesses and errors into Scripture and
thereby lose its purity, credibility, and subsequently, its authority. Hence, during the
writing process, sinful and erring man needs to be prepared for the task and placed directly
under the Spirit's influence, control, and supervision. This superintendence extends even
to the choice of words. Thus, Barth's portrayal of man during the writing of Scripture as a
free, active, but erring writer is changed in Henry to one who is a totally dependent,
passive, Spirit-controlled, and error-protected writer.
The above scenario indicates that Henry's portrayal of man in revelation seems to
harmonize more with Barth's depiction of man's role in inspiration where both emphasize
man's active and independent participation. However, viewed from a consideration of
consistency of the depiction of the human role, Barth can be said to be more consistent than
Henry because the former still maintains man's defectiveness at both levels of revelation
revelation which cannot be had or apprehended apart from its witness (ibid.). As such,
Barth also holds that the Bible can become the Word of God and when that takes place the
Bible is also at that juncture the Word of God (ibid., 502). To identify the Bible at face
value as the Word of God or revelation is not appropriate for Barth because he sees it as
doing away with the free grace by which the Bible becomes the Word of God. The Bible
becomes the word of God not because of its words but because of God's action, decision,
and work through it (ibid., 522-23, 516).
‘CD 1/2, 501, 507, 509-10. Pinnock observes that although Barth speaks of errors
and contradictions in the Bible, yet he did that only in principle. In practice he treated
Scripture as inerrant (see Pinnock, "Three Views of the Bible," 37).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

265
and inspiration. Man is so corrupt and defective that he is hardly ready or naturally
qualified for revelation. This is also his situation during inspiration. What he writes
reflects human shortcomings and limitations so that Scripture is ridden with errors and
contradictions.1
Henry, on the other hand, has not maintained this consistency about the human role
in revelation and inspiration. In revelation, man is depicted as independent, competent, and
ready for the unerring reception and communication of revelation, but in inspiration this
very man is presented as one totally unqualified and unprepared so that the only way he can
perform the task satisfactorily is by means of a prior, divinely orchestrated preparation and
training, and the Holy Spirit’s taking control of man through supernatural influence,
guidance, and supervision during writing. In so portraying the human role in inspiration,
Henry has, at the same time, failed to maintain a unified view of human nature.
The question is whether or not Henry's inconsistency could have arisen from his
apologetical zeal and burden. That is, could the human role presented by Henry be a result
of an overreaction to Karl Barth's doctrines of revelation, man, and Scripture? Could
Henry's attempt to rescue man from Barth's consignment of him to total depravity and
hence moral unaccountability2 have led Henry to emphasize man's independent, competent,
‘By emphasizing Scripture as a human product Barth feels that he is trying to save
Scripture from those who make it a docetic document and a "paper Pope" (CD 1/2, 525).
2Stress on man's total depravity implies man's total inability to respond to God and
his revelation. In such a situation man can be saved only through God's arbitrary action.
Henry sees Barth as emphasizing precisely this. Salvation for man comes not on the basis
of a response to God’s grace, but on the eternal covenant of reconciliation made between
God the Father and God the Son before creation and the Fall (CD IV/1, 22-34, 290-92).
This leads Henry to conclude that Barth is an advocator of universalism or salvation of
every human being irrespective of his/her relationship to Christ. Henry rejects this
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and inerrant reception of revelation and, hence, man's answerability before God?1 Or, is
the inconsistency also caused by Henry's overzealous attempt to save Scripture from
Barth's reduction of it to a mere human and fallible witness to revelation? And is not the
rejection of the Barthian view of revelation partly influential for Henry's description of man
as one who is detached, passive, greatly dependent upon, and controlled by the Holy Spirit
so that what he wrote is inerrant, objective revelation?
While the above questions suggest a connection between the inconsistency under
question and Henry's overreaction to Barth's doctrines of revelation, inspiration, and man,
yet we cannot rest the case just on this. The most we can say is that the connection is a
possibility or perhaps even a probability. Two other reasons seem to bear more directly on
the inconsistency: (1) inerrancy of Scripture and (2) authority of Scripture.

Inerrancy of Scripture
We have noted that inspiration (in Henry) is the divinely chosen means by which
revelation is written down. The need of inspiration for inscripturation of revelation
strongly points to the importance of revelation itself. The value of revelation for man is so
enormous that it needs to be carefully preserved. This is done in two ways: (1) the oral
form of revelation is converted into a written one in the form of Scripture;2 and (2) the
teaching because for him salvation is based on an individual basis which is further based on
personal repentance and faith in Jesus Christ (Henry, "The Road to Eternity," 26, 36, 38;
idem, Frontiers, 70; see also note 2, p. 172 above, pp. 174, 180, 184 above).
^ e e pp. 62, 64, 85-86, 106 above.
2Henry recognizes that much of revelation was formerly in oral form. This includes
Christ’s instruction to his disciples (GRA 4:32, 38). But oral tradition apart from the
written one would, over several generations, experience change and corruption and lose its
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conversion was executed under inspiration because that alone can safeguard the writer from
transporting error into Scripture. In other words, the need for an inerrantly written
revelation or Scripture calls for inspiration of the writer and especially his words.
Inerrancy is therefore an implication of inspiration.1 In fact, it is implicitly taught, logically
deduced, and a necessary correlate of Scripture as the inspired Word of God.2
When Henry refers to inerrancy he means that Scripture in whole and in its parts3 is
free from all falsehood, mistake, or error.4 This absence of error, however, is not to be
understood in terms of a scientific precision and exactitude in measurements, facts, or
wording of a quotation. Rather, inerrancy means that Scripture speaks truthfully in
religious and moral questions as well as in statistical, historical, and geographical matters.5
For instance, Henry argues that if geographical and historical details in Scripture are untrue
then there is no reason why the events or doctrines correlated with them should be true.6 If
proper normative function (GRA 4:32). A written Scripture, on the other hand, is less
likely to face such a misfortune. Scripture is also advantageous because it provides the
safest objective apparatus for the church to test the consistency or nonconsistency of
heretical teachings and philosophical speculations (ibid., 32). Moreover, "the mobile
missionary nature of apostolic church extension required that the content of apostolic
teaching be in written form if it was to be known as widely as possible" (ibid., 33, 38).
Revelation objectified as a written document will survive long after the author is dead.
‘GRA 4:193; Henry in Michaelson and Wallis, 27.
2GRA 4:168.
3GRA 4:133.
4See p. 113 above.
SGRA 4:178, 181, 183, 205, 207, 229; see also p. 113 above.
6GRA 4:178.
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we doubt the statistical details of the Bible we likewise have no sound basis to determine
that Stephen, or the apostles, or Moses and the prophets sought to tell the truth factually in
other respects.1 Hence, if error is admitted in one area of Scripture, there is no guarantee
that one's inclination will cease from looking for errors in some other areas of Scripture.
Consequently, epistemological uncertainty, frustration, and instability are likely the result,2
and one's confidence in, as well as efficacy of, the Bible itself is undermined.3 Therefore
Henry agrees with Lindsell who holds that if inspiration allows for a possibility of error
‘Ibid., 181. "If error permeated the original, we would never under any circum
stances arrive at an inerrantly authoritative text but only at an older one" (ibid., 241), and
that would not bring us any nearer to the truth of God (ibid., 240). Inerrancy of the
originals is also mandatory for Henry because without that quality there is no way of
verifying the corruption of the text brought about by the alleged discrepancy of the copies
(ibid.). That is, only inerrant originals can help us establish an error in the copy (ibid.,
239). If copies and originals are alike errant, then there is no means by which the church
can distinguish truth from error. In such a situation, the church is predisposed to tout its
particular version of Scripture as more superior than the original (ibid., 241). By the same
token, there is also no basis why one text should be preferred over the other (GRA 2:14).
Moreover, to oppose the notion of inerrant inspired Scripture is to "destroy the objective
truth of the Christian religion, trivialize theology, and lead finally to skepticism" (GRA
4:193). Without inerrancy, one is hard put to ascertain whether the Bible is speaking the
truth without mixture of uncertainty and doubt (Henry, Capital Baptist; GRA 4:234, 23940); or whether there is an identity of meaning between the copies and the originals (GRA
2:14). In Henry's opinion, then, if the doctrine of inerrancy is set aside, errancy is readily
correlated with much broader spheres of conflict (GRA 4:178).
2GRA4:178; see also Henry, "Boundary Disputes," 25, where Henry implicitly
suggests inerrancy as a necessary factor for epistemic stability in theology. Without
inerrancy, evangelicalism could pass on from evolution, to revolution, and, finally, to
devolution (see also Henry in Michaelson and Wallis, 27).
3GRA 4:188, 249. Henry's argument is that in the event of Scripture losing its
efficacy, it also loses its authority. But since efficacy depends on inerrancy, then authority
likewise depends on inerrancy.
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then it is not inspiration at all.1 For the same reason he also approvingly endorses John
Wesley who said: "If there be one falsehood in the Book, it did not come from the God of
Truth. "2 So when Francis L. Patton suggested that it would be self-disastrous to press for
detailed inerrancy of the Bible because it takes but one error to destroy one's confidence in
its inspiration, Henry quips: "How often can God err and be God?"3 The God of truth
cannot lie and thereby cannot inspire error.4 Only inerrant inspiration can ensure freedom
*GRA 4:191. Since Scripture has no error of any kind, Henry accordingly disallows
the notion of limited inerrancy. He cites some examples of the consequential difficulties
that would arise by accepting partial or limited inerrancy. For instance, Beegle and
Marxsen's denial of the resurrection as being essential to salvation implies the questioning
of Paul's authority who holds to the indispensability of Christ's resurrection for man's
salvation (1 Cor 15:17). Likewise, Bloesch's shift from inerrancy to the inner testimony of
the Spirit and the self-revelation of Jesus Christ leads to subjectivism, so that "no objective
reason can be adduced for challenging those who choose instead to orient life to the
spiritual perspective of the Koran or Zen, or for that matter of atheism and irreligion."
Ridderbos's limitation of inerrancy to the ethico-religious and salvific, to the exclusion of
the scientific and theological, presents a difficulty in ascertaining whether or not the ethicoreligious ever permeates the scientific-theological; or whether or not salvific efficacy of
Scripture can be correlated with an erroneous text. If the salvific purpose is achieved in
spite of its erroneous theologico-scientific teaching, then is not salvation only an existential,
internal event "unrelated to definite doctrinal conceptions?" Further, the reducing of
inerrancy only to the religio-ethical teaching of the Bible might also result in giving up all
those teachings that do not conform to this rule. It might present a problem of determining
the precise point at which to draw the line of demarcation between the relevant and the
irrelevant. Similarly, Berkouwer's limitation of inerrancy to the teleological, namely,
Scripture's testimony or witness to Jesus Christ, regards propositional inerrancy as being
irrelevant to this testimony. In that case "no sound reason remains for understanding
'testimony' 'to ' or 'Christ' in any objectively uniform or intelligible sense." This includes
the biblical testimony to Christ on which Berkouwer himself insists (see GRA 4:186-90).
2GRA 4:191.
3GRA 4:192-93.
4GRA 4:192-93. It appears obvious that Henry begins the doctrines of inspiration
and inerrancy with his doctrine of God (GRA 3:428, 406).

Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

270
of Scripture from "all falsehood or mistake and so safeguards the truth that Holy Scripture
is entirely true and trustworthy in all its assertions."1
Furthermore, if inspiration is a divine activity, then it necessarily participates in the
divine character of perfection.2 Henry puts this syllogistically as follows: "God does not
err, God inspired Scripture, therefore Scripture is inerrant."3 In fact, it is precisely on the
point of inerrancy of Scripture that Henry tells us why it is important for the Holy Spirit to
exert overwhelming control and supervision over the prophets and apostles—even with
respect to the use of words—during writing. Only by that manner of supernatural monitor
ing of human nature and operation can Scripture be expected to be error-free. When
human nature and function are thus superintended by supernatural control, man cannot
therefore be expected to be active or independent during the inscripturation of revelation.
Thus, the man that we see at the revelation stage as active, competent, and independent is
transformed at the inspiration stage to one who is passive, inadequate, and dependent.
lGRA 4:217, emphasis mine.
2GRA 4:166. In this connection, Henry does not object to Barr’s correlation of an
inerrant Bible—which Barr readily debunks—with God's perfection. What Henry
disapproves of is Barr's refusal to accept it as such. In Henry's eyes, it would mean that
Barr would then have to choose one of the three possible alternatives: an errant Scripture
which God did not inspire; an inerrant Scripture which God inspires; or an errant Scripture
inspired by a God who is less than perfect. Unfortunately, "Barr opts for the last and worst
of the options" (ibid.). This correlation of inerrancy with God’s perfection is obviously
arrived at through deduction, and not induction, which Henry admits to be the case, and in
this instance, even criticizes induction in favor of deduction (see ibid., 172-174). "If all
doctrines of the Christian religion were suspended on empirical considerations, then all the
basic theological affirmations of the Bible would dangle indecisively in suspense" (ibid.,
185).
3GRA 4:185.
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Authority of Scripture
The other possible reason for this inconsistency of the human role seems to come
from Henry's conviction of the unquestioned authority of Scripture. According to him, the
ultimate purpose of inspiration and inerrancy is that both serve as a foundation for the
authority of Scripture, which is its primary function.1 Therefore Scripture's first claim
‘Inspiration and inerrancy expressively serve to warrant the Bible’s authority.
Scripture is authoritative because it is inspired. Henry says: "The Christian apostles
affirmed not only the divine authority of Scripture but also its supernatural inspiration.
Any repudiation of divine inspiration as a property of the biblical text they would have
considered an attack on the authority of Scripture. In their view Scripture is authoritative,
because divinely inspired, and as such, is divine truth" (GRA 4:68). "While the authority
and the inspiration of the Bible are distinguishable doctrines, they are nonetheless
correlative. The Bible is authoritative because the revealer of divine truth and redemptive
grace authorized selected spokesmen to communicate his specially disclosed Word to
mankind. These authoritative spokesmen, however, affirm their message to be Godbreathed [inspired], that is, given by the Spirit through them" (GRA 4:71). This direct
correlation of scriptural authority with inspiration means that, for Henry, no solid doctrine
of biblical authority will long survive if the doctrine of scriptural inspiration is truncated or
dismissed (GRA 4:71). The two—inspiration and authority—are inextricably linked together
(Henry, The God Who Shows, 84). So, although authority is Scripture's primary emphasis,
yet inspiration is not to be left behind because "the notion of an authoritative word . . . that
isn't inspired, is out of view" (Henry in Michaelson and Wallis, 27). According to Henry,
the emphasis then falls first on biblical authority, followed by the Bible's inspiration (Henry
in Michaelson and Wallis, 27).
However, we must also not forget that for Henry inspiration means inerrant
inspiration (emphasis mine). In his view, there is no such thing as inspired and errant
Scripture. Such a view is Orwellian double-talk (Henry, "Who Are the Evangelicals?" 80).
What God inspires has to be inerrant (Carl F. H. Henry, "The Bible and the Conscience of
Our Age," Journal o f Evangelical Theological Society 25 [December 1982]: 403). Because
Henry makes an immediate and definite connection between inspiration and inerrancy, he is
also able to state that biblical authority implies inerrancy (Henry in Comfort, 20; Henry,
Evangelicals in Search, 54). Conversely, what is errant cannot be divinely authoritative
(GRA 4:192). Henry's position is therefore clear: it is only by safeguarding the doctrine of
inerrancy that one can safeguard the authority of Scripture (ibid., 192-93).
Therefore Scripture is either errant, uninspired, and unauthoritative; or inerrant,
inspired, and authoritative. Thus, one can maintain the full and final authority of Scripture
only to the extent that one is willing to admit its detailed inerrancy. If authority is to be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

272
about itself is authority. This claim also comprises the "forefront" of apostolic
proclamation and kerygma.1 "My conviction is that the first thing the Bible says about
itself is not its inerrancy or inspiration but its authority."2
However important the fact of divine inspiration is for the commanding importance of
the Bible, the aposdes like the prophets before them focus attention first and foremost
not on the inspiration and inerrancy of Scripture but rather on its authority: what is
crucially important for the human race is that they speak God's Word not their own.3
based on truthfulness of content, then its content must necessarily be inerrant. Only logical
imprecision can begin with errancy and conclude with divine authority (ibid., 192). So,
Henry rhetorically asks: "Can we associate divine authority with anything less than verbal
inerrancy?" (GRA 4:162). If detailed inerrancy is not part of Scripture then any attempt to
maintain the truthfulness of any one aspect of Scripture is done not out of a regard for
consistency, but "solely by the act of will" (Henry, Conversations, 25; idem, Evangelicals
in Search o f Identity, 55; idem, review of The Battle fo r the Bible, by Harold Lindsell, The
New Review o f Books and Religion 1 [September 1976]: 8). However, Henry does not
agree with Lindsell that only those who hold to the doctrine of inerrancy are real
evangelicals (Henry, review of The Battle fo r the Bible, 7).
In this case we see Henry making two important statements: 1. There is no
correlation between errancy and authority because the two are mutually incompatible and
exclusive. "To affirm the errancy of the text but to insist on the divine authority and
reliability of the Bible requires one to impose upon the notion of biblical authority ' the
death of a thousand qualifications'" (GRA 4:181); 2. Inspiration necessarily implies
inerrancy. "If one accepts 'plenary' divine inspiration of Scripture . . . the doctrine of
biblical authority doubtless implies 'inerrancy* of the content" (Henry in Comfort, 20). "If
the Bible is the Word of God it is inerrant; what is errant obviously cannot be the Word of
God" (Carl F. H. Henry and others, Spectrum o f Protestant Beliefs, ed. Robert Campbell
[Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing, 1968], 31).
‘GRA 4:27.
2Henry, Conversations, 24; see also GRA 4:41.
3GRA 4:41.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

273
In order to have a better grasp of Henry's stress on the primary function of
Scripture as authority,4 we need to take note of the following logical steps that leads him to
this conclusion: (1) the authority of God; (2) the authority of revelation; and (3) the
authority of Jesus Christ and of Scripture.

Authority of God
By virtue of being the creator and sustainer of all things,2 God alone is obviously
the source of all power and authority. He is the Potter and is free to do whatever he wills
with the clay of his creation. He is sovereign in creation and history.3 Every form of
authority is derived from him.4 This includes the authority of human governments, angels,
the antichrist, and Satan5 who, although he exercises and imparts limited power and
authority on earth, does so only within the defining bounds of God's sovereign will and
purpose.6 Since God is man's creator, man is ultimately answerable to God. By virtue of
being the creator and sustainer, God therefore wields legitimate and final authority, and
man is expected to submit to God's sovereignty. Hence, claims for the authority of
lPinnock also observes that Henry's main aim is to contend for the authority of the
Bible above every other form of authority (Pinnock, Tracking the Maze, 46-48).
2Henry in Comfort, 13-14; Henry, Spectrum, 9.
3GRA 4:8; GRA 5:11-12; GRA 2:24-26. God's sustaining power is expressed by
Henry as "the God who stays." "Were it not for his staying power, man and the world
would crumble into dust and disappear into nothingness" (GRA 5:17).
4GRA 4:24, 216.
5Ibid., 24-25.
6Ibid.
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revelation and Scripture are therefore significant and legitimate only if they can be shown
that they are a direct extension of his own authority.

Authority of Revelation
Henry asserts that one of the tragedies of the fall of man was his choice to rebel
against God's will and authority and assert self-rule and self-determination. It is this act of
revolt that constitutes man's sin.1 The assertion of human authority against God's authority
is also seen when man sets up his varying religious and philosophical systems in lieu of
God and his provision. These include communism, evolutionism, humanism, scientism,
naturalism, contingency, variableness, relativism, etc.2 In the event of accepting any of
these authorities, man also consciously and actively repudiates divine absolutes, revealed
truths, scriptural commandments, fixed principles, and supernatural purpose, and regards
them as challengers to his own autonomy and creativity.3
The question, however, is whether man can actually shut off God and his authority
from his life? Henry thinks that although man has tried to do that, yet the reality of the
living, sovereign, and authority-wielding God is known through his reason, conscience,
nature, and history; that is, through general revelation.4 Accordingly, man is without
excuse. In other words, no matter what modem man thinks of God, his reality and
authority still invade and haunt him. The fact that God gave up the unruly, wanton, and
^ e e note 4, p. 171 above; see also Henry, Spectrum, 41; GRA 4:11.
2GRA 4:8-10.
3Ibid., 10, 23.
4Ibid., 12-13.
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immoral pagans to a debased mind and improper conduct (Rom 1:28) attests his punitive
judgment against the ungodly generation that repudiates his authority.1 Besides general
revelation, God’s authority is also manifested through special revelation in Jesus Christ and
Scripture.2 In these two forms of authority God manifests himself as the transcendent
sovereign positioned at the crossroad of human civilization and destiny.3

Authority of Jesus Christ and of Scripture
The question that arises at this juncture is one concerning the relationship between
the authority of God, of Jesus Christ, and of Scripture. Henry explains the connection as
follows: God invested Jesus Christ with unlimited power and authority.4 Christ in turn
shared his authority with the prophets and apostles/disciples.s Later, he authorized them to
put down his instructions, teaching, and will into written Scripture that functions as decisive
authority for faith and practice.6 This order of divine authority from God, to Christ, and to
Scripture has also been stated thus: "The church recognizes no ultimate authority but that of
the true and living God, incarnate in Jesus Christ, known to us as Lord by the Holy Spirit,
who has inspired chosen men and inscripturated God's purposes intelligibly in the sacred
lIbid., 13.
2Ibid.; see also pp. 70, 98, 163 above.
3GRA 4:13.
“Ibid., 36.
sIbid., 27. For an elaboration of the transference of authority as described above,
see also ibid., 29-30.
6Ibid., 27. According to Henry, all the historic confessions had affirmed the
authority of Scripture (ibid., 17).
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canonical writings."1 This statement points to two significant dimensions of divine
authority: (1) the unity or synonymity of God's authority and Christ's authority; and (2) the
objective and/or material expression of this divine authority in inscripturated form.
Because Christ had delegated his word and authority to the apostles as the
authorized spokespersons and interpreters of his life, words, and mission,2 Henry sees little
need and justification for making a differentiation between the authority of what they had
written (i.e., the Bible) with and that of Christ’s. First of all, the reliability of Scriptural
assertions is attested by the incarnate Christ; second, Scripture is, in fact, the only source
of significant information we have regarding Christ's person, work, and authority, as well
as his impartation of authority to his apostles.3 Hence, the difference between Christ's
word and the word of Scripture is only in terms of one being the "living Word" and the
other the "written W ord.”4 Otherwise, the authority of Christ and that of Holy Scripture
lHenry, "What Is Christianity?" 113.
2GRA 4:38.
3Ibid., 50-51, 157, 27. Henry does acknowledge that the primary concerns of
Scriptures are theological and ethical, or faith and practice, with Jesus as the center (GRA
3:208; GRA 4:43), and hence, Christological in focus (GRA 4:60). Apart from the Bible,
we cannot know anything about Jesus Christ, or about the necessity of faith in him (ibid.,
203). But this does not mean that Scriptures give life; they witness to Jesus Christ, the life
(GRA 3:31). They reveal Christ (Henry, Protestant Dilemma, 82). However, Henry also
cautions that Scripture should not be reduced to Christology, because in so doing, we
"marginalize the rest and compress and limit the divine disclosure" (GRA 4:60; GRA
3:208). A limited or selective use of Scripture is strongly objected to by Henry because he
thinks that it "makes a mockery of divine revelation" and robs its "revelational
significance" (GRA 6:57, 74).
4GRA 4:216, 203.
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are one, together coalescing into a single fount of authority.1 Consequently, Henry
attempts to underscore the finality and binding authority of the Bible, insisting that it should
be regarded as if Jesus Christ had spoken, because its content was mediated by Christ
himself.2
For Henry, then, final authority for the church's faith and life resides in the Bible,
not in any subsequent authority or tradition alongside or outside of the Bible; not even the
councils of the early church had such authority.3 "In and by Scripture alone, the divine
‘Ibid., 217.
2Ibid., 37. "The Logos is the mediating agent of all divine disclosure both to and in
created reality. The Logos, or Christ the eternal Son, is the agent in divine revelation
given not only in created reality, both in nature and mankind, but also in the historical
manifestation of Jesus of Nazareth, and in the yet future eschatological revelation when
Christ returns in glory" (GRA 3:206).
3GRA 4:39. Henry's emphasis on an objective biblical text as the basis of authority
for the church leads him to an unsparing criticism of functional authority of the Bible as
espoused by men like David Kelsey, James Barr, and Jack Rogers. Henry views the notion
to be a product of theologization and not something which naturally comes out of Scripture,
or in accord with the way Bible writers use the Bible. Nor is the functional authority of the
Bible accepted by the traditional or orthodox church (ibid., 95). Henry considers that those
who use the Bible only as a functional authority are devising a "sophisticated way of
evading the role of Scripture as an epistemic criterion for doctrines and morals" (ibid., 10).
"The functional approach can supply no objective criterion for distinguishing Jehovah
Witnesses, Swedenborgians, Mormons or so-called Christian Buddhists from the New
Testament church" (ibid., 95). "A merely 'functional authority’ yield no directions
concerning what theology is or how it is to be done, and supplies no criterion for
commending or criticizing how others conceive and do it" (ibid.). "No fixed meaning
survives for any doctrine whatever if the functional premise is to be consistently applied”
(ibid.). "[The functional use of Bible] can provide no objective reasons why any portion of
Scripture ought to sustain a living experience of God in Jesus Christ, or why such a living
experience is to be found in Jesus Christ alone, or even that God . . . truly lives.
Evangelical Christianity rightly emphasizes that the Bible functions as it does in human life
because there is persuasive evidence for the ontological reality of God, for the authority of
the Bible as divinely inspired Scripture, and for Jesus of Nazareth as the Messiah of the Old
Testament promise. Had liberalism and neoorthodoxy alike remained faithful to these
verities, they would not have gone the way o f all rubbish" (ibid., 101; italics supplied).
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exousia, God’s authority and power, authorizes God’s people to withstand any derivative
and conditional authority that contravenes what God requires.

It is only when the Bible is

accepted as "the sole rule of faith” that Christ himself is preserved as the head of the
church.2 Christ rules or exercises his headship over the church3 by or through Scripture.
By means of Scripture he imparts authoritative truth, issues authoritative commands, and
imposes an authoritative norm by which all church pronouncements and theology must be
shaped and corrected.4 Hence, no ancient tradition, or papal power, or megachurch
structure should take the place of the Bible. Such was the stand of the prophets and
aposdes, the historic church, and the Protestant Reformers,5 and the present church is to
follow likewise.6 In fact, being God's full and final revelation, the universal truth-claim of
‘Ibid., 40.
2Ibid., 17.
3Ibid., 259. "The church is neither the locus of divine revelation, nor the source of
divine inspiration, nor a seat of infallibility. Rather, the church has the task of
transmitting, translating, and expounding the prophetic-apostolic Scriptures" (GRA 2:15).
"The Holy Scripture is the authority of God in the church, the authority of Christ in the
church, the authority of the Holy Spirit in the church, the authority of the propheticapostolic revelation in the church" (Henry in Gaebelein, 12; see also ibid., 10-11, where
Henry asserts that God's authority is expressed through the Bible).
4William C. G. Procter, quoted in GRA 4:39; GRA 4:15; GRA 4:42, 48; Carl F. H.
Henry, "Committing Seminaries to the Word of God," Christianity Today, 13 February
1976, 9. If the Bible is not taken as divine authority then it has no absolute authority. It
might as well be understood as "coming from the church, and the church might be disposed
to revised it. On the other hand, if the Bible is taken as divine authority, then it opens up
for the possibility of reformation in the church" (Henry in Gaebelein, 12).
5GRA 4:48.
6Ibid., 48, 380. "The fate of the Bible is the fate of Christianity" (Henry,
Evangelicals at the Brink, 13, 16; see also idem, Christian Countermoves, 28). "Destroy
confidence in the Bible and you destroy Christianity” (Henry, quoted in Sharp, 83).
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the Bible should actually be exerted upon the mind and conscience of all humankind.1 All
things should be brought under the authority of the Bible.2
lHenry, "The Priority of Divine Revelation," 78; Henry, "American Evangelicals in
a Turning Time," 44. Note: The overriding emphasis of Henry in this article is the finality
of Scripture, based on the assumption of its being a product of God's transcendent
revelation (see ibid., 41-49).
Henry is also convinced that Western civilization and the rest of the world's
civilizations find their endurance and felicity only by accepting the biblical presuppositions
and worldview as their basis of operation and anchorage (see note 1, p. 87 above; GRA
4:23). "Take warning, America: to lose this Book is not simply to lose a light, but the
Light, God's lamp to our feet, God's light on our pathway" (Henry, Faith at the Frontiers,
73; see also Miller, iii). Miller also pointed out that Henry joined Christopher Dawson,
Richard Weaver, and Reinhold Niebuhr in a "cultural critique that views the societal
rejection of Christian theology and ethics as disastrous" for the future of America as well as
Western civilization as a whole (ibid.). According to White's observation, Henry's thesis
of the dependence of Western civilization's well-being on biblical theism is a perpetuation
of the conviction of Peter Marshall, David Manuel and Francis A. Schaeffer (see White,
pp. 29-30).
2Henry, Evangelicals at the Brink, 15-16. Although traditionally, the Bible used to
enjoy final authority among Protestant churches, yet with the passage of time it no longer is
given that status. Henry traces the erosion of its authority to several factors, one of which
is biblical criticism. As Henry sees it, biblical criticism is antipathetic to the traditional
high view of Scripture and views it as simply a fallible witness (GRA 4:17). "If one asks,
what, in a word, eclipses the biblical doctrine of inspiration of Scripture, what stimulated
theological redefinition of inspiration in nonconceptual or existential categories, and what
encouraged neo-Protestant denial of inspiration as a decisive New Testament concept, the
answer is modem biblical criticism" (ibid., 75-76). "Any objective reading of the data will
trace to the hydra-headed modem phenomenon of biblical criticism the spirited assaults on
the doctrines of the inspiration and authority of the Bible affirmed throughout Christian
centuries by all major groups in their confessions of faith" (ibid., 76). In view of its
unsympathetic and negative publicity of the Bible, biblical criticism works toward the
deterioration of Scripture's claim to inspiration and as such, is "destructive" to the
Christian cause (Henry, "Who Are the Evangelicals?" 80; see also idem, "Henry: New 'on
God' Is Man Come of Age," interview by Art Troalston, Jackson Daily News, YJ February
1979, B-Sat., Special Collections; see also GRA 4:77-80, where Henry points to linguistic
and archaeological discoveries as evidences that weaken and blunt the conclusions of
biblical criticism).
Other factors that undermine the authority of the Bible are: (1) Pluralistic theology
as espoused by neo-Protestantism and ecumenism is responsible in undermining the
normativity of Scripture (GRA 4:17). Pluralism refers to "a metaphysical theory that there
are more than one or more than two kinds of ultimate reality" (WTNID, s.v. "Pluralism").
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The above sketch clearly underscores Henry's conviction that authority is the
primary function o f Scripture. It has also been pointed out that even inspiration and
inerrancy serve to promote the authority of Scripture.1 However, Scripture is authoritative
because it is inspired; and likewise it is authoritative because it is inerrant.2 In the case of
Henry, however, inspiration is largely understood in terms of inerrancy. Accordingly,
inerrancy has been singled out as a reason for the disharmonious depiction of the human
role in revelation as compared to inspiration. However, since inerrancy subserves
authority, it can also be stated that authority is actually the cause for this discrepancy.
Nevertheless, the relationship of authority to the discrepancy or inconsistency of the human
role is mediate, not immediate as is inerrancy.

Summary Conclusion
This chapter has engaged in evaluating Carl F. H. Henry's portrayal of the human
role in his doctrines of revelation and inspiration. It begins by showing the importance of
expecting consistency in Henry's portrayal of the human role within his doctrines of
According to William James, an early advocate of pluralism of this century, "ultimate
reality exists distributively, as numerous qualitatively different ultimate "eaches," only one
of which is God." Pluralism also points to a "tolerant attitude in which varying views are
acceptable" (see Beacon Dictionary of Theology [1983], s.v. "Pluralism"); (2) The decision
of the U.S. Supreme Court (Schempp) prohibits the Bible from being used as a divine
authority, and limits it only to a literary and historical source (ibid., 18). In this way the
role of the Bible in public life and affairs has been effectively curved and undermined;
(3) Modem scientism's adoption of naturalistic presuppositions marginalize the supernatural
in the Bible; (4) Philosophical speculations led by Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, and Kant
undermine the theistic explanation of reality (ibid., 19-20).
‘See note 1, p. 271 above.
2Ibid.
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revelation and inspiration. The chapter also clarifies the use of nature and function as the
criteria of evaluation. By means of comparison and contrast of man's role in revelation
with his role in inspiration we were shown that, in Henry, nature and function of man in
revelation do not correspond with nature and function of man in inspiration. In other
words, Henry's portrayal of the two roles lacks consistency.
In ensuring objectivity and fairness with Henry, the chapter also seeks to understand
why Henry portrays the human role in inspiration so discordantly with the one he presents
in revelation. Three reasons were submitted—all of which are tied to his apologetical
concerns: a reaction to Karl Barth, Henry's stress on inerrancy of Scripture, and his similar
emphasis on biblical authority. The first reason attracted our attention because in his
exposition of the doctrines of revelation, Barth has often been under attack. It was felt that
the inconsistency could be a result of his overreaction to Barthian doctrines of revelation,
man,1 and Scripture. However, it has been pointed out that although such a suggestion is
informed and reasonable, yet no direct link has been found between the inconsistency and
Henry's reaction to Barth. Nevertheless, rather than rule out the connection, it is felt that it
can be regarded as a real possibility.
The question of inerrancy is another reason which has also been explored. This is
an unavoidable consideration because of the fact that Henry links directly the Holy Spirit's
influence, control, and superintendency with inerrancy, and thereby indirectly portraying
man at inspiration level as one poorly equipped so that he needed a lot of supernatural help-a depiction which is quite different from the one given in revelation. Authority was
‘See pp. 163-65 above.
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presented as another reason for the inconsistency. This suggestion was considered
important because Henry sees authority as the primary function of Scripture. He makes
this clear when he says that Scripture's first claim about itself is not inspiration nor
inerrancy but authority.1 However, we also noted that Henry makes inspiration and,
particularly, inerrancy the basis of Scripture's authority.2 Inerrancy is the focal point
because of the fact that Henry would not consider Scripture inspired unless inerrancy is
assumed as a necessary implicate or corollary of inspiration. This means that inspiration
should be construed in terms of inerrancy. But he also says that inerrancy subserves
Scripture's authority. That being the case, the inconsistency directly connected with
inerrancy can also be seen as being actually motivated by a greater agenda, namely, his
campaign for biblical authority.
Thus far we have completed the evaluation of Carl F. H. Henry's portrayal of the
human role in his doctrines of revelation and inspiration. Chapter 7 summarizes the entire
study of this dissertation and concludes with some recommendations.
‘See pp. 273-74 above.
2See note 1, p. 271 above.
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CHAPTER 7

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE STUDY

Summary Conclusion
The primary task of this dissertation was to examine the human role in Carl F. H.
Henry’s doctrines of revelation and inspiration. The study sought to find out whether the
human role portrayed in revelation corresponds with that role portrayed in inspiration.
The study began with a brief survey of the theories of revelation and inspiration
(chapter 1). The need for familiarization with the theories arises from the fact that Henry
expounds those two doctrines in an apologetical fashion and, in the process, responds or
reacts to those formulations that he disagrees with. Since the focus of this dissertation is on
the human role, the survey was conducted with an eye on how each theory presents that
role. In order to provide an appropriate backdrop and perspective for the emergence of
emphasis on the human role, the divine role was also treated. This approach likewise helps
one see how the human role in those theories acquired place and prominence over the
divine role.
Traditional evangelical Christians consider this overemphasis on the human
involvement in revelation and inspiration as characteristic of those who hold that the Bible
is less than the Word of God—a position which is perceived by these Christians as
undermining the authority of the Bible. Among those who share this concern is Carl
283
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F. H. Henry. He is a major evangelical figure who deals with the problem by reclaiming
the traditional teaching of revelation and inspiration, which is also regarded as biblical and
in harmony with the Reformation. In so doing, he likewise addresses the human role in
those doctrines.
A preliminary survey of the human role in Henry's doctrines of revelation and
inspiration indicated that his depiction of the human role in revelation does not harmonize
with the one he presents in inspiration. That observation, however, needed far more
ground for understanding and verification which is provided by chapters 2-4, where
Henry's doctrines of revelation, inspiration, and man were examined. The doctrine of man
was approached from the perspective of revelation and inspiration, and hence, bears the
title, "The Divine-Human Point of Contact in Henry's Doctrine of M an." This approach
ensures a cohesive treatment of the human role under question.
To further clarify as well as determine the significance of the human role in
Henry's doctrines of revelation and inspiration, chapters 5 and 6 provided an analysis and
evaluation. Chapter 5 conducted an analytical examination of man's involvement in the
events of revelation and inspiration at three stages: origin, reception, and conveyance.
While addressing the human involvement at the level of origin, it was observed that a
human being has no part in them because both the events are transcendent in nature and so
naturally exclude any creature from their origination. According to Henry, the possibility
for human inception of revelation is further made hopeless by finiteness and sinfulness.
Moreover, human sinfulness has an adverse effect on man's ability to carry out the task of
inspiration, namely, the inscripturation of revelation.
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The human role in revelation and inspiration begins at the level of reception.
However, Henry's portrayal of that role in revelation indicates a divergence from the one
he portrays in inspiration. In revelation he depicts the human agent as actively,
independently, and competently using the will, conscience, linguistic capacity, and
reasoning power to receive revelation. With the will he decides to accept or reject
revelation, thereby indicating his freedom in it. His conscience perceives the moral
dimensions o f revelation. Through his linguistic capability man receives revelation in his
own language. Man's reasoning powers comprehend the content of revelation and endorse
its rationality, epistemic value, and cognitive clarity. Similarly, at the conveyance stage of
revelation, man makes an effort in retaining with his memory the content and words of
revelation and uses his linguistic capability in articulating the message of revelation.
On the one hand, during the reception of inspiration—that is, the receiving of the
Spirit's enablement or influence to inscripturate the content of revelation—man’s
involvement is depicted as largely dependent upon God. First of all, man is presented as
unqualified for the task of inspiration and, hence, his need of prior supernatural preparation
through a long period of time. In revelation, on the other hand, he is assumed as being
naturally qualified to receive it. At the stage of revelation, man's freedom, independence,
and competence are not only assumed but explicitly emphasized. These qualities, however,
are unaccounted for and overwhelmed at the stage of inspiration by the dominating
influence, control, and superintendence of the Holy Spirit so that man turns into a totally
divine-controlled instrument who executes the work of inscripturation to the degree of
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God's expectation, namely, inerrancy.1
This predominance of the Holy Spirit over man during inspiration is also to be seen
even in the so-called divine-human confluence/concursus—a term referring to the collabora
tion between man and the Holy Spirit in the writing of Scripture. Man's part, however,
loses its significance or is not recognized because Henry insists that despite the confluence,
"both thoughts and words are a divine product. "2 Consequently, he rejects the notion of
dual authorship or divine-human coauthorship of Scripture.3
Man's dependent and auxiliary role during the writing process is further indicated
by the Holy Spirit's giving His mind and inspiring man with the choice of words during the
writing process. If at the level of revelation man has the ability to understand revelation
and commit to memory Christ's sayings and teachings—either verbatim or with some verbal
variation—one then wonders why at the level of inspiration or inscripturation of revelation,
man is shown to be so limited that he has to rely heavily upon the Holy Spirit. Moreover,
the clarity and propositionality of revelation, plus man's linguistic capacity, would lead one
to expect that man can, to a certain extent, write that revelation with lesser dependence on
divine help. If the same man is involved in both the events of revelation and inspiration,
and if the content that has been revealed is essentially no different from the content that has
been written, then we would anticipate man's role in inspiration not to be so radically
different from his role in revelation. That is, we would assume that during the writing
lSee pp. 113-14, 118 above.
2See p. 232 above.
3Ibid.
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process man should be able to put to effective use those faculties that he used competently
in receiving and conveying revelation. Rather, we find Henry depicting man with a
different nature in revelation and quite another in inspiration to the extent that he threatens
his very acknowledgement of the unity of human nature. And even if Henry's claim for a
unified human nature is taken into consideration,1 how can man’s sinful defects which have
to be supematurally cared for during writing not have a similar adverse effect on man
during his reception of revelation?
Aware of this discrepancy of portrayal of the human role, chapter 6 pursued with
an evaluation. First, it pointed to the importance of expecting a concordant portrayal of the
two roles. Then, based on Henry's own use of nature and function in his doctrines of
revelation and inspiration, the chapter used nature and function as criteria for verifying the
discrepancy or inconsistency. In the event, it was observed that nature and function are
rendered consistently only within the individual confines of revelation and inspiration. The
consistency, however, breaks down when man's nature and function in revelation were
compared with his nature and function in inspiration. To bring this inconsistency to
sharper focus, man's role in revelation was further juxtaposed with his role in inspiration
where the two roles were then compared. Of the twelve entries2 only two bear similarity.
The rest show a disharmony or divergence of roles. In other words, the study of Henry's
portrayal of the human role in his doctrines of revelation and inspiration shows that the two
roles have not been presented harmoniously with each other. That is, Henry's portrayal of
^ e e pp. 170-71 above.
2See pp. 255-57 above.
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the human role in the two doctrines betray inconsistency.
In an attempt to understand why Henry presents the two roles differently or
inconsistently from each other, three apologetical reasons were suggested: (1) a vigorous
reaction to Karl Barth; (2) inerrancy of Scripture; and (3) authority of Scripture. The first
reason shows a real possibility for the inconsistency. For instance, we observed that when
Barth depreciates the human role in revelation, Henry reacted to him by exaggerating that
role. And when Barth depicts an unrestrained and free human involvement at the level of
inspiration, Henry again counteracted by portraying man's role at that stage as one that is
comprehensively controlled by the Holy Spirit. Inerrancy and authority of Scripture
display both a direct and indirect connection with the inconsistency under question.
Inerrancy has been explicitly shown by Henry to be the cause for the Holy Spirit's
comprehensive and overwhelming control and superintendence of the writer even to the
level of words, and biblical authority lies behind Henry's crusade for inerrancy.1
‘A question may be asked if Henry's doctrine of inerrancy did not actually arise
from his doctrine of divine sovereignty. This is precisely the contention of Karanja's thesis
(see his thesis referred to in note 4, p. 114 above). His argument is that since Henry
believes in the comprehensiveness (Karanja, 88, 91, 93) of divine causality or sovereignty
(ibid., 107-08, 158), Scripture is accordingly a product of this divine causality (ibid., 136,
138). And since Scripture is divinely caused, it is therefore inerrant (ibid., 136, 138). The
fact, however, is that Henry has not made any connection between inerrancy and divine
sovereignty. Actually, Karanja himself did not cite a single instance where Henry
says—either directly or indirectly— that inerrancy should be held on the basis of divine
sovereignty. Karanja's argument that since Henry believes God causes everything,
Scripture is therefore caused by him (ibid., 136), is logically valid. In fact, Henry himself
affirms that Scripture is a product of God’s breath; it is his creation (see pp. 220, 230
above). However, to state that Scripture is inerrant because of this divine causality
(Karanja, 136, 138) is not logically apparent or supportable. Rather, as we have already
pointed out, inerrancy is explicitly connected by Henry with God's attribute of perfection
and his character of truthfulness (see p. 271 above). Moreover, what is uppermost in
Henry concerning the question of inerrancy is not where it comes from but why it should be

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

289

Recommendations
I would like to conclude this study by submitting some recommendations with the
hope of bringing a balance and broadening of the depiction of the human role in ways that
tally with Scripture's own depiction of that role.

Man's Role in Revelation
The Place of Experience
Henry's strong emphasis on revelation as rational and propositional points to man's
involvement in it essentially in terms of his cognitive dimension. It places an exclusive
stress on reason's unquestioned ability to understand revelation, and depicts man's role in it
as primarily an intellectual one. While understanding revelation's epistemic viability is
useful for apologetics, yet it needs to be reiterated that in revelation man deals not only with
cognitive truths but meets the divine Person behind the revelation. Man not only hears the
words but encounters the speaker of those words. That is, revelation is both a cognitive
knowledge of divine truths and a personal acquaintance or encounter with God, the revealer
of those truths. Barth's emphasis on revelation as encounter need not therefore be ruled out
as unscriptural. However, that affirmation should also be simultaneously corrected if it
limits revelation only to an inner encounter.
Dederen, for instance, pointed to some texts that indicate man's involvement in
there. Actually, Karanja himself has shown (from Henry) that inerrancy is indispensable
for Scripture because, without it, Scripture cannot be trusted as an objective expression of
the content and meaning of all God's revelation (Karanja, 52-53), and, as I have already
shown (from Henry), such a Bible cannot consequently be authoritative, hence, the need for
an inerrant Bible (see p. 267-70 above, see especially note 1, 271 above).
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revelation as one that includes both an experience of a personal encounter with God and a
reception of divine truths. The book of Samuel says "The Lord revealed himself to Samuel
at Shiloh by the word of the Lord" (1 Sam 3:21, NRSV). This text indicates that in
revelation the Lord revealed himself to the prophet, accompanied with his word. Similarly,
Isaiah affirms: "The Lord of hosts has revealed himself in my ears" (Isa 22:14 NRSV).
The passage reiterates the thought of the preceding one where God simultaneously revealed
his own person as well as verbally communicated to Isaiah. Jesus said not only that God
the Father revealed hidden things to babes (Matt 11:25) but claims that he himself reveals
the Father (vs. 27).1
Similarly, I. Howard Marshall spoke of the rightness and wrongness of encounter
theology. It "is right in what it affirms and wrong in what it denies." It is right in
asserting that man encounters or is encountered by God in revelation, but wrong when it
denies that there is information involved in that encounter.2 The fact is that in revelation
man experiences both the elements of a "meeting and a knowing. "3 The two are not to be
dichotomized because they are "indissolubly linked with one another."4

The Place of Faith
Henry's emphasis on the cognitive side of revelation points more to its rational
lDederen, "The Revelation-Inspiration Phenomenon," 13-15.
2I. Howard Marshall, Biblical Inspiration (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 13-15.
3Dederen, "The Revelation-Inspiration Phenomenon," 13-15
4Raoul Dederen, "Revelation, Inspiration, and Hermeneutics," in A Symposium on
Biblical Hermeneutics, ed. Gordon M. Hyde (Washington, DC: Review and Herald,
1974), 7.
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comprehensibility without acknowledging some of its incomprehensible elements. Actually,
it can be pointed out that revelation is not always readily intelligible. There are some
elements that elude man’s comprehension. Peter, for example, refers to certain things Paul
wrote that are hard to understand (2 Pet 3:16). Paul himself in 1 Cor 13:10 speaks of the
partial nature of the knowledge of truth and the need of faith to understand revelation
because man can never know it beyond all doubt.1 The mysteriousness of the Trinity, the
Incarnation, and the Resurrection can be appropriated only by faith.2 Mortimer Adler
makes the following pertinent remarks: "What's the point of revelation if we can figure it
out ourselves? If it were wholly comprehensible then it would be just another philosophy. ”3

Man's Role in Inspiration
Inspiration of the Writer
Henry's emphasis on inspiration of words (verbal inspiration) leads him to
correlate it directly with inerrancy. Stress on inerrancy can consequently lead one to "focus
on the total exclusion of mistakes"4 from Scripture, resulting in a shift to its words instead
•Morris, 38; see also Bernard Ramm, Protestant Biblical Interpretation: A Textbook
o f Hermeneutics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1970), 30, where he cites 1 Pet 1:10-12 and Heb
5:11 as other examples of hard-to-understand elements of revelation
2Mortimer Adler, "Truth's Intrepid Ambassador," interview by Terry C. Muck,
Christianity Today, 19 November 1990, 34.
3Ibid., 34; emphasis added.
4WiIliam H. Barnes, "Inspiration and Inerrancy," in Oxford Companion o f the Bible,
ed. Bruce M. Metzger and Michael D. Coogan (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), 303.
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of to what it has to say,1 and moving the spotlight away from the primary objective of
Scripture which, as Henry himself admits, is that of human redemption or salvation.2
Apostle John also testified to this when he said that what is written is meant to lead the
reader/hearer to have faith in Jesus Christ as "the Messiah, the Son of God, and that
through believing [one] may have life in his name."3
If salvation is Scripture's main purpose, then we assume that the writer himself has
been convinced of what he wrote. That is, he must have been personally gripped with the
experience and conviction of salvation and, as Peter also pointed out, is moved by the Holy
Spirit to speak what he has been revealed (2 Peter 1:21 NRSV; italics added). In other
words, it was the person—rather than his words—that was moved; for strictly speaking,
word-inspiration does not necessarily require such personal experience and conviction on
the part of the writer.
It is because the sacred writers are believed to have had been supematurally moved
and inspired that renders what they wrote significant, important, and authoritative, and
therefore is, or should be taken with seriousness. In this instance, James O rr’s observation
is to the point:
Inspiration belongs primarily to the person, and to the book only as it is the product of
the inspired person. There is no inspiration inhering literally in the paper, ink, or type,
of the sacred volume. The inspiration was in the soul of the writer; the qualities that
are communicated to the writing had their seat first in the mind or heart of the man who
wrote. It is on the mind, heart, faculties of the man that the Spirit works: the work is
Douglas Farrow, The Word o f Truth and Disputes About Words (Winona Lakes,
IA: Carpenter Books, 1987), 85, 81.
2See note 1, p. 97 above, and p. 134 above.
3John 20:31, NRSV.
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inspired as coming from his thought and pen, and as having the power of quickening
and awakening a like glow of soul in those who read.1

Inspiration o f the Writer's Thoughts
Ramm observes that emphasis on the inspiration of words can lead to an atomisticality of words where God is seen as doling out to the writer word by word as individual
pearls. The fact of the matter is that although a sentence is written one word at a time, yet
prior to the words themselves are "meaning-chunks" which determine the choice of words.
Words essentially serve to convey meanings or thoughts. This means that the writer first of
all understands what he is about to write, and then chooses the words that correctly convey
the thoughts. The Holy Spirit can be assumed to come to man's aid wherever the writer
encounters a difficulty in expressing the thought. On the other hand, if words are given
priority in inspiration, it means that man's role at that level does not necessarily require
prior understanding of what he is writing. Hence, any schoolboy competent of writing
words might as well have written the Epistle to the Romans.2
Moreover, if words serve the clarity of expression of thoughts then words cease to
have a fixed or mechanical relationship to meanings/thoughts and instead display a dynamic
or flexible relationship between words and thoughts.3 Because of this, the same meaning
‘James Orr, Revelation and Inspiration (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1910),
162-63. Orr, nevertheless, went beyond the traditional understanding of inspiration when
he connected it with nonbiblical individuals, including Shakespeare, Milton, and Goethe.
Such an extension of inspiration renders the concept commonplace and does away with the
uniqueness and authority of the Bible.
2Bemard Ramm, Special Revelation and the Word o f God (Grand Rapids:
Eerdmans, 1961), 177.
3Ibid., 177-78.
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can be cast in different forms of speech: direct, indirect, active, or passive, or by use of
synonyms or equivalent expressions. "All these phenomena occur among the Gospels. nI
Given this scenario, man's role in inspiration is then more dynamic and free than the one
depicted by Henry as totally dependent and controlled by the Holy Spirit. It is because the
thoughts are divinely inspired that determine the value of what has been written, and will
continue to be cherished despite the writer's crude or poor use of grammar and syntax as is
the case in the Book of Revelation.2 This shows that man has the capacity to tell the truth,3
and God allows him to do that even if his linguistic skills are far from perfect.

Adjusting Henry's Portrayal of the Human Role
Consistency occupies a high priority in Henry's thinking. For instance, he holds
that this attribute should first qualify any system or worldview.4 Consistency comprises
lIbid., 178; italics original. Ramm, however, recognized that there is a limit to the
flexibility of relationship between words and meanings, for "if the limit is exceeded the
meaning is changed" (ibid.).
According to William Barclay the Greek of the author of the Apocalypse is "so bad
that a modem school boy would get into bad trouble for writing it" (William Barclay,
Introducing the Bible [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1972], 139). A similar comment was
also made by C. F. D. Moule when he speaks of the book’s "horrifying grammatical
blunders" (see C. F. D. Moule, An Idiom of New Testament Greek, 2d ed. [Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1959], 3).
3Based on the response of Henry to Brunner’s assumption of the fallibility of human
nature (GRA 4:149).
4Patterson, JMPL—1, 4.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

295
one of the important tests of truth,1 and makes knowledge possible.2 Henry's giving
importance to consistency is also seen in his reaction to the issue on whether or not one
should be considered an authentic evangelical if he does not subscribe to the doctrine of
inerrancy. Henry's reply is that such a person, while still an authentic evangelical, is
nevertheless an inconsistent one, and clings to the rest of the doctrines by an act of will,
rather than on the basis of epistemic consistency.3 In other words, an evangelical who
rejects inerrancy, does so at the cost of consistency.4
As pointed out, Henry's portrayal of the human role in the doctrines of revelation
and inspiration is marked with disharmony or inconsistency. In adjusting this inconsis
tency, perhaps Henry should reconsider his anthropology. His emphasis on man's unitary
nature and sinfulness needs to be correlated with the human role in revelation just as he has
done so in his portrayal of that role in inspiration. Similarly, his assertion that the Fall has
"fractured" man and created a "devastating fault"s should also be brought to bear upon the
human role in revelation, just as he has done in his doctrine of inspiration. In so doing, it
would imply that Henry would have to emphasize divine aid in human reception and
conveyance of revelation just as he does in the case of human reception and conveyance of
lGRA 1:233-34; Henry, Toward a Recovery, 53, 60, 81; Mohler, Baptist
Theologians, 526
2GRA 1:232.
3See p. 117 above.
4See p. 117 above; Henry, Conversations, 23-25; see also Henry, review of The
Battle fo r the Bible, by Harold Lindsell, NRBR, 7; Carl F. H. Henry, interview by Donald
T. William and others, The Scribe, 1 June 1976, 3; hereafter cited as "Henry in William."
5See p. 171 above.
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inspiration. With this adjustment, Henry’s stress on man's passivity and dependency in
inspiration can accordingly be shown to correspond with human dependency in revelation.
Otherwise, his doctrines of revelation and inspiration would have to be held together by an
act of will rather than by virtue of consistency.
In balancing Henry's depiction of the human role within his doctrines of revelation,
we can also endeavor that on the basis of direct and indirect evidences of Scripture. For
instance, while "divine speaking" as a model of revelation and inspiration has greatly
captured and exercised Henry's imagination and conditioned his exposition of those
doctrines, yet, there is need to take a closer look at the different genres of Scripture and
construct one's doctrines of revelation and inspiration and man's role in them on that basis.
By taking into account the different literary genres of the Bible, James I. Packer
concludes that inspiration can be divided into three types or forms:
1. dualistic inspiration—where God is represented as the speaker and man as the
hearer and reporter (This form of inspiration produced the prophetic oracles, Mosaic
legislation, and the apocalyptic visions of Daniel, and of John the Revelator.)
2. lyric inspiration—one which is similar to the inspiration of a poet where the
inspiring action of God was fused with the concentrating, intensifying, and shaping mental
processes of the author (This form of inspiration brought about the Psalms, lyrical drama
of Job, Songs of Solomon, and the many prayers throughout the Old Testament.)
3. organic inspiration—where "the inspiring actions of God coalesce with the
mental processes—inquiring, analytical, reflective, interpretative, applicatory”—of the
writer. (This psychological form of inspiration gave rise to the historical books of both
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Testaments, the apostolic letters, Proverbs, and Ecclesiastes.)1
If those forms of inspiration are taken into consideration, it means that the human
role in inspiration would have to be accounted in a manner that corresponds with the
literary genre of Scripture. Such an approach is likely to lead to a more balanced depiction
of that role where man's participation at the level of inspiration is just as actively and
intensely involved as the one shown by Henry at the level of revelation. Thus, man's part
during the writing process is more integral and deep, because it is his language, his
vocabulary, his culture, his emotions, his thoughts, and his mouth that are deployed.2
Since God is the exclusive source of truth as well as one that is totally behind inspiration,
Scripture is therefore
at the same time the word of God and the word of man. Although written by men, it is
God's truth; and although God's truth it is the product of human authors. The words
are their words, yet God’s word; and God's word is uniquely his word though in the
garments of man's words.3
Moreover, such an intensive, passionate, reflective, analytical, interpretative, and
applicatory nature of human involvement is a strength to one's view of the human role in
inspiration, because it rules out any notion of dictation inspiration and a consequent docetic
Scripture, of which Henry has been accused of.4
lPacker, God Has Spoken, 100-01.
2Ramm, Special Revelation and the Word of God, 179, italics adapted from the
author.
3Ibid., 179.
4Bloesch, for instance, feels that Henry's identification of the propositions of
revelation with the sentences of Scripture prevents him from accounting seriously and
adequately the historical and cultural elements of Scripture. Such a tendency leads Bloesch
to suspect whether Henry has a "docetic view of Scripture, one that denies its true
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humanity." A similar view has also been expressed by Richard. See Richard Rice, review
of GRA 1-4, Religious Studies Review 7 (April 1981): 112; see also Bloesch, review of
GRA 3-4, 415; Clark H. Pinnock, "Foreword," in Clark H. Pinnock on Biblical Authority:
An Evolving Position, Andrews University Seminary Dissertation Series, vol. 16 [Berrien
Springs, MI: Andrews University Press, 1993], xix, where Pinnock attributes the docetic
complexion of Scripture to an espousal of Warfield's view of inspiration).
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